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MEMORANDUM 
TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: 
MEMBERS, SENATE ENERGY & PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMITTEE 
COMMITTEE STAFF 
DECEMBER 2, 1991, INTERIM HEARING ON: 
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR 
SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS & ECONOMIC COSTS 
This hearing will focus on federal and state government 
efforts to ensure the safety of nuclear power plants located in 
California, as well as efforts to curb pollution from such plants, 
and to ensure that the costs of maintaining such plants are 
reasonable. 
With regard to the San Onofre operating plant, the hearing 
will focus on efforts to identify and mitigate marine pollution 
caused by the plant. Testimony will also be received concerning a 
Public Utilities Commission staff proposal to close Unit 1 of the 
plant based on the staff's view that Unit 1 is no longer 
cost-effective to operate. 
With regard to the Diablo Canyon operating plant, the 
hearing will focus on the safety of the plant, the activities of 
the plant's Independent Safety Committee, and will explore in 
particular a controversy involving the seismic safety of the 
plant. Testimony will also be received concerning the 
reasonableness of the "performance-based" rates that consumers pay 
to purchase power generated by the plant. 
The hearing will conclude with a discussion 
of the safety and costs associated with decommissioning the 
Humboldt Bay and Rancho Seco nuclear power plants. 
This background memorandum begins with a draft agenda for 
the hearing and then follows with a summary of major issues. 
Newspaper clippings which deal with nuclear power plant issues are 
attached to the memorandum. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR ISSUES 
REGULATORY ROLES 
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION (NRC)--SAFETY 
The NRC, which licenses the operation of nuclear power 
plants, possesses exclusive authority over radiological safety at 
nuclear powerplants. The NRC periodically assesses each nuclear 
plant on its performance in meeting NRC requirements. The NRC's 
periodic report is called the Systematic Assessment of Licensee 
Performance (SALP) and includes items such as plant operations, 
radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, emergency 
preparedness and security. The NRC is responsible for requiring 
safe operations at each nuclear plant and for enforcing compliance 
with all applicable NRC safety requirements. 
CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION CCEC)--ENERGY FACILITY SITING 
The President's National Energy Strategy, which is 
currently under consideration by the Congress, includes proposals 
to reform and streamline the NRC licensing process for new nuclear 
power plants. Nuclear power proponents hope that these reforms 
may help to restore public confidence in the nuclear power option, 
and lead to the siting of new nuclear power plants. 
In California, the CEC is responsible for siting large 
thermal power plants, including nuclear thermal power plants. 
Under the Public Resources Code, the CEC may not approve the 
siting of any new nuclear power plants until the Commission makes 
certain findings concerning the federal government's ability to 
dispose of high-level nuclear waste. 
In 1983, the u.s. Supreme Court upheld California's law, 
finding that in view of the state's "economic" purpose behind 
enactment of this law, it was.not preempted by congressional and 
NRC regulation of the field of nuclear "safety." 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION (PUC)--RATE REGULATION 
The PUC is responsible for approving investor-owned 
utility requests to charge ratepayers for the cost of constructing 
and operating energy facilities, including nuclear power plants. 
The PUC also authorizes utilities to charge ratepayers for the 
cost of decommissioning nuclear power plants once they are shut 
down. The discussion below sets forth PUC rate issues involving 
the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants. 
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SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
SONGS UNIT 1: OLD AGE AND HIGH COSTS 
The San Onofre Nuclear Power Plant, referred to as the 
SONGS plant, is owned by Southern California Edison Company (SCE) 
and San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDG&E), consists of three 
units (1,2 and 3), and is located in Southern California off 
Interstate 5 a few miles south of San Clemente, within the Marine 
Corps base at Camp Pendleton. SONGS Unit 1 is the third oldest 
operating nuclear reactor in the United States. To date, the NRC 
has required SCE/SDG&E to make $360 million in safety improvements 
to this SONGS unit. 
The nation's oldest operating commercial nuclear power 
plant, the Yankee Rowe facility in Massachusetts, was recently 
shut down after the NRC stated that it had reduced confidence in 
the plant's safety. NRC is reportedly concerned that the reactor 
pressure vessel may be so brittle from age that during an accident 
it would crack and release radiation. This type of concern has 
become increasingly common among the nation's aging reactors. The 
Yankee Rowe decision has been viewed by nuclear industry watchers 
as a possible clue as to what might be in store for other aging 
nuclear power plants, such as the San Onofre Unit 1, that will 
soon be up for NRC renewal. 
The SONGS Unit 1 reactor began operating in 1968, and 
its first decade was characterized by relatively high capacity 
factors--which means it operated regularly and reliably. Since 
1980, however, SONGS Unit 1 has been costly to operate and its 
availability has been relatively low. During this period, the 
plant has had a number of serious problems which required 
significant repairs and long outages. Some observers are 
concerned that SONGS 1 is heading into a new cycle of expensive 
repairs and poor capacity. 
SCE, which is the lead operator of the plant, has 
requested PUC authorization to make capital expenditures exceeding 
$125 million for SONGS 1 to comply with NRC safety requirements 
and to help extend the life of the plant. In response to this 
request, the PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (DRA), which is 
the consumer protection arm of the PUC, maintains that the capital 
additions proposed by SCE will ultimately increase rates by over 
$150 million and are not cost-effective. ORA's conclusion is 
based in part on its view that SCE has overestimated the future 
operating capacity of SONGS 1. While the PUC does not have the 
direct authority to shut down SONGS 1, it could effectively do so 
by denying SCE rate recovery as recommended by the ORA. 
ORA has also recommended that in the event the PUC rejects 
ORA's cost-effectiveness argument, then SCE should be placed at 
higher risk for future poor performance through the use of a 
"performance based" ratemaking system such as the one the PUC 
adopted for the Diablo Canyon plant (discussed below). The 
DRA maintains that performance based ratemaking will give SCE an 
incentive to operate SONGS 1 as efficiently as possible, and will 
place SCE at risk should its optimistic performance forecasts for 
the plant not come to pass. 
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MITIGATING MARINE RESOURCES POLLUTION--ADEQUACY OF ENFORCEMENT 
SONGS Units 2 and 3 are regulated under a California 
Coastal commission (CCC) permit that was issued in 1974. As a 
permit condition, SCE agreed to fund a Marine Review Committee 
(MRC) to study marine environmental impacts. 
In 1989, the MRC released its 15-year, $46 million study 
ordered by the CCC. The MRC study found that the SONGS nuclear 
facility kills large numbers of marine organisms in its intake 
cooling system, and then discharges turbid water into the ocean 
which kills kelp. Specifically, the report concluded that the 
facility sucks up and kills 21-57 tons of fish and 4 billion eggs 
and larva each year. The facility also discharges debris which 
blocks natural light to the ocean floor by as much as 16%, and 
this discharge has led to the depletion of 60%, or about 200 
acres, of the area's kelp beds. 
To "offset" this marine pollution, CCC staff with SCE's 
concurrence proposed the construction of a 300-acre artificial 
kelp reef, and the restoration of 150 acres of wetlands along the 
Southern California coast, along with an upgrade in the SONGS fish 
protection system. It has been estimated that these conditions 
would cost SCE an estimated $30-$40 million. 
In July of 1991, the CCC approved the staff's plan. In 
doing so the Commission rejected arguments that the plan would not 
prevent the SONGS facility from continuing the ongoing destruction 
of fish and kelp. The CCC rejected the option of retrofitting the 
SONGS plant cooling system by adding cooling towers, which use 
less sea water. The CCC expressed concern that this mitigation 
option could cost over $1 billion. 
In addition to CCC jurisdiction over the plant, the San 
Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board (SDRWQCB) also has 
jurisdiction. SONGS ocean discharges are regulated under National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits issued by 
the SDRWQCB pursuant to the federal Clean Water Act. 
Even though the MRC report was issued in 1989, and 
provided information regarding SCE compliance with NPDES 
requirements, the SDRWQCB repeatedly delayed reviewing this issue 
in order to await the CCC's decision on mitigation conditions. 
A SDRWQCB hearing was finally held on October 31, 1991, to 
consider whether SCE had violated its SONGS NPDES permits and to 
determine if a cease and desist order or some other remedy should 
be issued by the Board. The Board has yet to take final action. 
Litigation on this isue is pending in federal court. 
The suit, filed by Earth Island Institute, charges that SCE is 
violating NPDES permit requirements, and demands that SCE either 
fix the plant's cooling system to avoid marine pollution, or shut 
the SONGS plant down. 
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DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION SETTLEMENT DECISION 
The Diablo Canyon plant, owned by the Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company (PG&E), is located on the California coast in San 
Luis Obispo County, approximately halfway between San Francisco 
and Los Angeles. The plant consists of two nuclear reactor units, 
each capable of producing over 1,000 megawatts (MW) of 
electricity. 
As noted above, the PUC is responsible for approving 
utility requests to charge ratepayers for the cost of constructing 
energy facilities. When completed, the combined costs of building 
both Diablo Canyon units was over $5 billion, and PG&E applied to 
the PUC to recover these costs from ratepayers. 
The PUC's Division of Ratepayer Advocates (ORA), and the 
former Attorney General (AG), opposed PG&E's request arguing that 
billions of dollars in unreasonable costs should be disallowed. 
To resolve the dispute, ORA and the AG entered into a settlement 
agreement with PG&E which was approved by the PUC. The settlement 
provides that ratepayers pay only for power produced by Diablo 
Canyon--this is referred to as "performance based" pricing. All 
costs of the operation of Diablo Canyon are paid by PG&E. Thus, 
the operating risks of the plant are shifted from ratepayers to 
the utility and its shareholders. 
However, the consumer group Toward Utility Rate 
Normalization (TURN) points out that as a result of the 
settlement agreement, PG&E's customers pay a higher price for 
electricity generated from the nuclear plant than from the 
utility's other generating sources. Electric power from Diablo 
Canyon costs approximately 9.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, twice as 
much as power from PG&E's fossil fuel plants and more than 10 
times as much as power from the company's hydroelectric plants. 
The ORA and the AG estimated that the revenue to be 
received by PG&E from the settlement over the term of the 
agreement would be equivalent to a $2 billion rate base 
disallowance, based on their assumption that over its full life 
Diablo Canyon would operate at a 58% capacity factor. To date, 
PG&E has operated the plant at a much higher capacity factor. It 
has been estimated that for each percentage point above the 
predicted 58% lifetime capacity that PG&E is ultimately capable of 
operating Diablo Canyon, ratepayers will pay an additional $100 
million more than the total amount estimated by ORA and the AG. 
Opponents of the settlement, such as TURN, argued that 
pr1c1ng based on performance would give PG&E an incentive to 
maximize energy production and profits, which could threaten plant 
safety. And they now point out that Unit 1 of the Diablo Plant 
had the highest capacity factor (88%) for a nuclear power plant in 
its first year of operation, and that Unit 2 set a temporary world 
record for continuous generation when it completed over 480 days 
of operation without a pause. As a result of this exceptional, 
high capacity of operation at Diablo Canyon, PG&E has seen a 
substantial increase in revenues and profits in recent years. 
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TURN has expressed concern that the settlement agreement 
protected PG&E's downside risk should the plant perform poorly by 
assuring the company that it will at a minimum receive revenues 
based on a 36% capacity factor. In contrast, there was no upside 
benefit sharing, as in some other PUC rate decisions, which would 
allow ratepayers to share the benefits in the event of 
extraordinary capacity operations over the life of the plant. 
The PUC did, however, recognize the safety implications of 
performance based pricing. Consequently, the settlement agreement 
established an Independent Safety Committee to review PG&E's 
adherence to safety standards at the Diablo Canyon plant. This 
issue is discussed further below. 
UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY--SEISMIC SAFETY OF THE PLANT 
The United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.) is part of 
the United States Department of the Interior, and contains federal 
government experts on geologic issues, including seismic safety 
experts. As part of NRC's 1984 approval of the Diablo canyon 
operating license, NRC required PG&E to undertake a Long Term 
Seismic Program (LTSP) to provide a comprehensive study of 
earthquake hazards faced by the Diablo Canyon plant, and to 
reevaluate the seismic design of the plant. The NRC asked the 
U.S.G.S., as well as other geologic experts, to review PG&E's 
LTSP. 
Earlier this year, U.S.G.S. submitted its report to the 
NRC entitled "Review of Geological and Geophysical Interpretations 
contained in PG&E's Final Report of the Diablo Canyon Long Term 
Seismic Program for the Diablo Canyon Power Plant." The U.S.G.S. 
report focused on earthquake faults near Diablo Canyon, including 
the offshore Hosgri fault which lies within 3 miles of the plant 
and has been estimated to have an expected maximum earthquake 
magnitude of 7.2 on the Richter Scale. By way of contrast, the 
october 17, 1989, earthquake that occurred in the Bay Area near 
the San Andreas fault was reported to be approximately 7.0 on the 
Richter Scale. 
In its LTSP, PG&E concluded that the seismic design and 
existing seismic safety margins at the Diablo Canyon plant were 
sufficient to withstand the safety risks associated with a maximum 
earthquake on the Hosgri fault. In its 1991 report, U.S.G.S. 
disagreed with PG&E's interpretation of the Hosgri fault as a 
strike-slip fault with little or no vertical component of slip. 
U.S.G.S. concluded that the Hosgri fault contained significant 
vertical slip. The significance of this disagreement is that the 
U.S.G.S. characterization of the Hosgri fault results in greater 
ground motion at the plant during an earthquake than estimated by 
PG&E, which in turn creates a greater seismic risk to the Diablo 
Canyon plant. 
Some groups, such as the San Luis Obispo Mothers for 
Peace, have expressed a concern that the U.S.G.S. report suggests 
that a major earthquake on the Hosgri fault could cause shaking 
more severe than the Diablo Plant is designed to withstand. 
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The U.S.G.S. report has been added as a supplement to a 
1991 NRC Site Evaluation Report (SER) on the plant. Following 
review of the U.S.G.S. and other expert seismic reports, the NRC 
recently agreed with PG&E that the extra safety factors built into 
the plant's design gives it the strength to resist ground motion 
that might be caused by a Hosgri fault earthquake. Some groups 
have argued that the NRC finding is inconsistent with the U.S.G.S. 
report, and that a further, independent investigation of the 
matter should be conducted by the U.S.G.S. 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE (DCISC) 
Under the settlement of the Diablo Canyon rate case, an 
Independent Safety Committee was established to monitor safety at 
the plant. The Governor, the Attorney General and the Chairman of 
the CEC were each to make on appointment from a list of nominees 
prepared by the PUC, PG&E and the Dean of Engineering at U.C. 
Berkeley. 
According to the PUC decision approving the settlement 
agreement, the DCISC is intended to provide an "additional 
assurance of safety" at Diablo Canyon. It supplements, not 
supplants, the direct authority of the NRC to maintain safety at 
the facility. Under the PUC decision, it is to be a focal point 
for the public and state government on safety issues, as well as a 
credible source of "independent" information about the plant. 
The DCISC is directed to review Diablo Canyon operations 
for the purpose of assessing the safety of operations and 
suggesting recommendations for safe operation. The DCISC is given 
access to operating reports as well as NRC public reports and 
evaluations of the plant, and any other reports pertinent to 
safety that are produced in the course of plant operations. The 
DCISC is required to prepare an annual report and recommendations, 
which is first submitted to PG&E for comment, and later submitted 
to the Governor, the Attorney General, and the PUC and CEC. 
Controversy has surrounded the start-up of the DCISC. 
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and others have complained 
that there was unreasonable delay in establishing the committee, 
that the DCISC has refused to locate an office in San Luis Obispo 
which could facilitate participation by those living near the 
plant, that public access to safety-related documents has not been 
adequate, and that there has been inadequate DCISC attention to 
significant safety issues associated with seismic risks and 
emergency response. 
There has also been controversy surrounding the appointees 
to the DCISC. After two members were appointed by the Governor 
and the CEC, former Attorney General Van de Kamp declined to name 
a third member to the DCISC based on his view that none of the 
nominees would bring balance and diversity to the committee. 
Van de Kamp maintained that all of the nominees were too closely 
aligned with the nuclear power industry and their appointment 
would not add credibility to the work of the committee. Following 
his election as Attorney General, Dan Lungren filled the empty 
slot on the DCISC with one of the listed nominees. 
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On June 6, 1991, the DCISC issued it first interim report 
on the safety of the Diablo Plant. In addition to the safety 
report, the DCISC established an 800 number to receive public 
comments and inquiries, and outlined its future activities 
including the examination of the relationship of the Hosgri fault 
to the safety of the spent fuel pool located at the plant, and 
review of emergency drills at the plant. 
DECOMMISSIONED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
HUMBOLDT BAY 
The Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant is owned by PG&E and 
located about 4 miles from the City of Eureka in northern 
Californa, and stands a few hundred yards from Humboldt Bay. 
The nuclear facility at the Humboldt plant was shut down in 1976 
for refueling and never reopened due to serious concerns about the 
seismic safety of the plant, changes in NRC safety regulations, 
and the economic costs of retrofitting the plant to resolve these 
concerns. PG&E requested, and the PUC approved, a plan to pay for 
the decommissioning of the plant. 
The NRC is responsible for ensuring that nuclear plants 
are decommissioned safely. With NRC's approval, PG&E has 
implemente~ what is referred to as a "SAFSTOR" procedure as part 
of its decommissioning of the Humboldt Bay plant. This process 
places the facility in a condition of safe storage for 
approximately 30 years followed by dismantling. The spent nuclear 
fuel is to remain in the facility's spent fuel storage pool until 
a federal repository is available to receive commercial fuel. 
Residents living around the plant have expressed concerns about 
seismic and other risks leading to radioactive leakage from the 
storage pools. 
RANCHO SECO 
The Ranco Seco Nuclear Power Plant, owned by the 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD), lies on the 
outskirts of Sacramento. Following a troublesome history of poor 
performance and high costs, the citizens of the utility district 
voted to shut the plant down. 
SMUD is now in the process of closing the plant down in a 
series of steps. The utility plans to participate in a federal 
demonstration project to dispose of its fuel in specialized casks 
which will eventually facilitate transfer of the fuel to a federal 
repository. Similar to the Humboldt Bay plant, SMUD intends to 
put Ranco Seco into a SAFSTOR system which is estimated to cost 
$281 million, followed by site restoration costing up to $47 
million. 
* * * * 
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LOS ANGELES TIMES 
Seotember 19, 1991 
State May Push 
I Edison to Close, 
\ San Onofre Plant 
rrnm AUOC/Uit'ti Prt•u 
The ::;an Onofre nuclear oowcr 
plant that has been runnm~~: ior 24 
·ears on a temporarv fcderai It· 
rense soon w11i get tt:' full operat-
:ng hcen"e. b!J.l ;tate regulators 
.llread:v a~mkmg n m1ght be 
ume to shuttt down. 
The plant off Interstate :'i near 
Camp Pendleton ts the nauon·s 
'· hird -oldest operaung nuclear 
power factllty. It's the last one sull 
runnmg on a temporary or "provl-
<tonal operaung hcense:· whtch 
first was tssued 1:1 1967 for 18 
months. 
For vears. the LT.S. :-luclear Re2-
•Jiatory Commtsston wnhheld a 
·ruU-term operaung license" whtle 
;t requtred $360-mtlllon worth of 
;afety tmprovements at the reac-
•or. whtch cost $89 mtlhon to butld. 
:'.tore safet v modtficauons are 
~eeded. but ·the NRC dectded thts 
•ummer 1t wtlltssue the full license 
bv the end of thts month. satd 
c·eorge Kalman. the agency's prOJ-
ect manager for San Onofre. 
But Califorma·s Public l'lihty 
Commtsston w111 open hearmgs 
next month on whether It ts worth 
chargmg consumers S125 million 
for the tmpronments the :-;'RC 
wants. 
The commtsslon doesn't have 
direct authonty to force Southern 
Califomta Edison to JUnk the reac-
tor. but It could do so by denymg 
the rate mcrease. 
If the rate mcrease were re)t!ct-
ed. Southern Cahforma Edison 
would run the. reactor unul at least 
late 1993. when tt would need 
refueling. uuhty company spokes-
man Steve Hansen satd Monday. 
'-' · "To be honest. we don't know 
" what we would do after that," 
~ Hansen Slld . 
.... 
I 
sa- The Sacramento Bee Final • Monday. September 16. 1991 
STATE NEWS 
License for aging reactor 
But after 24 years of debate, state to weigh closure , 
BY Lee Siegel 
-\.ssociated Press 
LOS ANGELES - The San Onofre 
L'mt l reactor produced electnciry 
tnder a temporary license ior 24 
·,·ears while its safety was debated. 
';ow. federal officials will finally IS· 
,ue a full license for the agmg nude· 
,r oower plant -just as state regula· 
· 1rs cons1der shuttmg It down. 
'~\'the end of thiS month. the LS. 
.udear Re~latorv Comm1sston w1ll 
rant ~t ·ru!Herm operatmg hcense · 
•lr the nauon·s thtrd-oldest operaung 
~uciear plant. sa1d NRC project man-
:l!.er <...ieorge Kalman. 
fhe reactor on San Diego County s 
·:oast 1s the last in the United States 
~ttll runmng on a temporary or "pro-
'.1Sional operating license." first is-
~ued m 1967 for 18 months. 
"We know it sounds sillv. · :"lRC 
,pokesman Greg Cook ;a1d. "It 
,ounds stuptd that we haven't 
.. hang;ed this provisional license 
<.>ars ago. It would be even more stu-
•td to 1ust let tt stav that wav. · 
I ntt I 's long run on a temporarv li-
··n~e "ret1ects the NRC's wtilingness 
' ,ulow reactors wtth dubious saiery 
•.Tords to conunue operation ... sa1d 
\t\'ld Trickett of Public Citizen Criti· 
• ..ll :-.tass Energy Project. a Washing-
· on ann-nuclear group. 
Cook disagreed. saying 'there 
1asn t been anv difference at all in 
the way the phint was regulated be-
cause 11 had a proVJsionalliceme. . .. 
It was an administrative matter. We 
believe the facilitv is safe." 
'lext month. California's _Jublic 
L't1lity Commtssion will open hear-
•ngs on whether 1t makes economic 
.:;ense to spend millions to keep the 
Jja'tng reactor runnmg or whether n 
,hould be shut down. said Roben Ki-
noslan. a PUC policy specialist. 
.-\ decision is expected next spring 
•>n the reactor. owned by Southern 
C.::Jifomia Edison Co. ana San Diego 
Gas & Electric. 
Edison wants approval to charge 
ratepayers $125 million for further 
safety improvements required by 
federal officials. It has already spent 
:5360 million upgrading the nuclear 
:.Jiant. which cost $89 million to build. 
A&stv:iaMd Press 
The ~a.n Onofr_e Unit 1 nuclear plant near San Diego, viewed from 
the aar tn July, ts soon to finally 99t a full licence after 24 years. But 
the state Public Utility Commission may decide to shut it down • 
Nuclear power foes argue that 
Unit I is unsare. produces power at 
•>nly 51 percent of its caoac1ty and 
:hould be shut down so funds can be 
·...tsed to obtain electncny through 
conservauon or other sources. "It's 
like a car w11h too manv m1les. It's 
dangerous. It's inefficient." said Karl 
Ory. executtve director of Campaign 
Califomta. 
Harold Rav. Edison·s senior vice 
president-nuclear. said Unit I is safe 
to run at least until 2007 and is 
cheaper than other power sources. 
The reactor started up in mid-1967 
and began commercial power pro-
duction Jan. I. 1968. It produces 390 
megawatts. about one-third as much 
as each of the newer. $4.5 billion 
Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactors next door. 
During the 1970s. federal regula· 
tors were swamped issuing construc-
tion permits and operating licenses 
for other reactors. Convening San 
Onofre Unit I to a full license was a 
low priority. Cook said. 
In 1978. the NRC began a system· 
atic study of the safety of the nation's 
II oldest reactors. including Unit l's 
ability to wtthstand earthquakes and 
fires. The fhree Mile Island reactor 
? 
acc1dent in 1979 prompted more 
safetv reVJews. 
Th.e NRC reqUired scores of safety 
modificattons. frequently keeping 
L'nit I off line. The most important 
tmprovemems· were completed in 
1984. But Edison engaged in what 
the NRC called ~unacceptable de· 
lays" on other safety upgrades. 
prompting the agency to set dead· 
lines in a 1990 order. · 
For years. the NRC continued to 
withhold Unit l's full license while 
safety improvements remained un· 
finished. But the NRC staff and an 
advisorv committee ruled this sum-
mer that the reactor can nm safely 
even before they're completed. 
~They simply rewrote the. rule 
book." said Jim Jacobson. director 
for San Diego Alliance for Survival. 
an anti-nuclear group. 
~rn some respects the anti-nuclear 
e.uys are correct." Kalman aid. But 
Edison is under orders to make safe· 
ty modifications, so withholaing a 
full license no longer makes any dif· 
ference. he said. 
Ray said that Edison plans to per· 
fonn the work when Unit 1 is shut 
down for refueling, probably in 1993. 
,...:, 
,. 
Due Up for ·License R~n¢w~I:­
The Future of Nuclear Power 
b,..';t S'-<f l 
By 
S Tlw: New York 
WASHINGTON, June 20 -~~:;:;;;;;;;s'7is;-;;the time to phase out plants 
the end of the month, the Nuclear that do not measure up to safety re-
Regulatory Commission may issue a quirements enacted after they were 
rule defining the future of the nation's built. 
nuclear power plants by setting the The 110 reactors now in operation 
safety standards they must meet to ex- generate about 20 percent of the na-
tend their lives. tion's electricity, and in nine states pro-
Over the next 25 years, more than vide more than one-third of the elec-
half the nuclear plants in the United tricity used. From the years 2000 to 
States will tum 40, and their operating 2016, the licenses of 66 reactors will ex-
licenses wiU expire as they do. With no pire. 
reactors on order and only two under Some industry executives see apply-
construction, the nuclear industry's ing for renewal as a rehearsal for 
hope for survival probably rests on trying to license new plants. The U.S. 
continued operation of existing plants. Council for Energy Awareness, the in· 
The law under which those plants are dustry's public relations arm, has re-
licensed allows extensions, but does not leased polls that it says show that most 
Continued on Page AB, Column l 
specify for how long. Now the regula-
tory commission is debating what 
standards to set for allowing 20-year ===----------...,;., 
renewals. 
Two Safety Issues Joined 
• • ; .. ~ r. -._..,.' 'f 
There are two separate safety issues. 
First, are the plants as safe now as 
when they were new, or has age made 
them more dangerous? Second, should 
plants applying for renewal have to 
meet tougher requirements that went 
into effect for later plants? 
~uclecjr Plants NiiHng Retirement 
Opponents of the nuclear power in· 
dustry say the expiration of the h· 
PLANT UTIUTY STATE EXPIRES 
1 • .Y~~ Rowe* . Yankee,~ EI8Ctrtc J.A ..&.ta_~·-~ .... _.·.:. __ · ::_2000_~ .. -.· .......... ·' ',--, 
2.Big,ROCkPolnt ~:-.~- . · 
. . ···-- • .• ~;(. . '02_ 
3. Haddam Neet<• Northeast:UtiRha;c: '· · · ~~: -: · ~--•07h- ~ 
4. Palisades··--··· ConsumentPower·-- ·· Mich-..:~.. ..12 
--)~ 5. San Onofre 1 S. California E~ Calif. '07 
&. Dresden 2 CommonWealth Edison ·m:~'7"·-·. '09'-
7. Glnna Rochester Gas & Electric N.Y. '09 
8. Nine Mile Point Niagara Mohawk Power N.Y •. 
9. Oyster Creek G.P.U. NuctUr. N.J; 
10. Millstone 1• No~.UUiities .-~~ 
•Ucense extended to reflect time p!aiir'W.. under~ 
Scuw: '!.S. Council lot £t-wA--- . . , : . • ---::--· 
.. I· 
'08' 
'09 
'10 
Till>,._ York Times 
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D~e Up for License Renewal: 
I 
I 
: Contrnued From Page AI 
I 
Ame,;cans think nuclear power will be-
come an important energy source, and 
that inost do not object to the construc-
tion of a reactor near them any more 
than .they do to tht> construcuon of any 
indU$tnal plant. 
Still Losing Ground? 
But a New York Times/CBS News 
opinibn survey conducted this month 
suggests that the industry is still losing 
grou~d. Asked if they would approve or 
disapprove of building more nuclear 
power plants to generate electricity, 41 
percent of the respondents said they 
would approve. That is down from the 
46 ~rcent who said they would ap-
prove in a poll in April 1979, the month 
a1ter.the accident at the Three Mile Is-
land • nuclear plant in Pennsylvania. 
And ~ is significantly lower than the 69 
percent in July 1977 who said they 
woul<i approve. 
The latest nattonwide telephone poll, 
whtcl'l was conducted among 1,424 
adul•s from June 3-6, qid not ask there-
spondents' opimon on extending the 
An industry 
I 
waits to hear 
what it must do 
to prolong its life. 
days old, then ipso facto, they're unsafe 
the next day," he said in an interview. 
He generally agreed with the indus-
try's stance that the current licensing 
procedures assure safety now and, 
with some enhanced maintenance, will 
conttnue to do so. 
"A lot of It is how well you do mainte-
nance," said Mr. Carr. who said he 
owns a '63 Buick, a '73 Mercedes and 
an '82 Plymouth, "all in excellent run-
ning condition." 
How many old plants will actually 
apply for license extensions is uncer-
tam. Mr. Carr esttmated that 70 per-
cent would, with utilities deciding not to 
bother with plants that are small, need 
extensive repairs or have management 
problems and, therefore, seem vulner-
able to being shut by the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission. 
The original idea of a 40-year license 
apparently had little to do with techni-
cal issues. Instead, the industry mam-
tains that in the earlv davs of nuclear 
power, the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion's predecessor, settled on 40 years. 
because that was the time span com-
monly used by utilities for depreciating 
plants for accounting purposes. But 
cntics say that once uttlities knew they 
had a 40-year license, many designed 
the plants to last that long. 
A Function of Aging? 
And the critics question whether 
some plants, particularly older ones. 
even meet the safety requtrements 
they were supposed to meet initially. 
They argue that older plants have not 
had to moderm:r.e over the years to 
meet the same standards as newer 
lives of existing plants. The survey had ones because they were not expected to 
a margm of sampling error of plus or operate for a long ume. 
mmus three percentage points. For that reason. satd Robert C. Poi-
Th~ ullliues say they believe that op- lard, a safety engmeer with the Umon 
pos1tton to renewals w11l be dulled by of Concerned Sctenusts. if the owners 
netghbors' famtliarity with the plants. of Yankee Rowe were to build a dupli-
The idea of permitting a 40-year-old cate of thetr plant next door to the 
plant to run until it is 60 may raise eye- original, It would not meet current 
brows at first, the utilities acknowl- safety specifications and would not be 
edge. But, they argue, age 1s not a fac- allowed to open. 
tor if components are carefully in- And if the destgn does not meet cur-
spected, mamtained and replaced rent standards, he asked, why should it 
when necessary. be allowed to operate for another 20 
Andrew C. Kadak, president of Yan- years? "There ts no legal or ethical 
kee Atomtc Electric Company, which basts for saying that people who hve I 
runs ·the oldest nuclear plant in the around old plants deserve less protec-
country at Rowe, Mass.. was one of uon than those who live around new I 
those•argumg for extending the lives of plants," he said in an interview. 
nuclear plants. Electromc technology In addition. hts orgam:r.ation has told 
has advanced substantially since his the comm1sston. the regulators have I 
plant began commercial operatton in found several instances of destgn flaws ; 
1961, but so much has been replaced or m older plants that mean they do not 1 
added smce then. he said, that "it's not have as many mdependent backup sys- 1 
the same plant." terns as had been assumed. \ 
Leaning Toward Extensions For example. two ptptng systems at ! 
the Vermont Yankee plant were 1 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commts- thought to be completely separate, thus · 
sion is leanmg toward allowmg license backmg each other up, and were found 
extenstons. Kenneth Carr, whose five- to have a common pan mstead. Thus, 
year term as chairman expires June the systems at the vernon. Vt, plant 
30, said that adopting a rule on exten- owned by a consorttum of New Eng-
stons was the most Important thing he land utilities werE> subject to simul-
could accomphsh. next to keepmg the taneous failure. 
Pl~.nts ru~nmg safely. . . , Safety equtpmrnt mstalled in Unit 1 
There s notht,ng that says tf they re 1 at Nine Mile Pomt c'tght miles north- 1 
safe when they re 39 years and 364 east of oswego. · · ·, was designed to 
4-
the Future of 
Nuclear Power 
withstand a normal operating tef\-
perature of 150 degrees, but the acl!Jll 
normal operating temperature has 
been 20 to 30 degrees higher. 
The Union of Concerned Scientists I 
also says the commtsston has acknowl- : 
edged that it had difficulty determining i 
whtch regulations apply to which i 
plants, ~~d which plants fail to comply. 1 
In addttton.. the group says, utilities J 
have somettmes misrepresented what 
equtpment has been installed or what 
tmprovements have been made. 
Also at issue in extending the li-
censes is how long some pans will sur-
VIVe. Cables deteriorate with age but 1 
are generally not inspected closely. A 1 
large ptpe ruptured at Unit 2 at the Vir- ! 
ginut Power Company's Surry plant in I 
1986, killing four workers, after years 
of eros ton had gone unnoticed. 
At Vermont Yankee and other plants. I 
years of neutron bombardment has in-1 
creased the brittleness of the reactori 
vessel, the great steel pot that holds the 
core, for which there is no backup. At· 
many plants, that component is diffi-' 
cult to inspect, and replacement mav 
not be feasible. · 
or the 126 plants put into commercial 
operation thus far, 16 have given up far : 
short of thetr 40th birthdays. Indian 
Point's Unit 1 in Buchanan, N.Y., tor 
example, was closed by Consolidated 
Edison in 1974, after 12 years, because 
Federal regulators added a require-
ment for an emergency core cooling 
system, and the utility decided it was 
impractical to add one. 
Dresden 1, in Morris, Ill., closed in 
1978 after 19 years because it was 
highly contaminated with radioactivi-
ty. Seco, near Sacramento, calif., was 
closed in 1979 after 13 years by a er-
endum of the municipal utility d rict 
that owned it, because mism ge-
ment had made the plant ex ns1ve 
and unreliable. 
Yank~ Rowe. however, ha oper-
ated rehably. The industry has lected 
that plant and another, Mon lo 
owned by Northern States Power Cor-
poration in the Minnesota city of the 
same name, as the two plants that will 
apply first for the license extensions. 
,·. 
By RUDY ABRAMSON /6 • ::z. -~ 1 
11\11!> >fAif WWHf.W '-;.!-T'll'\j\~ 
W ASHINGTON- The owner of the nation's longest-oper-
aung nuclear power plant an-
nounced TuesdaY that the reactor 
1s bemg shut down aiter the staff oi 
the Nuclear Regulatcry Commls-
ston expressed concern about the 
safety of the steel pressure vessel 
surroundmg ItS core. 
The staff's findmgs on the Yan-
kee Rowe facilitY were to have 
been presented at a meetmg of the 
NRC here today, along wtth a 
recommendation that the reactor 
be ordered to suspend operations. 
But only hours after bemg m · 
formed of the report. Yankee 
Atom1c Electnc Co. sa1d that tt was 
voluntarily shutting down the 
plant m western Massachusetts. 
In operauon for nearlv 31 years. 
Yankee Rowe ts less than mne 
years from tne exptrauon of tt~ 
operatmg hcense. ~tany had ex-
pected that the plant would be the 
itrst of the nauon·s early nuclear 
plants to seek a formal extenswn of 
tts operating hfeume. 
Quesuons about the plant's safe-
ty have been funously debated for 
months. Criucs mamtam that the 
years of exposure to mtense neu-
tron rad1at1on have made the reac-
tor vessel brittle and suscepuble to 
fractunng under certam c1rcum · 
stances. posstbly releasmg seeth-
mg radtallon or even leadmg to a 
meltdown of the core. 
NRC Chatrman Ivan Sehn hatlea 
Yankee Atomtc·~ dectston to shut 
uown voluntanl\. saymg that tnc 
companv had "acted verv respon-
stbly :· Offictais satd that the reac-
tor wtll remam out of serv1cc 
pendmg additwnal techmcal stud-
tes and wtll not restart wnhout the 
commiSSIOn·s approval. 
Last July, m the face of cnucs· efforts to force a shutdown of 
the plant. the NRC staff mststea 
that the reactor could contmue to 
operate safely until its next sched-
uled refuehng next Apnl. The 
commiSSIOn reJeCted a pellllon for 
an 1mmed1ate shutdown. 
But m Its new report to membero 
oi the four- man comm1sston. staff 
experts satd that new analyses had 
"substanuallv reduced the staffs 
confidence" tn 1ts earher. more 
conservauve calculations about the 
condmon of the reactor vessel. As a 
result. the commiSSion "recom · 
mended that the Yankee Rowe 
nuclear power stauon be shut 
uown unttl the NRC IS sat1sf1ed 
that tne . pressure vessel ha!' 
aaeouate margms agamst fa1lurc 
aurmg operauon. 
/ LOS ANGELES TIMES 
Nation's Oldest A-Plant 
Shut Down Over Safety 
• Radiation: Federal regulators express concern over 
the strength of the reactor"s steel pressure vessel. 
Robert Pollard. a one-t:me NRC 
safety engmeer who has become a 
sharp cr1t1c of the nuclear mdustrv 
With the Umon of Concerned Set--
enlists. hailed the new staff recom. 
mendation as a vmdication of the 
posttion taken by critics. "It is a 
dramatic reversal resulting from 
usmg a much more reahsllc com. 
puter model. .. he satd. 
With ItS record as one of the 
country s most successful nuclear 
generaung stations. Yankee Rowe 
and the Monticello nuclear reactor 
m Minnesota had been used bv the 
Department of Energy as ·pilot 
cases m addressmg the problems of 
extending the lives of older nuclear 
plants. 
Unt1l attention was focused on 
the potential brttlleness of the 
reactor vessel. Yankee Atomtc had 
planned to submit this Y¥r a 
formal application to extend the 
plant's operatmg license for 20 
vears after exp1rauon of its ongmal 
40- year hcense m the year 2000. 
The problem of assessm~ the 
condition of the Yankee Row<' 
reactor vessel has been extraordl-
nartly difficult because fabr1cauon 
techmques used at the ume 1t wa!' 
created made tt impossible to take 
samples to mspect for m1croscop1c 
cracks. 
Experts have been forced. there-
fore. to reach decisions based on 
computer models. 
The vessel. which is 33 feet tall. 
9 feet m diameter and 8 mche~ 
thick. is filled with water and 
encloses the reactor core. whtch 
generates steam to drive electrical 
turbmes. 
The prtmary concern has been 
that the vessel could crack 1f 
emergency coohng water were m-
)ected durmg an accident. dramau-
cally changmg its temperature. 
That possibly could release radlo-
acuve steam. but company officials 
have always mamtatned that the 
contamment building would pre· 
vent it from reaching the atmos-
phere or endangering the restdcnts 
of the commumtv of Rowe. several 
milesaway. · 
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ORANGECOUNlY 
-Edison Fined for Safety Mistakes at San Onofre 
By AMY WALLACE 
TIMES STAff WIIT!I 
SAN DIEGO-The U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comnu111on hu pro-
posed that Southem Cahforrua Ed· 
1.10n Co. pay a 1160.000 ctvtl pen&J-
ty for two aeparate malluncuonam 
the standby safety ayatema of the 
San Onofre nuclear power gener-
at1JI8 aaUon jult south of San 
Clemente. Edison official.l reported 
Friday. 
Neither malfunction posed a 
hazard to plant workers or the 
public. according to DaVid M. BJ.r. 
ron. an Edison spokesman. 3ut 
Barron said the utility considers 
the mJ.Salignments to be "senou.s" 
problems. 
"'!.Je don't 111tend to c::.ntest the 
ncuce of V101auon or th<! proposed 
iir.e." Barron wd. aadU:~ t.i"lat 
corrective measures. mcludmg 
changes in plant procedures to 
J:reclude recurrence. are m pl.lCI!. 
An NRC ~Utement rete.J.Sed .r'ri-
uay credite<l the uwity With ilnme-
d.late ::.nd long-term correcuon.s 
J.na proused Ita "setf-cnucal" J.nd 
"aggremve" responae. 
Stili. the agency charged the 
utility mort than the ba.se penalty 
cf S50.000 per infraction "because 
of the durauon of the V1otauona.'' 
The h.rat occurred Aug. ZT. IWO. 
when a water dram valve on a 
steam supply p1pe to a standby 
feedwater pump on Urut 2 wu : 
Inadvertently left closed because of ; 
an opent1J18 error. The valve re-
mained cloeed unUI OcL 21. when 1 
the problem wu dilcovered. 
The eec:ond ViolatiOn occurred 1 
Sept. 24. 1990. when an automatic 
va.lve tn one of the two. redundant 
reactor emernncy cootin( systems 
at Unit 3 wu inadvertently ltti.' 
open for 95 hours-over 12 em· 
ployee shift changes. 
SAN DIEGO 
CLIPPING SERVICE 
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• ·~s·etter monitoring vowed at SONGS 
By Dan Trotta 
·StatTWriter 
SAN' ONOFRE - Southern Cali-
fornia Edison Co. officials Wednes-
day pledged "renewed vigor" in 
monitoring recently downgraded 
plant operations at the San Onofre 
i'l'uclear Gt!nerann.g Station. 
In a management meeting with 
representatives of the U.S. i'l'uclear 
Regulatory Commission. Edison 
officials said the company has 
already implemented changes in 
response to the penbrmance report 
releasea last week. 
Eight :-l'RC officials. 12 Edison 
officials and several observers 
filled a conference room at the 
nuclear power plant north of 
Oceanstde to review major points 
in the SALP report. 
Stu Richards. chief of the NRC"s 
reactOr projects branch. mentioned 
a number of incidents that resulted 
in the lower rating for plant opera-
tions. 
In one case. plant operators 
'inappropriately" allowed the Unit 
The :-l'RC's Systematic Assess-
ment of Licensee Performance 
<SAl.P), a reguiar review scheduled 
every l2 to 18 months. cited ~insuf­
ficient attention to detail" during 
the pertod from October 1988 
through January 1990 in plant oper-
ations at the nuclear facility. 
2 reactor to run at full power tor 24 
hours while completing an overdue 
surveillance test. the report said. · • 
The NRC blamed the mJ.Sta.ke on 
a misinterpretation of a letter it 
had sent on the sub]ect. Edison 
• SO~JGS 
)loFrom Page 6·1 
should have applied for permission 
to keep operating, according to 
company spokesman David Barron. 
On another occasion. San Onofre 
operators failed to reduce Unit 2 
reactor power by the required 30 
percent within an hour after a 
"control element assembly" 
slipped into the reactor core. 
Richards also menuoned confu-
sion at t:nit 2 when an equipment 
operator accidentally drained 700 
gallons of water from the pool sur-
rounding the reactor core. As a 
result. sensors indicated that the 
core protection calculators were 
inoperable. which led operators to 
believe Unit 2 was in critical condi-
tion. 
Addressing the cited weakness-
es in plant operations. Station lfan .. 
ager Gt!ne Moigan said. '"nlere are 
multiple examples of events where 
we have demonstrated a renewed 
vigor in that area·· 
The :-l'RC downgraded San 
Onofre's plant operations from Cat-
egory l. or ··supenor performance.·· 
to Cate!Jory 2. which is considered 
··good pen·ormance" or "a level of 
pen·ormance above that needed to 
meet regulatory requirements.'' 
The :-l'RC also granted higher 
marks 10 three other areas. prais-
ing Edison for improvements over 
the 16-month period. 
» See SONGS. Page B· 7 
In the areas of engmeeringttech· 
nical support and safety assess-
ment/quality vertfication. San 
Onofre jumped from Category 3. or 
'"not sutncient." to Category 2. 
Tbe nuclear generating station 
also advanced in 
maintenance/surveillance. from 
Category 2 to Category 1. over the 
previous SALP period. 
Thd plant. located on leased 
land along the beach at Camp 
Pendleton. now rates "supenor'' or 
"good" in a.ll areas. according to 
the NRC. 
"Overall. your performance has 
been very, very good.'' Bobby 
Faulkenberry, the NRC's deputy 
regional admlnistrator. told Edison 
officials at Wednesday's meeting. 
"But don't become complacent. 
There are still some areas for 
improvement." 
After the meeting, Richards told 
the Blade-Citizen that plant opera-
tions. which were graded down. 
carried no more weight that the 
other six areas that were evaluat-
ed. 
Because there is no overall rat-
ing under SALP. however. Richards 
declined to say whether the plant is 
safer now than it was during the 
prevtous SALP penod. 
"That's a difficult question:· he 
said. "I would say that all nuclear 
plants in the country are safe. I 
would say that the performance 
here has improved over the previ-
ous SALP period ... 
• 
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!:NRC lowers 
San Onofre's 
overall rating 
By Stacy Finz 
Staff Writer 
SAN ONOFRE - The U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
has downgraded its performance 
raung of the San Onofre Nuclear 
Generating Station from ··superior" 
to ''good." 
Although the three-reactor 
nuclear power plant b.as main-
tained an overall satisfactory rat-
ing, the NRC evaluators lowered 
the plant's performance assess-
ment because of concems over 
SONGS'.t operations and mainte-
nance. 
The NRC assessment covered 
the period Oct. 1. 1988. through Jan. 
31. 1990. The federal agency, wbic:h 
monitors and licenses all nuclear 
power plants 1n the United States. 
issued its findings April 11. It con-
ducts such revtews every 14 to 18 
months. 
NRC officials have a.tked to 
meet at San Onofre with plant offi-
cials on April ~ to discuss the ftnd-
ings. 
8 Court orders NRC to rwqui,. frWrt. 
ing tor n-pCant wane.,.. Page A-3. 
Several concerns. particularly 
in plant operauons and mainte-
nance. were Identified by NRC 
staff member:s 1n their repoa:t. 
The NRC evaluators satd the 
San Onofre facility, located on 
leased land on tb.e northwestern 
edge of Camp Pendleton. failed to 
set some alarms properiJ and that 
tbere was a need tbr additional 
attention to detail dllriq the per-
formance of routine actiViti& 
They also round the plant failed 
to correct some pnmau.t problems, 
including insutftcieat train:iDI thllt 
led to a December 1989 fire. The 
Dee. 1 blaze in a storage building 
for radioactive wastes o~urred 
while workers were perlormiq 
maintenance on a valve system 
used for proceui.ae eooliq p.aea 
for Unita2 and 3. 
'lbe NRC evaluators fOUD.d t1u1t 
,. See SaD ODab, PqaA.~l 
. ' . 
NRC wants SONGS oft!cia1s to use a where we had c:onceru. • San Onofre third. backup syaem to preveat sim. According to David Barron. a 
the nre was partly attributable to 
"insufflcient trailliq for the con-
trol of combustible eases." 
'lbe inspectors alto fouad that 
plant workers committed several 
errors during routine operations 
because of "in.sutlleient attention 
to detail" and "Weamesaes in train-
ing." 
Tbe evaluators citecllDiltakes by 
nuclear rnctor operators at Unit 2 
last year when warzli.nlllgbts indi-
cated a reactor m.a.l.funet:ion but the 
operators. relying on a separate 
pup. kept the ractor on line. 'lbe 
ilar contusion in the tbture. spokesman for the Southem Call-
NRC inspectors also noted fol'llia Ed.iaoa Co .. wb.ic:h operates 
another 1988 incident in wb.ich an the plant, thent bar been a dwlle 
equipment operator's use of the in procedures to prevent otber ftres 
wroq valve at the same unit result- trom happeinl 
ed in the inadvertent draining of Barroa said st.epa lw:l also beeD 
700 gallons from the Unit 2 reeetor taken to preveDi anodler incident 
cooling .system.. similar to the one that occurred 
An NRC spokesman said the wben the reactor wamina li&bts 
ftnci.i.Dis were not cauae for alarm. lll&lf\metioned. 
.. Any time you look a& a facility · Althoucb tbe miDI of the ovv-
tbi.s size. there are bouad to be all operation of the plant dropped 
areu that need impn'ri~" said from "superior performaace" to 
Phil Johnson. the NRC's chief of "1ood." the facillty'a status 
reactor projeds for. San. Oaofre and improved ill tbree other cateaories. 
a similar plant iD Washington. illdudillcsatetrandJUmlillaDce.. 
"There waa nothi.n& that wu UDall*'" "Bu:icallJ we· re ill pnaU:J good 
isfactory. We just pointed ou& area sbape." Barron aaid. 
• 
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!·Faulty devices 
threaten safety 
at San Onofre 
By Bob McPhail 
Staff Writer 
SA:--i ONOFRE -Two reactors 
at the San Onofre :Suclear Generat-
mg Statton contam equipment sus-
pected of malfuncuons that could 
compromise the plant's safetY sys-
tem. 
Forty-six devtces used to mea-
sure water pressure. water t1ow and 
water levels in reactor C'nits 2 and 
3 are among thousands that are the 
subJect of a nattonwtde alert. The 
wammg was Issued March 9 by the 
C'.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion. the federal agency that moni-
tors and licenses all C' .S. nuclear 
such reactors. 
"We continue to receive reports 
of these things fJiling because of oil 
leaking," said Frank Ingram. a 
spokesman at NRC headquarters m 
Bethesda. }ld. He said the first such 
reports came from the operators of 
the Millstone Nuclear Power Plant 
in New London. Conn. 
Northeast t:tilities. which oper-
~ See SONGS. Page A-ll 
Q 
~ 
~ 
J::... 
r 
SONGS 
,..From Page A-t 
ales lhe Millstone nudear plant, 
first I"CJlllrlcd prnhlems with the 
devices hetwccn Man·h and Octo-
her 1987. aecorcltng lo NllC docu-
ments ohtaincd hy the Uhulc-Cili-
zcn. 
The N IW's hullclin to nuclear 
)llant operators saul the CtjUipmenl 
failures Wt~rc eau~etl hy hil leaks 
lrumtlclcdlve scab 
As uf M111Th U, the NIIC hullclin 
slated, the manufadurcr ul' the 
pruhlem tlevicus hud reported !H 
cunl'trmcd failures 111 the ettlllp 
mcnt, hut NllC stalf members lntli-
calcd the actual number could he 
much highur. 
The transmitters. known as d1f 
rcrcntial prc:.surc transmlllers. m·e 
manufat:lurctl hy lloscmuunl Ana· 
lyhcals Inc. ol' Mannea1mlis. t.tinn. 
A company spokesman s11id the 
devices measure pressure. then 
lrunsmll an elcclrical signal to 
11lanl inslrumcntotion panels. 
Ingram suid the NIIC Issued the 
alc11 het·ausc :mdt lransmillcrs arc 
ont~ll used in sy:.tcms deSI!;IIcll Ill 
autmnutieally shut down nudcar 
rcodor:. 111 the event ul' a malfunl' 
tiun. 
"The failure of u lrilllSIIIICicr 
nmld, untlt'r wurst t'ill>C t·muhllnns, 
rt!:.llll 111 tlegnulatlllll ur l'atlure nl' a 
l•lanl sult!ly syl>lcm,'' lw :.au I 
Ingram refused to sJlec·ulat~ on 
the worst thin~ thai cuultl huppen 
lilumld those u~ctl 111 nudeor reac· 
tur liafcly :;ystcms go awry 
An officiul at the San Onufre 
uudcar plant. SIH~aklnl:( on t'HtHh 
lion o( iiiiiiiiYIIIIIy, lnltl lhc lllatlc 
l'tlltcn on Fnclay th;at a lnlllsnuller 
failure t:oultl cause a rcal'lo1r IH 
t·untinuc ope a alin.: IIIH.Icr t'IITIIIII 
sl;wccs dunng wh11'11 11 :.honltl 
aulomalically shut tlown 
"Thuse 111slrunwnb st·nsc· o·nnth 
111111!> lhill !>l~lliol iiiiiOIIIilflt· ~hill 
tluwn," the olf11 1<cl :.altl ·11 the 
lrallslllltler:. clnn·t work. 1111'~' 
woultln'l St'IISt: u prohlt!lll awl. they 
woultlnot :.t..:nal ,, :.hultlown .. 
l>avltl llanon, a ~pokesman for 
Southern l'ahl'orlll<l 1-:oh,un t'u. 
whlt'h opt' I 11lc:. ll11· th.-.·•· n·;u·tur 
fac·1llly al San llnulrc. Sitltl pl.1111 
llflit'\als there hr:.l learncclul lll·11h 
lcms with the Host·llltllllll tratblnil 
h~r:. ahoul il yean ilguuntl have hct!ll 
closely wateh1ng thetr pel lur-
llliii\Cc. 
"Th•~y itfe Vt'l\ lllljll>rl.tlll 111 
lllllllillll'lll~ \ ilrltllb 111-111~. ll.tl'l "" 
Silld. "So fill', we hill'c·u·l liou111l 1111} 
si~nilica11l pruhkm:. · 
The Nil!· has unh·rt·tl ultltltn 
UfWI'iltiiiJ.: lllldt:ill' p11Wl'l' plitllb lu 
i•lenlify any oltltn•c· tl1ll•·n·nt """c 
1111111111 lnlliSilllllcr~ u~ctl 111 lht•tt 
planll>, revieW all ('I ant n·cn1 d~ 1111 
llt~:.ellllllllll ll'illl:.llllllt·r pel lor 
lllilllt'e, tlcv"f"l' itlld IIIIJ•It·llll'lll 
"t·nhann~tl !>111'\'t·IILuwc pi 111-:1 au"· 
lnlllllllllur the lran~mtllo-r~. olnlllth-
dwck llliiiiUfill'llll'lllf.! lot 111111tlll't., 
lo CIISUrc llw tlt!VII'I~!> llllhl' illl' 111>1 
hunlle!! anti Jll'-llfy n111l 111111'11 plitlll 
op.~r;cliun whak lh•· :.11,111'1'1 ''·""' 
nllllt·r:. rt'lllillll ''' tb•· 
The Nltl' stall 1:. "''1"'~'"'1-: lhal 
ull nf the l>kp:. lllilllll.tlt·tl 111 th•· 
l111lld111 he t'lllll('lclt:tl w11h111 1211 
tlay:. 
J..-' 
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Water Panel Muddies San Onofre Waters 
• Regulation: Ending its delays on a hearing about nuclear power 
plant pollution. the agency takes a bold step toward confusion. 
board members seemed unsure about whit 
they had done. 
"ll'a a heanng for renewal of their 
penml." board cha~rman Charles Badger 
said. sumnung up-.ncorrectly-the public 
meeting that will take place this Hallow-: -By AMY WALLACE 
Tlllt£5 STAff IIIRIT£1 
the power plant. the board postponed its 
hearmg from April to August. Then. the 
board postpOned it apm-indefinitely. • ·r een. • 
More than 18 months ago. the Reg~onal 
Water Quality Control Board announced 
that 1t would hold a heanng to deode 
whether to ISSue a ceue-and-demt order 
to the San Onofre nuclear power plant. 
So on Monday. when the board voted 
unammously to finally hold a public ·hear· 
ing on Oct. 31 to deode whether the power 
plant has Vlolated its perm1t. some people 
were less than tmpressed. 
For one thing, 1nstead of a formal 
ceue-and-desiat order heanng on specific 
Vlolauons. the board opted for a less cntical 
fontm-what Arthur L. Coe. the board's 
execuuve director. called a "potenua.l en-
forcement acuon heanng" that would giVe 
the board a chance to "we1gh the eVldence 
whether to constder a ceue-and-dl!lllt 
Officials at Southern California Edison. 
the plant'a operator. sa1d they weren't 
surprised by the scheduled heanng. Hav-
ing long nwntained that the plant does not 
Yio!ate ill federal penmt. Edison ill ready to 
malte that case in October. according to 
spokesman Steve Hansen. The plant. wd a board memorandum 
wntten .n February. 1990. !JUiht have 
VIOlated Ill federal pollUtant dilc:harge 
perm1t as many as 20 times. To help the 
board dec~de what to do about it. mterel\ed 
parties were asked to subnut written 
tesumony before an Apnl. 1990. heanng. 
Envtronmentalists. meanwhile. who 
have long fought to mtntm!Ze the power 
plant'a effect on the ocean. lamented that 
the retPonai board. which has direct juris-
dic:Uon over federal penmt violations. has 
taken thia long to act. 
But the hearmg never happened. Saymg 
1t could not act until the state Coastal 
ComftUSSIOn completed its a.aeument of 
0~~- • 
If you find that confuatng. you aren t 
alone. After the board voted. even some 
Almolt two years ago. a 15-year. 146-
million study ordered by the Coastal Com· 
PI--POLLUTION, 84 
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POLLUTION: Confusirig Step on San Onofre 
Coallaued from 81 
m1151on found that the nuclear 
plant 1s breakmg federal law by 
killing off tons of fish and kelp each 
year. 
Released m September. 1989. the 
study found that the plant had 
caused a 60%. or 20-acre. reduc-
tion m the area covered by the San 
Onofre kelp bed. The study also 
slid the plant's cooling system 
sucks up and kills 21 to 57 tons of 
filh yearly, then discharges the 
debns-filled water tnto the ocean. 
reducmg natural light on the ocean 
floor by as much as 16%. 
Since that study wu made pub-
he. people like enVlronmentallaw-
ver R1chard (Corky l Wharton 
have been trymg to get the reg~on­
al·lioard to do something. In De· 
cember. 1989. Wharton. a professor 
at the Umvemty of San Diego 
School of Law. dispatched two of 
his students to address the reg~onal 
board. 
The students potnted out that the plant's federal permit spec-
Ifies that water diSCharged into the 
ocean "shall be essenually free of 
... substances that s1gmficantly 
decreue the natural light" under-
water. Further. the permit requires 
the discharge system to be de· 
signed to "mamwn the indigenous 
marine life and a healthy and 
diverse manne communtty." Edi· 
son officials deny v1olaung thetr 
permit. 
The students asked the reg~onal 
board to revoke the nuclear plant's 
permit until Edison reduces the 
amount of sea water sucked mto 
and spewed out of the plant by 
cooling towers. Instead. the board 
sa1d. it w11l wa1t for the Coastal 
CommiSSion to act 
But the Coastal CommiSSIOn. 
while concedmg that the cooling 
J) 
towers are the only way to fully 
protect the ocean. decided aptnat 
them. 
In a mitigation plan approved 
last month. the commillion decided 
that the towers were too expensive 
(their pnce tag is aatd to approach 
S2 billion l and that they might 
cause environmental damage to 
the surrounding land. 
Instead. the commilalOn called 
for Edilon to malte up for the 
continwnr damale by tmprovmg 
ill fish pro«ectioD and warnmg 
systema. building a 300-acre arufi. 
ctal kelp reef and reetonng a 
150-acre c:outal wetland some· 
where in Southern Califorma. 
Now the repx1Al and state wa-
ter·boarda are the en'lironmental-
IS&s' last hope short of a lawawl. 
Wharton IIICL 
If the regiOnal board refules to 
act agiUIIt the plant. opponents 
can appea.t to the state Water 
Resources Control Baird. 
"Nobody eJie t. pmr to stop 
(the plant'• envtronmellta.l Impact! 
from happeninl ax:e,t the Water 
Quality Control Board." he said. 
"The regional and the state boards 
are the last adminiltratin apndes 
we can go to. 'lbat.'a it. If they don't 
do il. it doeln't get done." 
But Wharton admlnrledgea be· 
ing baffled by the way the board 
characteriZed the public heanng ;r 
scheduled Monday. ~ 
"A ceue-and·delilt hearinl is 
what they set for April, 1990. 
Eveeybody hal a.lreM1 lubmitted 
wntten teaumony on this. .. he said. 
"For them to uy now that they're 
going to have anaf.ber hearinl to 
decide whether to take any ac-
tion. . . . Well. look at what 
they've done in the put-just 
d.ragglng their feet aad dragging 
their feel." 
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San Onofre Mitigation 
Plan Wins Approval 
• Energy: Environmentalists criticize Coastal 
Commission's failure to order a full halt to the nuclear 
plant's destruction of fish and kelp. 
By AMY WALLACE 
!1\1(\ ,f,\fF w•IIF. 
HUNTINGTON BEACH-ACter 
17 years of debate over the envi-
ronmental impact of the San Ono· 
rre Nuclear Generaung Stauon. the 
Califorma Coastal Comm1ss1on 
adopted a plan Tuesday that com· 
miSSioners acknowledged Will mtt· 
igate. but not prevent. the plant's 
ongomg destrucuon of tons of fish 
and kelp. 
Workmg With data from a 15· 
year. $46-mlllion study dmgned to 
look at the long-term Impact of the 
plant. the commiSSion voted 7 to 2 
to requ1re the plant's operator. 
Southern Californta Edison. to •m· 
prove the plant's fish protecuon 
systems. budd a 300-acre aruficial 
reef nearby and restore a 150-acre 
coastal wetland somewhere m 
Southern Callfornta. 
"What we have crafted here IS 
as specific and detailed an ap-
proach as we have ever recom· 
mended." Peter M. Douglas. the 
comm1ss1on's execuuve director. 
sa1d. "We do believe 1t is going to 
lead to a restOred. functtonmg 
wetland and that remediation w111 
occur." 
Edison officials. who held a news 
conference lut week to vo1ce the1r 
support for the plan. were delight· 
ed by the vote. 
"This 1s a ~ood result for the 
people of Calilorn1a." sa1d Michael 
Hertel. Edison's manager of envi-
ronmental affairs. who esumated 
that the plan w•ll cost Edison S30 
m11lion to 1mplement. "We are 
pleased. We're on the track now of 
domg somethmg positive aboUt the 
problem-producuve work. not 
JUSt wnting checks (to payl for 
research." 
But environmental advocateft. 
several of whom had addressed the 
comm1ss1on dunng five hours of 
testimony Tuesday. were VlSibly 
disappomted. Instead of endmg de-
bate about the nuclear plant's role. 
they predicted. the commtSSton·s 
vote Will spark controversy. 
"It's essenually buymg another 
lawsuit, this one agamstthe Coast· 
al CommiSSion:· sa1d Steve Cran· 
dall. a lawyer represenung the 
Earth Island Institute. which filed 
suit last November against Edison 
because of its alleged v1olauons of 
federal pollutant-discharge per-
mtts at San Onofre.)ust soul.h of the 
Orange County line. 
Crandall descnbed the plan ap-
proved Tuesday as "guesstng. 
maybes and what·lfs." saytng the 
PI- ... Nt1CLEAR. AlS 
J2 
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. 
··NUCLEAR 
Celldll ... ,,.. AJ 
·. COIIIJiliiiiOft wu uams unproven 
.~ to ftx "terrible" degrada-
Uon. 
. Rtmmon C. Fay, one of l.hree 
~on the coiiUIUIIion'a Ma-
rine Review Committee, which 
conducted the 15-year study,• 
qreec1. c:alllnl the Coula1 Com- • 
. million'S VOle l fall\lre. ·. 
"The eVldence wu there. They 
ducked the tssue and went to the 
coameuc solution of weUandl. 
wlrich are papuiar." said Fay, who 
represented env;ronmental inter-
eau on l.he panel. The eommis· 
sion'a plan. he sud. will mean "the 
resident fishes can look forward to 
beiq sucked In and killed. What's 
the ba.lanc:e? I fall to understaDd 
it." 
The two commiuioners who 
voted apinst the plan seemed 
c:onc:emecl about the unproven na-
ture of the mtttpuon measures. 
One sugestld adding penalties 1f 
the measures do not work. 
Releued In September. 1989. thf. 
Clllllllllit.tee's study found that the 
nuClear plant had caused a 601ll. or 
D-acre. reducUon in the area 
cofered by the San Onofre kelp 
bed. The study said the plant's 
cooling system sucks up and lulls 
21 to 57 tons of fiah and 4 billion 
egp and larvae yevty, then dil· 
charges the debris-filled water mto 
the oc:e1n. reducilll natural lilht 
on the ocean floor by q much u 
161(,. 
Fay and Crandall were among 
many who advocaled reuofiWng 
l.he nuclear plant's exJIUftl c:ootinl 
apparatua with cooling towers. 
. wlrich uae lea sea water. 
Bul on Tuesday, a c:ommilliP,n 
staff scienlilt teat.ifted that tlie 
towers themletves had negative 
side effects-&meml them. a IUb· 
· SWltial "salt fallout" when milt. 
from the toWel'l deposi&a Alt. on 
the Sllft'CIUilClln land. u well u the 
aeat.hetiCai1Y unpleuant addition 
of 300-foot. conc:ret.e cones on the 
c:aaat.line. 
Commlllioner David Malcolm. 
who voted for the plan. said t.baL 
· the Sl·bllllon to 12-billion cost of 
the propoled cooling towers would 
· hurt Edison's c:uat.Omen mare ~ 
the utility itself. 
"1 feel that. the gun Ia nol beinl 
(pointed) at Edison. the bad guy, 
but at me. the ratepayer. the lood 
guy." he sud. "The 1lll tb1n1 I I 
need to do Ia have my uUllty bill I 
doubled because we've built ugly I 
c:oolinltoWerl. • • • To me. they're I 
out of the question." 
------------------------· 
·r. 
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. Edison Reveals: Its Plans 
to Compensaiefor Fish.tni 
• Environment: Reef, wetland restorations to make up 
for marine life losses at San Onofre nudear power plant. 
By JOHN PENNER· 
\P£l'IAI TO TilE TIMES 
HUN1'INGTON BEACH- • 
Sout.hem Ca1iforma Ed:ilon eDCU· 
tives Friday outllned plana to ·im-
plement a senes of state recam-
melldationl to mit.ipte t.he killiDI 
of tons of fish and kelp at the f11111's 
SID Onofre nuclear power plant. 
Dllrml a news conference held 
at an Edilon power plant in Hun-
tiJIIt.on Beach. t.he company exec:u • 
tiVfl sud they are preplnDI to 
build a 8-acre arutlcia.l kelp reef. 
restore 150 acres in wetJands aJq 
the So\Mem Califomia cout and 
upcrade SID Onofre's fiSh protec-
tion system. among other mea-
sures. • 
ThOM! steps are the chief propos-
all made by the state Coutal 
Commismn st.alf after ana!)'ZIDI a 
15· ye&l'study completed in 1989 OD 
the nuclear planCa en't'ironml!nw 
efft!eu. That repon concludes that 
the dlmqell amouut to a Violauan 
of feQenl law. a ciw'p i:dilan 
dilpUteL 
N~ the utility ~>.xecu· 
tives Slid they will not chtller~~t 
the recommended measures. which 
t.he Coutal Conurusllon wtll con-
sider nnpo~~ng at a pubUc 1earing 
Tuelday at Huntm~t.on Beach City 
Hall. Mtelinl the reqUirements 
WIMd caat EdiaOD S30 million to 
140 million. estmtated Fn.nlt Mel· 
one. Edilon's semor engmeer in 
environmenw affairs. 
The nuclear facility's cooling 
system suc1ts up and kills 21 to 57 
tons of fish each year. the enVU"'O''· 
menta! report complied by three 
13 
-~--llid. 'l'be-pial-then 
diacbarpt debrts·ftlled·water into 
tA oeeao. bJoci:iDI aaunt liSht to 
t.he oceaD ftocr act depieCing 60% 
of the area'a kelp 1M!*. the report 
Slid. 
To otfaet thole problem&. Edison. 
in coapera&iOD wttb IWe and fed-
eral environmental agencies. 
would reatare 150 ICftS of 'degrad-
ed wet1aDd between·Pdnt Concep-
tion and Blja C&lifornia. 
The firm il COftlid:erinl five sues 
for rest.oraUoa. incJudiD( 17 acres 
of parc:bed. fOI'IMI' wetland It owns 
nat to its Huntilll'tOD ae.cb plant. 
Melone s8:L The ot.her favored 
sites are San Dlfl\lllO Laaoon m 
Del Mar. t.heTQuanaRiver Estuary 
in Imperial Belch. Ballona Creek 
Wetlanda in Manna del Rey and 
the Lol Cemtos Wetlands in Seal 
Beach. he lllld. 
If the comJIUISIOn approves the 
recommended rmt.iptiOD plan. the 
wet.laDd rat.ent.iDa will pt under 
'ft1 ~..MelanMiid.-
'nllelftia....a.lld baYe one year to 
eftlulle polllllual sites. for the 
offlhore artifidal reef. which en-
ables kelp to pow retldlly. After 
tbat. it would build a small. demon· 
stration reef. which would be mon-
itored for three years. The full. 
300-acre reef would be blli.l1 Within 
siX years. Melone Aid. 
Edison would aLso talte stepS to 
improve the San Onofre system of 
separatiftl filb from aea water. By 
installing high-intensity lamps 
Within t.he 1111tem. the firm may be 
able to divert more fiSh back into 
the ocean. Melone said. 
-r 
. -
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Court to Let 
State R.ule on 
San Onofre 
• Environment While 
allowing a lawsuit against 
the nuclear power plant 
to continue. a federal 
judge will wait for 
Coastal Commi.ssion and 
water board to resolve 
damar done by facility. 
By RAY TESSI.fR. 
TIWU STAfF WIIT£1 
A federal JUdge m San Oieso 
said Monday t.hat It is up to state 
apnc:~es to dec:Jde how to atop the 
San Onofre nuclear power plain 
from lti11inl fish and kelp off the 
COIIL 
U.S. Oi.stnct Judge Rudi Brew. 
ster derued the San Francisco-
bued Earth Island lnaUtute's 
IDCldOn for a prelilmnar)' tnJunc. 
l.laD apma the nuclear JIO'II"!T 
plant. wtueh is operated by the 
Rolemad·bued Southern CaJi. 
ronua Edilon eo. 
Tbe iDjlmc:Uon IOUibt to fon:e 
Edllan to eRIC\ a t.lmetable for 
endiDr the envuonmemaJ. dam-
ap that II purportedly CIU8ed by 
the plant's coolinr l}'ltelll. 
However. Bre'Witel' aJio hand-
eel Ed.llon a setback by denymr 
the UU.Uty's mouon to stall pro-
ceedinp 1n the en\'1roft1Denta.l 
SI'QUP'I laWIUit apsna Edison 
onr the plant's operatiOn. 
Brtwater's acuona keep the 
laWIIIIt alive. but sluft the burden 
to tbe state Couta.l Comzrrt;mOn 
llld the Rerumal Water Quality 
Comroi Board to act fila. ill 
ftndllll ways to offllt San 0110-
fre't claiDip. 
•He wanted to hold the apn. 
del' feel to the fire." Steve 
CrarldaU. the attol'lle)' foe: Earth 
1IJ&Dd. said after a brief ·court 
hW'iftl. 
The JUdge scheduled a status 
hW'iftl on the cue m m: mantbl 
llld the matter could 10 to U1a.l 
earty nen year uniesl the atate 
resotves the ISSUe. Crmdallllld. 
AlUiouP Eartb Island didn't 
WiD 1D IIIJWlCUOD. "We're IIJ'IU • 
fled the judge didn't staY the 
ca." like Edison wanted. be aid. 
"He wu allowmiJ the cue to 10 
forwud." 
DaYid LUDdln. an auomey for 
EdiDI. said the judge qreed 
WltJI the UU.Uty'a contention that 
stile &pnc~es are resp•wNe for 
nmewm, the plaDt'l opel"'UUm. 
"He thought it wu reaanable 
to let the state agenoes proceed." 
LUildin sa1d. "These arenc1es 
. . -~----- ............... ... 
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Sild Monday t.hat It IS up to state 
agenoes to deade how to atop the 
San Onofre nuclear power plant 
from 1tiJ.1in1 fish and kelp oft the 
Cout. 
U.S. Oi.stnctJudge RUdi Brew-
ster demed the San Franc:isco. 
bued Earth llland lnaUtute's 
motlon for a pretlminarJ lnjunc:-
Uon IPIJIIl the nuc.lar JlOWW 
Plant. which II operated by the 
Rosemad-bued Soutbem ~­
fornia Edllon Co. 
The iDjunc:Uon IOUfbt to force 
Edllon to enact a Umetable for 
eftttinr the enVIronmental dam· 
age that is purportedly caU8ed by 
the plant's coolinriJitelft. 
However. Brewster a1.ao hand-
ed Edilon a setback by denyiniJ 
the uUlity's mouon to staJJ pro-
ceedinp 1n the enVironmental 
BJ'Oup'l laWIUit lplnll Ediaon 
over the plallt's operauon. 
BreWSter's actions keep the 
laWIIIIt alive, but shift the burden 
to the state Couta.l ConmriiieiOn 
and the Rqiona! Water Quality 
ConUOJ Board to act fila. ill 
tlndinr waya to offset San Ono-
fre's c1a1r1qe. 
"He wanted to hold the apn-
ctes' fee\ to the fire." Steve 
Crandall. the attorney foe: Earth 
Island. saul after a brief ·court 
heann,. 
The JUdge scheduled a atatus 
heannr on the cue m m mantbl 
and the matter could 1J0 to U1a.l 
early next year unless the state 
re101ves the ISSUe. Crand&Jlllid. 
Althourh Earth Island didn't 
Win au Jll,JUilCLIOn. "we're IIJ'IU· 
fled the JUdge didn't stay the 
cue" like Edi.ton wanted. be said. 
"He WU allOW1niJ the cue to 10 
forward." 
DaV1d Lundin. an attorney for 
EdJ.son. said the judp qreed 
with the UUiity'a contention that 
state apnc:iea are responllbl~t for 
revimnr the plant's operaUaD. 
"He l..hourht it wu raallble 
to let the state arenas proceed." 
Lundin sa1d. "Then apnc1e1 
have been revieW'inl·tbe situa· 
Uon tor 15 yean and are about 
reacty to make fmal conc:JuaiODI." 
The ume 1t hu ta1ren to atop 
the c:tamare prompted Earth 11-
land and other plaintiffs to file 
suit 1ut November, c:laiminr the 
nuclear power plaDt il Violatinl 
federai law by ki1lJnl toni of ftsbooo" 
andkelp. r 
The acuon wu tiled a year 
after a 15-year. S48-milllon 
Coutal CoiDIIUIIiOD-IpOIIIOI'ed 
report conctuded the P1aDt suc:ta 
up and k11ll 21 to 57 toni o1 fish 
annually and bad c:a...t a 200· 
acre reduction in the kelp bed. 
Envtronmenta.liltl are 11181'1 
that it hu taken 10 loq to 
remedy the problem. IDd the suit 
accusee government QeDCies of 
Pl.._- SAN ONOI'R& 83 
• 
• 
)1-
~-
. • ·r 
SAN ONOFRE 
\. ,. ...... .- frta 81 ~aucralic lethargy" in pur-
~Y flilin.IJ to act on the re-
port's fihdinp. 
In a statement Monday, the 
plamuffs apin mamtained that the 
plallt's cU.scharp of heated ocean 
water-reportedly 2 miWon pi· 
Ions per minute to cool the plant's 
three reacton-hu c:au.l "wide· 
spread damqe to the ocean ecolo-
gy'' near the plant. 
Despite the study on marine loss. 
"foot-drlamr ~ NlpODii· 
ble for manne protectiaa have not 
acted." the statement canunuec:L 
Edison. which patd for the 
Couta.l Commilllan'a repan. baa 
held there il no ecoJop:a1 diluter 
and that litipUan 11 uanec:esary 
because state qendes wW act on a 
pial! to of.fJet the problem later this 
year. 
' . 
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Edison Sued Over Harm to Fish Near San Onofre 
By ALAN ABRAHAMSON 
TIMES STAFF WRITER 
SAN DIEGO-Charging that the San 
Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Is 
violating federal Jaw by killing tons of 
fish and kelp, an. envl~nmental group 
Wed suit Thursday against Southern Cali-
fornia Edison Co. demanding a stop to the 
killing. 
The suit was filed about a year after a 
15-year, $46-mllllon study found that the 
nuclear plant south of San Clemente Is, 
Indeed, killing tons of fish and kelp. But 
since then, neither Edison nor state reg-
ulatory agencies have taken action on the 
findings, according to the suit, filed by 
Earth Island Institute Inc., a San Francis-
co-based environmental group. 
The suit, filed In federal court In San 
Diego, demands that Edison either fix the 
plant's cooling system, which the study sull But he said the utility lsln compliance 
said is responsible for most of tbe.flsh and with all federal environmental laws. 
kelp kills, or shut the plant down. "The marine life offshore Is thriving, 
The study was Issued by a panel created despite some limited effects from operation 
in 197-t by. the Coastal Commission liS a of the plant, as one would expect," Barron 
condition of Its granting Edison a con- said. 
strucUon permit to expand from one reac- The San Onofre plant Is located along 
tor to three. the Pacific Ocean a few miles south of San 
The suit illso says Edlsoh . should be Clemente, within the Marine Corps' base at 
ordered to establish . a11' envlrohtnental ... _Camp Pendleton. 
trust fund and restore fish and kelp levels. Rosemead-based Edison operates three 
It also asks for unspecified monetary nuclear-powered units at the plant. The 
damages. first opened In 1968; the second and third 
"It's pie-In-the-sky until we \tin, which opened In 1984. 
we Intend to do," said one of Earth Island's According to the suit, fish are 
San Diego lawyers, Charles S. Crandall. killed when massive amounts of water are 
"But we want the plant to comply and to taken Into the plant to cool the reactors. 
make restoration for the damage It has Kelp. a<;cording to the suit, dies from 
done-and lt has done damage, clearly." particles that come back out with the 
Ah Edison spokesman, David Barron, water and either land on the fronds or 
said the utility's lawyers had not seen the block sunlight. 
~ 
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LOS ANGELES TIMES 
M6 SUNDAY. SEFTEMBER 16. 1990 
liEDITORIAi:~fTHE TIMESJ ~. 
The Shame of Serious Understaffmg 
Bureaucratic bottleneck developing over troubling report about San Onofre 
It has been more than a year since a 
:;tudy concluded that the San Onofre 
Nuclear Generating Station is break-
ing federal law by killing tons of kelp 
and fish every year. This was no 
ordinary report. Funded by Southern 
California Edison, the research was a 
15-year, $46-million review of the 
power plant's impact on the offshore 
environment. 
Ordered by the California Coastal 
Commission. the review determined 
that the plant has reduced the San 
Onofre kelp bed by 200 acres. or 60%. 
San Onofre's cooling system sucks up 
and kills 21 to 57 tons of fish a year. 
dischargmg the debris into the ocean 
and reducing the natural light levels 
on the ocean floor by as much as 16%. 
This is perhaps not an ecological 
disaster of the highest order. but 
certainly a matter for the commis-
sion's attention. And yet a year has 
gone by without a commission hear-
ing on the report. 
As a result of those delays, the 
Water Quality Control Board-the 
other agency empowered to force 
Edison to make changes-has post-
poned its hearings on the matter 
three times. This despite an environ-
mental lawyer's requests to revoke 
the plant's permit until Edison reme-
dies the two reported violations. 
The cause of all this delay is the 
now familiar commission staff shortr 
age. Staff scientists there simpl)l 
don't have the time to review a study 
that the agency ordered 15 years ago. 
That state of affairs is, of course. 
traceable to Deukmejian Administra-
tion budget cuts. Staff at the commis-
sion has been reduced from 172 when 
Gov. Deukmejian took over to 110 
today. An advisory panel on cost 
control round last year that the 
agency's budget had been reduced. in 
real terms. by 56% since 1977. 
The November ballot is full of 
potential new protections for the 
environment. Forests, crops, the 
ozone layer, bays and estuaries would 
I h 
receive more help. Yet only the oil-
spill-prevention provisions of Propo-
sition 128 would add staff to the badly 
strapped commission, and those funds 
would pay for its new responsibilities. 
(The Legislature has enacted a simi-
lar new program). 
It's futile to scold Deukmejian again 
for his attitude toward the environ-
ment (except to remind him of the 
need to sign the bill that would 
provide the commission with new 
enforcement powers over those who 
damage the coastline.) The commis-
sion. which will ask for :rT new 
staffers and a budget increase of $3.1 
million for fiscal 1991-92, must place 
its hope in the next governor. Both 
candidates have shown concern for 
the coast's future. 
While the electorate considers how 
far it wants to extend environmental 
safeguards. the state ought to fmd a 
way to help an existing watchdog-
the Coastal Commission-do the job 
we established it to do. 
r ~- .. 
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Report Detailing 
San Onofre Plant 
Failings Sits Idle 
By AMY W Al.Ut.CE 
TIMES STAFF WRITER 
One year after a 15-year. $46-million study found that 
the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station is breaking 
federal law by killing off tons of fish and kelp, state 
regulatory agencies have taken no action on the findings. 
and envtronmentalists-including one of the study's three 
authors-are crying foul. 
"Somewhere along the line. justice is being delayed," 
said Rimmon C. Fay, a biologist who represented environ-
mentalists' interests on the three-member Marine Review 
Committee, which released its 'study a year ago this week. 
"The present composition of the Coastal Commission is not 
one of great dedication toward the environmenL.The (state 
Regional Water Quality Control Board) bas an 01Jtstanding 
record of neglect of enforcement of regulation. So nothing 
is being done." 
Richard (Corky) WhartOn. an environmental lawyer 
who unsuccessfully challenged the nuclear plant's license a 
decade ago, agreed. 
"It's _been one year and they have done absolutely 
nothing but set the hearings back again and again," said 
Wharton, now a professor at San Diego School of Law. 
"Nobody questions (that the study is) the most definiuve 
report of its kind ever done. But there it is, and there tt 
sits." 
The study. which was ordered by the California Coastal 
Commission. found that the nuclear plant had caused a 
60%. or 200-acre. reduction in the area covered by the San 
Onofre kelp bed. It found that the plant's cooling system 
Pl ....... NUCLEAR. B4 
\Y 
completely financed by Edison, NUCLEAR 
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· . ·~tWtotlnt~nded to provide an Inde-
pendent 'ctentlllc review of the 
plant's Impact by appointing one 
bloloJist for each special Interest, 
EdiSd'JI, the environmentalists and 
the CoiStal Commission. 
sucks up and kills 21 to 57 tons of 
·nsh yearly, then discharges the 
debris-filled water Into the ocean, 
reducing natural light levels on the 
ocean floor by as much as 16%. 
These "substantial" adverse ef-
feels-while "not large-scale eco-
logical disasters"- violate the 
plant's federal pollutant-discharge 
permit, the study found. It recom-
mended several ways to prevent or 
mitigate the damage. from upgrad-
Ing the plant's cooling system to 
building an artlrtcial reef. 
To· date, the plant's opetator, 
Southern Callrornla Edison, has not 
altered Its operations, Edison orrt-
clals confirmed. And spokesmen 
for the two stale agencies that 
have the authority to force Edison 
to take action on the study's rec-
ommendations acknowledge that 
lh~y _have been slow to evaluate 
thorn, repeatedly postponing hear-
Ings Jn order \o focus on other 
pressing Issues. But they say nver-
work -not oversight-Is to l>lame 
for the delay. 
"The truth of the matter Is we 
hav~n·t had starr to do It-we 
should have a team of 10 scientists 
looklr1g at this and we don't. We 
didn't have anybody working on It 
for a while." said Susan M. Hausch, 
manager of the energy and ocean 
resources unit of the Coastal Com-
mission. "The commls5lon Is defi-
nitely not dragging their feet. It's 
the staff- we h:wen'l taken It to 
them. We couldn't." 
The Coastal Commission r.realed 
the Marine Review Committee in 
I 97 ~ a~ a condition of ils granting 
Edison a construrtion permit to 
expand from one reactor to three.' 
The committee's study, which was 
llansch said the commlsston Is 
due to lake up the study when It 
meets In San Diego In December. 
But that has led to the third 
postponement of a Water Quality 
Control Board hearing on the 
study: although the board Is not 
required to by law,ll has decided to 
wall for the Coastal Commission to 
evaluate the study. 
"Our feeling was the Coastal 
Commission Initialed the study and, 
completed the study and they 
should take a position on It," said 
John V. Foley, a board memher _ 
and the general manager of the I he 
Moulton Niguel Water Dislrlct, 
which serves southern Orange 
County. "Th~ real question Is dm~s 
the study really, truly document 
any violations. I don't think we 
want to do their work first. And we 
don't have a reason to believe 
anything yet." 
W hat that has meant, howev-er, Is that every lime the 
Coastal Commission postpones ac-. 
lion, so does the water board. Last 
l>ecemher, two of Wharton's law 
students asked the board to revoke 
, he plant's permit until Edison 
remedies the two reported permit 
violations. The board delayed tak-
Ing action until April, then delayed 
It until August. and now.has said it 
will wait until sometime In Janu-
ary. 
"ll's kind of a joh; wc·ve hati so 
many tentative dates schedule-d 
and they've all been postponed," 
said Bruce Posthumus, a senior 
water resource control engineer 
for the board, adding that the 
board's tentative January hearing 
Is designed to follow the Coastal 
Commission's December meeting. 
"That's a ways away. Hetw~en 
now and then, who knows what 
will happen? f wouldn't bet against 
It being postponed again." 
Edison spokesmen called the 
postponement "reasonable,'' but 
rejected their critics' content ion 
that the company has exerted its 
Influence to extend the delay~. 
"I don't think this could hf' laid 
at our doorstep," said Michaelllcr-
tel, Edison's manager or environ~ 
mental JfL;llrs. "ll took Wayl and 
his colleagues 13 or 14 years to 
come up with the report. and it's 
obviously going to take the Coastal 
Commission some lime to decide 
what should be done. To take a 
little bit of extra time on It to make 
sure they do the right thing Is not 
only the prerogative but the duly 
of the commission." 
In the meantime, envlronmen- 1 
tallsts say, the San Onorre kelp bed 
will pay the price. 
"As long as that plant operates In 
Its present mode, on a CUil)UlaUve 
basis things are going to grow 
worse," said Fay, who believes 
that even the final report to which 
he signed his name underestimates 
the extent of the damage. In order 
to get construction permits in 1974. 
Fay said, Edison "said, In erfect, ·u 
you provide us the evidence that 
something is wrong, we will do 
something about it.' But nothing 
has happened. Nothing. Not even 
token action. Ills frustrating." 
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' Diablo Canyon 
l Safe for Quake, 
NRC Decides,·-~, .. 
F By Cha.rl8• htlt {f"tt 
, Chronic£• Sct.IUie Writer -
The Diablo Canyon nuelear 
power plant can withstand a ma-
jor earthquake on a fault discov-
ered well after it was designed, 
the Nuclear Regulatory Comm.is-
sion ruled yesterday In Washing-
ton, apparently ending yean of 
legal wrangling for Pacific Gas 
and Electric Co. 
In announcing its decision that 
the plant "has an adequate margin 
of safety," NRC offtcen praised 
the reviews of seismic hazards con-
ducted by the utility and indepen-
dent contractors. The prime threat 
is the Hosgrl Fault on the bottom 
of the Pacific Ocean three miles 
west of the plant, which is near 
San Luis Obispo. 
The NRC said the geological 
and seismological studies "are the 
most extensive, thorough and com-
plete ever conducted for a nuclear 
facility in the country and have 
advanced the state of knowledge 
in these disciplines significantly." 
Federal regulators Issued 
building permits for the power 
plant's twin l,lOO.megawatt Wes-
tinghouse reactors in 1968 and 
1970, when geologists said the 
nearest major faults were at least 
20 miles away. In 1971, U.S. Geolog-
ical Survey sclentilts dJseovered 
the Hosgri just offshore. 
I~ 
That finding forced PG&E to 
review its design and upgrade the 
plant and led to demands by oppo-
nents that the plant be shut down 
because of seismic danger. 
After yesterday's ruling, PG&E 
geosciences director Lloyd Cluff 
said "We're very pleased with this con~lusion, because of course it 
confirms our own conclusions." 
The ruling requires PG&E to 
submit further calculations to 
back up its stand, but Cluff said 
this will be ho problem for the 
plant's engineers. 
JJetailed calculations show that 
PG&E may have underestimated 
slightly the amount of.shaking at 
some frequencies from a magni· 
tude 7.5 earthquake on the Hosgri 
Fault, the NRC decision said. Air 
suming the next set of calculations 
contain no surprises, it agreed 
with PG&E arguments that the ex-
tra safety factor built into the 
plant's design gives it the strength 
to resist such vibrations. 
Opposition to the plant has 
come largely from Mothers for 
Peace, a San Lula Obispo organiza. 
·t1on. No one I.DIWered its tele-
phcae yesterday for comment. 
.,. 
Post-qual5e 
rumblings 
at N-plant· 
Safety debate rages 
over Diablo Canyon 
By RUSSELL CLEMINGS 
~ee staH writer 
October's lorna Prieta earth-
quake leveled buildings and bridges 
in the San Francisco Bay area and 
brought the World Series to a tem-
porary holt. 
Now, six months later, its scien-
tific aftershocks have reached 230 
miles south of San Francisco and 
arc thn·atcnlng Pnci(ic Gas & Elec-
tric Co.'s niablo Canyon nuclear 
pow!'r plant on the coast near San 
l.uio,; ( lhispn. 
U.S. (;eolo~ical Survey seismolo-
gists reviewing a PG&E study or the 
plant's seismic surroundings are 
warning that on earthquake similar 
to the Lorna Prieta could occur on 
the sea-floor llosgri fault near Diab-
lo Canyon - and that such an 
earthquake could cause shaking 
111ore severe than the plant is de-
signed to withstand. 
In nwelings that begin this 
month, l'~i& E's geologists will try 
to rl'futc that contention. U they fail, 
the utility may lace the expensive 
prospt>c\ of installin~ even more 
~ei~mic bracing than tt has already 
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had to build into its $5.8 billion 
plant. 
The debate over the Hosgri fault 
began long before the quake. and it 
may not be resolved for another 
year or more. But USGS geologist 
Robert D. Brown said that data 
gathered in the Loma Prieta earth-
quake gave the -agency a "Jiving ex-
ample• of the hazardous geology it 
already was saying might be pres-
ent at Diablo Canyon. 
"I don't know of another example 
that fits what we were suggesting 
about Diablo Canyon as well as the 
Lorna Prieta does. • Brown said. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion ordered PG&E to study the 
faults around Diablo Canyon as a 
condition of the plant's license. By 
1985, when the study began, the 
utility had spent 16 years and $5.8 
billion building the plant - far 
more than the seven years and $340 
million it had estimated the job 
would take when it began work in 
1966. 
- ...: _: - --
April 30, when ground motion will. 
be the subject. 
But a compromise seems unlike-
~ ly. While Brown and other review-
' ers say the Lorna Prieta earthquake 
I
. has strengthened their belief that 
the Hos · ma be a thrust or 
oblique Fault. tluff said PG&E's 
most recent field research near the 
Diablo Canyon plant has left him 
even more convinced that the Hos-
. . ly ....... t.-...... J; .. gn IS pure ..... ......-'"""t'. 
"We've got all the evidence: 
Cuff said. •If someone says they 
still don't want to believe us, that's 
their problem. • 
Cuff bases his conclusion largely 
on studies of the onshore San Sime-
on fault about 40 mlles north of 
Diablo Canyon. That fault. he says, 
is unmistakably a strike-slip fault. 
But while Cuff contends the San 
Simeon fault is simply an extension 
of the Hosgri fault - •tt is the same 
fault,• he said - Brown says the 
evidence on that point •is not whol-
ly convincing. • 
ln any event. Brown also argues 
that similar research on the San An· 
dreas fault shows that it is mainly 
strike-slip to the north and south of 
Lorna Prieta. but at the October 
The biggest part of the overrun 
was attributable to bradng the plant 
to withstand a 7.2 magnitude earth-
quake on the Hosgri. which wasn't 
discovered until after construction 
began. 
At. issue now is a seemingly ele-
mentary question: Exactly what 
type of fault is the Hosgri? Although 
the question is basic. it is almost 
impossible to answer for certain be-
cause the fault lies under water, and 
therein lies the main source of dis-
agreement. 
PG&E favors a theory that says 
the Hosgri is a simple strike-slip 
fault. in which two blocks of the 
earth's crust slowly grind past each 
other. Brown and others believe it is 
more likely to be a thnlst fault. in 
which one block slides up and over 
the other. or eise a combination of 
thrust and strike-slip that is called 
an oblique fault. 
How the question is answered is 
important because earthquakes on 
thnlst and oblique faults nre gener-
ally - although not universally -
believed to cause more ground mo-
tion than earthquakes· of similar 
magnitude on strike-slip faults. 
Diablo Canyon is designed to 
earthquake's epicenter, the faulting 
proved to be oblique. 
Even before the Loma Prieta 
earthquake, the USGS reviewers 
had used data from seismic tests at 
the Diablo Canyon site to theorize 
that the Hosgri fault had two parts 
- a nearly vertical fault that 
reaches up to the sea. floor and a 
buried thnlst fault that begins more 
than half a mile below. 
It wasn't until they examined data 
from the October earthquake, 
Brown said, that the USGS geolo-
gists learned that the San Andreas 
fault at Loma Prieta was configured 
exactly the same way. 
"What we had suggested in some 
of our review comments prior to 
Lorna Prieta was an earthquake and 
fauh.geometry (on the Hosgri] that 
turned out to be identical to what 
we had at Loma Prieta, • he said. 
""The two are kind of mirror im-
ages." 
The outeome of the debate over 
the Hosgri fault is likely to depend 
on the NRC, which will have to 
reach a decision after getting re-
ports from PG&E. the outside re-
viewers and its own staff. It also 
will be aole to draw upon the rec· 
withstand an earthquake of 7.2 
·magnitude on the Hosgri fault. as-
suming the fault is a strike-slip rath-
er than thrust or oblique. If the 
NRC. which has the final say-so, 
rules that the Hosgri is more likely 
a thrust or oblique fault. does that 
mean the plant is underdesigned? 
PG&E's chief geologist, Uoyd 
Cuff, said there was "hardlY. a stg· 
nificant difference• in the reSulting 
ground motion whether the fault is 
deemed thrust rather than strike-
slip. Robert Rothman, an NRC seis-
mologist. said the estimated ground 
motion probably would jncreas~fby 
10 percent. an amount that may or 
may not tum out to be significant. 
But Ken Campbell, a former 
USGS earthquake engineer who al-
so has been revi · the Diablo 
Canyon work for ~C, estimat-
ed the increase in ground motion at 
47 percent. 
"'That's significant, no question 
about it. • Campbell said. 
Differences among the scientists 
are supposed to be hashed out at 
meetings the week of April 16, 
when the nature of the Hosgri fault 
will be discussed, and the week of 
ommendations of its Advisory Com-
mittee on Reactor Safeguards, a 
panel of experts on nuclear power 
safety. 
Ro~ the NRC seismologist. 
predicted that the most PG&E 
would have to do is to . reinforce 
some of the plant's equipment. 
something that probably could be 
done during a normal refueling 
shutdown. A permanent shutdown 
of the plant is highly unlikely, he 
said. 
However, the debate over the 
Hosgri fault is provoking .calls for a 
shutdown from groups opposed -to 
the plant. which was dogged by~ 
tests throughout construction. 
· Rochelle Becker of the San Luis 
Obispo opposition group Mothers 
for Peace said the data gattaegd 
already were enough to create "rea· 
sonable doubt" that the plant is 
safe. 
And Audrie Krause, executive IIi· 
rector of the San Francisco consum-
er group Toward UtDity Rate NDr· 
malization, said that if the plala'a 
safety was in question, "'it shouldbe 
shut down and the ratepayfn 
should not be forced to pay for fle 
power it produces. • 
---
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Diablo CanyOn Plaltt 
Breaks World ·RecOrd 
.. 
Nuclear reactor runs 481 days without pause 
~·?l·'lt By Dtu1UJ Perlllu.ua 
SF Chroak,. ~ 64llor • 
The Diablo Canyon nuclear erating about 1,100 megaWatts ~ 
power plant'• aeeond nuclear llllit or more than a miWon tuowaua-: 
set ~world reco1d. for eondnuou. of elec:tr1dty. .· , ... ..._. · :• 
eledridty generation by a UC)lt- Plannrn1 for the plant began tn· 
wa&er reactor when it eompleUcl 1988, bat Pae utlllty.al~JqL~ 
481 days of operaUon without a · dJately ···encountered· ·:protest$ 
pauae yesterday, Padflc Gu and apmst n~ear power'·QCI law~ 
Electric Co. President George A. satts aimed at preventing eoF 
Maneada announced yesterday. atructton. Discovery oflbe Hoagrt' 
The reactor began operating earthquake fault three .miles off 
more than five yean ago, and dur- the eoast forced the utWty to rede-
ing its most recent record-break· algn the reactors in 1978. Follow• 
ing run. tt generated 12.5 bUlton tug the reactor accident at the 
kilowatt-hours of electricity - Three Mlle Island nuclear plant 
enough energy to meet the needs three years later, Diablo Canyon 
of a city twice the size of San Fran· engineers were forced to strength· 
cisco for a year and a hall, Manea· en the reactors even more. 
t1s said. Bulldlng the first unit bad be-
The un.tt Is scheduled to shut gun lD 1988. and af~C,. 20 
down briefly wtthtn two weeki to )'81.1'1 of conii'OVeny c~ 
tate on a fresh load of nuclear Uon delayatt ltal'ted·ojentlon iQ 
fuel. but the electrle power tt pro- May 1885. CoDatruc:UoJt!lt .Untt.2 
duced during this period of opera· began lD 1970, and it ltlrted Pl"'> 
tton was the equivalent of nearly dac:tng electl1c1ty in ~ 1988. 
20 milllon barrels of oil burned in a Lut weet. atter·a detailed in· 
fossil fuel power plant, Maneadl apeetion by federal eniineen. the 
calculated. .' ~ Nuclear Regulatory. CAmmtaton, 
"The record symbolizes our - which oversees ail the ·..nation's 
commitment to safety. attention to atomic power plants. announced tt 
detail and excellence in opera- bad given Diablo Canyon's over-all 
tlon," be said lD a stater.1e.:1L Both operations h16lo uaarka for efflclen-
reactors nat only save petroleum, cy, safety, radiation ... ~ntro}s, 
Maneatls said, but they also oper· maintenance, emergegcy pre-
ate without emitting the poilut- paredzie...and. aecurtty. •. 
ants spewed by oU· or coal-bu.rntna Until yesterday's record, tiie 
plants. Untt 1 reactor at Three Mile Island 
The $5.5 bllllon nuclear plant tn Pennsylvania -held the-record ot 
houses two reactor units, each gen· _ 480 daya of continuous operation. 
,,--.--·••r.,-.-,..,....-~-c~ ....,. .. --......-,""; 
. ·~· .. ::-~ . . ,_;;&.1Q't.": ··~ ·~-.. ~ - ... '. 
Diablo set~ record, shut· down by.Jeak 
lly Richard Jackbwa~ .L.j · <1 J level for Jenks of radioactive water. wo~;~~'t shui·:_d·~~-\~~~x (tJ-
Assistant News Editor L:J.SL rrionth, the Jenks exceeded 1.0, plant) until it was time·for rcfuelir 
ARROYO GR.¢\NDE- Unit 2 at causing a brief "unusual· event" to because they wouldn't: want to lo 
the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power be declared at the plant. money," Becker said;;~. 
Plant was shut down ~or refueling . The leaks_ n~ver created a danger She said sh~ vJ~·t··~omfoned · 
Monday a week before It was sched- for the pu~llc nor pla~u_ ~mEY~ye~s, .. a television repon .this. week tl 
uled to and three days _after settmg a Th.~mas smd. . . ~' quoted a Diablp .official as sayi 
world record for .. conunuous opera- The wa~er that 1s. gom,g ~n tJ:e the plant is designed to leak 
tion. floor goes mto a dram .. It s bke m .. . · ·: • · ·. ··, : . · 
The shutdown came three weeks your sink," he said. Plants routinely I can '1 tell )'ou · 1£ .tt ','s fl7 
after small leaks were detected in have to deal with small Teaks, he dangerous or not. ~utI do~ t ~h· 
the reactor coolant system, accord- added. they' woul~. shut· 1t. down if 1~ v. 
ing to plant spokesman Brad The plant's record run of 484 dangerous, she wd ... -.~~:--: 
Thomas. days beats the record of 480 set • Diablo officials have insisted 
The leaks, combined with .other earlier this year by Unit 1 at the only by strictly following sa: 
small problems, led plant operators Three Mile Island nuclear power rules will the-i>lant·Operate at 
to start the scheduled refueling plant in Pennsylvania. · m~efficient., 
early, Thomas said. Unit 2 was last off line during its '\,, · 
At the time of the shutdown, the 1990 refueling. Because the current .------....; ___ _ 
leaks were measured at .7 gallons a shutdown was so close to the sched-
minute, below the 1.0 federal action uled Sept. 9 refueling, plant opera-
tors have decided to start the refuel-
ing early, Thomas said. 
The early start-up of the refueling 
process could increase he length of 
the outage by a few days, Thomas 
said. . : ~: :.. . · ~ -~~;~. · 
- Mothers for-Peace spoi<Cswoman..,-
Rochelle Becker said the early shut-
down fueled some of the group's 
most persistent fears. 
"All along we have said they 
v 
PG&E I 
Jumps 89% uisco ([~roniclt 
\_) 
In 9':12~!;r 
Ry Jeff Pellim~ 
Chronat'lf!. • tUJWrltrr' • 
At i§. ~nual meeting yes· ' 
terday, PaciHc Gas and Electrir 
t:o. demonstrated just how lu· 
erative its much-maligned Dia· 
blo Canvon nuclear plant can 
be. The company reported an 89 
percent leap in quarterly earn· 
ings, thanks largely to Diablo. 
Profit rose to $244.4 million 153¢ 
per sharel from $136.7 million 1~1 
m the year-earlier quarter, whtle 
sales rose to $2.1 billion from $1.9 • 
billion. 
"The major reason for this lm· 
provement is the increase in reve-
nues produced by Diablo Canyon," 
Chairman and chief executive Rich· 
ard t:larke told 1.500 shareholders 
at the Masonic Auditorium in San 
Francisco. 
The Diablo Canyon plant ran 
into a series of major cost overruns 
and ultimately set the utility back 
S5.5 billion - as compared with the 
$500 million it was supposed to cost 
originally. PG&E wanted its custom· 
ers to bear the brunt of the cost. but 
the California Public Utility Com· 
See Page C4. Col. 4 
PG&E 
From Pa~te C1 
mission balked at this. 
The settlement reached last 
year wtth the commission rewards 
PG&E for operating the plant "at 
sustained higb levels of perfor-
mance" - and safely, as Clarke 
pointed out yesterday. 
For the first quarter. at least. 
the company did just tbat. One of 
tbe plant's two reactors operated at 
98 percent of capacity while the oth· 
er was at 93 percent. The industry 
average for nuclear reactors is just 
70 percent. 
Diablo Canyon's revenue for 
the three months totaled $359 mil· 
lion. compared with just $181 mil· 
lion a year earlier. Last year. the 
gross from Diablo was "insufficient 
to cover normal operating expens-
es. and thus had a depressing effect 
on earnings," Clarke observed. 
Clarke cautioned, however. 
that the first-quarter performance 
can't be sustained indefinitely. 
Whenever one of the nuclear reac-
tor units is shut off for refueling-
they go throu~h this procedure ev-
ery 18 months - the company's 
earnings are bound to suffer. 
Clarke noted Utat one of the 
units will he down for refuelin~ in 
the fourth quarter this year. "This 
means our fourth-quarter earnings 
are expectC'd to he lower than the 
first-quartPr earmnl!s I reported to-
day.·· 
Contir.umg to operate the plant 
at high eW~iency is "fundamental" 
to the company's success, Clarke 
said. The facility accounts for 27 
percent of the utility's assets. 
Diablo Canyon offers a chance 
for si~nificc;nt earnings ~rowth un-
til 1994. beeause of price escalators 
built into the agreement, Clarke 
said. After that, the price PG&E re· 
leives for Diablo power will reach a 
plateau. 
"Starting In the mid-19905. our 
objective is to have investments in 
unre~ulated business ventures that 
will provid·:- a new source of earn-
ings to sust.un growth." he said. 
During the next five years. the 
company p~ans to plow $2.2 billion 
into unregtlated business ventures 
in oil and g<;s, power-plant construc-
tion and real €'State. The chief bene-
Thursday, April 20, 1989 
ficiary will he PG&E Entf'rpnses. an 
unregulated ~uhsidiarv that thP 
rompanv erE'ated. In thl' meantirr.P. 
the c·ompany w11l trv to t·ilrn the fu:l 
13 percE'nt authonzcd rE'turn on its 
gas and E'lectric husmess. 
Clarke's strategic plan didn't sit 
well with all the shareholders at 
yesterday's meeting. 
Instead of all thE' rapital spend· 
ing, the company "hould first re-
store the dividend that it cut last 
year. one shareholder said. In th£' 
first quarter of this year. it paid out 
35¢ per share. as compared with 48~ 
in the first quarter of last year. 
Clarke said that the dividend 
would be restored only when "our 
earnings stream is sufficient to sus-
tain an increase." But he didn't 1)(. 
fer a time frame. which angered 
some shareholders at the meeting. 
"The performance of this com-
pany has stunk. · sa1d sharehold<'r 
Nick Rossi. a Boon\'ille residt>nt. 
"Management needs a swtft kick in 
the butt.· 
• 
.. _;.: 
Wednesday, July 10, 1991 A-3 
: ..... .:..r ... . 
··'' '~!'.·, ..... 
PG&E citedro~e·r~·~ 
. . ·1:.:~- '-~-~~.;;- -~ 
secudtY.VioJatiOhs 
·1• .. ·~~· . "! :-~···;:. 
By Jan Greene - . . ployees who were allO~;tb:ettter.a 
Telegram-Tribune "vital" area allowing another .. worker 
Security continues to be a problem 
at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power 
plant, according to a Nuclear Regula· 
tory Commission letter announcing 
three nevi alleged violations of federal 
rules at the plant. 
Overall, plant security "appears 
adequate," an NRC inspection con-
cluded. But there are areas Pacific 
. Gas and Electric Co. needs to work 
on, a commission regional offi.cal said. 
In a June 25 letter, NRC radiation 
safety and safeguards official Ross A. 
Scarano complained about "the rela-
tive ease" in which unauthorized 
people got into high-security areas, 
and said PG&E has not fixed similar 
problems identified more than a year 
ago. · · ,.:_ 
But a plant spokesman described 
the problems as ~echnical, mostly 
involving plant workers allowing oth· 
er PG&E employees or contractors 
into vital areas without making sure 
they have proper authori7.ation. 
Still, spokesman Brad Thomas ac-
knowledged that PG&E takes . the 
problem seriously and will continue 
working on it. , 
The three alleged violations were 
classified as Level IV on a scale of 
five, with Level I being most serious. 
Level IV violations generally do not 
involve fines, although the NRC will 
wait for a response from PG&E 
before deciding whether a fine is 
warranted. 
Federal nuclear officials also men-
tioned two other problems not consid-
ered serious enough to warrant 
citations. Neither of these problems 
was described in detail because they 
involve security. A more.,. detailed 
inspection report describing them 
was not made public. 
PG&E's Thomas said two of the 
incidents stemmed from plant em-
inside without proper aut119riz8tion. 
The third incident occurted when a 
security guard was riot fulli searched 
upon .re-entering a high·seClJrity area, 
he sa1ei. · . .. .• , .. > .. -
Thomas• said the violation.~--were 
reported by PG&E. Government in· 
spectors . found the problems when 
going :OYe~ , logs .. ~ept by.:. Diablo 
workers · · · . • · · . ..-.,.~- · · 
"Aity ~olation is bad.". Tho~ ~aid. 
"We're working hard to make ~ertain 
these don'l occur again. It's really a 
problem of educating everybody". on 
the staff about proper procedures. ... • ·· 
AIIother NRC regional' 9fficial, senr-· 
ior physical security, specialist Doug. 
Schuster, called the problems .. "an 
administrative goo~ more or less.".,-. 
But Scarano's letter. took PG&E CO 
task because the violations' come . on . 
the heels of a more serious Level m 
notice of ·. ~olation involving li securi· 
ty problems cited in Aprlll990. · 
"Thest: ... violations are of concern 
because ·they demonstrate that in 
spite of your efforts to reduce the 
occurrence of these types of events, 
your corrective actions· have been 
less than fully effective," Scarano 
wrote. •· · ' ,,:.. · · •·"- ··' · 
"Specifically, the relative ·ease in 
which unauthorized individuals have 
repeatedly · gained vital-area access 
continues to demonstrate the possibil-
ity of a more serious compromise," 
the letter continued. 
The NRC decided not to fine the 
utility for the Level m violation in 
1990 because of a promise to set up a 
"comprehensive program" .to keep 
the problems from happening again .. 
The 1990 violations involved allow-
ing unauthorized people into vital 
areas, failing to keep complete logs on 
who entered vital areas and failing to 
protect. information on. the plant's 
security program. 
SAN rRANCISCO CHRONICLE 2/15/90 
]itRC Proposes Fine 
• ~ .. h, 
·q~er Diablo Canyon 
. ·~ . 
. ·.1rhe Nuclear Regulatory Com-
liiiWon staff Is proposing a fine of 
tsODlO against Pacific Gas and Elec-
trj~ Co. for alleged violations of 
· NRC requirements involving a safe-
ty system at the Diablo Canyon pu· 
clear-power plant. 
The plant bas been cited for 
violations three times before, a NRC 
spokesman said . 
......... 
- · "PG&E accepts complete re-
sponsibility for the violations and 
wtU pay the fines," said James Sbif. 
Cer._senior vice president of nuclear 
~er generation. "We have taken 
. ex-.nsive corrective action to ad-
flress the deficiencies." 
.J 
·: 
.. 
Diablo warned on workers' excessive 
By David Eddy 
Telegram-Tn'bune 
~;~1 \d'~ ',{ 
checked before the reactor Is starlet·-- · · - - - -- ·. • 
up. so any mistakes made by fatigue( o· vert I me workers can be corrected. 
. The excessive overtime problem 
At le~t ~8 mamtenance workers was deemed a Level 4 violation on a ~erfo~g 'kef safety-related func- scale. of 1 to 5, with Level 1 being thll>re ---
tions at the Diablo Canron nuclear worst, said Marvin Mendonca, NRC 
power pl~t were w~rking far too section chief. 
much overtime, according ~ a .recent Level 4 violations are fairly com-Nucl~ Regulatory CoDlD1lSSlon in· mon, he said, noting that in a recent 
spection. . 
The workers were performing elec· year there were 23 Level 4 violations 
trical and mechanical maintenance on at the plant 
the Unit 1 reactor during its current There Is no penalty associated with 
refueling. said Ken Johnston, a the violation, said Mendonca, at-
resident NRC Inspector at the planl though PG&E is requJred to respond 
Though inspectors cited Pacific Gas with a list of corrective adions. 
and Electric Co. for a violatlon of the 
technical specifications of the plant's PG&~ om~ did not know that an 
license, no serious ~ resulted, workers ex~ overtime had to be 
h 'd .. ·r-'J'"•·-;-·~· 1 ., ti r approved,saidTbomas,andlschang-e S31 or: ~";~: :·~ .t I • ''·. ;-l lng its poUcles. From now on, an 
'1t didn't lead to-pJJyilcal. ~ overtime wort must be approved by 
!ems," said Johnston. "JJ It bad, Uley the plant manager. In the~ only 
:!ly~ve ~--~~m/r~ C}!~~~ d to be 
Inspectors rouD~ ~~!oCt."''/ Ins~e-~to~s ~ere irritated by 
6 and Nov. 3, at leaSt .1~ people had . · PG&E s initial response to the prob-
worked more than 72 hoUl'llln a single · lem, said Johnston. 
week, according ~ a ~tly 1. re- "Although the Inspectors' llndings leased NRC report . ~- . were brought to the attention of plant 
According to the report jlrepared managem~nt on ~ct. 27, Individuals In 
by Johnston and his colleague, Paul the electrical mam~c:e shop ex-
N arbut, workers must have authoriza- ceeded the 72-hour mamnum as late 
tion from the plant manager to work as Nov. 3, 1989," accorditg to the 
more than 72 hours in a week. report 
M.anag~ment ~d no knowledge of the In addition, after noti.Mng plant 
excesstve overtime. management, the inspectOrs• report 
PG&E spokesman Brad Thomas on the routine inspection was delayed 
said many of the refueling procedures because they had to wait more than 
aN! long and complicated, and compa- three weeks for the workers' time 
ny officials wanted to keep the cards. 
workers on the jobs until they were 
c'lmpleted. 
He emphasized that an the work 
dnne during the refueling is double-
"Tbey were not very repsonsive to 
our concerns," said Johnston. "We 
were frustrated" 
Thomas said that it took so long to 
' 
• 
respond because the daily time 
records of 1,000 workers bad to be reviewed. In addition, aU those work-ers who were found to have worbd 
~cessive overtiiiie ·had ~belnt;:' 
viewed. 1 ·:.· 
~ 
~ 
;·! 
I 
d I; 
r: 
f' 
1 
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t 
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.. ·NR,C criticizes Diablo engine!at~ 
~~).,1;.:.. ' . . :;;'~. 
'.;·By Teresa Ma rian.1 Brown ~ . 
"'t :Teleil:IJD·TriliLJ.De . 
~Fri~~; Canyon engineers are ~doingi1Dcomplete or inadequate 
· · ort.:J:harge.s a new federal report. · 
e 'report,· released this week by ~~Uie'.Nuclear Regulatory Commis· 
~p;'cltei~.Pacific Gas & ·Electric. 
· · :lor 14 possible violations.:..- • 
., Four of the citations could end up 
•. u~;Level· m violations and 10 have 
. r alleady been judged Level IV viola-"'.'Uou~'''·-; . 
; ··~. Unde; NRC rules, a Level I viola· 
:. tion is the most serious, and a Level 
· V violation the least serious. -~ PG&E spokesman Ron Rutkowski 
~Aid the utility is taking the NRC's ~-:report·: seriously. "We're going to 
.. promptly and aggressively take the 
~··appropriate corrective actions," he ~~ 'd ' .... -~ .. ~. .. ~ .Ill •··• "f .. 
;¢ The NRC is now studying the four 
-~u yet LJ.Dclassified Diablo violations 
. to•see.;if they warrant a Level m 
; 'status.~ 
~!! Diablo Canyon has received only ~:two Level ID violations in its histo-
~.ry · said NRC spokesman Greg ~: ~k.· The first was in 1984, when 
~ ::· PG&E was given a $50,000 fine for 
~:"inadvertently" having an emer· 
t: · gency reactor core cooling system 
t· out of service when it should have 
t been working, Cook said. The reac· tor was not running at the time. .... Tbe second came in 1986, when PG&E was ordered to pay a $50,000 
t .. fiDe for having one of two safety ~· valve systems out of service without ~ realizing it, Cook said. Level m ~: violations can bring fines from the ~ NRC; less-serious Level IV and V l~ violations have no fines attache~. 
~ · Having only two Level III vtola· 
~ tion.s "is a very good history," Cook :wd. "That's pretty good for viola-tions in terms of this (western) ' region.". ~ PG&E was assigned five Level IV f. violations when a small amount of 
= radioactive gas leaked from a reac· ~ tor core into the containment build· 
~ ing' ar.d · then into the atmosphere 
& during refueling April10, 1987. f ~ PG&E did not violate any rule.s 
r wbicb would warrant a more sert· ! ous. violation because the NRC ~d 
~ not at that time developed rules 111 
t the safety procedur~s wbich led to 
r the incident. Cook sa1d. 
i , Tbe latest violations were issued 
{after five NRC inspectors and sev· 
: eral independent contrac~ors spent 
~more than a month at Dtablo Can· 
. on- from Jan. 23 through Feb. 28. 
' ~-During that month, the team fo-! cused on Diablo's safety system 
. review and surveillance p_ro~r~ms. 
:What they saw "raised stgnthcant 
!· uestions " according to the report. 8 "Plant 'staff does not fullr under· 
;~nd the plant design basts ·:· the 
~commLJ.Dication) between engmeer· 
i~g- and plant (staff) is -
weak ... (and) engineering_ work 
has been incomplete or tnade· 
quate," the report said. . 
"Engineering needs to . be •.m· 
proved. The quality of engm.~er~g 
work needs to be improve~. sal~ 
Paul Narbut, the NRC:s seruo~. re~l· 
dent inspector at Dtablo. Tb1s 
demonstrates some issues we've 
been discussing with the plant staff 
for years ... it shouldn't be news to 
PG&E." 
Most serious of the four. unsettled 
violations is a problem w1th opera· 
tion of the plant's oce.an water 
cooling system, Narbut satd. 
PG&E's engineers told plant man· 
agement in a letter in -1983 to rLJ.D 
the system with three pumps, or 
add a second heat exchanger when 
only two of the pumps were rLJ.D· 
ning. That direction was apparently 
never followed. 
The incident illustrates weak com· 
munication between PG~.'~ nucle· 
ar design engineering divtston.. lo-
cated in San Francisco, and Dtablo 
managers and engineers, Narbut 
said. "We've been saying this for a 
while. and now we've brought home 
the point," he said. . 
Bryant Giffin. fonnerly .a des~g~ 
engineer in the San Franctsco divt· 
s1on and now assistant plant manag· 
er at Diablo. a2reed that the letter 
. ··ilo.f':~~· 
incident shows poor communicatioD.i ~ 
Communication between San Frap-0_·' 
cisco design engineers and· pla~t. ·-
engineers needs to improve, he saliL 
"We're trying," Griffin said. "We · 
recognize that bad been and sWill _ 
a problem. We're trying to improve : 
communication within our own or· 
ganization and the guys in' San 
Francisco are trying to do the same 
thing . . . I think it has improved." ... 
The letter. about the cooling sya-
tem heat exchangers should have 
been followed up on, Griffin said. i-0 
PG&E now uses a more formal 
notification system for such· eng!· 
neering directions, be said. San 
Francisco design engineen now .fol-
low up on what was done at Diablo · · 
with their design-change directions, .: 
be said. · · · ' ~-e-;, 
Griffin stressed Diablo officiala · 
are taking to heart all of the viola-
tions listed in the NRC report. ,. • ;.:-
"We want to do well," be· said. 
"When you. read the names of the 
No. 1 plants ln the United~States, 
and you see your dame there, you . · 
have pride. That's ~ben we ~ant_to 
be" he said. . .. 
PG&E has its own inspection pr. ·· 
gram to find the kinds of violations ·. 
listed in the NRC report. The NRC ·_ · 
praised PG&E for starting that pr. 
gram. but said it needed to :.!Je 
improved. · · · 4 
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Diablo's safety violations liste~r.>· 
Among violations of safety stan· PG&E is short ~veral hours• w~:~ . 
dards for which Diablo Canyon bas • Level IV violation: for deClaring a Unlt.2 •· 
been cited, or that tbe Nuclear ventilahon system o!)!rational even tiiOuOII- .... 
Regulatory Commission is consider· portion was not completed and was schtd·. -~ 
ing: . uled to be completed later, and !"• prow .;: 
Under cons'deration: A citation for a paperwork on the change had. ,not -~~en .. 
• . 
1 
. . completed. ;·~a.~;~-.... ·~ · 
fa11ure _to Incorporate 1 1_91l eng1neenno • Level IV violation: for installing 1 Unit 2 ' 
catculahon from PG&E eng.neers ~nto plant pipe support clo~r than reguletionsellowtd.\ :. 
operahon procedures. The calculation called Level IV violation· for not havin" tour ; 
tor a second ocean water coolant heat • . . · . . " · · 
trcllanger to be put Into service whenever PIPt bolls 1ft a Unit 2 coohng watt~ line !IO.~! 
one of tllree ocean water cooling system enough. · .:to.:·.:·.::~ 
pumps is out of service. • Level IV violation: to' rtplacing Urtb" 
• Under consideration: a citation for the quake support bolts on two dampers In a 
way PG&E handled the installation of a Unit 2 ventilation system without written 
replacement pump at Unit 2 during a main· work instructions or procetdures. ;:.. ·. ~- ·'~ 
tenance shutdown. The new pump was heav· • Level IV violation: tor not inspecting 
1er and required new earthQuake standard nine welds inside a ventilation pipe before' 
calculat1ons. However, the calculations were the pipe was welded shut from the outside 
not officially completed until a month after and the ventilation system was. declared 
Unit 1 was restarted, according to the NRC operable. · .. , ; 
report • Level IV violation: tor running a power 
• unoer consideration: citing PG&E tor supply cord for temporary construction 
tne way it handled tilt installation ot a piece projects next to a power cord that Is part 4f 
lor a pumo in the auxiliary salt water tne Unit 1 control room preuurlzatlon ·sys: ·. 
cooling system. The NRC report says PG&E tem - without a written safety evaluation · · 
•nstalled il without re·selting a breaker considering any electrical interference tt1t - • 
switch that would have told O!)!rators if it conwuction cord could cause. ;..._ -:Vc::-
wasn·t working properly, according to the • Level IV violation: for not filcin; a Unit 2. • ~ 
report. anchor bolt that didn't meet standards, aod ."· · 
• Under consideration: a citation for not tor not fixing loose. miuing and unpropeny, . 
hav1ng enough diesel fuel on hand at tile operating parts when a pump was replaced~;~ .. 
Plant. NRC regulations require nuclear pow· •Level IV violation: for allowing a worker,:,.· .. 
er plants to have at least seven days· worth to change a cooling system pump washJf'~ ... 
ot chuel futi ~tored to run plant touipment without filing the right paperwork. ,.,.. -~ ~,, .. ~ 
'" an emergency. The NRC calculated that -Term MarianiBrowr-• 
.. 
-A -ald.. S.. r ....O.o 5.mcl.v E.u-r ....! o.-;o. d-el, -BS 
Diablo Canyon reactor 
repaired, back on line 
Safety valve leak 
caused ~eeklong 
Unit 2 shutdown 
SAN LUIS OBISPO - Work· 
er.:; at the Diablo Can~·on nuclear 
power plant mtarted the Unit 2 
reactor Saturday. a week after a 
small leak in a safety valve prompt· 
ed its shutdown. utilit!· officials 
said. 
The unit. which had b("(·n in 
(·ontinuous service for nearly four 
months before the weeklong out· 
agP. will be ~adually brought up to 
full power. said Ron IWtkowskf.' a 
!<pokesman for Pacific Gas and 
EIN'tric Co., which operates the 
nuclear power plant. 
"We11 be conducting tests all the 
wa\' until full power is achi£'\•ed, 
prt~bably wmetime Monday." Rut-
kowski said. "You don't just flip a 
switch to turn it on again." , 
l't ilit~· officials shut down the ·: 
unit April 8 to n>place a pressurizer · 
!'o&fety valve that had begun leaking 
several weeks before. 1be valve is 
desitmed to open if pressure in the 
n>act.or coolinR system exceeds ac-
cepted lt>vels. 
"We monitored the leak for liE'\'· 
(·ral WE't'ks before deciding to shut 
1 down the unit," Rutkowski said. 
l"The !'.E'E'P81ZC was well below Nu· ciPar I-\ejZUlatory Commission stan· 
dard;; - about one-fiftieth of 
what's allowed - but we felt that 
because it wasn't getting any better, 
we F.hould shut. down the reactor 
and n>place the valve." 
DurinR the week that Unit 2 was J 
out of commission. Unit 1 operated 
at full capacity and continued to do ; 
so Saturday. Rutkowski said. The 
unit ·s shutdown had no affect on 
plant or public safety. 
r" Repair of Leaky Pipe \ 
·Forces Shutdown 
:of Diablo Reactor 
. ?-;?,.. '69 :sr. . Assnrral~d Pffu 
~tPsan Luis Obispo 
The Unit 2 reactor at the Diablo 
Canyon nuclear power plant was 
:shut down early yesterday for re-
·pair of a leaky pipe in the seawater 
-<·ooling system, a utility spokesman 
.·said. 
The plant's other reactor. Unit 
1. was operating at full power. 
The leak occurred in a heat ex-
chancer in a "non-nuclear" poruon 
· of the s\·stem. said Clvde Walthall. 
_l;pokcsman for Pacific-Gas and Elec-
:tne. 
H.epa1rs are expected to take 
1 '' o or three days. 
The reactor was running at 50 
:percent power for rout me cleamng 
. of the seawater cooling system 
when the leak was disco\·ered. Wal· 
thall said. The repairs will prevent 
) 
:;altwatcr from leakinJZ into part of 
1 h<' cooling system where it does not 
belong, he said. 
J 
I •. 
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Diablo Reactor 
Remains Shut Down 
For Repair of Pipe 
,_,,-n 
-4MIIOf'fGf~d Prral' 
san Luis Obispo ~J-. 
, The Unit 2 reactor at the Diablo 
: · ( ·anyon nuclear power plant re-
mained shut d~wn yesterday while 
workers repa1rt>d a leaky pipe in th£> 
ot(•an water tooling sy~tem. a utili-
',. spokesman said. 
.. 
,, 
, 
.• . 
·" 
·' .. 
" ,
" ·. 
". 
The leak. disco\'ered Sunda\ 
wa!> m the unit's "non-nudear" po·r. 
tton of the ~,·stem and po!>cd no 
<lancer of rad1at1on relca!>c. said 
l'l~·dc Walthall. spoke!>tnan for Pa-
tlfit Gas and Electric Co. 
The t;nit 1 reactor contmued to 
operate at 100 percent capacity, h(· 
~aid. 
·r 
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~,Opinion 
Editorials 
Report underlines 
' 
";. 
danger of Diablo 
A recent report on a mishap at Diablo CanyOn ·:; 
nuclear power plant in Aprill987 doesn't sound like the 
same incident that was reported to the Telegram-
Tribune at the time. 
The current report by the McClatchy News Service 
was based on information from Jesse Crews. a senior 
reactor engineer for the Nuclear Regulatory ,..:, 
Commiwlion who led an investigation of the incident. 
-,. Crews said the the NRC did an intense investigation 
of the- incident because it had catastrophic potent1a1. 
H things had been only sligbUy different, the NRC " 
official said, the result could have been a core t 
meltdown such as happened at Three Mile IslaDd. 
The McClatchy News Service report said it was 
"the most serious mishap" at the plant since it was 
turned on. "Water began to boil in one of Diablo's twin 
reactors at a time when most of its safety systems -
and its operators - we!\! dangerously relaxed." 
That is a bit different than the information we were 
given by a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. spokesman at 
the Ume - although many of the details were the same. 
The story at that point was that 30 gallons of· 
radioactive water had leaked and traces of ... 
radioactivity were released into the atmosphere. 
The spokesman said in Apri11987 the incident was 
''minor" and didn't endanger the public safety or 
workers at the plant. 
The Telegram-Tribune story went on to explain 
many of the details as recounted in the current 
McClatchy account. 
The main difference is that the potential for a core 
meltdown or other serious results was not made clear · 
right after the incident occurred. 
The incident was serious enough that the NRC 
issued bulletins to all the utilities in the country asking 
them to take steps to prevent the Diablo type of event 
and how to cope with it if it -occurs. 
We have pointed out over and over again that 
Diablo by its very nature as a nuclear power plant has 
a potential for disaster that cannot be overemphasized. 
This recent report bears that out and it should 
place an even greater burden on PG&E to tell it like it 
as whenever an emergency occurs at the plant. 
I 
I· 
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Nuclear plant panel 
needs a jump start 
The idea of creating a ~tatewide advisory safety 
committee to oversea all nuclear power plants in tbe state is a 
good one. 
Sen. Herschel Rosenthal. D-Los Angeles, has proposed a 
bill <SB2541) that would establish a six-member cammittee to 
review the safety, public health and environmental conditions 
of the nuclear plants in tbe state. 
Rosenthal said he introduced his bill because, in his 
opinion, tbe Diablo Canyon nuclear safety committee, 
negotiated as part of a Pacific Gas and Electric Co. rate 
settlement in 1988, has been a failure. 
So far only two members oftbe three-member panel have 
been appointed and tbe committee has not held any meetings 
yet One of tbe two is a UCLA professor, tbe other is an 
executive of a power company in North carolina. Attorney 
General John Van de Kamp, who was to pick the third 
member, rejected all nine nominees. 
Rosenthal's bill provides lor an advisory committee 
composed of a representive of the nuclear power industcy, a 
public health expert, an environmentalist, an emergency 
response expert, a nuclear safety engineer and a member of 
the public. 
It makes sense to us that establishing a broad-based 
advisory panel by state law is a much better way to oversee 
the nuclear industry than negotiating a committee out of a · 
rate agreement 
Rosenthal's bill, in our view, would lessen tbe chance that 
industry-oriented people would be the "watchdogs" over 
nuclear power. 
·· ... ,. . 
. ·. .,. 
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Bill seeks panel 
for nuclear safety 
·. ' 
By Jan Greene I 1. \ ~ C 
Telegram-Tribune ) 4' . 
The Diablo Canvon nuclear safetv 
committee is a •'failure." according to 
a state senator who has introduced 
legislation to create a statewide 
r.uclear safety paneL 
The panel has never met. although 
there are plans for a meeting in April 
in San Luis Obispo. 
Sen. Herschel Rosenthal, D-Los 
Angeles, complained that the commit-
tee should have been available last 
October to review any effects of the 
Lorna Prieta earthquake on Diablo 
Canyon. -.... .,_ The Diablo Canvon committee was 
created in Deceniber 1988 but onlv 
two of its three members have been 
appointed because of a dispute among 
state officials. 
"My bill would fix. the Diablo 
Canyon problem and at the same time 
4- .,. 
i ..• 
Please see Nuclear, Back Page 
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e:rtend independent oversight to all of 
the state's nuclear power plants." 
Rosenthal said in a written statement. 
Rosenthal is chairman of the state 
Senate Energy and Public Utilities 
Committee, which oversees nuclear 
power plants. 
Rochelle Becker, a spokeswoman 
for Mothers for Peace, long a critic of 
Diablo, said the fact that Rosenthal 
offered this proposal should not keep 
the Diablo committee from moving 
forward. 
"This isn't a replacement'' for the 
Diablo safety committee, she said. in 
part because it would take at least a 
year for the bill to get through the-
Legislature. 
However, Becker said Rosenthal's 
new panel could replace a poorly 
functioning Diablo committee "some-
time way down the road." 
Under the Rosenthal bill <SB 2541>, 
a six-member advisory committee 
would review the safety, public: health 
and environmental conditions of the 
four nuclear power plants in Califor-
nia. 
Diablo Canyon and San Onofre, 
near San Diego, are the only plants 
currently operating. Rancho Seco, in 
Sacramento, and Humboldt Bay, in 
Eureka are closed. 
Committee members would include 
an expert from the nuclear power 
industry, a public health expert, an 
environmentalist. an emergency re-
sponse expert, a nuclear safety engi-
neer and a member of the public. 
The Dlablo Canyon independent 
safety committee was created in a 
1988 rate settlement agreement nego-
tiated by Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 
the state Public Utilities Commission. 
and state Attorney General John Van 
deKamp. 
Van de Kamp, one of three parties 
to choose a member for the panel, in 
December 1989 rejected all nine 
nominees, saying they were all too 
industry-oriented. 
The PUC has refused to compile a 
new list. so the issue remains at a 
standstill 
In the meantime, the two members 
already appointed constitute a quo-
nun and . are planning an April 
~eeting somewhere in the San Luis 
Obispo area. according to committee 
member \Vllliam Kastenberg, a UCLA 
engineering professor. The other 
member is Warren H. Owen. an 
e:tecutive \\ith Duke Power Co. in 
North Carolina. 
Becker said her group wants input 
on how the committee sets up its 
meetings and procedures to be sure 
they are public. But letters to both 
men garnered only a simple response 
that they are planning a first meeting 
in April and the public will have an 
opponunity to speak then, Becker 
said. 
Under the Rosenthal bill, 
a six ~member advisory 
committee would review 
the safety, public health 
and environmental 
conditions of the state's 
nuclear power plants. 
. ., ·'~....__-..,...,-,·-··...----~ ..... ~·· 
Sina'l crowd praises, 
deplores Diablo safety 
1 o- I 1- Cf I t=eTF 
(Continued from page 1) 
self-described "mother for power," 
thanked the committee for meeting 
in San Luis Obispo because it gives 
residentS "the opponunity to give 
input to you" and "hear information 
from PG&E about what's occurring 
at the plant." 
Ilona Ing, a San Luis Obispo 
Realtor. posed some issues for com-
mittee members to think about. not-
ing that none of the members at-
tended the meeting of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's Advisory 
Committee on Reactor Safety in San 
Luis Obispo last month. 
lng said she was surprised to fmd 
that the ACRS had hired a seismolo-
gist from the East Coast who is not 
familiar with West Coast seismicity 
and who also did not attend the 
ACRS meeting. 
Cal Poly professor Richard 
Kransdorf addressed the committee 
at length, saying there is a need for 
the committee to have a local office. 
He said safety committee mem-
bers not attending ARCS meetings 
indicates the comminee is "going 
through a lot of motions." 
Kransdorf said he reviewed the 
county's emergency safety plan in 
the Diablo Canyon repository at Cal 
Poly and wondered if any committee 
members had examined it. 
He said while some pans of the 
five-volume plan had been updated 
to 1990 and 1991, one had not been 
updated since 1987, another not 
since 1982, and the portion for Cal 
Poly was only a rough draft from 
1982. 
"Some were not there at all," he 
said. noting that the Cal Poly shel-
tering analysis simply said "to be 
filled in by contractor." 
He said the plan contained some 
general information about sheltering 
in the event of a release of radioac-
tive mazerial, little information on 
what to do in an eanhquake, and 
"absolutely nothing" in the event of 
both at the same time. 
"1 believe it's criminal people 
have no idea in this county where 
they might go in the event of a 
nuclear release if they cannot evacu-
w.c." Kransdorf said. 
He also said there was no infor-
mation on what kind of protection 
would be afforded by various types 
of shelters. · 
Kransdorf also criticized advance 
warning and practices for 
emergency drills at Diablo Ca_ny~. 
"I'd like to urge that someume tt 
would be nice to do an unannounced 
drill at night in bad weather and see 
what. kind of results you have." 
Kransdorf said. . 
He offered to look into the issues 
he bad raised if the committee so . 
desired. 
Kransdorf said the lack of public ! , 
panicipation at the meeting ·Thurs-
day tnight be a "reflection of happi-
ness or simply the relaxation of peo-
ple or they view the committee as 
increasingly irrelevant." 
Committee Chairman Warren 
Owen said a committee member and 
its legal counsel bad planned to at-
tend the ACRS meeting in Wash-
ington. but when it was postponed 
and moved to San Luis Obispo they 
were unable to be here. 
But he said a consultant did anend 
and briefed the committee on the 
meeting Thursday. 
"In all fairness. we try to be re-
sponsive to things that come before 
the committee," said mpnber WU-
laim Kastenberg, notillc thai no 
members were here when the chair-·· . 
man of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission visited Diablo Canyon 
because "be doesn't tell us when 
be's coming here." 
He pointed out that the committee 
only learned of the ACRS meeting 
from Kransdorf. 
"I'm not the person that should be 
telling you. .. Kransdorf said. urging 
the commiuec to set up a communi-
cation process with other advisory 
and regulatory bodies. 
The commiuee's legal counsel 
Robert Wellington said the county's 
emergency p~ ~~·t within .the 
committee's jurisdiction and advised 
Kransdorf to comact the State Advi-
sory Committee on Emergency 
Planning. 
"I'm sorry that anyone feels 
we're not taking our responsibility 
seriously," Owen said. .. 4s Roben 
(Wellington) pointed out.. some 
(issues) are in our purview and some 
are noL · 
·an 
J;lecuic Co.Bi1· .. a fV\T iUla'l" ... . . . ...• ·.'-D4;. . r-· 
all the.. . ~-4-~ ~ public commeDi" .. -= .. ·; tt But Motiun for ~~'lfe le8d g opp(ment of. tile Diabro' Canyo1 
~UC;Iear Power Plant;: \Jas ·been boy. ~coumg th .... .;, · i b'ecauie e . CQll!JDi~ a. mecung. 
'.. they believe"lhc committel ~ useless and have: petitioned for i 
tb be disbanded. 
• Citizens for ~·Energy,, 
nut!ear. group, did bl.ve a rep 
emauve present. but she did not 
any safety issues. 
Chris Pillsbury· Qf Los Osos. 
{Continued on page 6) 
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Nuclear safety panel 
on Diablo Canyon 
has yet to meet once 
By Russel CJemings 
\fc:Clatc:by News Service 
fRESNO - When the epic elec-
tricity rate case for the Diablo Can-
yon nuclear power plant was senled 
in 1988. part of the agreement called 
for creating an independent commit· 
tee on safety to start keeping an eye 
on the plant in January 1989. 
Today. more than a year after that 
deadline. the committee has yet to 
hold its first meetmg - or even set a 
finn date for a first meeung. Its rwo 
members have never met each other. 
And its $500.000 budget for 1989 will 
never be spent. 
Blame the delay in part on the 
time-consuming process of screenmg 
potential committee members. said 
Pete Arth. a staff anomev for the 
state Public Utilities Commission 
who has been doubling. as the com-
mittee's lawyer until the comminee 
can get itself organized enough to 
hire its own Iawver. 
·The process took some time." 
Arth said. "There was a nominating 
process that required looking at a 
fairly large pool of potential candi-
dates and making sure they had suf-
ficient expertise." 
.---Blame it in part as well on a long-
standing dispute over the makeup of 
_ the committee. which originally was 
supposed to have three members. 
The dispute ended in December with 
Attorney General John Van de Kamp 
refusing to appoint a member on 
·grounds that the entire list of pros· 
peers was aligned too closely with the 
, nuclear power industry. 
· 1 he two members - William E. 
i(Utenberg, an engineering profes· 
sor at the Universitv of California, 
f:.os Angeles. and Warren Owen. ex-
«;.~tive vice president of Duke Power 
Co .. a utility based in Charlone. N.C. 
- were appointed by Gov. Deukmeji· 
~ .. and the chairtnan of the California 
Energy Commission. 
The 1988 settlement lets the Pacif· 
tf Gas & Electric Co .. which operates 
lfte plant. I'KO\Ier more of its S5.8 bil· 
~ in construction costs if it runs Di· 
ablo Canyon more efficiently than 
~1~'£~plant. 
-~to make sure PG&E doesn't cut 
tomers. the safety committee was 
created. Its primarv job is to make an 
annual repo~ on . the safety of the 
that they had decided to carry on de-
spite not having a third member. 
Kastenberg said their present plans 
were to have their first meeting 
sometime in May at San Luis Obispo. 
not far from the plant on the Pacific 
coast. . • 
~The work is there. and we'll tack· • 
le it." Kastenberg said. "We'll have a i 
meeting. and he and 1 will have to 
discuss in public how we will oper-
ate." 
Arth said the committee would 
have access to the entire plant and to 
all of the documents relating to it, in· 
eluding those that are not nonnally 
made public. such as reports by the 
industry's secretive safety panel. the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Opera-
tions. 
The list of prospective committee 
members was drawn up by the chair· 
man of the PUC. the chainnan of the 
engineering department at the Uni· 
versity of California, Berkeley. and 
PG&E. • 
• Rochelle Becker. a member of the 
Mothers for Peace group. which took 
a leading role in the decadelong op-
position to Diablo Canyon's con· 
struction and licensing. said the 
screening process gave PG&E virtual 
veto power over the candidates. 
All of the candidates •. Becker said, 
"have been involved in the nuclear 
industry. Most of them bave been in· 
volved in EPRI, the Electric: Power 
Research Institute. which is an advo-
cate of nuclear power." 
In defense. PG&E spokesman 
Brad Thomas said the utility simply 
played by the nates. 
"'ur view is that this is what ev-
erybody agreed to. • Thomas said. 
"We've done what we said we would 
do." 
Because the committee did noth· 
ing in 1989, it spent none of its 
$500,000 budget. so that money -
which wu supposed to come from 
PG&E's customers - will not be 
charged to them. Arth said. 
As for this year and the future. 
Kastenberg said then! would be no J 
shortaee of things to spend money I 
on. especially because the committee 
Is supposed to operate independent· f 
ly. 
•we'll use a lot of consultants, 
there will be some travel. we'U have 
some staff members and we've been 
advised that we should also hire 
.. -- --~··-~ .... -.i. 
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Panel is part of Diablo ~on rate-setting deal 
Van de Kamp rejects 
rate panel nominees 
SACRAMENTO (AP) - At-
torney General John Van de 
~p declined Friday to ap-
pomt anyone to the Diablo Can-
yon Independent Safety Com-
mittee. 
He said the seven nem.i.oees 
from wbich he was to choose 
were too aligned to the nuclear 
power industry and none would 
bring diversity or indepentient 
views to the committee. 
Tbe committee was part of 
an agreement approved by the 
Public Utilities Commission 
that called for rates for electric-
ity from Diablo canyon to be 
based on bow well the $5.5 bil-
lion plant perfonns over its ex-
pected 30-year life. Rates were 
increased 5 percent last Janu-
ary. 
Pacific Gas&: Electric, wbic:b 
owns tbe nuclear power pJaat 
near San Luis Obispo. is paying 
for the committee. whose three 
members are to be appointed by 
the governor, tbe attorney gen-
eral and tbe c::bainnan of the 
California EDergy Commission. 
Nine men with backgrounds 
in nuclear power were nominat· 
ed for the committee last Julv 
by the rresideDt of the PUC, the 
president of~ aDd tbe dean 
of engineeriDg at University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Gov. George Deukmejian ap-
pointed William Kasteoberg of 
t.be UCLA School of' Engineer-
ing. EDergy CommissiOn Chair-
man Charles lmbrecht named 
Warren Owen. executive vice 
president of Duke Power Co. of 
North Carolina. 
Van de Kamp said the indus-
try views of the seven are al-
ready represented on the com-
mittee by the other two nomi-
nees. 
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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL: We're here today because a number of serious 
controversies have arisen regarding California's nuclear plants. For example, 
proposals have been suggested to shut down the San Onofre facility in Southern 
California due to environmental and cost problems. 
There is also a continuing debate over whether the Diablo Canyon Plant in San Luis 
Obispo County will be able to withstand a major earthquake. And I have been concerned 
that the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee may not be doing an adequate job. 
Questions have also been raised about the costs and safety of shutting down and 
removing high-level nuclear waste from the Rancho Seco Plant near sacramento, and the 
Humboldt Bay Plant near Eureka. We will explore all of these issues today. 
But there is also a broader question before this committee. Recently, Governor 
Wilson released his "Energy Plan" for California which sets forth a bold strategy to 
meet California's future electricity needs through energy conservation and renewable 
energy generation facilities. Bill proposals consistent with the Governor's plans are 
pending in the Legislature. 
Neither the Governor's energy strategy nor the legislative proposals envision 
nuclear power playing a significant role in California's energy future. This leads me 
to the general question of whether this state should step back and reassess its 
position on the use of n~clear power, particularly in view of safety, environmental, 
and ratepayer considerations. 
So in essence, this hearing is about the future of nuclear power in California. 
Will we be seeing proposals for new plants? How long will we keep aging nuclear plants 
on line? And what are we doing to decommission shut-down nuclear plants? 
I am pleased to say that we have with us today distinguished panelists to discuss 
these matters. 
Let me conclude my remarks with the ground rules for the hearing. I'm asking all 
witnesses to please refrain from reading your written testimony. Your written material 
will be put into the record. Instead, please take 10 to 15 minutes, or less, to 
highlight the major points you would like to make. 
Questions from the members may follow each presentation. In a few cases, where I 
have had numerous questions, some of you have been given advanced copies of the 
questions. So please be prepared to respond. 
At the end of the hearing, we will have an open-microphone session to take brief 
comments from persons whose views were not represented by the witnesses. Those wishing 
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to speak at the open-mike session should give their name to the committee sergeant. 
Now Senator Russell, Senator Hart, any comments pertaining to this? 
What I suggest is that each panel come forward and sit in the front row seats, and 
then we'll take one witness at a time at the table. 
Let's start with John B. Martin, Regional Administrator of the u.s. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. Welcome, and thank you for attending. 
MR. JOHN B. MARTIN: Is the microphone on? 
Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senatore. I'm pleased to be here this morning. 
I am going to take you up on your invitation and refrain from reading this statement. 
It will be provided for the record. 
What I would like to do would be to briefly summarize our responsibilities and, 
from our perspective, the status of the four nuclear power facilities in California. 
I'll start by just a very brief summary of what we do. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has basically three functions. One is to promulgate regulations 
implementing the Atomic Energy Act; secondly, is to license nuclear power plants as 
well as a host of other types of facilities involving radioactive materials for medical 
use and research and universities and whatever. And then, lastly, we spend a valuable 
portion of our time doing inspections of the different facilities, and that's primarily 
the function of my office. I'm located in Walnut Creek, and we have roughly 100 people 
in the office of which roughly 65 or so are devoted full time to the inspection of 
nuclear power plants, as well as our 42 other staff that includes work in Washington 
and the regions. 
The regulation development and licensing was handled by our headquarters staff 
based in Washington, so I won't spend a lot of time on that. As I said, the inspection 
program enforcement activities are handled in our office. 
We basically have two categories of inspectors. Each nuclear power plant has at 
least two full-time resident inspectors. Some have more. San Onofre, for example, we 
have four people there, full-time residents. They do inspections on a regular basis, 
frequently at night. There are quite a bit of unannounced back-shift coverage. It's 
the function of the resident inspectors to have their finger on the pulse of what's 
going on, to understand the people, how they interact, and have a good sense of the 
chain of events as they're unfolding from day to day. About half of the inspections or 
so are provided by our regional-based inspectors who are primarily specialists in such 
things as radiation detection and various engineering disciplines. And they travel 
through the plants, typically, for a week at a time, eo that over a period of time they 
have a broader perspective of several different plants. 
As I say, we devote, on the average of six staff years per year on inspection 
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activities of each nuclear power plant. Some give a little more, some a little less, 
depending on the activities at the plant. But it averages out roughly six, 
six-and-a-half staffers per plant. 
Let me summarize briefly our view of the performance at the nuclear power plants in 
California. As you may know, each year or so, a period of 18 months, we do an 
evaluation, a summary evaluation, of how we think the plants are performing in several 
different areas of operation -- engineering, quality assurance, radiologic detection, 
maintenance, and a few other topics. And we summarize in a numerical fashion how we 
think the plants are doing. 
San Onofre is a three-unit station with -- Unit 1 is an older plant that's been in 
operation since 1967, and Units 2 and 3 are a more recent vintage, in the early '80s. 
And our summary for these plants is that their performance has been generally good to 
excellent during the last four or five years. We've had a couple of enforcement issues 
over the last couple of years, one involving engineering deficiencies -- that was in 
1988 -- and another in 1991 involving failure to maintain safety compliance completely 
in accordance with the technical specifications. But in general, our conclusion is 
they are an above average performer and generally satisfactory. 
Diablo Canyon is a two-unit station that started operation in the early '80s, and 
our evaluation of them is that they've been on a continually improving trend since 
start-up. And our overall evaluation is very good to superior. It's, as I say, 
generally an improving performer. 
As you may know, there has been a sizable issue involving seismic safety at Diablo. 
In fact, part of the additional licensing was the requirement that they do a seismic 
re-review to take into account any new geological information and new technology that 
may have developed during the first two years of plant operation. That review was 
recently completed; we've completed our review and heard all the different views on it 
and considered the plant design is entirely satisfactory for the seismic conditions 
that exist there. Diablo Canyon, that's had a ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can we hear from Senator Russell. 
SENATOR NEWTON R. RUSSELL: As I recall, Diablo Canyon initially was designed and 
then re-designed when we found some additional seismic concerns that deal with those 
issues; is that correct? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes, that happened a couple of times. As I understand it, again, the 
plant was originally done, construction, permanent in the early '70's sometime. And 
the plant was well under construction when this new fault was called the Hosgri Fault. 
And I can't speak real authoritatively about that. But as I understand it, that was a 
sizable perturbation in the design. It was a location in which the fault hadn't been 
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anticipated, and the plant was re-designed to meet the new requirements and 
substantially upgraded. And so that's correct. There was a substantial re-design of 
the plant during the late '70s. 
Then, as you may recall, right in about 1981 or so, there were some additional 
design problems found which, just the quality of the design and engineering work, 
wasn't specifically seismic related -- and that happened at about the time I got up 
there -- and required a couple of years to go back and redo and reverify and check the 
design. Diablo Canyon is one of those plants that we know probably most about, not 
only the seismic design, but the whole plant design of any plant in the country. But 
you're right. It's had a considerable amount of checking and double-checking and 
independent verification. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In your study, the review has shown what regulations of the 
seismic ••• 
MR. MARTIN: Concludes that the design of the plant, as it stands today, is 
entirely satisfactory for the seismic conditions at the plant as they are known today. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's true of San Onofre also? 
MR. MARTIN: Yes. Turning to Rancho seco -- of course, this was shut down due to a 
voter referendum -- and in the last couple of years the fuel was removed, and we worked 
quite closely with SMUD over the last couple of years to work through the 
decommissioning plans on a step-by-step basis and have gradually worked towards their 
submitting decommissioning plans, which I suspect they will do sometime this summer. 
And we're prepared to act expeditiously on it. In the meantime, the fuel has been all 
consolidated and has been stored, and sizable portions of the plant have been cleaned 
up. As far as we're concerned, things have been proceeding satisfactorily towards 
decommissioning. 
Humboldt Bay is the last plant I'll mention. This is a very small plant located 
near Eureka. In 1976, we required that the plant be upgraded to meet more modern 
seismic standards. PG&E decided at the time that after some studies that they just 
didn't want to spend the money to do that. It was just too much trouble for the 
seismic risk, so they elected to shut it down and decommission it. And Humboldt, like 
Rancho, has had the fuel unloaded in the spent-fuel pool and is stored. And as soon as 
a federally funded site or a storage facility is available, it's my understanding to 
ship the fuel off and complete dismantling of the plant. 
And that concludes my remarks, a very brief summary of our written testimony. And 
I'll be happy to answer any questions that ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You're aware that we provided you in advance with a number of 
questions. I'd like to just go through them--
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MR. MARTIN: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- one at a time. 
What is the NRC's position on the use by state regulatory agencies of 
performance-based ratemaking where utilities are paid on the basis of the amount of 
power generated? 
MR. MARTINt Well, I think we're somewhat defensive about it. We've proceeded 
rather cautiously in this area because, depending on the details of these schemes, they 
could be good or they could be awful. And I think the ones I'm familiar with here in 
California are not of great concern. What we're particularly concerned are incentive 
plans that would provide an incentive for utilities that, if you keep running the plant 
when you really ought to shut it down to do maintenance or some other kind of 
corrective actions. And in particular, we've had concerns about incentives that have 
very sharp thresholds. You know, a utility would have a very large incentive to keep 
operating until next Friday, as opposed to this Thursday, when it's time to fix a 
valve, or sharp thresholds or doing evaluations over very short periods of time where 
there's large incentives to keep running a plant as opposed to shut it down for 
maintenance. We have not seen that yet, but the commission has taken a fairly strong 
position, and we're going to be looking for this sort of thing and communicate to the 
public service commissions our feeling. And we've really got to be careful with these 
things so that the utilities maintain the incentives to operate these plants 
responsibly. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You've got a point. Doesn't the performance-based rate making 
incentive concept fall in that same category? I mean if you're paying for producing 
power, they do not pay when you don't, then the incentive is to run the power plant. 
And depending upon the economic conditions of the utility and the person in charge, 
they pose a risk. When you talk about dollars and cents, the bottom line to 
stockholders is that they pose a risk to the public if there's danger when they 
operate. 
MR. MARTIN: Well, I think that's true and that's what we're concerned about. And 
if the incentives are particularly over the longer term, I think it's of less concern 
than if it is over the shorter term, where you know, it's not unusual for a power 
plant to develop a deteriorating condition in the valve or something to where it would 
be wise to shut down and fix the valve. Well, if you have incentives to run over 
periods of years or months, that doesn't really affect that decision much. But if you 
have one that, for example, there's a sharp penalty if you run less than nine months, 
and your valve is leaking at eight months in 28 days, you have an emotional commitment 
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to keep operating when you really shouldn't. Those are the kinds of things we're 
worried about. 
But as I said, we haven't seen that anywhere out here, but I think we've taken a 
position on this kind of a preventive measure to kind of remind people to be mindful of 
it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What's the NRC's position on the creation of Independent 
Safety Committees for nuclear plants? And what contacts have you had with the Diablo 
Canyon Independent Safety Committee? 
MR. MARTIN: As far as I know, we don't have any position expressly articulated on 
Independent Safety Committees. I think, as far as we're concerned that, again the 
situation is in the details if it's a committee that seeks to provide direction to the 
utility and conflicting signals would, what we consider, not provide for safety, I 
think that would be a problem. So far, the Independent Safety Committee at Diablo does 
not appear to be set up that way. We have not -- I personally have not had an 
interaction with an independent committee which operates independently, as far as I can 
tell. I've read the first report or two, and it did seem like the kinds of issues they 
were raising were very similar to the kinds of things we've been concerned about. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are they employees or outside citizens? 
MR. MARTIN: No, this is an outside citizen's group. It's a very complicated 
scheme that perhaps PG&E could explain better than I. But it involves faculty from 
UCLA. Well, there's a fairly complicated scheme of nominating the slate of candidates, 
and then the appointments are made, I believe -- I'm not sure exactly, but I believe 
the appointments are finally made by the Chairman of the PUC, Attorney General, and the 
Energy Commission. so there's a nomination process of the slate of candidates by a 
variety of commissions, and I think either the company gets to nominate some and then 
the final selection is made by the chairman of the California Energy Commission, the 
chairman of ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
What is the NRC's policy concerning plant license renewals? In other words, will 
aging plants, such as San Onofre, have to meet tougher safety requirements than those 
applied to newer plants? 
MR. MARTIN: Well, let me answer it this way. The requirements that the plants 
have to meet are reviewed on a continuous basis. When the older plants, like San 
Onofre, didn't want it, for example, when we conclude that it gets out of date, as we 
did in the late '70's, we concluded that it was not up to snuff on seismic 
requirements; and the plant was ordered to upgrade to meet current seismic criteria, 
which they did during the early part of the '80's. That's not on a continuous basis. 
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So when the license expires, there should not be a big backlog of unresolved safety 
issues. Those are handled on a daily basis, weekly basis, so that at the time license 
renewal comes the issues ought to be pretty well restricted to age-related degradation. 
There isn't any sharp difference between a plant that's 40-years-old and one that's 
40-years-and-6-months. And so the scheme that we've adopted for license renewal is to 
have the utility submit at least five years ahead of time, if they elect to renew their 
license, an evaluation of the plant and any age-related susceptibilities, just because 
of time, that need to be evaluated. Those issues will be reviewed by the staff and 
litigated in a public hearing, if agreed to and if it's desired, and that is the 
approach. But we do not foresee saving up a whole bunch of items until the license 
renewal. Both should be dealt with. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Has your agency reduced the number of on-site inspections at 
the nuclear plants in California as a result of budgetary problems? 
MR. MARTIN: Well, my budget is a little bit less than it was years ago, so I'll 
have to say yes. I've got like 100 people where I used to have at least 110. So we've 
done we do some fewer inspections. On the other hand, during the 1980s, there was 
an awful lot of activity in the western plants. And there were several upgrade 
programs underway so that -- although at some point you realize, we do fewer 
inspections than we used to. The activity level is way down. So I would not see that 
there's any appreciable difference in the amount of coverage. The Diablo Canyon, for 
example, there was, at one time we had four resident inspectors that we had two plants 
in a start-up program. And they subsequently are going through the start-up phases and 
settled down to steady operations. But I haven't had to reduce because of any budget 
concerns. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Finally, you've already said that -- I guess it's fair to say 
that the NRC has rejected or given little weight to the report provided by the u.s. 
Geological Survey concerning Diablo Canyon's seismic risks associated with the Hosgri 
Fault. 
MR. MARTIN: I would disagree with that, Mr. Chairman. The NRC considered in great 
detail the Geologic Survey Report. As a matter of fact, it's included as an appendix 
to the overall review. I think a better characterization would be that the report was 
considered and reviewed in detail and discussed. There remains, as I understand it, 
and I'm just parroting what I've been told-- I'm not an expert in this --that there's 
a difference of opinion on what kind of slip motion may occur along the fault line. 
And there was, after all the reviews were done, we concluded that the NRC's view and 
our consultant's view were also supportable positions; so we just agreed to disagree. 
But, the overall result of this, in terms of what does it mean, is the plant 
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design. It's my understanding that there's an intellectual discussion over the site of 
the Hosgri fault, but I believe that everybody agrees that the ground motion and the 
requirements that the plant would have to withstand would not be much different at all 
within the envelope. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We'll have an opportunity to hear from the u.s. Geological 
Survey soon. 
Well, thank you very much. I appreciate your --
MR. MARTIN: Certainly. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: input today. 
Next with us is William Chamberlain, General Counsel for the California Energy 
Commission. Welcome. 
MR. WILLIAM CHAMBERLAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
William Chamberlain appearing for the Energy Commission. Seated next to me is Mr. 
Daniel Nix of the Energy Commission who co-chairs the Western Interstate Energy Board 
Committee on high-level waste. He's here to answer any questions you might have of the 
federal program for disposing of spent fuel from nuclear reactors. 
Based on the requests in your invitation, I'm going to try to do two things, three 
things, this morning: First of all, summarize the Energy Commission's responsibilities 
with respect to nuclear power plants; second, I'll discuss our view concerning the 
likelihood of new nuclear power plants being sited in California; and finally, I'll 
address the commission's role in the operation of the plants. 
Addressing first our responsibilities, which is siting nuclear power plants, we 
have no jurisdiction over any existing nuclear power plants that you're looking into in 
particular today. They were all specifically exempted from our licensing authority and 
from the '76 nuclear laws. 
we did evaluate the possibility of alternatives to the Rancho Seco nuclear plant 
and found that SMUD had that under consideration. And we found that SMUD would like to 
be able to purchase alternative energy from others. But we have no regular role in 
inspecting or monitoring any of the existing Diablo or San Onofre units. 
Turning to our assessment of the likelihood of new nuclear power plants in 
California, we concluded the probability of that event is very low for a number of 
reasons. First of all, we feel that utility officials have indicated no interest in 
continuing with nuclear power development. They're citing the high cost of 
construction, long regulatory and construction lead times, and public opposition to 
nuclear power. And they're not alone in this attitude. No new nuclear power plants 
have been ordered in the United States since 1978. 
Second, I think there are -- this attitude is also driven by the fact that there 
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are many sources of electricity today that compete with nuclear power, including 
demand-side management, co-generation, repowering of existing utility gas-fired 
boilers, and alternative resources, such as wind, geothermal, and solar-based 
technologies. In addition, natural gas prices are very low today. One of the many 
benefits of nuclear power is replacing fuel, oil, or natural gas, burned by other 
utilities. And our recently completed gas price forecast suggests that these prices 
will remain attractive at least through the 1990's. So that made highly capital 
intensive nuclear power plants seem economically unattractive. 
The third and fourth reason for our view that new plants are unlikely has to do 
with earthquake safety and scarcity of water for cooling. Almost all of our 
experience, including what Senator Russell indicated just a few moments ago, with 
nuclear power plants, have been marred by unexpected problems that have come up with 
respect to earthquake faults which were undiscovered when the plant began. Because of 
our generally unstable geology, the construction costs are higher here than they would 
be in other parts of the country. And the likelihood of geologic surprises is 
increased. 
Additionally, because the nuclear units convert heat to electricity less 
efficiently than other kinds of power plants, they require more water for cooling. And 
I'll give you the last six year's drought that dramatizes the need to rely on sources 
of generation that require less water consumption. 
A further hurdle for any new nuclear power plant proposed, at least by an 
investor-owned utility in this state, is the Public Utilities Commission's current 
regulatory procedures for resource acquisition. Utilities don't simply decide what 
they want to build and go out and build it today. They have to first identify what 
they believe is the best economically attractive resource. And then they have to allow 
other parties to bid in order to allow competition to benefit ratepayers. This 
procedure would make a utility commitment to the nuclear power plants today difficult, 
if not impossible. In our analysis of future need we did not identify nuclear power 
plants. And even if one was identified, it would have to be open to competition from 
other parties to have the opportunity to offer to provide that power. 
Finally, as you're probably ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are you saying then that ? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I think they would try to propose the cheapest possible plant 
that they could, and it would have to be -- it would have to turn out to be less 
expensive than all the alternatives. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'll ask another question. If you talk about alternative energy 
and natural gas projects, those fuels are fossil fuel. And there is some concern about 
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heating up the atmosphere, the greenhouse effect, and so on. And it's my understanding 
that the hydro and solar and so forth were more valuable but are less than 5 percent of 
our power. So as we grow, we're looking at more fossil fuel generated power; is that 
true? And if that is true, how do we deal with the greenhouse effect? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: I think the greenhouse effect is one of the issues that the 
nuclear industry hopes will provide incentives for nuclear plants in the future. We 
will right now, at this stage, could establish a goal, for example, to lower greenhouse 
emissions. We could buy a great deal more emission reduction per dollar in efficiency 
improvement and possibly in future renewables. Or this could turn out to be wrong if 
the cost of nuclear power plants comes down substantially. But current construction 
costs are high. I just don't think you're going to be competitive with efficiency 
improvements and renewables. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You indicated that renewable& were limited, and I think certainly 
in today•s technology that's true. But aren't there some problems in their 
development? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: In addition to the natural gas power plants, emissions today are 
very, very low. For example, earlier emissions of 80 parts per billion are down to 
less than 5 parts billion today. And we believe there's even a possibility that those 
emissions could be reduced further with new technology. So I don't -- and when you 
look at the electricity growth which is very small compared to the past, you can 
increase generation efficiency to meet needs. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: My understanding is that you have reviewed the San Onofre Unit 
Number 1. Is it under Energy Commission jurisdiction? 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: No, Mr. Chairman. I believe that when they were rebuilding the 
plant in some way to add 50 megawatt capacity we looked at it. 
I think the final point that I would like to make relates to our experience in 
successfully defending California's nuclear laws from pre-emption challenges. 
California citizens are obviously concerned with the safety of nuclear power plants, 
and that gives rise to your legitimate concerns with these issues. But the United 
States Supreme Court has now clearly indicated that actions of the states that are 
specifially designed to regulate radiation hazards are pre-empted. By contrast, the 
the court has unanimously upheld California's regulations that were based on legitimate 
economic questions relating to the wisdom and cost-effectiveness of using this 
technology as compared with other alternatives. The state can also legally regulate 
environmental concerns that relate to radiation hazards, such as biological effects. 
So we would therefore recommend that any action the committee of the legislature 
might consider in the future with respect to the existing nuclear power plants focus on 
-10-
two areas: the environmental impacts that are not associated with radiation hazards, 
and the economics of continued investment in these facilities, given possible nuclear 
safety requirements by the NRC. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I'd like to welcome Senator Boatwright to the hearing. 
MR. CHAMBERLAIN: That's the end of our ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much for your testimony. we move to the next 
one now. 
Mr. Edward O'Neill, Assistant General counsel with the PUC. Welcome. 
MR. EDWARD O'NEILL: Thank you. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senators, Assemblymen. 
My name is Ed O'Neill. I'm the Assistant General Counsel with the California Public 
Utilities Commission. And this morning, I was planning on just going briefly over the 
role of the commission as it relates to nuclear power plants. We have other people who 
will be here later in this hearing to discuss the issues concerning the San Onofre Unit 
1 Plant, the Diablo Canyon Plant, and the Humboldt, and all sorts of general items this 
morning and answer any questions you may have relating to those general issues. 
Very briefly, the regulation of nuclear power is divided. It's divided between the 
federal government and the state. It's divided here in California between the Public 
Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission exercises authority and its exclusive authority 
over the nuclear safety and the technical aspects of nuclear power development as it 
relates to nuclear safety. So they have jurisdiction over radiation hazards and 
handling of nuclear waste, the technical design issues concerning the plants, the 
Quality Assurance Program, and things of that sort. But that does leave a significant 
amount of authority for the state to exercise over nuclear power. 
The Atomic Energy Act does not pre-empt traditional state authority over production 
and distribution of electricity. Those functions that have been traditionally 
exercised by states -- and they continue to be functions that can be exercised by 
states -- are being exercised by the State of California and other states. In the 
State of California, the authority that we have is divided into, as I said, between the 
Public Utilities Commission and the Energy Commission. 
The Public Utilities Commission generally exercises what we consider economic 
authority, but it isn't solely or strictly economic authority, and I'll explain that 
briefly in a moment. Our primary function is a rate-making body. We have to decide 
jurisdiction over the rates that the utilities charge and over the rates that cover the 
costs associated with nuclear power plant construction, operation, and maintenance. We 
are responsible for setting methods for the recovery of the costs associated with 
nuclear power, and those rate-making methods have a significant impact on the way the 
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utilities respond to events, the decisions they make, and consequently on certain 
resources and the ratepayers. 
We also have authority to set aside funds for decommissioning nuclear power plants. 
That is an important activity that we are engaged in on a periodic basis. We take a 
look at the amount of money that is going to be set aside for future decommissioning. 
We have responsibility for establishing some means to assure that those funds are 
available when they are needed to decommission plants in the future, and we also try to 
make sure that the funds are collected in such a way that ratepayers who benefit from 
the power produced from the nuclear power plant also pay the costs associated with the 
decommissioning of that plant. so we try to match the cost of the facility, both the 
construction and operation, maintenance, and future decommissioning costs with those 
ratepayers who are receiving benefits. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The amount of money that's allocated for the future 
decommissioning, is that paid on a monthly table by all the ratepayers; and is that a 
small increment of their rate? 
MR. O'NEILL: It's a small increment of the rate that's currently charged to 
ratepayers, and we can get into this a little more detailed when we talk about Humboldt 
in particular. But in general, the Public Utilities Commission holds a hearing ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't have to ••• 
MR. O'NEILL: Okay. But basically it's recovered through your utility bills. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How is that then sequestered? By the utility or by the CPUC or 
what? 
MR. O'NEILL: We require that it be set aside in a separate fund, a separate 
department account. Some states allow ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yes, okay. 
MR. O'NEILL: We require them to set it aside so that there is a higher degree of 
assurance that that money will be there. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And the interest on that money then is factored into the total 
ultimate cost? 
MR. O'NEILL: It is. Third, I mentioned our role of setting rates and recovering 
decommissioning costs. Third, we share authority with the Energy Commission over 
resource planning decisions. 
The Energy Commission has the responsibility for adopting an energy plan for the 
state. The PUC basically implements that plan. It's a somewhat complicated procedure, 
but we do so by reviewing the particular utility resource plans as they come up for 
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review. And there may be some changes between the time the Energy Commission adopts a 
p1an and the utility seeks PUC review and approval. And that may result in a 
difference between the plan approved by the PUC and the one approved by the Energy 
Commission. But basically the Energy Commission approves an energy plan; the PUC 
reviews the implementation of that plan by reviewing the utility resource plan. 
The other important element of resource planning that we're engaged in is the 
function of our continuing oversight of the utility operation. We review the 
reasonable utility resource procurement decisions on a regular ongoing basis, and that 
has applied to nuclear plants. If a particular plant becomes too expensive to operate 
-- for example, the Public Utilities Commission defines certain utility costs 
associated with that plant; for example, continued operation of a plant to be improved 
that can result in the utility deciding to use a particular plant less often or use 
it in a different way or shut it down altogether. And that hasn't happened yet but 
that's an important ongoing responsibility that we have over utility resource planning. 
Fourth, we also have some jurisdiction, although it's limited, in the area of 
siting. The Energy Commission has primary responsibility for siting, and they would 
have the responsibility for issuing a certificate for the construction of any new 
nuclear plant if an application was filed. 
The PUC does have responsibility in that area, though. We would review a proposed 
plan for a nuclear power plant from a financial standpoint. We would take a look at 
the cost of the plant. We'd also take a look at questions concerning service 
reliability and things of that nature. 
Finally, both the PUC and the Energy Commission have some indirect authority over a 
number of different aspects of nuclear plant development and operation that have 
economic impact. And this is an area of jurisdiction that is not real clearly defined, 
but it is a result of the u.s. Supreme Court decision in the PG&E vs. Energy Commission 
case in 1983. Now that case did hold, as we stated, that the state is not barred from 
the regulation of the economic aspects of nuclear power development. As a result, 
there can be many different aspects of the nuclear power plant operation that have 
economic effects that we, at least in theory, have some jurisdiction over. 
If, for example, we continued operations of a nuclear power plant and created such 
financial risks that a utility's bond rating was affected, the Public Utilities 
Commission may have authority to require some changes in the way that plant is 
operated. We may have authority in such circumstances to require a utility to shut the 
plant down. I say "may have" because that's an area where the legal support is not 
directly on point and there is some dicta in the PG&E case which suggests that we may 
not have that authority. I think the better argument is that, as long as we have 
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authority over the economic aspect of nuclear power development, we would have 
authority to issue an order like that. That's generally my overview of our authority. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask you a question. How closely is the PUC 
coordinating your rate making decisions with the NRC? For example, have there been any 
discussions with the NRC concerning the safety implications of your decisions? 
MR. O'NEILL: I believe they're having some informal discussions, and at one point 
I believe we received a letter from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission commenting on at 
least one of our decisions which established a performance-based pricing mechanism. 
I'm not sure exactly which one it was. Since that letter was sent, though, the NRC did 
institute a general review of performance-based rate making decisions. And we've 
reviewed the NRC's ruling, and notice, and I believe there's a report produced as a 
result of that. And I think our program in California meets the NRC's standards. I 
don't think there's a problem there. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. O'Neill. 
Senator Hart. 
SENATOR GARY HART: Mr. O'Neill, could I ask you to comment just a little bit more 
on the decommissioning work that the PUC's involved in? Did it involve my district's 
decommissioning of the toxic dump sites? I'm just trying to understand a little bit 
better how the decommissioning works in terms of the resources that will be available 
and whether we have adequate resources to dispose of the waste. I don't know what's 
taking place in other states, but there seems to be adequate resources to work through 
the decommissioning process. Do you make modifications based upon new information that 
might give you additional resources? 
MR. O'NEILL: We can cover Humboldt Bay specifically a little bit later, but I have 
to give you a general answer. We do take a look at the amount of money that is going 
to be required to decommission a plant, typically in an adversarial proceeding where 
interested parties can present different points of view; different experts can give 
their own estimates. 
Once that's done, funds can be set aside so that, over the years, through 
continuing utility contributions, the estimated amount needed for decommissioning will 
be available. Now there's a big debate ongoing about the cost of decommissioning large 
nuclear power plants. In order to account for that cost with certainty, the PUC has 
generally approved decommissioning funds that have a large contingency factor a 
contingency factor up to about 50 percent. Now there is a 
SENATOR HART: Fifty percent of what? 
MR. O'NEILL: Fifty percent of the estimated cost. 
SENATOR HART: What are the estimated costs of, let's say, Diablo Canyon or San 
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Onofre or Humboldt. Can you give us some idea of what we're talking about? 
MR. O'NEILL: We have the Humboldt figures. I don't have the figures right with 
me, right now. I can provide them for you later, during the Humboldt panel, later this 
afternoon, if you'd like. 
Excuse me, Senator. But assuming that we estimated the cost of decommissioning a 
plant is a billion dollars. The PUC would set aside that billion, plus a contingency 
amount to account for a possible higher cost. We would set aside $1.5 billion under 
that hypothetical. 
The other thing that we do to protect ourselves is to provide for reconsideration. 
If it looks like the amount of money set aside is well under what current estimates 
are, we will reopen our proceeding and redetermine the amounts from the ratepayers so 
that accrual will be suficient. I don't believe we've had the need to do that yet, but 
the mechanism is in place. So we can judge that at any time. 
The most difficult case is the case where you have a plant that prematurely 
retired. The Humboldt Bay Plant is an example. In that case, you may have set an 
adequate amount of money aside on a yearly basis, and you may have estimated the future 
decommissioning amount after it. But if the plant's prematurely retired, you may not 
have collected nearly the amount of funds necessary to decommission it. 
SENATOR HART: What do ratepayers pay? 
MR. O'NEILL: In that case, it's sort of interesting. The big problem isn't 
collecting the profits. The big problem is one that we consider a shareholder equity. 
You may have no alternatives but to bill future ratepayers certain costs to cover the 
cost of decommissioning Humboldt, and that's just filed on the basis of the fact, not 
that they're getting power from Humboldt anymore, but on the basis of the fact that 
they're getting utility service in general and all of its resources. But there may be 
some dispute in equity in charging ratepayers that are not receiving power from 
Humboldt, the costs of decommissioning the plant. 
There is not a high rate power plant because you have a large body of ratepayers 
now, and you'll have a large body of ratepayers in the future. But you can come up 
with higher incremental costs of decommissioning the facility if your estimate is off 
by a bit, or if the plant's decommissioned early as in the retirement in Humboldt. 
SENATOR HART: Will you give me some idea as to what the -- what are the 
decommissioning costs involved of saving -- you used the figure of a billion dollars. 
It seems like a generous amount of money. How is that billion dollars spent? 
MR. O'NEILL: Well, I'm a lawyer and not a nuclear engineer. We can get you that 
information later. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay, our next witness is David Freeman, General Manager of 
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the Sacramento Municipal Utilities District, SMUD. 
Welcome, Mr. Freeman. You bring a unique energy background to this hearing with 
your federal experience in Washington, D.C., your TVA work, and of course, more 
recently, you came over to a utility that voluntarily shut down its nuclear plant. So, 
this morning, I hope you can help us with the big picture, sharing your view of the 
role of nuclear power in our energy strategy, telling us what life is like with SMUD 
after nuclear power. 
MR. S. DAVID FREEMAN: Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. 
Let me begin by expressing my appreciation of this committee. I have not lived in 
California long enough to be accused of being a provincial or a chamber-of-commerce 
type. But I must say, that having lived in all parts of the country, this state led by 
this committee and the counterparts in the Assembly are leading the nation in 
developing an energy policy for this nation. And I'm very proud to be here and be a 
very solid part of what is being done to kind of rationalize the conflict between our 
environmental concerns and our need to keep the lights on. And the rationalization 
process is something that has to be continually evolving. we learn more about the 
environmental problems and learn which sources of energy really are the chief leader 
and which are too expensive to use. 
I have good news to report. The dark cloud that was hanging over SMUD in terms of 
nuclear decommissioning costs, and the health and safety problems associated with 
closing down Rancho Seco have been largely lifted. And I think due to the excellent 
cooperation and oversight that we've received from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
this is made to be a sort of a man-bites-dog-type story, not the utility's perspective 
of being prey to the regulatory agency. But I think the NRC is doing an excellent job 
of keeping our feet to the fire, so to speak, if you'll pardon the expression, and as 
well as working with us in a practical way to reduce the staff at Rancho Seco, as we're 
no longer an operating plant. 
We have moved the fuel rods, stored in tanks, but we have a definite plan for 
removing that fuel from out of the liquid into dry, transportable casks which will put 
us in position by 1998 of having the fuel there. And if the federal government, in all 
its glory, can get its act together ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Good luck. 
MR. FREEMAN: Well, don't count on it, sir, but you're right. We'll be ready 
in case it happens. In any event, with the fuel being in its safest possible posture 
in a dry cask, which can either stay there at the site indefinitely, or be transported, 
if they ever find a place which several states agreed upon and the federal government 
agrees upon, it doesn't seem like it will happen any time soon. 
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As far as the reactor and the other pieces of equipment out there, we're putting 
them in what we call "SAFESTOR"; in other words, cleaning them up and kind of leaving 
them where they are. Now we were one of these awful utilities that the gentlemen from 
the PUC certainly identified, in that by a vote of the people in Sacramento County, we 
did prematurely shut the reactor down in '89. The operating license was for 2008. We 
had been collecting money regularly in the decommisioning fund, and we have about $100 
million. And it is, Senator Russell, put in a trust fund that we can't get our hands 
on -- and that's pursuant to rules of the NRC. so, we had $100 million collected, but 
that is not what's needed to decommission the plant. And the issue was, what do you do 
about a prematurely shut-down nuclear plant? And we worked that out with the NRC, and 
they are permitting us to continue to collect the money until the year 2008 because the 
safest thing to do with a reactor is to leave it alone. 
It would be unbelievably stupid to go out there and expose workers to tearing that 
reactor vessel apart and kicking it to Shangri-La because there is no place that's 
available to put it so it's not hurting anyone. It is, in fact, cooling off so that 
the plan that we have is to leave the reactor right where it is until 2008. In the 
meantime, we will continue collecting the money in our rates to accumulate the amount 
of money we need. And we have detailed list of distribution of costs to be brought in 
to the prudency review of Batelle and their European company that's had some experience 
over there. And we have a specific estimate of $284 million dollars which we estimate 
to be the cost of ultimately doing everything that needs to be done. There is a 
contingency factor included in that. 
That money will be collected, but I don't think anyone today can tell you for sure 
what we're going to learn between now and 2008 about what to do with a nuclear power 
plant whose useful life is over. There's a lot to learn, and quite frankly on-site 
storage of that reactor, just leaving it right there, it looks like a very attractive 
option rather than spending hundreds of millions of dollars tearing something apart 
that's inherently radioactive and putting it and burying it in a shallow grave 
somewhere. We have a decommissioning report from the NRC which contemplates that we 
will tear it apart in 2008, and ship it to wherever waste disposal site may be licensed 
and approved by then. 
But there is the alternative option that the best thing to do with the reactor in 
2008 is let it sit there for a while longer because it's certainly not endangering 
anyone where it sits. And there's a moral issue here, and the Chairman asked me to 
speak to this. There's a moral issue of whether it isn't more responsible to leave the 
nuclear waste as sort of a sore thumb there, where you can stare at it and see it, and 
have two or three people out there carting it, so to speak, rather than just spending 
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huge sums of money tearing it apart, putting it on trucks, and burying it somewhere and 
then forgetting about it for a hundred years. 
That's a very, very difficult question to answer, and at this point I would like to 
say, Mr. Chairman, I applaud your suggestion that this state review its nuclear policy. 
We are, I think, at the end of a first nuclear era, and we haven't yet begun the second 
nuclear era. We're sort of in-between of having perhaps gone too far, too quickly in 
scaling up the size of the reactors based on submarine technology and not putting 
enough effort into the research and development of inherently safer reactors. And it 
would be wise, I think, for the state to re-think it's nuclear policy, not that any 
nuclear reactors are going to be built in the '90's; but we know the lead times to 
these measures, and we're all very much aware of the global warming problem and we 
ought to consider every option. And I personally have a lot of faith in renewables, 
but I would think that it would be unwise to just dismiss nuclear power indefinitely. 
It is just an option and therefore I think that it would be wise to reconsider the 
state policy, including how you go about handling the nuclear waste, which frightened 
the federal government. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Hart? 
SENATOR HART: Well, Mr. Chairman, let me be sure I understand this, as it relates 
to Rancho Seco. 
You're saying that the plant is not doing anything as it relates to removing 
materials until the year 2008. And then, after 2008, it seems from your remark that 
your recommendation would be they put out a state hearing. And if there was a 
Shangri-La to take them to, then that would be the safest and the most cost-effective 
thing to do. Is that an accurate interpretation of your testimony? 
MR. FREEMAN: Not, let me, if I could say it in my words. First of all, we're not 
doing nothing out there. We're cleaning up and laying up and putting it in a SAFESTOR 
condition with the facilities that are there and putting the fuel into the dry casks so 
we can make that facility just as safe as it possibly can be. Our plan is -- we are 
raising the money to be in position to actually tear the reactor apart and strip it 
down to the bone in terms of getting ready to prove that it cna stay there or move 
someplace. 
I'm simply raising for this commission, Mr. Chairman, actually to raise policy 
questions so that the possibility that between now and 2008 we will have a deeper 
appreciation of the costs and the options. And I would just not completely overlook 
the possiblity that on-site storage, may, perhaps, be the safest and the most 
cost-effective way of dealing with it. I don't advocate that. Our decommissioning 
plan before the NRC contemplates that we're going to tear apart and take it down to 
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move it. I don't -- and I think that's a prudent thing to do. We need to raise the 
money to be able to do it. We need to be in a position to do that, but I just gently 
suggest that when we're 10 or 15 years older, perhaps wiser about these things, with 
the hope of finding an answer to moving all those nuclear wastes all over the country 
to bury it somewhere, that we may come to the conclusion that leaving the reactor at 
the site, guarding it, would be the wisest thing to do. 
Alvin Weinberg, one of the foremost nuclear scientists, once said that "Eternal 
vigilance is the price of nuclear power." And I personally believe that it's more 
responsible to have something above ground where you can visibly see it, so future 
generations can't forget about it, than these storage outlets -- that's just my 
personal opinion. Our corporate policy is to follow along and raise the money, and 
we're going to do that. 
SENATOR HART: And the money that you will be raising, did you say it's $281 
million? 
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR HART: And I don't know if you could comment on my question to Mr. O'Neill, 
as to, for those of us that really aren't that familiar with nuclear technology or the 
decommissioning process -- why does it cost $281 million to take something apart and 
take it somewhere? 
MR. FREEMAN: It's a very good question. 
First of all, the productivity of workers working with highly radioactive material 
is understandably very low. You just, you can't work very fast if you've got to have 
all sorts of protective clothing and gear so that you're dealing with highly 
radioactive components. And it just takes a lot of person-hours to tear it apart, to 
take all the pieces, and then you ship it. Say ship it down to Needles, and then you 
have to pay for that transportation and you have to pay them a certain fee for handling 
it for you, and it all adds up. But the $281 million also includes our program for 
putting the fuel into dry casks and for the maintenance of this SAFESTOR between now 
and 2008 so that when you break it down into component expenses, we still have 175 
people out at Rancho Seco, although it's a far cry from a couple of thousand when it 
was operating. And it just adds up. 
we have done this calculation very carefully, but I personally think that we'll 
learn a lot. And the number could easily be high rather than low. It's an enormous 
sum of money. I'm hopeful that SMUD will be able to use that money to pay off some of 
it's debt and not have to waste it dealing with waste. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR HART: Do you think that's the realistic possibility that you might be able 
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to undertake such a scenario that you were putting forward, one possibility. 
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR HART: You could save a lot of money. 
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, sir. The money's in the bank, and it will be there for the 
ratepayers of Sacramento. And if it doesn't need to be spent, it can be used to pay 
off debt or reduce rates or whatnot. I think it's prudent that we raise the money. 
Let me say this, Mr. Chairman, I don't rule out the possibility that a new, 
inherently safer, nuclear reactor may be built at the Rancho Seco site in 20 or 30 
years from now. I'm not wise enough to say that that's impossible. If that were done, 
then the reactor would just be sitting in the site where you have people there anyhow, 
and it would be very cost-effective to just leave it there for another 20 or 30 years. 
SENATOR HART: Mr. Chairman, finally, I just wondered if the committee would be 
interested in getting one of these various commissions that we have in the State of 
California to share with the Senate information on the decommissioning costs and how 
this $281 million -- how it breaks down -- or what the decommissioning costs are for 
the other larger facilities, such as San Onofre. 
MR. FREEMAN: We have a detailed estimate that I believe a witness will make 
available to you this afternoon, and I'll be glad to to provide it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much.. Senator Russell has a question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Yes, the San Onofre was providing power generation for a certain 
amount of money. If that's taken out, so that loss has to be replaced by some other 
source, will that replacement come from PG&E? 
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, sir. We had contracts with Southern California Edison and PG&E 
to replace the Rancho Seco power and ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And what is the cost to the ratepayers? 
MR. FREEMAN: We ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Of that shut-down and transfer? 
MR. FREEMAN: Well, we're purchasing electricity from PG&E and Southern California 
Edison at roughly the same costs that operating Rancho Seco incurred, recognizing that 
Rancho Seco operated at about a 50 percent load factor over its age. Now obviously, if 
the nuclear plant was operating at an 80 percent load factor, then it would be higher 
cost and higher than 50. But we negotiated fair contracts. We think the price of 
natural gas has been good to us and has gone down rather than up. 
I looked at the projections at the time, before I was there when they decided, the 
people decided to shut down Rancho Seco. And the projections of natural gas prices 
were 20 percent higher than what they are today. So we are not being punished, 
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economically, by having shut down the Rancho Seco plant. And we are in the process of 
requiring co-generation power plants, one wind plant which is from a facility in the 
northwest of here, in the very late stages of consideration this month and is a 
complete replacement for Rancho Seco. So, by the year 2000, we'll be independent, 
again, with our own power resources. But it will be primarily our energy efficiency 
program which is a 700-megawatt program, the co-generation plants, wind plants, the 
hydro that we already own, and some geothermal. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But those replacements will be costs that would not have had to 
have been expended had the Rancho Seco plant continued. So there is a cost to the 
ratepayers that would not have been there; is that correct? 
MR. FREEMAN: Well, the cost of Rancho Seco, at the time it was shut down, on an 
operating basis, are pretty well in line with what we're going to be able to bring in 
to new power resources because a nuclear plant operating only half the time isn't a 
very cost-effective unit. Now, I'm not commenting on the other nuclear units in the 
state, which apparently operate much better. But, looking at -- I've only been there a 
year-and-a-half -- I wasn't there when the decision was made. But based on the 
projections of what was considered would happen if Rancho Seco stayed or was shut down, 
what's happening is not costing the ratepayers money now. I'd be answering the 
question differently if we never built Rancho Seco, in the first place. All right. 
That's a different question. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But maybe this is hindsight and maybe you can't answer it, but we 
would always hope that a facility that's working 50 percent, if it were to continue, 
would be improved so it would operate more effectively and efficiently. Was there any 
chance of that? 
MR. FREEMAN: Yes, sir. I think the people of Sacramento County voted once to let 
it go for another year. Hundreds of millions of dollars were invested. It didn't 
operate a whole lot better. I don't want to, you know, look backwards and 
second-guess, but my experience with nuclear power is such, that if you don't put the 
money into the maintenance every year and you let it go for a number of years, which 
may have happened here, it's almost too late. This is one of the earlier nuclear 
plants that was built before Three-Mile Island. There was a lot of retro-fitting that 
had to be done. And, frankly, I think the answer is that it's continued operation 
really didn't appear to be economic because the vote in sacramento that denounces that 
plant was not a vote against nuclear power. It was a lack of competence in the ability 
of this particular utility to operate this particular nuclear plant in a cost-effective 
manner. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Freeman. 
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We've now had the general overview and I've been a little bit lax in terms of the 
total time. I'm going to hold everybody to ten minutes. 
The next panel will be the discussing the San onofre Nuclear Power Plant. The 
first one will be Richard Rosenblum, Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs for Southern 
Cal Edison. 
Let's begin with testimony from Southern Cal Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric 
Company. Mr. Robert Lacy will come up to the table, will be near the front so that you 
can come next. And this is concerning San Onofre. 
I'd appreciate the utility witnesses including in your testimony your views 
concerning two major issues: efforts to mitigate the marine pollution that we've heard 
about and the cost-effectiveness of SONGS Unit 1. Okay, ten minutes. 
MR. RICHARD ROSENBLUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators, Assemblymen. My name's 
Dick Rosenblum. As stated, I'm the Manager of Nuclear Regulatory Affairs for Southern 
California Edison. As you may know, Southern California Edison is the operating 
partner for the three units at San Onofre and owns 80 percent of san Onofre Unit 1, the 
remainder being owned by San Diego Gas and Electric; and about 75 percent of San Onofre 
Units 2 and 3, 20 percent of those units are owned by San Diego; and the remaining 5 
percent is owned by the Cities of Anaheim and Riverside. san Onofre is located on the 
Pacific Coast, about halfway between Los Angeles and san Diego on the Marine Corps Base 
at Camp Pendleton. 
In preparing for this meeting and sitting in the back, I noticed there are some 
briefing materials already handed out with the agenda. And in listening to what others 
have said, I'll try to keep my remarks very brief. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: To some extent, I may repeat information already stated merely for 
consistency and continuity. 
With that brief introduction, let me re-acquaint you with the three units at San 
Onofre quickly. Unit 1, as stated, started operation in 1968, has a capacity of about 
400 megawatts. During its first 12 years of operation, San Onofre Unit 1 operated on 
average at about 73 percent of its capacity. 
In the early 1980s, following the accident at Three-Mile Island, a period of 
back-fits, retrofits at the unit, started, which has been going on now for about a 
decade that has required extended outages and has reduced the lifetime capacity factor 
at San Onofre to about 51 percent. We've obtained a full-term operating license for 
San Onofre just recently from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. And, in the next 
refueling, we'll be completing this decade-long period of modifications and following 
that would expect the unit to return to the performance that ••• 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just to clarify what you said, the 51 percent, is that what 
you've cut over the lifetime,- longevity of the plant, by 51 percent or is the 
power-generating capacity 51 percent during this period? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: We've reduced its lifetime capacity factor, in other words, the 
average amount of energy it's produced over that presently almost 20-year period to 
about 51 percent of what it theoretically could have done if we'd run it at 100 percent 
the whole time. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Starting back in '60 ••• 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Starting in 1968. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So it's been shut down, basically then, for some time, which 
will -- which has reduced that quotient. Now, you said it was operating at 73 percent, 
but now because of the retrofit that has been reduced to 51 percent? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And then when you finish all these retrofits, then you'll start a 
new phase and maybe it will go up to 73 or 80 percent again? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: We would expect it to return to about 70 percent again. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: With that brief review of SONGS 1, let me talk about SONGS 2 and 3 
for a few minutes. SONGS 2 and 3 came on-line in the early 1980s following the 
accident at Three-Mile Island and, as a result, have not had long shut-downs or 
back-fits. Most of that work was done during the initial construction. The units have 
operated lifetime capacity factor of about 69 percent to date, and we consider that to 
be roughly typical of what we would expect in the future for this site as a whole. 
Since they first became operational, the three units at San Onofre have produced 
about 160 billion kilowatt hours of electricity, which to give you a feeling for what 
that means, it's roughly equivalent to the electricity we would obtain from about 260 
million barrels of oil. During that period, we've eliminated approximately 62 million 
tons of air pollutants that would otherwise have been generated from fossil fuels such 
as natural gas. Those include NOx, SOx -- which are the precursors to smog -- and 
carbon dioxide, which is thought to be a significant contributor to the Greenhouse 
effect. 
In recent times, 1990 is the most recent year for which we have complete year 
statistics, the three units at San Onofre produced about 15 percent of the total 
electricity on our system. We had a site ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Yes, sir. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: That billion kilowatts that you referred to, do you have any 
figures that, if that had been produced by a typical fossil fuel plant, with all the 
retrofits required during that period of time, would the cost per kilowatt be less with 
a fossil fuel, or less with the nuclear power, or do you know? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: I really couldn't say. The cost of energy has been so volatile 
during that period that it would be very difficult for me to predict what the result 
would have been otherwise. 
As I was saying, in 1990, our latest complete year, the aite operated at an average 
of 74 percent capacity for all three units and ranked fourth in the nation for nuclear 
plants on total energy generated. We expect 1991 to have performance that's very 
similar to 1990, based on what we know today. 
I was going to speak briefly about plant safety. Mr. Martin from the NRC has 
already said a good bit. I won't repeat any of the information he provided. I will 
point out that we don't look to the NRC as our primary source of oversight or safety at 
San Onofre. We have our own oversight organizations staffed by 140 professional 
nuclear personnel. They spend 100 percent of their time reviewing our activities. 
They range in qualifications from people who perform non-destructive examination, 
x-rays of pipes and that sort of thing, to a group of Ph.O.s that oversee the operation 
of the plant and the engineering decisions we make. 
With that brief overview, let me speak, Mr. Chairman, about the environmental 
matters you questioned. 
As you know, we recently completed I should say recently completed was a Marine 
Review Study of San Onofre operation. It took about 14 years to do that study at a 
cost of in the high $40 million, about $48 million dollars. And the result of that 
survey, that study, was that San Onofre was not creating the ecological desert that 
some had feared in the Pacific Ocean prior to the initial operation. The study did 
identify localized impacts to the ocean. And although Edison doesn't agree with the 
results of the study completely, we have nevertheless agreed to a mitigation program to 
compensate for any effects. We think this is very important because obviously almost 
any endeavor by man results in some impact to the environment. And where that impact 
cannot be feasibly or cost-effectively avoided, it ought to be mitigated to the extent 
possible. 
So we've agreed to this program. The mitigation program is between the Coastal 
Commission, the Chairman of the MRC, and ourselves. We all agree that this will avoid 
the impact -- it will mitigate the impact, I should say -- of the operation of the 
unit. 
There are three pieces to the mitigation program. Very quickly, it consists of: 
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Restoration of 150 acres of wetlands in the vicinity of San Onofre. This not only has 
an impact on the environment but obviously great aesthetic impact since it sharply 
improves them; the establishment of 300 acres of artificial kelp to avoid any damage we 
may be causing to the kelp; and some improvements in our plant's fish protection system 
to minimize the number of fish that may be entrained in our cooling water system. 
In addition, although not finalized yet, the Coastal Commission is looking at the 
possibility of a marine fish hatchery. That study also raised some questions about our 
compliance with our cooling water permit. The San Diego Regional Water Quality Control 
Board has just finished extensive hearings on the matter. We believe that we are in 
compliance with our permit, and a conclusion by the Water Quality Board is expected 
early next year. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's the problem? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: That we are having a more than localized effect on the marine 
environment which would not be allowed by our permit and that, as I believe stated 
earlier, we are reducing the light level reaching the bottom of the ocean. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How wide an area is your operation affecting? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: I'm sorry, Senator. I don't know the exact extent of what's 
considered localized under the regulations. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We'll hear a little bit more about the particular problem from 
the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board a little bit later. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Okay. Just one more minute and I'll try to be done if I'm okay on 
time? 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Cost effectiveness of SONGS Unit 1. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Yes, Unit 1, of course, is the oldest unit at San Onofre and is 
presently in its 11th fuel cycle. 
In a CPUC filing recently, we requested permission to invest $125 million to 
complete the safety-upgrade program I discussed previously. Hearings in the matter 
were heard in the Biennial Resource Plan update phase of a CPUC hearing recently. The 
Division of Ratepayer Advocates who will speak after me disagreed with Edison's finding 
that investment of that money and continued operation was cost-effective. 
We believe that continued operation is cost-effective. And, in fact, in that 
hearing, and to determine the cost-effectiveness, we performed 32 evaluations of 
possible futures for San Onofre involving different capacity factors, different gas 
prices, different values for environmental pollution credits, and other values. 
Twenty-seven of those studies showed that san Onofre was cost-effective with a 
ratepayer benefit as high as $600 million dollars. In other words, the ratepayer would 
get $600 million more benefit from running San Onofre than not running it. Five showed 
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that San Onofre might possibly not be cost-effective in the future. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What factors did you take into account ••.• 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Gas costs and the capacity factor of the unit, how much capital we 
have to invest. That's correct. We also ran six studies using the CPUC's preferred 
and primary cost-effectiveness tool. All six of those showed that San Onofre was 
cost-effective. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: So you're telling me that PUC says that you're okay? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: No. we have filed that information. Those are our studies. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Oh, I see. Okay. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: As I said earlier, the DRA from the PUC disagrees with the ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Fine. Thank you very much. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: The PUC itself hasn't concluded it. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. I'd like to welcome to the committee 
Assemblyman Harvey. Thank you for coming. 
ASSEMBLYMAN TRICE HARVEY: (Inaudible) 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: It's all right. It's all right. 
Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If the decision, whoever commits to it, in terms of 
cost-effectiveness and so forth and so on, the result would be you have to shut that 
plant down? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: That would be one possible result, certainly. The outcome of the 
hearings aren't at all clear and what the possible treatments for San Onofre aren't 
clear. We could continue to run it in the rate base; we could run it under some form 
of incentive-base rate-making; or conceivably we might shut it down. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What's your opinion of the incentive base rates? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Well, of course •.• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You're heard the concerns, the views, described by ••• 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Of Mr. Martin? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Martin. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Yes, I think those are valid concerns. It can provide wrong 
incentives to a utility; and it might not, depending upon how it's structured. It's 
really very difficult to answer that question in the abstract. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But if the plant is taken off-line, what effect would that have 
on SMUD customers buying power from the Edison Company? 
ROSENBLUM: I'm sorry, Senator. I don't know what the effect would be in our rate 
treatment. I believe that's a contract. I don't know how it's -- it's -- the price is 
fixed. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: If that were taken off-line? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: It is our view that taking San Onofre off the line would result in 
a loss to the ratepayers, yes, in 27 out of 32 of the possible features. 
SENATOR ROSENTHAL: Yes. Assemblyman Mountjoy? 
ASSEMBLYMAN RICHARD MOUNTJOY: We just heard a minute ago about the fact that 
Rancho Seco is shut down, they now buy power from Southern Cal. If San Onofre is shut 
down, what happens to that power that we're now selling to Rancho Seco customers of 
SMUD? It would seem to me like you'd be very foolish to go into a contract where you 
don't have some kind of escalator. Your costs are going to go up. Obviously, the 
costs then to SMUD would be going up also. 
MR. ROSENBLUM: Again, I don't really know what that contract's terms are, so it's 
difficult for me to answer. At least in the near term, we have sufficient capacity on 
our system to replace San Onofre were it shut down. I believe when San Diego 
testifies, you'll see that that's a very different situation for them. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: You have enough capacity to continue your operation and that 
is in continuing, even selling to the other customer that you have out there? 
MR. ROSENBLUM: I believe that's ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: I assume you're selling ••• 
MR. ROSENBLUM: In the short term. Somewhere down the line, that would reverse; 
and, of course, we'd need new capacity. For San Diego, I believe the picture is very 
different and they need the capacity right now. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. We'll next hear from Robert G. Lacy, 
Manager of Nuclear for San Diego Gas and Electric Company. Welcome. 
MR. ROBERT G. LACY: Good Morning, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Ten minutes, sir. 
MR. LACY: And Senators, Assemblymen. My name is Robert Lacy. I'm the Manager of 
the Nuclear Department for San Diego Gas & Electric. 
In the interest of time, I'm not going to talk about the Marine Review Committee 
and the offshore environment. Mr. Rosenblum has already done that eloquently. I would 
like to talk, though, about our role at San Onofre, since we don't operate the 
facility. But in view of the fact that we are a 20 percent owner, and coincidentally 
we get 20 percent of our customers' energy from that facility, we've got a very deep 
and continuing interest in its safe and reliable operation. And, with that in mind, we 
monitor and work with Edison in a number of areas that I'd like to talk about very 
briefly. And then I'd like to get into the issue of safety and the cost-effectiveness 
of San Onofre Unit 1. 
We do have an on-site engineer who monitors the day-to-day performance of the 
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facility and reports to our senior management on close to a real-time basis, what is 
going on at the facility. He has a nuclear background. He understands the plant 
probably as well as the Edison people who are out there. 
In the estimating and budgeting area, we also have a full-time cost engineer and 
full-time accountants and auditors who monitor and work with Edison in preparing 
budgets, estimates, and tracking costs at san Onofre. 
In the licensing area, we have a full-time licensing engineer who works with his 
counterparts at Edison. And on occasion, either I or my senior management will attend 
meetings with the NRC on issues that are of particular importance to san Diego Gas & 
Electric. 
Overseeing in these areas, the entire operation of the facility is a business 
endeavor, is the Board of Review which consists of members from our senior managements, 
both Edison and San Diego; and in the case of Units 2 and 3, the two cities of Anaheim 
and Riverside. They monitor and approve things like budgets, overhaul schedules, fuel 
plans, and so on, everything except for matters related specifically to safety -- and 
I'd like to get into that right now. 
We do take a very proactive role with Edison in matters related to safety and 
participate on bodies at two separate levels that are specifically charged with 
reviewing what goes on at the facility as it relates to safety impacts and the 
potential for perhaps reduced safety in the future. 
The first is the On-Site Safety Review Committees. There are two: one for Unit l 
and one for Units 2 and 3. And their role is to ensure that the plant complies with 
all of the safety procedures that are either mandated by management or by the NRC. The 
other level, this is a senior level, are the Nuclear Control Boards, who are made up of 
senior technical managers from the owners; that is, in the case of Unit l, Edison and 
San Diego -- and in the case of Units 2 and 3, Edison, San Diego, and the two cities. 
In addition, the Nuclear Control Boards can, and as a matter of fact right now, 
they do have an outside consultant who participates with us in overseeing the plant 
from a safety perspective. That consultant happens to be an ex-manager of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission. 
In many respects, the nuclear control boards are analogous to PG&E's Independent 
Safety Committee. They oversee what's going on from a safety perspective. But there's 
one very important difference between these boards and the PG&E committee; and that is, 
that these boards have the authority and in fact have dictated changes in the plant, 
either operating procedures or physical changes in order to ensure a continued safe 
operation of the facility. so there is that one very important difference. 
There's another point I should make in this context, and that is, that the nuclear 
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control boards are not, have not, been mandated by the NRC. These boards were created 
by the owners, although I understand that the NRC looks very favorably on them and 
their work. 
Let me now talk about the cost-effectiveness of Unit 1. And I want to start by 
~inting out that the conclusions that were reached by San Diego as compared to Edison 
are somewhat different. And when one looks at the difference between our two 
utilities, I think that's pretty understandable. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Conclusions as to what? 
MR. LACY: The cost-effectiveness and under what conditions the unit remains to be 
cost-effective, and I'll describe that in just a minute. 
We participated with Edison in the studies that led to certain assumptions that 
were made with regard to predicting the future for San Onofre Unit 1. Those 
assumptions related to capacity factor, capital requirements, operating and maintenance 
costs, and so on. Those are unique to the unit. And regardless of who the owner is, 
those assumptions would stand. Then we coupled those assumptions with those that are 
unique to San Diego Gas and Electric, and those would relate to such things as the need 
for capacity. And as Mr. Rosenblum has pointed out, our needs are more immediate than 
theirs, as well as internal financial constraints and capacity options and 
opportunities and so on. 
The result is that we have demonstrated in the PUC proceeding we think very 
strongly that the unit remains cost-effective for the customers of San Diego Gas and 
Electric. And in doing that, we did sensitivity studies at varied, as Edison did, 
things like capacity factor and in gas prices and so on and demonstrated even more 
strongly, and under some of these varying assumptions, the unit remains 
cost-effectiveness. 
In fact, Senator, you talked about 51 percent capacity factor a few minutes ago 
when Mr. Rosenblum was testifying. we even took the capacity factor of Unit 1 down to 
44 percent, and it is still cost-effective for our customers. So we feel very strongly 
in this regard that the unit should remain in service, that hopefully the BRPU 
proceeding will reach that conclusion sometime early next year. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
MR. LACY: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If the decision were to be that it's not cost-effective, you've 
got to take that plant off-line, where would you make up that 20 percent loss? 
MR. LACY: Well, here's an important difference between ourselves and Edison. We'd 
have to make up that loss immediately where Edison would have a few years to come up 
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• 
with an alternative capacity. I'm not in the resource planning area. My judgment 
right now would be we'd have to go outside and buy capacity someplace in the near term 
to make up for that loss. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You have been, I understand, short on capacity and have been sort 
of scrambling for and reaching out to other plants and other states; is that correct? 
MR. LACY: That's correct, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And for now, I presume that you have met your needs. So this 
would then exacerbate that possibility, that requirement. Do other plants around have 
enough capacity that you could make up that loss immediately? 
MR. LACY: Well, our strategy in the near term -- absent shutdown of Unit 1 --
we're still trying to buy capacity off-system. I would assume, even though again, I'm 
not a resource planner, that we could probably make up the additional capacity that we 
would be required to make up, if the unit is shut down, through off-system purchases. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: From the -- what was it? Arizona Nuclear -- Palo Verde -- is 
that what it's called? 
MR. LACY: Well, no. Palo Verde is fully subscribed. There's no power available 
there. It would be from probably coal resources in Arizona and New Mexico. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Which are under the gun now, I understand. 
MR. LACY: I'm sorry, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Which are under the gun now for environmental degradation. 
MR. LACY: Environmental perspective, yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Would that be a long-term contract? 
MR. LACY: I couldn't answer that question, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
MR. LACY: Yes, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We'll next hear from Dr. Fay, Member of the Marine Review 
Committee. And there's a replacement for Dr. Murdoch who I understand is ill. 
DR. RIMMON FAY: Mr. Chairman, thank you. I think Dr. Ambrose is here for Or. 
Murdoch. He'll give you the background of the MRC studies, and then I'll fill in 
for ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You have ten minutes between you. 
DR. FAY: Pardon? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Ten minutes between you. 
DR. FAY: Between us? Oh. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Ten minutes between you. You have five minutes each. 
DR. FAY: Okay. Take it away, Rich. 
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DR. RICH AMBROSE: Good morning. My name is Rich Ambrose. I'm a marine biologist 
at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and the Technical Coordinator for the 
Marine Review Committee. And Dr. Murdoch would have liked to have been here today but 
he's sick, and so he asked me to give his testimony in his place. 
Between 1976 and 1989, the MRC carried out a study of the effects of the cooling 
system of the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, or SONGS, on the the marine 
environment. The study broke new ground, first, in being wholly independent of the 
~wer company, and second, in using a powerful statistical design that can distinguish 
the effects of the power plant ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Are you going to give us the gist --
DR. AMBROSE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: in five minutes, or are you going to read your statement? 
DR. AMBROSE: I'll give you the gist. 
The second reason it broke new ground was using this powerful statistical design 
that can determine the effects separate from the natural variation in the environment. 
The power plant affects the marine organisms in two ways. First, it takes in an 
enormous amount of ocean water to cool the reactor, an equivalent amount to one square 
mile by 14 feet deep every day. Second, it moves turbid water -- that's water with a 
lot of particles -- from near the shore and from close to the ocean floor, offshore, up 
near the surface, and about 60 percent of the time over the kelp bed. 
So the two major corresponding effects on the marine biota are as follows -- can I 
get slides, or should I just do ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Just for my own information, the Marine Review Committee, who 
appoints them; is that an established public group or is it self-anointed or what? 
DR. AMBROSE: It was a condition of the permit that the Coastal Commission gave to 
Southern California Edison for the construction of SONGS. There are three members. 
Dr. Fay, who's a member -- a representative -- of the environmentalists; Dr. Vira 
McCalis, who is a representative of Southern California Edison; and Dr. Murdoch, who's 
appointed by the Coastal Commission. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And who appoints those other two? 
DR. AMBROSE: They were interveners who are coordinated by Friends of the Earth who 
appointed Dr. Fay, and Southern California Edison appoints their own ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So the coastal Commission appointed one; the Friends of the Earth 
appointed one; and --
DR. AMBROSE: And Edison. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Edison appointed one? 
DR. AMBROSE: So the idea is a balanced ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well balanced, yes. 
DR. AMBROSE: Right. (Laughter) 
So the two major effects of those physical changes to the environment are, first, 
the intakes kill 4 to 5 billion fish eggs and larvae every year. Now although fish 
populations can compensate, to some extent, for these losses, most likely that results 
in a decline in adult fish stocks. The main effects fall on a few species of fish that 
are concentrated near shore, and the MRC calculated that the standing stock of these 
species is reduced by 1 to 10 percent in Southern California Bight -- that's an area 
from Point Conception to Northern Baja California -- and this is an amount equivalent 
to about 600 tons of fish. 
Now these are not large percentage losses, and they occur mainly in non-sport and 
non-commercial species. But they occur on top of losses imposed by other human 
activities, and they probably appear ultimately as reductions in the sport and 
commercial species that feed on these affected groups. 
The second major effect is that the changes in the physical environment cause 
roughly a 50 percent reduction in the area of kelp near the power plant, an average 
reduction in the abundance of about 70 percent of fish that occur in the kelp bed, and 
of about 45 percent in 9 species of invertebrates in the kelp bed. These effects are 
substantial because kelp beds are ecologically important and biologically diverse 
habitats in the ocean and are quite sparse in the San Onofre area. 
The MRC concluded that these effects do not constitute an ecological disaster, but 
they are substantial adverse effects and require corrective or compensatory action. 
And along those lines, the MRC first considered massive changes to the power plant, 
namely, the addition of cooling towers and altering the discharge systems, that could 
prevent most of these effects. The majority of the committee concluded, however, that 
the cost would be disproportionate to the benefits and there would be additional 
significant environmental effects. 
So instead, the MRC unanimously recommended a set of options from which the 
commission was invited to select its final list of conditions. And these options 
included changes to the operation of the plant and various possible mitigation 
techniques. 
The MRC worked with the commission staff in exploring these options and decided 
that changes to the plant would reduce its efficiency and would transfer a portion of 
the environmental effects to other power plants. Thus the mitigation package finally 
imposed on Edison by the commission centered on a replacement kelp bed and restoration 
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of a coastal wetland, as you've already heard, and that this package is entirely 
consistent with the MRC's recommendations. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How do you replace kelp? 
DR. AMBROSE: By constructing an artificial reef and making sure that kelp grows on 
that reef. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In the same general area? 
DR. AMBROSE: In the same general area but outside of the effect of the plume of 
the power plant so that you don't have ongoing ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How far away? 
DR. AMBROSE: I don't know exactly, but the kelp bed extends a little bit over a 
kilometer from the discharge of the power plant and we detected effects that far. So 
it has to be at least a kilometer away. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you wind up, please. 
DR. AMBROSE: Yes, sir. Two points -- the Marine Review Committee has submitted 
testimony to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Control Board on hearings on SONGS' 
NPDES permits. The majority testimony is that two standards in the permit are not 
being met: First, the plant reduces the light reaching the ocean floor in the kelp 
bed; and the second one is the plant causes a degradation of the biota by reducing the 
abundances of kelp and other organisms in the kelp bed. And the board is presently 
weighing this and other testimony. 
And then finaly, you asked Dr. Murdoch to comment on the broader implications for 
regulation, and he has two conclusions -- three conclusions -- sorry. 
He's concluded that the current regulation on the SONGS' NPDES permit is inadequate 
for three reasons: First, the present standards are ineffective. Edison's required by 
its NPDES permit to carry out environmental studies to determine whether or not the 
effects of SONGS on the marine environment violate regulatory standards. But the 
mandated studies do not have the power to detect any but the most disastrous of 
effects. Second, self-assessment does not work. As is standard, Edison investigates 
itself. The company or its consultants carry out the studies required by the permit. 
The company analyzes and interprets the results. These analyses do not apply adequate 
techniques for finding effects. And then finally, the Regioanl water Quality Control 
Board has too small a scientific staff to investigate properly the issues raised by 
this inadequate process. 
In Dr. Murdoch's view, the regulatory activities carried out for SONGS' NPDES 
permit have been almost entirely a waste of the millions of dollars that have been 
spent. The situation could be improved by carefully rewriting the regulatory standards 
and requiring third-party monitoring by a wholly independent body reporting directly to 
-33-
the regulatory agency. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Help me to understand. You've got a power plant on the coast, 
and it's discharging water, which is creating some problems that you're saying. And 
how far --you call that a "plume", do you? 
DR. AMBROSE: Right, from the discharge. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And the plume affects the adjacent water? 
DR. AMBROSE: Right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And how big is the plume, and how big is the area that is 
affected with the temperature change? 
DR. AMBROSE: Most of the effect is not from the temperature. It's from particles 
that the plume picks up and distributes in the area around. The temperature changes 
less than 4 degrees farenheit within a thousand feet of the discharge. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What are the particles? Where do they come from? 
DR. AMBROSE: They come from -- they're natural particles that are in the water. 
They're usually either inshore or close to the bottom. What the plume does, what the 
discharge does, it picks up these particles and moves them up closer to the surface and 
over the kelp bed. And when they're moved in that location, they reduce the light that 
reaches the bottom of the ocean floor so that kelp can't grow as well. It doesn't 
survive as well. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that area that these particles cover is how big? 
DR. AMBROSE: I don't know exactly, but on the order of a few kilometers, a mile or 
two. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that creates in that area an environmental degradation of the 
organisms that are living in the kelp bed. And compared to -- that's a part compared 
to the whole; it doesn't seem very significant that the plume that would be a couple of 
kilometers across and maybe a couple of kilometers out would make that big a deal. 
DR. AMBROSE: And it's true that that effect is localized. And one of the reasons 
we believe it's important and it should be mitigated is because kelp is a very 
important -- kelp beds are a very important community, and they're relatively scarce in 
that area. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Were they there before the plant was built? 
DR. AMBROSE: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: They were scarce? 
DR. AMBROSE: That's right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And they're still scarce? 
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DR. AMBROSE: Right. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So what's the problem? 
DR. AMBROSE: But there are fewer of them, so the ones that are there are 
Lmportant. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So what was there, there is less of? 
DR. AMBROSE: Right. But also the other major effect is not from the discharge but 
from the intake. The power plant takes in a lot of fish larvae and eggs and kills 
them, and some of those fish would have grown up; some of those larvae and eggs would 
have grown up to be adult fish. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: If there is an environmental disruption of a certain area, isn't 
is a natural process that, in this case, the fish, go somewhere else? 
DR. AMBROSE: The way the life cycle of fish, marine fish, those larvae and eggs, 
are floating over many, many miles in the ocean; and so that effect actually is spread 
over a very, very large area. And we estimated the effect over the Southern California 
Bight, which is from Point Conception to Baja California. It's virtually all of 
Southern California. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The sucking of the eggs? 
DR. AMBROSE: Because the larvae are spread over such a large area. Even though 
they're killed locally in San Onofre, the effects are spread over a large area. 
SENATOR HART: Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Yes, Gary. 
SENATOR HART: Dr. Ambrose 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Hart. 
SENATOR HART: -- I missed the point that you were making about Dr. Murdoch's 
conclusions, and you mentioned a waste of dollars. Now this was a study that cost a 
lot. This was a $40 or $50 million study? 
DR. AMBROSE: Excuse me. The waste that he was talking about was not the Marine 
Review Committee's study but ••• 
SENATOR HART: Which cost how much? 
DR. AMBROSE: Forty-eight million is the number that we've been told. I think it's 
about that right. 
It has to do with the monitoring that's required as part of the NPDES permit. 
SENATOR HART: NPDES. What's that? 
DR. AMBROSE: It's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System. It's something 
that the ••• 
SENATOR HART: The Regional water Board? 
DR. AMBROSE: Yes, that's right. The Regional Water Board has to give a permit to 
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the power plant to discharge their water. And as a condition of that permit, they 
require Edison to conduct their own studies. So these are separate studies from what 
the Marine Review Committee did to see whether -- but with a parallel purpose, to see 
whether the power plant is having an effect on the environment or violating a permit. 
SENATOR HART: Having spent $40 or $50 million on a major study to make these 
determinations, these conclusions that you've just shared with us, we have another 
study --
OR. AMBROSE: Right. 
SENATOR HART: that's going to be ••• 
OR. AMBROSE: Has been going on. 
SENATOR HART: That has been going on that's dealing with some of the same issues? 
DR. AMBROSE: Right. 
SENATOR HART: Why do we need to have two studies when one study was done by 
eminent biologists and cost $50 million? 
DR. AMBROSE: The monitoring for the NPDES permit, it's a standard condition for 
and there are many NPDES permits for discharges along the coast. They routinely are 
required to monitor their discharge to make sure they're in compliance. 
The Marine Review committee study was a special study established j~st by the 
Coastal Commission to see whether there is an effect on the marine environment. 
SENATOR HART: Didn't the coastal Commission and the Regional Quality Board try to 
get together and do one study? 
OR. AMBROSE: In fact, there was some coordination. But for the most part, I think 
the important distinction is that the Marine Review Committee study was done by the 
independent body, independent from the power company; whereas the NPDES permit 
monitoring is conducted by the power company. 
SENATOR HART: I see. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. Assemblyman Harvey. 
ASSEMBLYMAN TRICE HARVEY: Yes. I have two questions. The first one, I guess, 
would be, you've told us the bad side of it. Is there a good side? Is there any 
increase in species due to the warmness of water and so forth? In '78, there was 
because I was heavily involved in the proposed nuclear power plant being sited in the 
town of Wasco in Kern County or whether it should be on the coast. We went through 
this debate with scientists on both sides and not taking to other area, but we had 
community hearings, the civic center with scientists on both sides, one side telling us 
it's based on all of their education and all the books and studies they've done on how 
safe nuclear power is; and the other side, well qualified, saying how it's going to 
destroy us all and we're supposed to make decisions when they're well-qualified people 
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that don't agree. 
At the time -- this is going back to '78 and '79, though -- it was beneficial, once 
pointed out, that happened as a result of this intake and output. The other gentleman 
LS shaking his head no. There's nothing beneficial; nothing happens; nothing's 
Lmproved. It's strictly everything is from the bad viewpoint of this. 
DR. AMBROSE: I think I can answer that with the slides. 
This slide summarizes the effects of the nuclear power plant. And you can see at 
the top there are substantial adverse effects. Those are some of the ones I talked 
about. The red arrows indicate those were all significant decreases. 
On the bottom, the Marine Review Committee also studies those groups but concluded 
that there were no substantial adverse effects in those groups on the bottom. The ones 
with the green arrows actually showed significant increases. The other ones didn't 
have any significant effect at all. Also, you'll notice that there's an asterisk 
against the ones with no adverse effects and we expressed reservations about those 
effects. But the majority of the committee concluded that there were significant 
increases in those three groups -- such as soft bottom fish. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY: Okay. Thank you. So there is two sides to the stroy. I'm 
glad I asked that. 
I guess the other question I had was sort of answered in that because we're here to 
review the study. And what I would hope could be done is, if you've got $50 million 
spent, as Senator Hart was related to, on that amount of money and another study on top 
of that, I think it comes to the decision now on what needs to be done. And I guess 
that becomes political. I don't really think that most of us would need other studies. 
And I'm sure that there's other sides of this story that may or may not be heard today, 
that there's those who will try to say that there's some positive things happened. 
DR. AMBROSE: The coastal Commission will talk about what action they took. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Dr. Fay. 
DR. RIMMON c. FAY: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal. I'm Rimmon c. Fay, from Venice, 
California. I also served for a little over six years on the California Coastal 
commission, not at the time when the state commission heard this matter of San Onofre. 
And then subsequent to 1980, I gained tenure on the Marine Review Committee. 
The MRC came into existence because Southern California Edison said you'll not be 
able to detect an effect of the nuclear power plant on the environment. The 
environmentalists said you're going to create a marine desert. And we could not get a 
regulatory agency, the Water Quality Control Board or the Department of Fish and Game, 
to enter in here and lend their expertise to tell us what the effects would be. So the 
coastal Commission resolved this matter by creating a Marine Review Committee to go in, 
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to study, to predict what the effects would be, and then to monitor, to see what 
actually occurred in the environment. The srength of that is that the MRC looked at a 
number of different groups of organisms, looked at them in a way that they could 
determine if there was a significant difference in the populations of those organisms 
once the power plant went on-line versus the before period when it was in construction. 
The design on that study was done with enough statistical validity to it that the 
MRC could report with confidence if the 50 percent change occurred in the populations 
of the organisms that we were examining. More than that, the MRC examined the physical 
and chemical effects of the operation of the power plant to explain how some of these 
changes in populations occurred, and that's where this problem of turbidity arose 
because San Onofre is sited in probably the worst portion of the coastline of 
California to put in a nuclear power plant that entrains a square mile of water to a 
depth of 14 feet per day. That's an enormous volume of water. That's more than ten 
times the daily discharge from the City of San Diego's sewage discharge to the ocean, a 
huge volume of water. And in this operation of circulating water through the power 
plant for cooling, it moves a great deal of sediment offshore where it naturally would 
not occur, natural sediment. That reduces the life to the water column, interferes 
with the reproduction and recruitment of the kelp. The kelp is a keystone species that 
supports a great number of other organisms. It's a whole community by itself. The 
kelp doesn't reproduce, and the organisms dependent upon the kelp bed can't live there 
any longer, and the organisms that are entrained in the flow are killed as they go to 
the power plant. And I've given you a summary of some of these losses in the handout 
that I've delivered to the committee. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman. 
MR. FAY: The MRC did not set out to maximize the estimates of the losses. It set 
out with a statistical design to make sure that the losses measured were statistically 
valid, good evidence. In every group of organisms that we examined, there were changes 
in the population structure. Water quality law says, if there's a change in the 
balance of indigenous populations of organisms, you've got a violation of water quality 
ordinance. 
We know that every group of organisms we examine change in population structure. 
We know that there were significant changes by more than 50 percent in the groups of 
other organisms caused by the operation of the power plant. That is the hardest 
environmental evidence that's ever been created by any environmental group to study a 
problem of this nature anywhere in the world, and it's good you 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is your testimony reflective of the majority of your group? 
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DR. FAY: The committee unanimously stated in its findings that there was 
substantial damage being done to the environment as a result of the operation of the 
SONGS Units 1, 2, and 3; unanimous conclusion. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: They support what you've just said? 
DR. FAY: We differ, and I differ with the present Coastal Commission and I've 
differed with my colleagues on the MRC. 
The mitigation law has its first priority, the prevention of damage to our natural 
resources. That's what the Coastal Act is about; that's what the Clean Water Act is 
about; that's what every bit of environmental legislation that deal with the coastline 
has been about. You protect our natural resources. 
We have given conclusive evidence that SONGS is substantially adversely impacting 
those resources. The protection the Marine Review Committee agreed upon unanimously to 
an extent of 90 percent of the prevention of the damage could be implemented with the 
retrofitting of cooling towers to SONGS Units 2 and 3. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I thought this gentleman before you said that some of the 
recommendations they realized were not cost-effective, and so they reduced those to 
what he said. It sounds like you're saying something different. 
DR. FAY: I'm representing the public, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: We all represent the public. I mean that's a given. 
DR. FAY: I'm representing the public, I hope, on behalf of our marine resources. 
And I'm speaking for the applicability of the relative law that says we'll protect, 
maintain, enhance, and restore our coastal resources. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: At what cost? Are you concerned with that? 
DR. FAY: Yes, sir. I use the same sources of information that Southern California 
Edison uses for the cost of installing and operating cooling towers, same exact ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, apparently, your committee came up with some different 
conclusions or different solutions than what you're saying. What I hear you saying is 
some sort of a massive change whereas that's not what I heard from the first witness. 
DR. FAY: Substantial -- that's the key word, substantial change. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, planting kelp beds, you know, that's a change. 
DR. FAY: Those are not the same kelp beds that were lost as our operation, as a 
result of the operation of the power plant. They're different kelp beds. It is 
compensatory mitigation. It is not a preventative mitigation, nor is it restoration in 
kind -- well, resources that are lost as a result of the operation of the power plant. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: It sounds like what you're saying is that you want to have things 
the way they were before the plant was built. 
DR. FAY: That's what the law calls for. 
-39-
SENATOR RUSSELL: And I just say, as a previous witness said, any time you put 
anything into the environment, it's going to make some changes that we can mitigate, we 
can modify, but we can't go back to what it was before. And it seems to me that we 
have to keep in mind the incremental costs of what you're trying to do and a bit of a 
mitigation cost. 
Let me ask another question. Your commission, your Marine Review Committee, 
started when? When was it appointed? 
DR. FAY: It began in 1975. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In 1975. And the plant was built in '68, operating '68? 
DR. FAY: Units 2 and 3 became operational in 1984, '85. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'm talking about when the first plant was built. 
DR. FAY: 1968. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: so that pre-dated your commission? 
DR. FAY: Yes, sir. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And you have been -- the commission has been -- making their 
findings since 1973? 
DR. FAY: No. They made annual reports and semiannual reports to the Coastal 
Commission since 1975. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: '75? And do you have any idea what the cost was? We heard this 
$40 million cost over ten years by Edison. What has your committee spent in their 
reviews? 
DR. FAY: Southern California Edison provided those funds. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, they did? Is that part of the $40 million? 
DR. FAY: Yes, sir. That's where it came from. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So they did their own study, plus you did your study? 
DR. FAY: There's two independent studies in here -- let me go back to where it 
was ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The question was: Did Edison pay for both studies? 
DR. FAY: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And that's the $40 million? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's the $40 million? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The two studies, $40 million? 
DR. FAY: No, no, no. Edison has an annual monitoring budget in excess of a 
million dollars for studies -- they're monitoring studies that are required by their 
NPDES permit. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I think I understand where you're coming from. Thank you. 
-40-
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Hart. 
Okay. Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: In your studies, are you just, did you just study the area; 
and is your -- you were talking about the depletion of certain species of fish. Is 
that only in that two-kilometer-wide plume? 
DR. FAY: No, sir. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Or is it the entire coast in that area? Is that what ••• 
DR. FAY: It depends on the particular effect that you're talking about and ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: The loss of species. 
DR. FAY: And it depends on the particular study. If you use radioactivity and 
enrichment of heavy metals, presumably from the power plant, discharge from the power 
p1ant, you can see an enrichment radioactivity and heavy metals 12 kilometers up and 
down the coastline from the site of the plant. If you're looking at the populations of 
organisms ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: We're just talking water-in, water-out at that point, aren't 
we? Suction water-in discharge? 
DR. FAY: Well, it appeared that there was an effect on the biology of the sand 
crabs, plus or minus six kilometers up and down the coast from the power plant. So it 
depends again on the particular variable that you're looking at and the particular 
organisms. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Okay. But in the entire coast, there's a problem because of 
the taking of the -- if you talk about -- I notice middle fish, and I guess you're 
talking middle fish, would be like barracuda or some species of that type. But those 
are depleted basically because of loss of bait, but that's overfishing by commercial. 
And there's been a study done on that. So unless your study included other causes of 
depletion of middle fish, the bottom fish are doing very well there because it's one of 
the best places to fish, bottom fish. And so it's kind of confusing to me if it's 
disturbing the bottom so much, why are the bottom fish doing very well? 
DR. FAY: I disagreed with the conclusion on the bottom fish. There was never any 
evidence that where the bottom fish were impacted the discharge from the power plant 
could be measured. And so ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Well, I didn't do the study. The study that I saw that you 
f1ash on a screen said bottom fish were doing better. But I know from fishing the 
area ••• 
DR. FAY: I understand. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's not agreement on the committee about everything. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Well, it's his committee, right? 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: He's a member. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Oh, I see. so you're in a minority opinion that there, that 
the bottom fish aren't -- well, I agree with the committee because I fish there, and it 
does very well, so (laughter) ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Assemblyman Harvey. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY: Yes. One question. I think we're back sort of where I was on 
the nuclear power plant safety. I guess you can get well-qualified people on both 
sides of this issue, and Mr. Fay doesn't agree with some of his colleagues, and he has 
a right. But then again, when I was asking about isn't there a good side of some fish? 
Mr. Fay's shaking his head no, and he's showing me yes. So I understand they don't 
agree, and I can appreciate that. 
There's an old adage, I said, in doing these studies that statistics don't lie but 
statisticians do. You can kind of get where you want to go with your job, and I 
understand that. I've been guilty myself. But the question is throwing me. I hear 
twice you have said in response to Senator Newt Russell's question about you need to 
put in those cooling towers. 
Now you disagreed then because the gentleman just said, when I asked the question, 
it's not the temperature; it's the turbidity and coming up above levels it's doing 
this. It's really not the temperature. And I was taught way back that the temperature 
helps some species, but you don't agree with that at all. You want to spend all this 
money for cooling towers when somebody says that's not going to help a thing, but 
you're willing to spend all that for cooling towers because you don't agree with them, 
right? 
DR. FAY: I quoted you Dr. Ambrose's text. He created the words that said this in 
the MRC final report. He was our technical advisor on this particular point. And Dr. 
Ambrose said: "Ninety percent of the damage caused by the operation of Units 2 and 3 
can be prevented by the retrofitting of cooling towers to SONGS Units 2 and 3." 
More importantly, and I hope we can get NRC to comment on this, NRC has recently 
examined extending the life of these generating stations to 40 to 50 years. Absent the 
abatement of this pollution problem, we're going to be looking at those annual losses 
with chronic impacts introduced to them for 40 to 50 years for the operation of SONGS 
Units 2 and 3. To me, that's criminal and certainly justifies retrofitting with 
cooling towers. 
ASSEMBLYMAN HARVEY: The last point, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and I'm still not 
clear, and maybe it will be later, that if you're going to put in cooling towers, you 
still, as Mr. Mountjoy's referring, you've got the same amount of product coming in, 
the same amount going out; you just cool it some. As far as turbidity, I'm not sure of 
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all that. But maybe it'll come clear to me before this is all over. 
DR. AMBROSE: Could I clarify? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Gentlemen, we have to conclude this portion. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'd like to ask Dr. Ambrose, was that your statement? Did he 
quote that correctly? 
DR. AMBROSE: That's correct. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But I also understood you to say that because of the costs of 
doing those kinds of things, it was not cost-effective, and so you recommended other 
things; is that correct? 
DR. AMBROSE: costs and also the fact that cooling towers have other environmental 
effects ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
We'll next hear from Susan Hansch, Manager of Energy and Ocean Resources Division 
of the California Coastal Commission. And maybe you can explain the problem we've just 
heard about. 
MS. SUSAN HANSCH: I'll do my best. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MS. HANSCH: Good morning, Senators. My name is Susan Hansch. And on my left, is 
Chris Perry who is the deputy manager of our unit and also the project manager at San 
Onofre; and she'll be here if there's questions I need help with. 
What I'd like to do this morning is highlight two major sections of two major 
issues. One is to discuss the mitigation package the Coastal Commission approved and 
also highlight for you what we feel that we learned from the Marine Review Committee 
studies and how it applies to power plants along the coast, how you might want to 
consider it in looking at other power plants. 
The original SONGS permit condition and the Coastal commission's practices prefer 
prevention over mitigation. This was an important premise the commission used when 
choosing between the range of prevention and mitigation options recommended by the MRC 
to address the marine resource impacts. 
After a complete analysis of the MRC's work, the coastal Commission chose a package 
of mitigation that with, essentially all mitigation, very little changes to the plant. 
And we have looked at the cooling towers because we believe that they could, as was 
mentioned earlier, eliminate the impacts, most of the marine resource impacts, because 
essentially you don't have a large intake of water into the plant and you don't have a 
large discharge into the ocean. You essentially eliminate that whole section. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: would that reduce the operating capacity of the plant? 
MS. HANSCH: It can, especially when you're doing a retrofit. If you design 
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cooling towers into a plant initially, it's a lot different. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So, would that reduce the efficiency of the plant? 
MS. HANSCH: It could, yes. And Edison said that they believed in this case it 
would. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MS. HANSCH: If you design a plant initially with cooling towers, that's much 
different than doing a retrofit. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman Mountjoy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: If you cool with the saltwater, if that's what you're going 
to do, what's the environmental impact of that saltwater when it sprays into the 
atmosphere? You know, here at Rancho Seco, it's clean water. It's just regular lake 
water; they have their own lake, and that's what cooled it. But here you're talking 
about pumping sea water into the towers. There's going to be some corrosion. 
MS. HANSCH: That was one of the issues that was looked at, and one of the 
environmental impacts was a possible, of saltwater fog, increase in fogging. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: We're talking about all the plant life now on the beach, all 
over the, all the stuff that's playing along that freeway now being sprayed with salt. 
You know, we're going to cause another --we're going to cause a worse impact for those 
of us that live on the land. 
MS. HANSCH: The commission did not recommend that there be the cooling towers. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Oh, that was not a recommendation of ••• 
MS. HANSCH: No. The MRC laid it out as one of the options. The Coastal 
Commission staff evaluated it and recommended to the commission that cooling towers not 
be required for the different environmental impacts, including the fact that 
retrofitting the plant could make the need to increase power production at other 
coastal power plants, moving air pollution problems to other plants and also increasing 
the input of water from the ocean from other power plants and increasing fishery 
impacts of those locations, and, because the cooling towers were very expensive. 
I would like to say right now, though, in looking at a new power plant that was not 
a retrofit, the Coastal Commission's staff would recommend looking thoroughly at the 
option of cooling towers to eliminate marine resource impacts. That's different than 
in a retrofit. 
The Marine Review committee looked at a broad array of mitigation measures, 
including the changes of the cooling system, moving the diffusers, construction of the 
cooling towers, as well as all sorts of compensation techniques. And you've heard the 
whole debate about the cooling towers. The staff recommended to the Coastal Commission 
that cooling towers not be implemented. We did recommend that there be a kelp bed of 
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300 acre, artificial kelp bed. That was approved by the commission on July 16. We 
a1so recommended that there be changes and mitigation measures for 150-acre restoration 
of wetlands some place in Southern California. We're working closely with Edison now 
and a panel of scientists to determine which wetlands should be mitigated and restored. 
Aund in that whole process, we developed fairly strong performance standards to make 
sure that the wetlands are actually mitigated and meet scientific standards. And if 
they are not, Edison is required to remediate until the mitigation project is 
successful. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. Are there some wetlands that have been impacted by 
this plan? Is that ••• 
MS. HANSCH: No, there were no wetlands impacted by this plant. The idea was to 
figure out how to help compensate for the loss of fisheries. And since wetlands have 
value for fisheries as breeding areas, and also overall, they're a very impacted 
coastal resource. It was a way to provide mitigation. 
The kelp bed mitigation in this proposal will be direct mitigation for the impact 
to the kelp bed. And the wetlands is designed to provide fishery enhancement for the 
fish loss through the entrainment and impingement in the plant. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I thought wetlands dealt with birds. 
MS. HANSCH: Well, wetlands have a whole range of values, including bird values. 
There are two other aspects that Edison is being required to do, and that is, to 
install and measure the effectiveness of behavioral barrier devices which are designed 
to either prevent fish from entering the intakes or to attract fish into the 
fish-return system. 
The second is the Coastal Commission directed the staff to look into a possibility 
for a marine fish hatchery program. We're working with a group of scientists now to 
determine, and with the Department of Fish and Game, to determine if we should require 
Edison to fund a fish hatchery program. we expect to go back to our commission 
sometime in early '92 with that information. 
The knowledge that the Coastal Commission gained from the exhaustive Marine Review 
study provides really important knowledge that can be applied to other coastal power 
plants, and it covers several major points, the first being that the MRC scientists 
developed new and more accurate environmental assessment techniques. Usually, it's 
very hard to separate the changes in the ocean that are natural from impacts caused by 
something like a power plant. The techniques of the scientist design could prove that 
statistically. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Another question. Since the MRC didn't start up till 1975 and 
since the first plant opened in '68 and was started earlier, how do they go back and 
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compare what it was before and what's happening now? 
MS. HANSCH: The whole MRC study was really designed to look at the impacts of 
Units 2 and 3, the later two stages, not the first stage. And they did look at some of 
the impacts that had occurred with one. But Units 1 and 2 and 3 are really quite 
different, as far as their intake system and discharge system; so they're not directly 
comparable. 
The MRC data, we believe, will provide important design information for future 
power plants, that is, how to figure out how to do the diffuser system so there'll be 
less impacts, where to locate discharge systems. And one of the things that was found 
by the MRC is that the impact that everyone thought would be caused by heat wasn't as 
significant as the impact that's actually caused by the increased turbidity. So that 
changes a lot for future design when you're looking at any kind of coastal power plant, 
not necessarily just the nuclear power plant. As Dr. Ambrose suggested, the MRC had 
recommended the State Water Resources Control Board re-evaluate some of their standards 
based on this data. 
One of the most important things, I think, that came out of the whole study was 
that independent third-party monitoring is preferable to self-monitoring. It became 
very clear through this study that this evidence showed that there was an impact, and 
that impact would never have been found through Southern California Edison's 
self-monitoring program. Part of that is because it is not designed to get the same 
sort of information. And it always helps to have independent scien·tists and academics 
working through the problems and questions. We feel that there's a real need to 
consider revising many of the ongoing regulatory monitoring programs. 
And in conclusion, we believe that the knowledge gained from the MRC studies will 
allow more informed decision-making processes for the coastal Commission and other 
agencies. The MRC studies clearly showed that coastal power plants have significant 
impacts on marine resources, especially coastal fish populations. And one of the 
things I'd like the senators to consider is this is just one of many power plants along 
the coast. All of the coastal power plants have intake systems which entrain and 
impinge fish; and cumulatively, that is a significant effect on fishery resources along 
the coast. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman Mountjoy. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Does that include the oil-fired plants, the beach plant, the 
Huntington Beach Plant? 
MS. HANSCH: Yes. Most of them do have cooling systems. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: So no matter what the plan is, whether it's nuclear, whether 
it's oil-fired, it has an impact? 
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MS. HANSCHa Right, as far as impacts on fish entrainment and impingement. This 
~wer plant actually has some very sophisticated fish return system that returns larger 
fish back to the ocean. Most of the old power plants do not have such. This power 
plant, though, does take in a larger amount of water --
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: San Onofre. 
MS. HANSCH: -- than any of the other -- yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: San Onofre. 
MS. HANSCH: Than many of the other power plants. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: One question, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You know, you talk about an independent group or study, and that 
does make sense. But it kind of, kind of seems similar to trying to have an outside 
organization do reapportionment and get an even balance. I mean, you know, we can be 
as scrupulous as possible, but the Republican philosophy and the Democrat philosophy 
would still come through in some way or other, perhaps; or at least we would fear that. 
How can that be prevented? You've got this gentleman here who's a scientist who 
probably has wonderful credentials. He's disagreeing with other scientists who have 
equally fine credentials. You have the concerned scientists over here. You have 
another mother for science or something over there. And how do you, how do you know 
that -- we always thought that science was science; two and two is four and you don't 
argue with it. But apparently, these things can be massaged one way or the other, 
depending upon your philosophical viewpoint. Have you struggled with that? 
MS. HANSCH: Yes, we have struggled with that and since the very beginning in 1974 
when the commission had to look at giving this permit to Southern California Edison. 
There were people on both sides. The environmentalists said there would be an 
ecological desert, and Edison's scientists said that there would be no impact. And so 
there's this huge range. So the commission tried to set up this three-person committee 
that would take those varied opinions and hash out and argue and work out those 
differences throughout the process. It's a very difficult, cumbersome process. But 
they did that; the Marine Review Committee did that. And you're right. There are 
differences of opinion, but all three of them signed the final report and did come up 
with solid recommendations. There are variations in their opinions. And I don't 
think, Senator, there is any perfect way to do it. 
I do believe that the process did work and came up with something that the 
regulatory bodies could use and make some significant changes and some important 
decisions. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I understand. 
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MS. HANSCH: But there's no simple way. I wish that --well, at least we haven't 
found any. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Former Attorney General van de Kamp didn't even appoint somebody 
to the MRC; is that right? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That was the Safety Committee. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, Safety Committee. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That was different. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, sorry about that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
Okay. We'll next hear from Arthur Coe, the Executive Officer of San Diego Regional 
Water Quality Control Board. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We provided you in advance some questions. 
MR. ARTHUR L. COE: Yes, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Senators. 
My name is Art Coe. I'm the Executive Officer of the Water Quality control Board of 
the San Diego region. 
I've handed out to your staff my prepared testimony which I was planning to briefly 
summarize and then answer the questions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. COE: If that would be appropriate. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: In ten minutes. 
MR. COE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. COE: Less than ten minutes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: As I pointed out, Mr. Chairman, the prepared testimony has 
been handed out. And I'm going to focus my summary on the issue, the MRC report, and 
the actions that the Regional Board is taking in response to it. 
I will point out in the information that I had prepared beforehand, there is 
presented some details on two other NPDES permit violation issues that involved Unit 1. 
And if anyone has any questions, I don't if I can answer them as they come up. 
With regard to the report of the Marine Review Committee, the Regional Board 
received that report in August of 1989. Sometime prior to that, we had a meeting with 
staff of the Coastal Commission to discuss the general findings of the report and also 
discuss coordination between the two agencies in dealing with the findings of the 
report. 
At that time, at the staff level, it was determined it would be desirable for the 
Coastal Commission to act first on the report of the Marine Review Committee. And this 
was basically for four reasons. 
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First of all, this was a request of the Coastal Commission and the chairman of the 
MRC, as we understand it. Secondly, the Marine Review Committee was commissioned by 
the Coastal Commission, and we thought it was most appropriate that that commission 
hear and decide on the disposition of the report before another state agency began 
dealing with it. Thirdly, the issues that were anticipated to come up at the coastal 
Commission hearings would provide information that would be of use to the Regional 
Board in their deliberations. And finally, there was the question of what disposition 
the Coastal Commission would make of the MRC report that would have some bearing on 
what the Regional Board, what action the Regional Board would take. As an example, 
would they accept the report~ would they reject the report; would they ask for 
additional work? So for those reasons, at least at the staff level very early on, it 
was decided that the Coastal Commission should go first. 
In December of 1989, we brought this, after the final report was out from the 
Marine Review Committee, we brought the matter to the Regional Board as an information 
item. This was partly in response to a request from the Surf Riders, two environmental 
groups -- Friends of the Earth, I believe, and the Surf Riders Association. 
At the December 1989 Regional Board meeting, the board heard a fair amount of 
information about the content of the Marine Review Committee report. And following 
that discussion, the Regional Board made the decision that they would hold a hearing to 
consider enforcement action based on the findings of the Marine Review Committee. The 
Regional Board at that time also concurred with the staff recommendations that the 
Coastal Commission should act first, and then the Regional Board would begin their 
process. 
The Coastal Commission held their hearing and reached their decision in July of 
1991. In August of 1991 at the regular Regional Board meeting for that month, the 
Regional Board set their hearing date on the matter for October 31. On October 31, the 
Regional Board had their hearing. We listened to some seven hours of testimony. The 
record was held open until November 15 for submission of additional written testimony. 
The October 31 hearing was to receive testimony only. The board did not make a 
decision on that date. The Regional Board staff is now reviewing the testimony that 
was submitted, and we will come back to the Regional Board at their December 9 meeting 
and suggest some dates for the board to meet and make a decision on the testimony that 
was received during the hearing process. It appears that we're looking at sometime in 
January of 1992, right after the first of the year, before we'd be able to get through 
the material that was received during the hearing and bring it back to the board. 
With regard to the questions that you had posed, the first one dealing with why the 
Regional Board has taken so long after the release of the MRC report to deal with the 
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compliance issue, it's simply --we had determined that the Coastal commission should 
go first. 
The second question deals with the requirements of the NPDES permit for the San 
Onofre discharge. And the question was: Can the Regional Board use the Coastal 
commission offset conditions to comply with the Clean water Act, NPDES requirements? 
And by offset conditions, I'm assuming that you were referring to the mitigation 
programs that were agreed to or mandated by the Coastal commission. And the answer, as 
far as the Regional Board is concerned, is not directly. If the Regional Board 
determines that the NPDES permit has been violated by the San Onofre facility, the 
board can consider the mitigation programs that have been agreed to in their 
deliberations on what remedies they would seek for the violations. The board also 
could find that the permits were violated but that the impacts were not particularly 
great and that Edison, should they decide to do so, could request state modifications 
to the NPDES permit for those conditions that were in violation. If Edison were to 
approach the State Water Resources Control Board for an exception to the state's ocean 
plan, the mitigation program that has been agreed to could be used as partial grounds 
for requesting an exception to the state's ocean plan. 
The third question that he posed to me was dealt with the Regional Board requiring 
independent monitoring as opposed to Southern California Edison monitoring to ensure 
compliance with NPDES requirements. We have discussed that issue with our legal 
counsel; we discussed it sometime ago. And the answer was maybe, but it's not clear. 
This ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me break in. What you'e saying then is that you said let 
the Coastal Commission go first, and then we'll comment on it. Maybe it should have 
been the other way around. Maybe you should have commented, and then the Coastal 
commission would try to deal with your concerns, because if you can't offset with the 
way they have suggested, what happens? 
MR. COE: The remedies that the Regional Board -- if the Regional Board determines 
that the NPDES permit has been violated, the NPDES permit conditions have been 
violated, the remedies available to the Regional Board would include assessing 
penalties to Edison for the past violations. That would include establishing a time 
schedule for bringing the discharge into compliance. Those are actually the two basic 
alternatives. The Regional Board, as far as we can tell, does not have the authority 
to require Edison to install cooling towers; they do not have the authority to require 
Edison to shut the plant down. so I don't know -- I can't conceive of a scenario where 
the mitigation measures would be, in effect, wiped off the books. Obviously, if they 
want the cooling towers -- I'm not sure if the mitigation measures would be appropriate 
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but the Regional Board can require that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Question. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Who monitors then the NPDES compliance? Do you? 
MR. COE: The Regional Board monitors compliance. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: That's you guys? 
MR. COE: Yes. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And if the commission says they approve of these offsets and your 
experts say, well, even with the offsets, it doesn't meet the NPDES requirements, then 
you would be authorized to levy some fines but not much else. 
MR. COE: Or the board could also require them to bring the discharge into 
compliance with the NPDES permit conditions, which could require them to take some kind 
of structural measures or some of kind of, make some kind of operational changes in the 
dLscharge of the plant. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And if they didn't do anything or didn't do it the right way, 
let's say, you would have authority to take them, what, into court and to fine them 
or ... 
MR. COE: If the board issued an order requiring compliance and the order was not 
complied with, the board's recourse is to go to the Attorney General and request that a 
legal action be filed. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I see. Thank you. 
MR. COE: I'm not sure if I finished answering about the monitor. I guess I did 
finish the monitoring. I don't know if there's any questions on it or not. The answer 
is maybe, and that is, the issue of discharge or monitoring versus third-party 
monitoring was raised in the Regional Board's hearing. That will be something that 
will be considered as a part of the board's decision-making process. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. That places the plant in a no-win 
situation. There isn't anything that you can do to satisfy your requirement by 
anything that the Coastal Commission has suggested as mitigating? 
MR. COE: Well, as I pointed out, they can request, first of all, an exception to 
the state's ocean plan. And the mitigation measures would be a factor in determining 
if that request would be granted. If they get the exception of the state's ocean plan, 
they can then come back to the Regional Board and request that those permit conditions 
that they were in violation with be modified. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I see. so there is an avenue for them to --
MR. COE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- come back? 
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MR. COE: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
Next witness is Charles Crandall, an attorney with Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, 
representing the Earth Island Institute. Welcome to Sacramento. I hope you enjoyed 
your honeymoon. 
MR. CHARLES s. CRANDALL: I did, although I got sick on it, Mr. Chairman, so most 
of it was spent flat on my back; but I had a relatively good time. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. But as they say, the honeymoon is now over, right? We 
appreciate receiving testimony on the Earth Island Institute lawsuit which is filed 
against Southern California Edison. And in particular, I'd like to hear your views on 
whether the Coastal commission and the Regional Water Board are adequately enforcing 
the law. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: May I ask, so I can understand the direction you're coming from, 
I never heard of the Earth Island Institute. What is it? Is it like Earth First or 
the Sierra Club for islands or what? 
MR. CRANDALL: I would like to analogize it more closely to the Sierra Club than 
Earth First, if I could. It is an environmental group that had its origins with the 
Friends of the Earth. One of the founders was Mr. David Brower, and it is involved in 
various environmental endeavors. One of the most notable involves the tuna fishing and 
the dolphin problem on the international level where they've been quite successful. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The island part is what? 
MR. CRANDALL: Earth Island Institute? That earth is a biosphere basically and 
that we have to ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Island in the universe; is that what ••• 
MR. CRANDALL: Exactly. Right. My name, Mr. Chairman, is Steve Crandall. I'm an 
environmental lawyer with Milbert, Weiss in San Diego. I was with the Department of 
Justice for ten years in environmental enforcement, and I teach the subject and have 
for the past six years at the University of San Diego School of Law. 
I would prefer to approach this in the limited time, not by going through the 
litigation that is ongoing in San Diego. That essentially is litigation that was 
designed to make up for the fact that the water board had not filed an action within 
the timeframe required by law, which is 60 days, far from two years that it has taken 
the water board to get around to holding its hearing. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are you suing the Water Board? 
MR. CRANDALL: We are not suing the Water Board. We are suing Southern California 
Edison only. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Not the Water Board district? 
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MR. CRANDALL: No, we didn't think it would be productive, frankly, to sue the 
Water Board. We view them largely as an ally. They have technical expertise. They 
are terribly understaffed and underfunded, I believe, and their enforcement activities 
really are in serious arrears; and we view ourselves as supplementing their authority. 
so we didn't think it would be productive to sue them. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Your lawsuit relates to the water discharge? 
MR. CRANDALL: Yes. It relates to exactly what's been going before today, that is, 
the turbidity problem, and the SONGS Units 2 and 3. I would just point out a couple of 
things from the litigation. 
First, as I think this committee is seeing, you can't understand the issue, let 
alone come to a decision in a ten-minute time frame or one-day hearing or indeed, as 
the water board held on Halloween a one-day public hearing, just can't do it. 
In the litigation that's been pending, for example, I took the depositions of two 
of the so-called experts for Edison. That lasted three days. It is, as Senator 
Russell commented, an incredibly complex issue. But there is an answer that we believe 
the litigation will resolve once and for all. And our pitch to the Water Board was, 
listen, don't bother yourself with the cease and desist order at this late date. 
Intervene in the lawsuit, which is before a federal judge, and we'll address the issue 
of should there be cooling towers? Are cooling towers, in fact, so expensive as Edison 
says? And things of that nature. 
But here is what I would just leave this committee with briefly. What we have 
uncovered in litigation, it is really one point, and it echoes what Ms. Hansch said 
about independent monitoring. And I know, Senator Russell, you had some concerns about 
it, which is, is self-monitoring the way to go, or do we need to get the regulated 
industry out of the business of looking at itself? And my answer is, we must get the 
regulated industry, in this case, southern California Edison, out of the business. And 
I have two, what I think are, irrefutable reasons why. 
First, back when Unit 1 was in operation and Units 2 and 3 were just in the process 
of being planned, the Water Board went to Southern California Edison. It said, look, 
you have a turbidity problem at Unit 1. We want you to stop it and correct it before 
you build Units 2 and 3. What did Edison do? They went out, they conducted a series 
of intensive tests. They came to the conclusion that, gee whiz, there's really not too 
much we can do about this turbidity problem, short of serious design changes. What did 
they do? They didn't tell the Water Board for four years. They sat on this 
information until the concrete was laid for Units 2 and 3, and the machinery was 
already going forward so that it would be extremely costly to make any kind of design 
change. That's point one. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Did they make any changes in the outflow compared to the Unit 1 
which you said wasn't a problem? 
MR. CRANDALL: They didn't make --well, that's a difficult question. Originally, 
the diffuser system for Units 2 and 3 was designed differently to accommodate a 
temperature problem that was feared. In other words, the out-take, the outfall system 
is different, but not as a result of the problem I just discussed. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But is the turbidity in 2 and 3 different than in 1? 
MR. CRANDALL: No. And Edison knew that when they built Unit 1, Units 2 and 3, and 
they designed it essentially the same way. The intake system is identical, and the 
problem is that the intake system takes all this turbidity, which is near the shore, 
and shoots it in a plume out over the kelp bed. And so my point 1 is, a breach of 
trust by Edison. They knew that information. They withheld it for four years until it 
was too late for the Water Board to take any action. 
Point 2, and this has been made by Dr. Murdoch through the testimony here and I 
want to emphasize it. You mentioned, Senator Russell, isn't there a waste of money 
because you have this $45 million study by the MRC that had three representatives on 
it, on the one hand, and then you had this additional study that was going on that was 
being funded by Edison for its Water Board and why don't they get together. I say 
here, here. That's precisely what should have happened, but who should have brought 
that to the Water Board's attention? Southern California Edison. The same scientists 
that were doing, that were participating in the MRC study, Dr. Byron McCalis and his 
staff, were the same people that were participating in these yearly reports to the 
Water Board. 
Listen to what happened. The MRC was concluding we have turbidity problem. It's 
going to affect the kelp bed; these are substantial impacts over here. And over here, 
and in its yearly reports to the Water Board, Edison was saying no problem; there's no 
problem. The kelp is very healthy, just totally sticking its head in the sand, as to 
the results that were in the possession of its own scientists over here in the MRC. Is 
that good faith? Is that the type of behavior that this committee or the Water Board 
wants to see on behalf of a regulated industry? No way. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What are you suing for? Money or for some kind of action? 
MR. CRANDALL: We are suing for both. There are two types of essential remedies. 
One would be the ultimate remedy, would be, in fact, a change of the cooling system to 
retrofit cooling towers which is a possibility. I think it's going to be a tough job 
to show because of the cost-benefit analysis that you mentioned before, but that's 
something we think is desired. Another thing is penalties because each and every day 
that that plant is violating its light requirements, it is subject to a $25,000-per-day 
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penalty. And that doesn't go to me; it doesn't go to the group. It goes to the 
Treasury of the United States Government. But we think it is a penalty that the 
message has to be sent to industry that you can't take lightly these requirements and 
then expect to get away with it 15 or 20 years down the road when you bring your 
accountants in and say, gee whiz, it would cost a billion dollars to retrofit our 
plant. We can't do that. We don't think that's fair. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: My concern, and certainly, anybody's entitled to bring any 
lawsuit of anything, is that we have a body, the coastal Commission. We have this 
local water board, Regional Water Board, and we have this commission that we heard from 
all looking at this, and now a federal judge who is going to make a decision, either 
for you or against you or somewhere in between, which basically throws all that out. 
MR. CRANDALL: But Senator Russell, that's because the agencies didn't act in a 
timely manner as required by federal law. That's the nuts and bolts of it. They had 
-- we put them on notice back in August of 1989. You have this report that unanimously 
concluded, unanimously, with an Edison representative, the plant was violating federal 
law. We said to the Water Board do something. Don't hold hearings; don't wait two 
years; do something. And they still have yet to do it. And at this time, right as I'm 
sitting here, they haven't made a decision yet. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblyman ••• 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: I'm curious about your source of funding. Is it strictly 
private, or is it government funding of any kind? 
MR. CRANDALL: I'm sorry. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Your funding for your organization. 
MR. CRANDALL: The organization comes from non-profit contributions, I believe. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: Strictly non-profit kind? 
MR. CRANDALL: Yes. 
ASSEMBLYMAN MOUNTJOY: There's no government type ••• 
MR. CRANDALL: No, not to my knowledge. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. CRANDALL: Thank you very much. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: When was the lawsuit filed? 
MR. CRANDALL: It was filed in November of 1990. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Division of Ratepayer, Robert Kinosian. I think Edward 
O'Neill is going to introduce you. 
MR. O'NEILL: I will. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This is the Division of Ratepayer Advocates of the PUC. 
MR. O'NEILL: Yes. There are actually two different questions that you may address 
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concerning San Onofre Unit 1 issue. Some may relate to the recommendation of the 
Division of Ratepayer Advocates that was filed in written testimony this September 
concerning the cost-effectiveness of continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
MR. O'NEILL: And Mr. Kinosian is here today to discuss that recommendation. He is 
the engineer with the ORA responsible for performing that analysis and preparing most 
of that testimony. 
The other area that you may have questions, it concerns the role of the commission 
itself. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
MR. O'NEILL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: 
I'd like to just deal with the ORA. 
That's fine. Well, then let me, in the interest of time --
He gave it to the PUC. 
MR. O'NEILL: -- turn it over to Mr. Kinosian. 
MR. ROBERT KINOSIAN: Thank you. I guess it's still morning, maybe afternoon. 
Good afternoon, Chairman, senators. 
We'll start off with SONGS 1 is over 20-years-old. It's one of the oldest 
operating nuclear plants. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We've heard that. Tell us ••• 
MR. KINOSIAN: Okay. Well, our commission required that a cost-effectiveness 
analysis of SONGS 1 be done because of the high costs of some modifications which are 
required to be done on the facility. As you've heard ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you pull the mike up a little closer so we can get ••• 
MR. KINOSIAN: As you've heard, Edison and San Diego both asserted that they 
believe the continued operation of SONGS 1 is cost-effective. This might be correct, 
if you assume that SONGS 1 in the future will operate very reliably, that natural gas 
prices will increase significantly, and that the cost of operating SONGS 1 will 
decrease considerably as they have done. However, those assumptions are not 
reasonable, given the historic experiences with SONGS 1. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Now they said that out of 32, 27 different configurations said 
that it would be cost-effective to make these changes, and five or something else. 
You've studied those 32, have you? 
MR. KINOSIAN: Yes, we have. And in all of those ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you disagree with them? 
MR. KINOSIAN: Yes, we do. In all of those scenarios, they used very optimistic 
assumptions regarding both the operation and the costs of SONGS 1. For example, the 
lowest capacity factor, which is the measure of reliability of the unit, the lowest one 
they used in those 32 analyses was 60 percent. As Edison itself had mentioned, the 
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historic lifetime average for SONGS 1 has been only 50 percent. They also used in 
those 32 analyses assumptions of 70 and 80 percent. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, that 51 percent is based upon the retrofit time that was 
calculated into the running of the full plant. Once it starts up after being 
retrofitted, that will no longer be 51 percent. 
MR. KINOSIAN: The 51 percent wasn't just due to retrofits. For example, in the 
1ast five years, the plant has been shut down more than 50 percent of the time to 
repair broken equipment, not for retrofits required by the NRC. So it's not simply a 
matter of retrofits. The plant is aging, parts are wearing out and breaking, and there 
needs to be maintenance done on them. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But also SDG&E testified that they're 20 percent. And they 
evaluated it, and they said it would be cost-effective, I believe. 
MR. KINOSIAN: Yes. In fact, they had an analysis that assumed, that showed, that 
~t was cost-effective even at a capacity factor of only 44 percent. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Right. 
MR. KINOSIAN: However, in that analysis, they used a natural gas price forecast 
that assumed natural gas prices doubling by next year. So on the one hand, they were 
assuming that the costs of any alternatives to replace San onofre would be very, very 
expensive, in concluding that SONGS 1 would be cost-effective to continue operating. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So you get your experts and we'll get our experts, and we'll 
f~ght. 
MR. KINOSIAN: Well, we believe that we've made a very strong showing in the 
proceeding at the PUC that SONGS 1 is clearly not cost-effective. In addition, the 
utilities simply ignored a number of factors regarding the cost-effectiveness of SONGS 
1 in the analysis they presented. 
They failed to consider the fact that shutting down SONGS 1 would, for example, 
reduce their insurance costs; and fees are considerable. We estimated that those two 
things alone would result in $50 million savings to the ratepayers from shutting down 
SONGS 1. 
They also ignored the environmental detriments of operating SONGS 1, as you have 
heard their environmental impacts on the marine life that they did not consider in any 
way ~n their analyses. They did not consider environmental impacts from radiation from 
the facility. However, they did include the value of reducing air emissions from other 
resources that might replace SONGS 1. In fact, the single largest benefit they found 
in their analysis to operating SONGS 1 was the value of reducing air pollution from 
other resources. And as you may be aware, Edison has strongly asserted that the values 
the PUC uses for air emissions are too high and overstate the benefits to ratepayers 
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from reducing air emissions. Yet, those exact same air emission values are the sole 
reason Edison found continuing operation of SONGS 1 to be cost-effective. 
DRA believes that using reasonable assumptions and accounting for all the factors 
which apply to SONGS 1 clearly shows that it is not cost-effective to continue 
operation -- in ORA's opinion, yes. But I would add, that as I said, if you ignored 
the air emission values, Edison and San Diego both would concur that continuing 
operation was not cost-effective. 
Now if the PUC rejects ORA's recommendation and approves the continued operation of 
SONGS 1, we have recommended that a performance-based pricing mechanism be put in place 
for the utilities to recover their costs of operating SONGS 1. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: On that point, if you disagree with the conclusions that they 
have made, I presume that you have some private reasons for that as to what they did 
wrong. Aren't you then, if that same group are going to be based upon 
performance-based rate making, aren't you putting them in a position where the bottom 
line is going to dictate and therefore somebody might choose to operate a plant that's 
not completely safe simply because of the dollars and cents involved? 
You know, it sounds good to say make it, do it this way. But, you know, I'd rather 
opt for safety first. And everybody's concerned about nuclear power plants and the 
safety and so forth, and you get a utility with a CEO that's maybe under the gun. The 
returns aren't all that great. The pressure to operate that plant longer, we've heard, 
I think, is just not appropriate. How do you respond to that? 
MR. O'NEILL: Senator, could I respond just for a moment, because the commission 
itself has considered the general question that you asked in the context of the 
adoption of a performance-based rate making method for recovery of costs for the Diablo 
canyon Nuclear Power Plant. And although there are differences, and they're fairly 
significant between Diablo and a small plant like San Onofre 1, that Bob can discuss in 
a moment. 
I think it's important to look at the question in the broader context. The 
commission did find, in reviewing the Diablo canyon settlement, that with an economic 
incentive tied to the plant performance on a regular, continuing basis, like the 
performance-based pricing system that opted for Diablo, the utility will actually have 
a greater incentive to operate the plants safely over the longrun. And I think the 
reason should be fairly apparent. As long as there aren't sudden thresholds which 
affect financial performance in a dramatic way, a performance-based pricing incentive 
can give the utilities increased incentive to monitor the plant carefully and maintain 
it well. If the plant is shut down for some reason because of a safety problem, it's 
going to cost the company an awful lot of money. That's a much better incentive than 
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under traditional rate making where the utility's income is not affected by shutdowns 
of that type. 
But the other thing that's really critical is that the plant can be shut down 
simply because of the appearance that things are not being managed well or operated 
well. The NRC could issue an order requiring PG&E or southern California Edison or any 
other utility operating a nuclear plant to shut the plant down or to extend an outage 
in order to assure itself that a problem will be taken care of. Even if there was no 
problem at all at the plant, the plant can be shut down under those conditions. So 
with the performance-based pricing incentive in place, there's a real incentive for the 
utilities not only to operate and maintain the plants safely, but to make very, very 
sure that they're going above and beyond the requirements of the NRC to make sure they 
can demonstrate that it's being operated safely. So I think there really is a very 
strong long-term incentive on the part of the utilities under these performance-based 
pricing mechanisms to maintain a very close watch over the operation of the plants. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But it does concern me. 
MR. KINOSIAN: Well, if I might follow up on what Ed just said, I would agree that 
their performance-based pricing provides a long-term incentive to operate the plant as 
reliably and safely as possible to avoid any long shutdown periods. However, the 
performance-based pricing system, we're recommending for San Onofre also does not 
produce any significant short-term concern over a short-term need to, say, increase 
your quarterly profits or your annual profits because we're recommending that the 
prices for SONGS 1 be based on Edison's forecast of what it will cost, which is 
relatively low. So the price that will be paid for any increased generation is 
relatively low, and there's very little profit for them to make from increasing the 
generation. In addition, the plant is only one-seventh the size of Diablo Canyon, so 
there's not a significant impact on their bottom line from relatively small changes in 
its operation. There's not that large amount of money involved. 
Finally, unlike with Diablo Canyon, for San Onofre there is already an existing 
rate making mechanism in place. And since this is a plant that's been in operation for 
a number of years, the existing rate-making system provides for bonuses or penalties 
for the utility if the plant operates outside of a certain band of reliability for a 
period of two years. So we're replacing -- and that's the exact sort of system which 
you've heard concerns about from the NRC where they have short-term deadlines they need 
to meet. 
We're recommending that that system with a two-year deadline be replaced by a 
system which simply has the long-term incentive over the life of the unit to operate as 
reliably as possible. So we think our proposal is actually, if anything, going to 
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improve the situation, which is why we have not in our proposal recommended that a 
safety committee be formed for San Onofre due to the adoption of performance-based 
pricing. 
MR. O'NEILL: There's one thing I should add. The commission is considering this 
recommendation in the context of its biennial resource plan update proceeding, and a 
decision should be issued early next year. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. And the final witness for this morning 
session, Karl Ory, Chief Administrative Officer of Campaign California. Mr. Ory, 
welcome. 
It's my understanding that Campaign California has had a long-standing concern 
about the cost-effectiveness of San Onofre Unit 1. The document you provided indicate 
you believe there are less expensive ways of providing power to ratepayers. Can you 
briefly elaborate on these issues? 
MR. KARL ORY: Certainly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senators. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You're another environmental group? 
MR. ORY: First of all, I'm the Executive Director of Campaign California. We're 
one of the state's largest environmental-consumer organizations. We're chaired by 
Assemblyman Tom Hayden. We led the campaigns to pass Proposition 65 ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You don't need to say any more. 
MR. ORY: And Prop. 99, the Tobacco Tax Initiative. We also led two initiative 
campaigns here in Sacramento to close the Rancho Seco Nuclear Power Plant. 
The DRA report documents a record of omission and concealment by Southern 
California Edison. And it's filing for authorization to pass further costs to SONGS 1 
to ratepayers, include examples of inflated capacity performance, reliability, and 
numerous underestimatations of cost, including the cost of capital additions, of line 
losses, of environmental impact on marine life, of insurance, of decommissioning, and 
they overestimated the cost of replacement power. 
Southern California Edison is cited by DRA for flawed and incomplete information. 
As an example, Southern California Edison, for comparison, uses a group of seven 
similar nuclear plants but omit five other plants of similar design that had poor 
performance. Campaign California applauds the DRA recommendation now under 
consideration by the PUC that SONGS 1 be designated a deferrable resource and its 
capacity be put out to bid. 
Let the free market determine the need for SONGS 1. The state's leading ratepayer 
organization TURN joins us in this position. Simply put, SONGS 1 is like an old car 
with too many miles. It's dangerous; it's inefficient; it operates to avoid 
embarrassment to the nuclear industry. Nuclear plants are not exempt from the laws of 
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nature. 
You stated earlier that you're aware of its age, 24 years of age. But I think that 
it is the single most significant fact about San Onofre Unit Number 1. As nuclear 
plants age, they require increasingly larger expenditures from maintenance to repairs 
and produce ever less power. One national study showed that for the period between 
1981 and '85, repair cost at older plants, those built in the '60s, were twice that in 
newer plants. 
An early DOE report projected this trend, suggesting that after 15 years, capacity 
of older plants would decline by 2 percent every year. SONGS 1 has proven this rule. 
Reliable in its first decade, its averaged only 27 percent capacity from 1980 to '87. 
In '88, it rose to 36 percent. In '89, it fell to 31 percent. Yet Southern California 
Edison projects a capacity factor of 60 to 80 percent. 
In future years, in order to justify continued operation of this plant, let's look 
at those five other plants that have similar design. The highest lifetime capacity, 
the best of those other five, is 59.9 percent. To continue to operate at all, 
expensive repairs and improvements will continue to be needed. Southern California 
Edison budgets for some long-delayed safety improvements triggered by the Three-Mile 
Island accident but leaves little contingency for other likely costs. A 1988 national 
study of cost found SONGS 1 to be the costliest in the nation. It measured net capital 
additions from '82 to '86 ranked by cost per kilowatt. 
While Southern California Edison would like to think they've got everything fixed, 
they in fact face probable, large unbudgeted expenditures. Southern California 
Edison's rosey forecast would be destroyed if SONG 1's troubled steam generator needed 
to be replaced, estimated by Southern California Edison at $200 million, yet all other 
three-loop Westinghouse pressurized water reactor plants have replaced their steam 
generators. The optimists at Southern California Edison also project that NRC will 
lighten up on requirements as the plant ages because modifications will not be 
cost-effective. We agree that it appears at times that the NRC will place cost above 
safety. But not even the NRC will as a matter of policy allow a plant to operate less 
safely because of age. Southern California Edison's assumption that cost of capital 
additions would decrease is false. 
Factors outside of the control of SONGS 1's managers may force unbudgeted expenses 
onto the plant, a problem that any of the other 12 similiarly designed plants may 
trigger improvements at all the plants. The current Earth Island Institute lawsuit 
could increase costs. Seismic activity and continued research could lead to yet 
further earthquake safety requirements. Finally, SONGS 1 is simply not needed. 
A 1987 study showed that even without nuclear power, the nation has a 28 percent 
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electrical generating power in '86, the year of the study, 28 percent surplus 
electrical generating power. In the western half of the United States, the surplus 
without nuclear was 40 percent. 
with the closure of Rancho Seco. 
And certainly, this has been proven here in Sacramento 
Even the perceived environmental benefit proves to be 
just so much smoke. 
First of all, SONGS 1 reduces the need for fossil fuel only to the extent that it 
operates. And for the last decade, it's only worked about a third of the time. Is 
there anyone here that believes that SONGS 1 is a reliable source of energy to the next 
century? 
Second, any air benefit is offset by the damage to the marine environment. 
Significant marine environmental benefit will result when SONGS 1 is closed. 
Third, continued operation increases the large amount of on-site stored nuclear 
waste. 
And finally, continued operation exposes the nation's largest urban area needlessly 
to the inherent safety risks of nuclear power. 
SONGS 1 should be considered a deferrable resource. The ORA report notes that 
SONGS 1 has not met any of the requirements for designation of a resource as 
non-deferrable. 
If the PUC arbitrarily designates SONGS 1 as non-deferrable, it will shield it from 
competition from other energy resources. This lost opportunity could cost ratepayers 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
If the PUC ignores its own policies, legislation should be adopted defining what 
resources can be shielded and requiring a competitive market. 
Russell wasn't here to hear me agree with him in his position. 
I'm sorry. Senator 
I think that the option 
of performance-based rate-making, while preferrable to the existing situation, is 
ill-suited to an aging troubled plant that needs no disincentives for safety. We 
instead would like SONGS 1 to face a free market and see what other options are out 
there of other energy-producing sources. And as we found here in Sacramento with 
Rancho Seco, there is no limit to the number of ingenious and environmentally sound 
ways of replacing the power lost by such a troubled plant. 
Finally, I'm reminded of a fight that Campaign California joined in the late '70s 
to stop San Diego Gas and Electric's involvement with the Sun Desert Nuclear Plant. We 
were told then of rosy economic projections and endless need. However, two years 
later, a San Diego Gas and Electric executive described their denied plans as one of 
the best things that ever happened to them. 
Utilities can't make tough decisions. They're on a nuclear powered treadmill. The 
treadmill is driven by the guarantee of rate returns and a lack of competition. It's 
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time to put on the breaks. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
We will adjourn this committee until 2 o'clock. We'll come back this afternoon and 
complete the testimony. 
--- BREAK ---
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The hour of 2:00 having arrived, let me, in order to expedite 
the afternoon session of the hearing, for those of you who have received questions in 
advance, please try to respond to them as part of your direct testimony. For those 
questions that remain unanswered, please respond in writing to the committee by 
December the 16th. That's two weeks from now. 
Okay. We'll begin now with PG&E. Mr. Womack, Lawrence Womack, Manager of Nuclear 
Operations Support, Pacific Gas & Electric Company. 
MR. LAWRENCE F. WOMACK: Good afternoon, Chairman Rosenthal. I'm pleased to be 
here. My name is Larry Womack. I'm currently manager of steam generation with Pacific 
Gas & Electric. For most of the last 14 years, I was involved with the PG&E nuclear 
program, most recently from 1989 until November 1 of this year as Manager of Nuclear 
Operations Support in our Nuclear Power Generation Business Unit in San Francisco. 
I'm pleased to be here this afternoon, and I plan to report to the committee on the 
operation's safety and ratepayer costs of Diablo Canyon. And please bear with me. I, 
you know, I was better prepared to read a statement, but I'll work on the eye contact 
here. 
First, as a bit of background, Diablo Canyon has two 1,100 megawatt electric 
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors. They went into initial service in 1984 and 
1985 respectively. And currently, each unit has completed four 18-month cycles of 
operation. so we're along on the major curve. We've still not subject to the initial 
start-up problems that we experienced years ago. 
First, I'd like to talk about operations and safety. But first to emphasize PG&E's 
commitment to operation of Diablo at the highest levels of safety, reliability, and 
performance -- these were paramount in our nuclear organization. They are also 
important to PG&E's ratepayers as the plant is operated efficiently and effectively. 
It provides the best return to them. 
Diablo is a vital, strategic resource in PG&E's energy plan for the next ten years 
and beyond. In 1990, for example, Diablo accounted for 18 percent of PG&E's generation 
to its customers. Diablo also is helping PG&E in implementing its strategic initiative 
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to improve the environment of the Central and Northern areas of California. 
Diablo is principally operated as a base-load facility. It's maintained 
meticulously and routinely upgraded, its systems and componentry, such that we minimize 
the possibility of equipment failing as a result of age or obsolescence. As a result 
of this, Diablo does operate or has operated for long, continuous periods between 
refueling outages. This is a general indicator used in the nuclear industry to signify 
a positive or a high level of performance, that being the operation in absence of 
unplanned outages or forced shutdowns. As a result of this effort, the lifetime 
capacity factor for both Diablo Canyon units is 76 percent. This is well into the 
upper area of performance of the industry on the whole. 
As Mr. Martin from the NRC discussed this morning, we have two resident inspectors 
full time at Diablo, a regional staff in Walnut Creek that also oversees the operation 
of the plant and literally dozens of inspections that are performed on an annual basis 
by both our resident and non-resident staffs, including personnel from Washington, 
D.c., to oversee the operation of Diablo. And at approximately 18-month intervals, the 
NRC performs what is called an overall systematic assessment of licensee performance, 
or SALP. 
In the NRC's most recent SALP report on Diablo for the period of January 1990 
through June 1991, Diablo received what we consider one of our best SALP reports or 
evaluations compiling our performance through that period in the eyes of the NRC with 
receipt of top marks or ones in four of the seven SALP categories and twos in the 
remaining three categories. The SALP score, as a point of information, it's scored on 
a scale of one to three with one being a really superior operation, as Mr. Martin had 
discussed this morning; where two is good or, you know, better-than-average 
performance; three, acceptable performance. 
Probably the most important information contained in the SALP report was, and I'd 
like to quote it from the NRC -- this in regards to Diablo's performance -- and that 
is, I quote: "It was very good, in some cases superior, and clearly directed toward 
safe facility operation." We have put a tremendous effort in over the years to improve 
upon our performance, learn from our experience, and deliver higher levels of safety 
and plant reliability. We've also found that meticulous attention to good maintenance 
can produce many benefits, multiple benefits, in the way of safety availability and the 
like. 
I'd like to talk a little bit about our refueling process and to say that there are 
literally thousands of maintenance and plant refurbishment tasks, which must be 
completed during a refueling outage. These tasks require considerable planning such 
that they can be executed efficiently and safely when it comes time to shut the plant 
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down and refuel. 
To this end, we have applied what we consider some innovative management techniques 
and established what we call high-impact teams of both management and union personnel 
to work closely together for as long as a year before the refueling outage takes place 
to practice and plan their activities such that when it does come time for them to 
perform, they can perform as a cohesive team directed really by their own actions and 
requiring minimal management because of the level of their rehearsal. 
When we did this, or took this approach, two major improvements occurred. First, 
the training and practice that these teams had gone through made the performance of 
their task very efficient. And as a result, the unit was able to be returned to 
service at an earlier date or at earlier dates than had been previously experienced. 
In other words, we were able to shorten the overall duration of our refueling outage. 
The second and most significant here is again the efficiency and planning that went 
into the reduction in task time also resulted in a reduction in the amount of radiation 
exposure to our plant workers, and these are not insignificant numbers. And I'd like 
to give you a couple of numbers in that manner. 
In 1988, which was a year that we performed two refueling outages, one each on Unit 
1 and 2, we have reached an exposure of 430 man rem per unit. A rem is a measure of 
radiation. In 1991, a similar year, in that we had two refueling outages, we averaged 
only 270 man rem per unit. This was a reduction of 37 percent. Both -- this is both 
an improvement in overall plant safety and an attention to worker safety in the power 
plant to minimize overall exposure to our working population. 
PG&E has also made many capital improvements at its own initiative in order to 
enhance the safety and reliability of Diablo Canyon. I'd like to discuss a few of 
those very quickly here. 
The first is the installation or the procurement and installation of a sixth 
emergency diesel generator to be installed and on-line in 1993. The purpose of this 
$40 million investment is to improve the safety of the plant to give us better 
assurance that emergency backup power will be available to safety systems in the plant 
if we were to have a loss of off-site power. 
We have also upgraded two major systems within the plant. As examples, the first 
being our plant process computer, which monitors the operation of either unit. There's 
one for each unit continuously and helps to alert operators of any change, again, a 
multi-million-dollar investment we elected to make. 
We've also installed a new digital feedwater control system for the sole purpose of 
trying to minimize the number of transients that the old system had put plant 
components and equipment through, and in many cases, in the past resulted in unplanned 
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reactor shutdowns. 
PG&E also continues to maintain a $90 million spare-parts inventory to ensure that 
we both have the right part when needed and to ensure that we can properly maintain 
plant equipment in as safe as possible condition. 
In the area of seismic safety, the NRC's staff in June 1991 submitted their safety 
evaluation report on PG&E's long-term seismic program for Diablo Canyon. Based on its 
review and the review of its consultants, and I'd like to refer to the extensive list 
of consultants here, the University of Southern California, the United States 
Geological Survey, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sania National Laboratory, 
the University of Nevada, Reno, and Rice University. With all this input, the NRC 
staff concluded that Diablo Canyon's seismic design margins are sufficient to assure 
the health and safety of the public. 
The NRC also concluded that PG&E's six-year evaluation of the seismic margins at 
the plant have been carried out in a competent and professional manner and really 
represented the most extensive, thorough, complete study ever commissioned of its type 
for a nuclear facility in this country. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask a question. 
MR. WOMACK: Sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: As part of your emergency preparedness, can you tell us what 
you had to do or what you did or what you didn't do during the earthquake in 1989? 
MR. WOMACK: You're referring to the Lorna Prieta quake? First off, as maybe a bit 
of background there, the Lorna Prieta quake epicenter is something on the order of 150 
to 160 miles from Diablo. As a result, the ground motion or the accelerations 
experienced at Diablo were very small, very smal: indeed. In fact, they were so small 
that it was not felt by any of the personnel at the plant site. Only our sophisticated 
detection system, which is capable of measuring response down in the thousandth of a 
"g" range responded to it. 
Aside from that, once the event was reported to the plant, and I believe I was the 
first one to report it, I experienced it very well in my 14th floor office in San 
Francisco. That was to initiate a response to that with our established emergency 
operating procedure for an earthquake or a seismic event. That resulted in extensive 
walk-downs and evaluation of Unit 2 which was in operation and not affected at that 
time and also a review of Unit l's status at the time it was in its third refueling 
outage. 
I'll continue here. 
More recently in October of this year, the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor 
Safeguards, or ACRS, which is an advisory body to the NRC independent of the staff, 
-66-
~rote NRC chairman Ivan Sellen and endorsed the conclusions of the NRC Safety 
Evaluation Report. The ACRS noted that the geological and seismilogical 
characteristics of the area that are significant to the seismic safety of the plant 
~ere not at issue amongst the large number of consultants and experts that were 
associated both with the staff, the licensee, and the ACRS. The NRC and the ACRS, then 
concluded that this represented satisfaction of PG&E's license commitment, license 
requirement to perform this study for Diablo, and the NRC has concluded its review of 
the matter. 
I'd also like to discuss operational safety matters, and in particular, note that 
the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee has concluded in its two annual reports 
that the plant is being operated safely. The Safety Committee was created as part of 
the Diablo Canyon rate case settlement for the purpose of reviewing the impact of 
performance-based rate making on the safety of plant operations. As I'm sure you're 
also aware, the committee acts in an advisory capacity and exercises no authority over 
the day-to-day operation at Diablo. 
The Safety Committee has been in operation since early 1990, the three members 
sitting on the committee possessing the technical knowledge of the operation of the 
plant. Their review has been thorough, fair, reasonable. In each case where the 
committee has taken or made a recommendation, we have carefully reviewed that and taken 
action on each recommendation. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: One question. Do the workers in the plant know how to contact 
the Independent Safety Committee? 
MR. WOMACK: Yes. The Independent Safety Committee, again, associated with its 
independence, does publish in the local media a method of access to that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: There's nothing posted in the plant so that anybody can call? 
MR. WOMACK: No, not directly. we rely on the local media. However, PG&E has long 
had what we refer to as the quality hotline which is a system whereby plant employees, 
workers can anonymously make their concerns heard. This has been in place for 
something in the neighborhood of eight to ten years and have been very effective 
through the redesign, refurbishment, and operation of the facility. I might also point 
out that the two resident inspectors at Diablo are available to take that input, if 
there would be any concern as to the operation of the plant. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you begin to conclude. 
MR. WOMACK: Yes. I'm about at my last-- I'd like to discuss the implementation 
of the Diablo rate-making settlement. 
And again, as you're aware, the rate-making scheme was approved by the CPUC for 
Diablo and is unique in the utility industry. The settlement agreement was approved in 
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December of '88. Under the agreement, the plan is not included in our rate base. 
Instead, we tie our revenues to plant operation. Simply if the plant operates, revenue 
comes in. If the plant does not operate, no revenue comes in. 
All operating and maintenance costs, including all capital costs associated with 
the facility, are paid out of these revenues. The shareholders, not the rate payers, 
share the risks and rewards of operation. 
This agreement we strongly believe gives PG&E a real incentive to run Diablo at the 
highest level of safety and reliability for the entire 28-year term of the agreement, 
not just these first three years that we've been in so far. 
I'd like to make one quote here, if I can, and enter it into the record, Mr. 
Chairman, that the NRC made in recent discussions regarding this type of rate making, 
and that is, I quote: "The settlement provides a number of incentives to PG&E to 
improve the reliability and safety of plant operations. PG&E assumes risks associated 
with equipment failures, prolonged outages, and new regulatory requirements for the 
entire 28-year period of the settlement. This program provides PG&E with an economic 
incentive to ensure that plant operations -- excuse me -- that the plant operates well 
over many years. The Diablo canyon settlement does not rely on short-term performance 
measurements with sharp thresholds and does not use SALP scores, features that the NRC 
has identified may adversely affect the public health and safety." 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me ask one final question. It's been suggested, and there 
was some reference to it earlier today, that the cost of a kilowatt hour is higher than 
any other form of energy. 
MR. WOMACK: I might rephrase any other form of energy available in the PG&E 
system. That is unfortunately only partially correct, and I'm, by no means -- I'm an 
engineer. I'm not familiar with, as well, with our rate structure. But I do know that 
the range of costs in the system is quite wide, ranging from our hydro generation, 
where the fuel cost is effectively zero --
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Hydro. 
MR. WOMACK: -- up to the higher end, QF power sources, which are in excess of the 
kilowatt hour cost at Diablo. Exactly, you know, how much is above us and how much 
below, I really can't answer. We can provide that information but 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: One of the things that we've heard over the years is how much 
cheaper nuclear power is than other sources of power. And when we held a hearing 
sometime ago about various kinds of energy, we found out, for example, that solar was 
no good because that was 8 cents; that's high. Now I'm informed we may be spending 9.5 
or 10 cents for nuclear power at Diablo. Can you comment on that. 
MR. WOMACK: Well, I guess again ••• 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: If you're not prepared to, I'd like to have an answer to the 
question. 
MR. WOMACK: Yeah, I guess my best answer, and again, I'm not an expert in that 
area, but one certainly has to account for the fact that, when it was predicted that 
solar could be delivered at 8 cents a kilowatt hour, it was many years ago. There have 
been advances there as there have been in other energy sources. But my own comment 
would be that Diablo's costs today are well in line with what would be the avoided 
~wer costs or the costs of securing new generation within the PG&E system. So again, 
recognizing that we are growing and that our old resources have to be retired. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What I'd like to hear at some point is the question of costs, 
and you mentioned some of the other forms. I'd like to know what you paid for 
cogeneration as compared to nuclear. I'm informed that cogeneration is cheaper, and so 
I • d like to ••• 
MR. WOMACK: Again, it depends on a number of complicated factors, and I think it's 
best for us to respond in writing to the committee with the full range rather than me 
stumble over myself here this afternoon. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because in past hearings, we've heard from cogeneration 
o~rations about what they're getting paid, and it's not 10 cents a kilowatt hour. 
Anyway ••• 
MR. WOMACK: Understood, Senator. Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
MR. WOMACK: I guess I do want to make one conclusionary statement, and that is, 
that PG&E is taking, continues to take aggresive steps, to maintain a high level of 
performance, both in safety and reliability at Diablo. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Already said that. We don't need to hear it again. 
MR. WOMACK: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
MR. WOMACK: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Now we'll hear from the PUC. Edward O'Neill, I guess, 
is going to introduce Bruce DeBerry. 
MR. O'NEILL: Let me just take a minute to introduce both Bruce DeBerry and Anne 
Mester. 
In order to be fully responsive to the committee, I wanted to bring people here 
today who could respond to hopefully all of your questions on all aspects concerning 
the Diablo Canyon settlement. 
Bruce is currently an assistant director on the commission's transportation 
division, but he had previously served the commission in the capacity as the project 
-69-
manager on the ORA's Diablo Canyon rate case team. Bruce and I spent quite a few years 
working on that case and shared responsibility for developing the case that led to the 
Diablo Canyon settlement. 
Anne Mester is an attorney with the commission, and she is responsible for, among 
many other things, oveseeing our involvement, limited as it may be, with the Diablo 
Canyon Safety Committee. So first, I thought Bruce would explain briefly some of the 
provisions in the settlement and then Anne would discuss the Safety committee. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: In five minutes. 
MR. BRUCE DeBERRY: Okay. Chairman Rosenthal, as you know, the agreement was 
signed in June of 1988 and later approved by the commission in December of 1988. The 
agreement was reached after assessment of the highly complex dispute and technical 
issues that existed in that case. DRA believed that this agreement shifted the risks 
of operation and the risks of the costs and capital additions, and it also provided a 
potentially large cost disallowance which was in the best interest of ratepayers. 
Under the agreement, as you know, PG&E owns and operates the plant and is only paid for 
any energy which is delivered from the plant to ratepayers. 
The agreement in summary covers 27 years of operation and includes the prices to be 
paid for energy in the future and a mechanism to calculate the prices under a formula 
which begins in 1994. It also includes an incentive to incur its operation when the 
power is most needed in peak periods of the summer. It includes also a cap on cost 
recovery if the plant is ever abandoned and, as you know, also creates a safety 
committee. A summary of the elements in the settlement have been provided for the 
record. And if you would like to address any of those, why, I can do that. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's fine. we have it for the record. 
Okay. Now let's hear about the Safety Committee. 
MS. ANNE MESTER: Good afternoon. we also have provided for you a statement of the 
basic provisions of the settlement agreement which do apply to the Safety Committee. 
And what I'd like to do today is just briefly go over the mechanics of the commission's 
limited involvement with the committee. I'd like to stress that the committee was 
intentionally created to be an independent safety committee. It functions -- it is 
intended that it function wholly independently from either PG&E or the PUC; and as a 
result, the PUC's involvement is fairly minimal at this point. Of course, the PUC did 
approve the settlement which created the committee. The settlement contains, as was 
referred to briefly, earlier today, a rather elaborate scheme of nominations and 
appointments mechanism. The president of the commission serves as one of the 
nominators. The nominator -- there are three nominators -- they serve as a committee 
and nominate, as it turns out every year, three names to either reappoint or to replace 
-70-
a particular appointment on the committee. The committee member's terms are three 
years; they're staggered; and so we have this system whereby it recurs every year. 
The PUC as a body does not participate in this nomination process. This is 
strictly the role of the president of the commission, although the president must 
consult with the PUC as a whole before the nominations are actually relayed to the 
appointing powers. 
The PUC also sets fees for the members of the committee, and these fees come out of 
the committee's annual budget. The fees are based on commensurate fees which PG&E pays 
to like individuals which it hires. And another thing we've looked at there has been 
the fee schedule for trustees of the nuclear decommissioning trust, which is another 
entity the PUC created a while ago. 
The settlement agreement gives the PUC the authority to audit the books, accounts, 
and records of the committee. And such auditing is to be done with an eye to 
reasonableness of expenses and conflicts of interest which may occur therein. The 
staff of the commission is going to undertake with some involvement from PG&E because 
that's also the way the settlement agreement provides for it, its first audit of 
committee expenses in the first quarter of next year. 
The last role the PUC has is in reviewing the committee's annual reports. And to 
date, even though two annual reports have been adopted by the committee, the PUC has 
only seen one of them because there is an intermediate step before an annual report is 
transmitted to what turns out to be actually for reviewing agencies, the PUC being one. 
The annual reports are also given to the Energy Commission for review, the Attorney 
General, and the Governor's Office, any one of which entities may decide based on 
recommendations in the report to approach the NRC to request an institution of a 
proceeding to cause PG&E to adopt one or more of the Safety Committee's 
recommendations. At this point, that has not occurred. 
I'm happy to answer further questions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I just have one question. Does the commission have the 
authority to revisit the decision if it determines, for example, during audits that the 
rate-making provisions were not reasonable to the rate base, or the Independent Safety 
Committee was seriously flawed? 
MR. O'NEILL: Well, the commission does retain continuing jurisdiction over PG&E 
and every other utility that it regulates. It has the legal authority to reopen the 
proceeding and to modify its decision approving the settlement. However, I think there 
are a number of reasons why that's a very unlikely circumstance. First, I think it 
would have a very, very chilling effect on any future settlements in important, complex 
cases. This settlement was entered into with the understanding that it was a long-term 
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agreement and that the actual plant may perform much different than anybody forecast. 
As a result, if the PUC were to re-open the proceeding because of three years of 
high-plant performance, I think it would have a very adverse effect on any future 
settlements that involve similar types of long-term estimates. 
Secondly, the settlement is really in its infancy. It's a long-term settlement. 
The plant has operated well for several years, and I think that's good for PG&E. It's 
certainly in the interest of the ratepayers and citizens of California from a safety 
standpoint, the safest nuclear plant is one that operates at a pretty high level. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What if the PUC decided the energy was costing too much? 
MR. O'NEILL: Well, it has the legal authority to re-open the settlement. But it 
would have a very difficult time setting a rate for Diablo Canyon, given the fact that 
there is no complete evidentiary record concerning the reasonableness of the costs 
incurred there. There is no record that they could rely upon. We prepared hundreds of 
thousands of pages of testimony in supporting exhibits which were filed with the 
commission but hearings were never held. Had they been held, I imagine they would have 
taken years to conclude. We may still be, have been involved in that process today. 
But there are practical problems doing that. 
The other thing, though, is that re-opening the settlement at this point may have 
the effect of achieving the worst possible outcome for ratepayers. PG&E would have 
received the benefit of high-plant performance in the early years and avoided the risk 
of potentially much lower plant performance in the later years of the plant. So by 
re-opening the settlement, the commission might ironically achieve exactly the opposite 
result that it was seeking to achieve. So I think there a number of reasons why that 
would not be a good idea, although it's clear that the commission does have the legal 
authority to re-open the proceeding and revise that decision, should it choose to do 
so. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
We will now hear from Robert Wellington who's the legal counsel for the Diablo 
Canyon Independent Safety Committee. 
Welcome to the committee. 
MR. ROBERT R. WELLINGTON: Good afternoon, Senator. As noted, my name is Robert 
Wellington. I'm the Attorney for the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee, and 
we're pleased to be here this afternoon. Thanks for your invitiation. 
My nine-year-old son told me yesterday that my prepared remarks take 14 minutes and 
40 seconds to read, so we'll save all that time and we'll just submit them for the 
record. 
I've also provided to you, and I'd rather go through that, the comments talk about 
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the formation of the committee and the history and the background. And since this is 
the first time we've appeared before you, we had submitted that material. Also, we've 
noted the appointment of the three members and have attached I've provided you with 
an attachment of documents of exhibits. As you can see, the background resumes of the 
Independent Safety Committee members as appointed. B is a list of documents pursuant 
to the settlement agreement that are provided to the committee. 
Your letter, a recent letter, asked for a brief summary on the activities of the 
committee, and I'll just touch on a couple of those. In particular, if you'd look over 
at Exhibit C of the packet of documents, at Exhibit c, D, E, and F, I've provided you 
with a notice of meetings; and then on the second page, the agendas from each of the 
meetings of the Safety Committee. The first meeting, as noted, was held in San Luis 
Obispo on May 22, 1990. As has been indicated, the settlement agreement was entered 
into in the summer of '88 and was then approved by the PUC in late 1988. But it wasn't 
until a year later that Professor William Kastenberg at UCLA was first appointed by the 
Governor, and then a second member was appointed which allowed them to hold that first 
meeting. 
As you can see from that agenda, which is attached at Exhibit c, the sessions were 
set up, the committee is held in this format, as followed: The committee has held 
full-day meetings in three sessions -- the first session, usually a morning session, 
devoted to a business and organizational matters; a second afternoon session devoted to 
fact-finding and presentations; and in connection with that, then an evening session or 
a third session devoted primarily to public comments and communications. 
In the list of the questions you provided, that was provided to me this morning, 
one of the questions was having to do with the open-meeting laws. As noted there in 
Exhibit C, we've adopted Policy Number Four, Rules and Procedures for the Conduct of 
Meetings. And that provides that meetings will be noticed and will be open in public 
pursuant to applicable law. And then I provided -- with regard to the next four 
exhibits, you might -- could I have a copy for Senator Russell as well. Thank you. 
The next four exhibits, three exhibits, D, E, and F, again, are the subsequent 
agenda meeting notices noting the subsequent meetings all held in San Luis Obispo 
County. All three of the meetings were held in San Luis Obispo itself and one south, 
about 15 miles, in Arroyo Grande. As you can see, in addition to the committee's 
meetings itself and the technical presentations, the fact finding that the committee 
has conducted by review of these exhibits, you see outage management, training 
programs, fuel-handling operations, fitness for duty, and other reports and technical 
fact-finding matters that the committee has asked PG&E to make presentations on. 
I might note for the record that in the first four meetings of the committee, over 
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16 hours have been devoted to fact-finding sessions that have been open to the public, 
available for people to listen, the people in the affected community to hear what's 
going on, and also to express their concerns in the local community. 
A review of these exhibits would also show the number of consultants. This 
question was relevant to the consultants retained by the committee during the terms of 
its operations. It has, in addition to the technical presentations, the consultants 
shown on the exhibits, a geotechnical engineer has been retained to advise the 
committee on seismic matters. One of your questions relates to that, and we'll address 
it in more detail. That consultant is going to address the committee on that matter, 
following the conclusion of the USGS report, and the NRC report is now reviewing all 
those materials and report to the Independent Safety committee at its meeting, next 
meeting, in February, in San Luis Obispo. 
other consultants have included a board-certified psychiatrist to review fitness 
for duty and Employee Assistance Programs, a metallurgical engineer, who gave a report 
who was also going to be giving a report at the February meeting, a professor of 
radiology who spoke about the low-level radiation program at the most recent meeting in 
October of the committee, and a consultant who is advised on probablistic risk 
assessment, and a report was concluded at the last meeting on that matter. I've 
also ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Question. 
MR. WELLINGTON: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How often does the committee meet? 
MR. WELLINGTON: In 18 months -- as I said, the first meeting was in May of 1990. 
The committee has met four times. It looks like it's going to meet an average about 
every, its average about every four months, three times a year. I finally then report 
to you the charge of the committee to prepare a report and note the first interim 
report that cover the first six months of 1990, and a copy of that has been filed with 
you. 
The first annual report of the Safety Committee was adopted at its October meeting, 
and that's some 200 pages in length. That's been provided to PG&E for their response. 
And upon our receipt of that response in mid-December, that will be filed pursuant to 
the settlement agreement with the Governor, Attorney General, and the Chairman of the 
Energy Commission will also file a copy of that with your committee. 
I've got other questions that you've provided to me. But if you-- and I can 
address those or ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You can address them-- I'd just like to ask one. 
MR. WELLINGTON: Sure. 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Have you made an unannounced visit to the plant, as a 
committee? 
MR. WELLINGTON: The settlement agreement does not provide for unannounced visits. 
rn fact, the terms of the settlement agreement by which the committee is organized 
provides that the committee shall take, have at least one annual site visit plus what 
other site visits it wishes, and it will make arrangements with PG&E for those, and 
that all the, each site visit must comply with all applicable federal laws, 
regulations, and NRC policies relative to who may go in. So the settlement agreement 
~tself, by its own terms, does not allow for unannounced visits. 
Anything else? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I think that's it. 
MR. WELLINGTON: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. WELLINGTON: You know -- I'm sorry. Could I add one other thing? It's not in 
my prepared remarks, but it ties off on what Anne Mester just said a minute ago and 
~t's in the exhibits. And I'll just mention it because it might be of interest to you. 
Anne Mester, the attorney from the PUC, mentioned the limited oversight that the 
PUC has of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee. But there has been a recent 
review where the PUC did take a specific look at what the committee was doing. And if 
~t hasn't been brought to your attention, I'd like to bring it to your attention. At 
Exhibit o, you'll see there's a petition that was filed back in the spring by the 
Mothers for Peace in connection with the committee; and that petition was filed with 
the PUC relating to the settlement agreement and specifically the Independent Safety 
Committee. 
At Exhibit P then, you'll see a brief, a short, it's a 14-page response. And this 
deals -- this was filed by the committee, on behalf of the committee. It deals with 
all of the issues that had been raised relative to that. And then at Exhibit Q, 
there's an opinion of the administrative law judge from the PUC and then also approved 
by the PUC itself dealing with those petitions; and I thought it might be of interest 
toy~. 
Thanks very much. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
our next participant will be Dr. Robert Brown, u.s. Geological Survey, the u.s. 
Department of the Interior. 
DR. ROBERT D. BROWN: Chairman Rosenthal. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Welcome. 
DR. BROWN: Senator Russell. I should begin, I think, by noting that the u.s. 
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Geological Survey's report on Diablo Canyon is available to the public as Appendix c in 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Were you here this morning? 
DR. BROWN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Because NRC testified this morning and agreed to 
disagree with USGS. 
DR. BROWN: Yes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. I hope you'd comment about that. 
DR. BROWN: All right. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you pull your mike a little bit closer. 
DR. BROWN: All right. Fine. A point of clarification is that our report to the 
USGS examined the geological, geophysical, and seismilogical issues related to Diablo 
Canyon and the long-term seismic program that PG&E conducted. It did not examine such 
other topics as soil structure interaction, the engineering performance, of the 
building or the structures at the plant or their components. 
Initially, USGS considered, was to have considered the ground motion conditions at 
Diablo Canyon. And one of our geophysicists, Ken Campbell, was assigned to that task. 
Ken left the USGS about three-quarters the way through the process, the review process. 
And he continued to consult on ground motion for the NRC but as a private individual 
rather than a USGS employee. And for that reason, there was no ground motion -- there 
were no ground motion issues considered specifically in our report. 
The discussion of the scope of our review relates to a number of questions that 
were asked, and these concerned things like whether the USGS has expressed an opinion 
on whether the plant will survive a major earthquake, whether we will be involved in 
further review of PG&E's evaluations for NRC. A number of these issues are engineering 
matters, and they require a rather sophisticated structural engineering judgment. We 
did not provide that for ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You'll have an opportunity in the next two weeks, I hope, to 
provide us with that information? 
DR. BROWN: Yes, I can provide that in written form, if you wish. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
DR. BROWN: But essentially, that's the reason why some of these things were not 
done. 
We have, in fact, a long-standing interagency agreement with NRC to advise them on 
earth science issues and research related to reactor siting. And from 1985 until the 
completion of the review process in September of this year, I was the senior USGS 
geologist involved in that process. A landmark in that process was the PG&E final 
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report which was issued in July of 1988. And chapters 2 and 3 of that report, which 
dealt with the geology, seismology, and tectonics, and the capability of the fault for 
generating large earthquakes raised a number of questions. Those questions were 
formally addressed to PG&E by NRC, and there were a series of reports then issued over 
the next 18-month period approximately. And all of that material, the final report, 
plus those supplemental reports, is the documentation that PG&E offered. That material 
formed the basis of our review plus access to other published and unpublished data that 
we have and also our own investigations that have been completed or in progress. 
As our report to the NRC noted, we were able to confirm many of the conclusions 
from the long-term seismic program, PG&E's investigation. But we also questioned 
several conclusions, and the most significant of these, the ones that received the most 
notice, were those relating to the Hosgri Fault. And there's several issues involved 
there, and I'll try to summarize those rather quickly. 
PG&E's interpretation of the Hosgri is a vertically, essentially, a vertical fault, 
extending down to 12 kilometers' depth, and characterized by horizontal motion of the 
blocks on either side. So it's essentially, in geologist jargon, a right-lateral, 
strike-slip fault. It's very similar to most of the earthquakes that occur on the San 
Andreas Fault. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is that in the ocean? 
DR. BROWN: I beg your pardon? The fault, yes, the fault is in the ocean. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: In the ocean. 
DR. BROWN: It's three miles -- it's about 2.8 miles offshore from Diablo Canyon. 
The USGS interpretation of the fault geometry and the nature of slip is somewhat 
different. We agree that it probably is vertical down to depths of about two miles, 
but we think that it flattens to depths of 50 to 70 degrees toward the northeast at 
depths between three miles and eight miles deep. 
We agree with PG&E that the maximum magnitude earthquake on the fault is a 7.2. We 
also differ in the sense of slip. As I mentioned, the PG&E intepretation is 
strike-slip horizontal motion on the fault. The USGS interpretation is that it's 
likely to have a combination of vertical- and horizontal-slip, an oblique-slip fault, 
very similar to the Lorna Prieta Earthquake of 1989. And in fact, one of the 
significant things about Lorna Prieta is that it demonstrated the possibility of large, 
oblique-slip earthquakes in California. We had been arguing that this was a 
possibility before Lorna Prieta. It was a nice demonstration to have come along. 
These differences become important chiefly in estimating ground motion. And the 
critical thing, from the standpoint of ground-motion estimates, is really not how far 
the plant is from the earthquake of the surface of the earth but its relationship to 
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the fault zone at depth. And as I think I mentioned before, the energetic part of the 
fault zone is down at three or four miles to something like eight miles deep. 
The USGS interpretation would incline the fault zone toward the plant. And in 
fact, at most of the depths that we're talking about, the very lower part of the fault 
zone would be beneath the Diablo Canyon facility. So -- and then the other point is 
that in general, coming out of the ground motion estimates for Diablo Canyon, it 
appears that the oblique-slip or reverse-slip faults consistently have higher ground 
motion for the same magnitude earthquake than do strike-slip faults. so both the 
geometry of the fault and the oblique-slip orientation contributes somewhat to 
increased levels of ground motion. And, of course, if ground motion levels become too 
high, they exceed the design parameters for the plant and can lead to failure and loss 
of function. 
There's a problem, however, with estimating maximum ground motion levels. And, in 
fact, there are a number of problems associated with that issue. I might just mention 
three of these. One is, that in order to estimate the slip on the Hosgri Fault, it's 
necessary to import slip observations on the San Simeon Fault 36 miles to the north. 
Another one is a vertical component of slip on the Hosgri Fault is clearly there. But 
its magnitude is certainly unknown, and it's likely to remain so without offshore 
drilling to provide reliable age control. 
And finally, and perhaps more importantly, even if all these other questions were 
resolved, our ability to estimate ground motions for ?-magnitude and greater 
earthquakes within three miles of the source is limited because the database for that 
estimation is nearly devoid of that kind of earthquake. I think about the only one we 
have right now is the Corralitos station on, that was within the distance of the Lema 
Prieta Earthquake. 
These kinds of gaps in our knowledge make the assessment of the earthquake hazard 
uncertain, and we can overcome some of that with, by the use of probablistic methods. 
But these -- and these allow us to make decisions, but they're really no substitute for 
hard data. There are, I think, five important conclusions or lessons that we might 
draw from the Diablo Canyon experience. 
The first, which is specific to Diablo Canyon, is that the problem of the Hosgri 
Fault and its seismic potential is still not entirely satisfactorily resolved. Some 
more general points are, first, for critical facilities, such as dams and reactors, 
geologic hazards should be fully and carefully evaluated before resources are committed 
to construct and operate the facility. 
Secondly, in regions as geologically complex and incompletely known as Coastal 
California, exploration costs required to define earthquake hazards adequately may 
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approach or exceed the constructions costs in many facilities. New discoveries and 
unexpected events occur frequently in earthquake research. Providing for timely 
reassessment of earthquake vulnerability is a critical element in long-term risk 
management. 
And finally, where a seismic hazard is recognized, adequately defined and 
~antified, engineering strategy can usually reduce the risk to acceptable levels. An 
engineering solution to an undefined or poorly constrained problem offers substantially 
less protection. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
Any questions, Senator Russell? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Were you involved in any surveys before the plant -- I mean was 
your organization involved in any geological surveys before the plant was started or 
approved? 
OR. BROWN: We were involved -- we became involved -- actually, we were involved 
early on through our regular interagency agreement with NRC, and the assistant director 
for engineering at that time was the main contact for that. After the construction 
permit and before licensing, the Hosgri Fault zone was discovered offshore. And so 
that's something that came up midway in the process. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Was that discovered by your agency? 
DR. BROWN: It was initially discovered by an oil company geologist who was looking 
for oil offshore and was not called by that name. But after that discovery, the survey 
assigned part of is marine geology group to go out and further explore that fault zone 
and determine whether or not it was active or inactive; and they provided much of the 
data to show that it was active. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And then based upon that, PG&E redesigned 
their plant in keeping with the information that you or the oil company or whoever 
else? 
DR. BROWN: I think that was the foundation for the first redesign that was 
mentioned by the PG&E people. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. And when they redesigned their plant, were you asked to 
comment? Was your agency asked to comment on the sufficiency of it as it relates to 
that fault? 
DR. BROWN: Senator, that was before my relationship to this problem. I think we 
were involved in that process on pretty much a day-to-day level directly through our 
contact with NRC because NRC was overseeing this process. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: So while you weren't there and cannot testify as to your personal 
knowledge, would it be fair to assume that your people were involved in the analysis 
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and in looking at the safety factors as it related to that? That would be part of your 
charge normally? 
DR. BROWN: I think they were involved but to a less of an intensive degree in terms 
of a review. We were doing more independent evaluation of the geology around the plant 
site and less of a review process than this time. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And now your overview has been reactive, reactivated, or is it, 
has it been an ongoing oversight? 
DR. BROWN: It's not an ongoing thing. It was reactivated in 1985 at the time that 
the long-term seismic program was begun. However, we continued to have an interest on 
offshore geology, and we are doing surveys of Coastal California. And this, the Hosgri 
is just part of a fault zone that extends all along the coast, and it's a major issue. 
so ..• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: How did you get reactivated as it relates to Diablo Canyon? Do 
you know? 
DR. BROWN: Yes. There was a request that went from the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission to the USGS director's office to provide review capability for the long-term 
seismic program. 
SENATOR RUSSELLi And since '85 then, it's been kind of an ongoing review process? 
DR. BROWN: That's right. There were a series of informational meetings between 
NRC and PG&E beginning in 1985 when they were scoping the program and deciding what 
should be included and what the content of the program should be. And as time went on, 
those meetings became an exchange of data and interpretations and a questioning sort of 
thing. And I was involved in all of those meetings from the time of the scoping study 
until September of this year. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, if you can paraphrase then your bottom line. Here are some 
facts, period; or here are some facts -- you need to do something else; or you don't 
need to do anything else; or what is ••• 
DR. BROWN: Well, I think that NRC went further toward meeting some of these 
concerns ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Their reference to what? 
DR. BROWN: Toward meeting some of the USGS concerns and were clear this morning, 
the statement that we agreed to disagree. And incidentally, I was a consultant to the 
NRC staff. That's who I interacted with. But they did require an increase in ground 
motion levels and an incorporation of a vertical component of motion in the analysis of 
the ground motion. And they also required a look at the range of dips on the fault 
which was not as great as we would have liked to have seen. But it overlaps with the 
survey interpretation. 
-so-
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, do you think then for the citizens that live in that 
general area, people of California, that proper precautions or proper analyses or 
proper whatever is being done as it relates to this issue? 
OR. BROWN: We've probably gone about as far as we can go with the data that we 
have right now. But one of the points I wanted to make is that new data may confirm 
that this is a perfectly safe situation and that we may even have overestimated the 
hazard. On the other hand, it may show that we haven't. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: And your agency is in the process of developing that data or 
trying to develop such data? 
DR. BROWN: We're gathering data on Coastal California faults. We're not doing it 
specifically for the power plant because it's a regional problem. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But you are looking into that. And if anything that comes up 
that reflects upon this, you would share it? 
DR. BROWN: Yes. our data is interpreted and released. It's made a matter of 
public information. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
The final witness in this portion, Rochelle Becker, who's going to be speaking for 
San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace and TURN. 
Welcome, Ms. Becker. I guess you were invited to testify on behalf of the Mothers 
for Peace who have concerns about the safety of the plant and the Independent Safety 
Committee created by the PUC. In addition, I've been informed that the consumer group, 
TURN, has concerns about the costs of Diablo Canyon energy could not attend and asked 
you to represent them at this hearing. 
MS. ROCHELLE BECKER: That's correct. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Since you're wearing two hats, I'd like to request that 
you take no more than 15 minutes to cover both the safety and the cost issues. 
MS. BECKER: I will do my best. 
First, thank you very much for inviting the Mothers for Peace to attend today. 
We have been legal interveners in Diablo canyon proceedings for over 17 years and 
represent a large portion of our community who supports us over that time. We have a 
slightly different view of Diablo Canyon and PG&E. 
We have been participants in this hearing since 1974. And 17 years later, we are 
here again to speak about seismic issues and safety issues. 
First of all, I'd like to call to the committee's attention that in the USGS review 
of the long-term seismic program, the USGS spoke very clearly in statements that they 
made disagreeing with PG&E and disagreeing with the long-term seismic review of the NRC 
as a result-- I have to read some of this. I'm really sorry, but it's ••• 
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You can read as much as you can in 15 minutes, and then I'm 
going to cut you off. 
MS. BECKER: Okay. (Laughter) All right. While I feel Mr. Brown is a very 
capable man and led the USGS team, someone in the USGS wrote very strong language when 
they came to reviewing PG&E's long-term seismic program. 
To quote the last sentence in the first paragraph of the USGS review: " ••• some 
issues remain unresolved or controversial, chiefly because of the lack of definitive 
evidence." They go on to state that "Reviewers disagree with PG&E's interpretations of 
the Hosgri as a substrike fault." The words "disagree", "controversial", "unresolved", 
constantly appear in their testimony. We the public read their testimony and read the 
NRC's staff's review. And the first sentence of the NRC's staff's review 
many papers. Basically, it was that everything was all right at the plant. 
nowhere in the NRC, in the USGS, review does it say that everything is okay, 
seismically okay, at Diablo Canyon. 
way too 
And 
They talk about controversy; they talk about unresolved issues. And they're not 
the only ones. Other independent reviewers who worked on the NRC long-term seismic 
review, in PG&E's long-term seismic review, talked about unresolved issues. 
Dr. Ken Campbell, who worked on ground motion, used the following descriptive 
words: "biased", "unconservative", "unreliable", "inappropriate", "too subjective". 
Dr. David McCollough, who was involved in the review of the offshore data before he 
retired and worked for the USGS before that time, was so disturbed with the NRC's 
staff's conclusions, that he's writing, formulating a letter of protest that's going to 
be forwarded to the NRC. Dr. Crouch, who was formerly with the United States 
Geological Survey and a consultant to the California Public Utilities Commission, 
reviewed the long-term seismic program and the NRC review of that program for the 
Mothers for Peace. He also is concerned about the bottom line, whether or not this 
plant is safe. 
And at the last day of this review hearing from the Atomic Committee on Reactor 
Safeguards, a man named Dr. Jay Sampson showed up. He's an independent oil geologist 
from Southern California. And he was so angry with the long-term seismic program 
conclusions that he traveled to San Luis Obispo at his own expense to speak to the ACRS 
about his conclusions. I've included all of his documents in a packet that I gave to 
the committee before I attended, and you also have my testimony. 
But the bottom line is that NRC allowed PG&E, the applicant, with the largest 
financial stake in the outcome of this program, in the seismic program, to do its own 
review. They allowed PG&E to hire the consultants; they allowed PG&E to do all the 
work. PG&E does not get paid if they have to shut this plant down to fix it; PG&E does 
-82-
not get paid for the time that it's shut down, if they have to shut it down to fix it. 
we are very concerned that the Public Utilities Commission's performance-based rate 
making scheme also affects whether or not the outcome of this seismic review was as 
upfront and open as it could have been. We believe that more information is needed and 
that more information will be available. 
One of the USGS review teams who worked under Mr. Brown stated that they felt -- he 
felt -- that they were way too gentlemanly in their review of the long-term seismic 
program. And he was livid with the NRC review. This is Dr. Steve Lewis, and I request 
that the committee talk to him about the United States Geological Survey results and 
the NRC review. 
We feel that the only way to assure the public in San Luis Obispo that this plant 
is safe is to have an independent study, a complete independent study. PG&E was given, 
had given, data to the USGS to review. The USGS developed very little of their own 
data in looking into the long-term seismic program. The only way we're going to be 
assured that it's safe is for an independent study to be made. Every time there is an 
earthquake in Northern California within the first 30 minutes, some reporter is saying, 
gee, we've talked to the people at Diablo Canyon and everything is okay. Well, we live 
there, and these earthquakes have occurred hundreds of miles away from us. We want to 
make sure that this plant is okay. 
The NRC is full of engineers; the NRC is full of attorneys. The NRC is not full of 
seismic consultants who are experts on the California coastline. We need people who 
are experts on the California coastline to assure the people of San Luis Obispo that 
this plant is safe. 
Now I'd like to speak on the Safety Committee. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'd like to ask a question. 
MS. BECKER: Sure. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Has the Mothers for Peace taken any position on nuclear power in 
general? 
MS. BECKER: Oh, absolutely. We oppose nuclear power, just as much as PG&E favors 
nuclear power. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MS. BECKER: And nobody in the Mothers for Peace is paid and have not been paid for 
17 years. We're here because we really care about our community. We have full-time 
jobs. We take time off from work to attend every one of these meetings for 17 years. 
We believe the plant is unsafe. we have brought safety concerns to the NRC, to the 
PUC, to anybody who would listen to us over and over and over again. And I believe 
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even PG&E will agree that the plant is safer today because the Mothers for Peace 
brought those concerns to the public. 
Now the Mothers for Peace also participated in the safety hearings in the PUC rate 
case. We participated because we were concerned that the Public Utilities Commission 
would adopt such a settlement agreement to pay the utility for performance. 
We were disappointed when the PUC staff decided not to go forward with their 
original recommendation of a $4.4 billion disallowance. But we were devastated when 
they decided to bring forward this pay-for-performance rate scheme which they 
formulated behind closed doors without the participation of the public and brought to 
the commission's attention two weeks before the reasonableness hearings were supposed 
to begin. 
Now we were never filed in this hearing because we were concerned about how much 
money PG&E was going to make. That's my other half. we were filed in this hearing 
because we were concerned about safety implications of the way this plant was rate 
based. We felt that pay-for-performance would give PG&E the incentive to not shut down 
their plant when maintenance needed to be made or hurry through refueling and making 
those maintenance modifications at the plant because they wanted to get back on line 
and because they wanted to continue making the very high profits that they've made. 
Well, every time PG&E has refueled, they have touted publicly how fast they have 
done that. They have set worldwide records at refueling at Diablo canyon. That might 
make them feel very good, but the public who lives there wants them to take their time. 
They've also had problems during refueling. They have been cited for excessive 
worker overtime; they had a crane accident that caused a power outage at the plant; and 
during the last refueling, they had two workers that were exposed. Also, they had been 
leaking at that plant for three weeks before they shut down for refueling and didn't 
shut down until they had set this, once again, world record for continuous operation. 
That does not make the people of San Luis Opispo feel safe. 
Now also because the commission agreed that there might be a small safety problem 
in this pay-for-performance rate scheme, they gave us this safety committee. The 
safety committee has absolutely no authority to do anything at Diablo Canyon. We find 
them to be a toothless lap dog and not a watch dog that they're supposed to be. We 
waited and waited and waited for this committee. Now if the commission felt that there 
might be safety implications of this rate scheme, why did we have to wait a 
year-and-a-half for the first safety meeting? Why did they require that any member of 
the safety committee have experience, background, and knowledge of the nuclear industry 
when they have no authority to do anything? Even the NRC doesn't require experience, 
background, and knowledge in the nuclear industry. And they have authority over 
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nuclear power plants. 
f~rst public meeting. 
So we waited; we waited a year-and-a-half. And we attended that 
There was a lot of the public who attended. And we went before 
the safety committee, and we asked for three things. 
We asked for an office, a presence, in San Luis Obispo, a place where the community 
could go to review documents, to look at correspondence, to talk to the committee about 
our concerns or their staff about our concerns. We haven't gotten that. We asked that 
they retain a seismic consultant to look into the most obvious concern at Diablo 
Canyon, and that is the seismic problem at Diablo. We waited for that. Just this 
year, they did retain a seismic consultant. And the seismic consultant they retained 
is from the East Coast, a man who does not have experience on the California coastline 
geography and seismology, a man who couldn't even attend the public hearing in San Luis 
Obispo to listen to the independent people who spoke to that committee. 
Third, we asked for this committee -- I forgot what was third -- sorry. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: About two minutes left. 
MS. BECKER: Okay. We asked that -- I'm sorry. We asked for all the 
correspondence submitted to this committee to be made available to the public. We 
don't know what the public is asking the committee to do. We no longer attend the 
Safety Committee's hearings. We have to take time out from work from our schedules to 
do so, and we no longer believe the Safety Committee can provide any additional 
assurance for safety. 
Now we've gone to the public document room, and we have read the documents that are 
there from the Safety Committee. The public document room is on the third floor of the 
Cal Poly University. You cannot park there during the day, so you have to go in the 
evening. But what we discovered when we were reading the documents is that there is 
no correspondence in there. We do not know what correspondence this committee has 
received, nor do we know when the committee asked PG&E a question what question was 
asked. The responses to the questions are in the public document room. You read the 
responses, but we don't know if they're responsive. We don't know if there's any 
follow-up that's been done. It's not there. We need to know what this committee is 
doing. We are paying $500,000-plus a year over the very high profits that PG&E is 
making under the settlement agreement for this safety committee. And I don't believe 
that anyone in San Luis Obispo believes that any additional assurance of safety is 
provided by this committee. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You talk about high profits. 
MS. BECKER: Excuse me? 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You talk about high profits. 
MS. BECKER: Yes. 
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SENATOR RUSSELL: Would you explain that, what you mean by high profits. 
MS. BECKER: Well, PG&E has issued statements talking about their record profits 
since Diablo Canyon went on-line. They're PG&E's words, the high profits. They're not 
necessarily the Mothers for Peace. We're not concerned about profits. We really 
aren't. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Oh, I'm well aware of that. 
MS. BECKER: It will cost us more to shut down the plant. 
My other hat is TURN, but they have submitted written testimony. And unless you 
have any questions ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, I have no -- just a comment. It seems to me, that if 
there is a perception that there's something wrong, and there appears to be, whether 
there is anything wrong or not is the question. But the fact that there is a 
perception that there's something wrong, it seems to me that somebody, PG&E perhaps, 
ought to try to make some of these things a little bit easier for people to get 
information about. 
I don't know why, for example -- if the plant is in San Luis Obispo I don't know 
why there isn't one person in San Luis Obispo that can answer questions or provide 
information. 
MS. BECKER: Senator Rosenthal, you're assuming that when we ask PG&E a question 
we're going to get the complete truth, that we're going to get all of what's going on. 
We get misleading statements. We have spoken to PG&E for 17 years. We don't not speak 
to PG&E. They're our neighbors; they're my neighbors. We do. It's not them versus us 
as people. It's a nuclear power plant 2.8 miles from an earthquake fault in which 
there is such conflicting testimony from independent experts. We're not experts. We 
only read what we're given. We read everything we can find. And the bottom line is 
they really don't know if this plant's going to withstand an earthquake until it 
shakes. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
MS. BECKER: You're welcome. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The final ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman, I would say that your observation has 
some merit to it, but I would submit, that given the philosophical opposition that this 
group has to nuclear power and the obvious distrust of anything and everything from the 
Safety Committee to the Geological Survey, to certainly to PG&E, that I wonder whether 
there's anything that anybody could do that would satisfy them, other than to close the 
plant down. 
CP~IRMAN ROSENTHAL: Perhaps not. I would think that people might have, some 
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people-- I'm not suggesting this particular group-- some people might have -- I would 
feel better if the committee could make an unannounced visit. I don't know of anything 
other than that that would at least give me confidence that something wasn't open. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: You mean to visit the plant unannounced? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. We can't do that. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: What would they expect to find? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't know. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: People sleeping or something? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I don't know. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But, you know, in many areas where somebody is supposed to be 
watching whatever goes on, whether it be a nursing home or a manufacturing plant, the 
ability to make an unannounced visit by OSHA in one case or by this committee on 
another case or by somebody to a nursing home, how else do you make sure that what is 
going on ought to go on and hasn't been sanitized? That little thing alone, I think, 
would give me a better feeling that something was available or happening. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Well, the PG&E people are here and they're listening. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I'm not I understand their position. They're opposed 
to nuclear; that's something else. I'm just talking about --well, we'll move on; and 
then the open microphone, if you'd like. 
Okay. Now we're going to take care of the Humboldt Bay and the Rancho Seco Nuclear 
Power plants. 
The first one is Lawrence Womack, Manager Nuclear Operations Support, Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company. And since some of it has already been touched upon ••• 
MR. LAWRENCE F. WOMACK: I'll be as brief as possible, Mr. Chairman. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. WOMACK: Again, my name is Larry Womack. Mr. Chairman and Senator Russell, I'm 
pleased to provide a brief status on the decommissioning of PG&E's Humboldt Bay Power 
Plant Unit 3. 
Humboldt Bay was retired in 1983, and it's currently in what is called SAFESTOR 
status which Mr. Freeman described with regard to the SMUD facility this morning 
pending its decommissioning upon removal of all-spent fuel. Under the rate making 
required for decommissioning by the CPUC, PG&E has collected approximately $94 million, 
and Humboldt Bay's decommissioning costs are considered fully funded at this point. 
And again, this exists in a trust that PG&E cannot touch pending removal of fuel from 
the plant. 
In June 1987, after questions have been raised by the Redwood Alliance and others 
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concerning the viability of shipping Humboldt's spent fuel off site earlier than the 
then scheduled 1998 startup for the federal repository, PG&E agreed with Redwood 
Alliance and governmental representatives in the area around the plant to pursue the 
highest priority possible for acceptance of the spent fuel at a federal respository 
once it opened. PG&E also agreed to decommission the plant following the shipment of 
the spent fuel off site to a viable repository. 
Finally, PG&E agreed to re-examine the possibility of using dry-cask storage to 
store the spent fuel if and when such storage option becomes available for sites such 
as Humboldt. As a result of this agreement, PG&E has reviewed the feasibility of 
dry-cask storage at Humboldt. PG&E has concluded that to date dry-cask storage at 
Humboldt is not feasible from an economic, safety and regulatory standpoint. 
First, from the regulatory standpoint, the current version of dry-cask storage 
being used on a demonstration basis by various utilities is not necesarily of the same 
design that would be used to ultimately ship the spent fuel to a repository. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you vitrify that? 
MR. WOMACK: No. I don't want to get caught up in the current designs, but it's 
the French that vitrify their wastes. The various designs for the ultimate repository 
could indeed vitrify, but I'm not positive there, Senator. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MR. WOMACK: Given that uncertainty from an economic or a safety perspective, it 
does not appear to make sense to move the spent fuel out of wet storage and into 
dry-cask storage only to face the possible further removal of the spent fuel from a dry 
cask to a transfer cask ultimately for shipping to a repository. 
Secondly, from a purely economic standpoint, the existing SAFESTOR wet-storage 
capacity at Humboldt is adequate to serve our needs until the federal repository is in 
operation and the spent fuel can be transferred. The wet storage is as safe as 
dry-cask storage, and it does not make sense for us to employ dry-cask storage with the 
movement, the possible movement, of the fuel twice, if no economic or safety reason of 
a demonstrable nature is identified. And to date, none have. 
And this concludes my status report on Humbodlt Bay Unit 3. I'd be happy to answer 
any questions. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. In the press just recently, in the last 
couple of days, there is the suggestion of another process of eliminating the waste, 
changing its form in some way. 
MR. WOMACK: It might be referred to, what's called, I think it's called actinide 
burning. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Right. 
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MR. WOMACK: And the process here would involve taking spent fuel or separating the 
particularly active components, fabricating it into fuel-like assemblies or including 
it in fuel for a nuclear reactor or another type of reactor working on -- well, where a 
lot of neutrons would be present and causing it to be transmuted into basically, I 
guess what I'd say, benign, non-radioactive forms, or possibly even further burning 
those byproducts of the fission process and obtaining usable energy from that. But ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: The article went on to say that we ought to wait for a little 
wh~le before we put the stuff in the ground. 
MR. WOMACK: Well, there's certainly a camp out there that would argue that the 
va1ue of the spent fuel is quite high, both for the plutonium content, the remaining 
uranium, and as recent information is identified, the fission products that are highly 
radioactive. So ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. WOMACK: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Edward O'Neill, Assistant General Counsel for the PUC. 
MR. O'NEILL: Good afternoon again, Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell. I'd like to 
introduce at this time Cherrie Conner who is an accountant with the commission's 
Advisory and Compliance Division. She is responsible for, among other things, 
overseeing the utility trust funds in which funds have been set aside for future 
decommissioning. She will go through briefly the procedure that we use for doing that. 
And then we also have some answers to questions that Senator Russell asked this 
morning. 
MS. CHERRIE CONNER: Okay. You have some written documentation that was 
prepared ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Would you pull the microphone over, closer to you. 
MS. CONNER: I'm sorry. Good afternoon. You have some written documentation that 
was prepared for you that gives a brief history. I won't go into too much detail 
except to say that the utilities -- San Diego Gas & Electric, PG&E, and Edison -- both 
have qualified and non-qualified nuclear decommissioning trust funds. The qualified 
fund is tax deductible, so the contributions, the utilities, don't have to pay a tax on 
those contributions. The qualified portion, they do have to pay a tax on them. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What's the breakdown? Why is there a breakdown? 
MS. CONNER: Because the Tax Reform Act of 1984 prepared, made, under section 
468(a), said that pre-1984 service life of nuclear plants would be, could be 
decommissioned and that would be non-qualified. In other words, those fundings would 
not be qualified for tax deduction purposes. But anything after 1984 would be 
deductible. This allows the utilities to collect more money and to retain more of 
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those funds. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Just a personal comment. One of the reasons we're in the 
depression we're in was as a result of the 1984 tax legislation. 
MS. CONNER: Okay. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's a personal comment. 
MS. CONNER: Okay. (Chuckle) Well, in 1987, the commission has established 
decommissioning funds for, the decommissioning costs for, Diablo Canyon 1 and 2, 
Humboldt Bay, San Onofre, 1, 2, and 3, and Palo Verde 1, 2, and 3. Along with 
establishing the cost, they established the annual decommissioning revenue requirements 
that each of the utilities would charge their ratepayers for decommissioning of those 
plants. At that same time, they allowed the utilities to establish the trust funds 
and ••• established the nuclear decommissioning trust funds, the trust agreements. And 
they limited the investments on the non-qualified portion of the funds to primarily the 
same parameters that the Tax Reform Act in 1984 established for the qualified, although 
they allowed them to enter into investments and high-quality corporate bonds and 
equities in addition to the municipal 'bonds, U.S. Treasuries, and certificates. 
Each utility has a five-member trust committee. This committee has no more than 
two utility employees on it and then three outside committee members. The committee's 
responsibilities are to select the trustee and the investment manager as well as to 
establish the investment policies for the trust funds. They also submit reports 
annually and tri-annually to the commission for review of their performance of their 
funds. And that's basically the responsibility of the Commission Advisory and 
Compliance division in my branch. We review the nuclear decommissioning trust fund's 
performance. We meet with the trust committees at least once a year, if not more often 
than that, and provide information to the commission on the peformance of the trust 
funds. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I have a couple of questions. What is it going to cost, the 
total cost, for Humboldt? 
MS. CONNER: The total cost to decommission Humboldt. I have that for you. In 
1991 dollars, the utility's latest estimate, the decommissioning of Humboldt, is $77.9 
million. If we decommission it into future dollars of decommissioning Humboldt in the 
year 2000, I believe that ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Eight. 
MS. CONNER: Eight, 2008, would be $265.5 million. It's the same $79.9 million 
escalated by various escalation rates for labor materials. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How often does the utility in any of these funds, the 
decommissioning funds, send money for funds? 
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MS. CONNER: It goes in monthly. The utility is collected in their general rate, 
and then they submit it to the trustees on a monthly basis for investment. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I see. And the money is invested by a trust? 
MS. CONNER: A trustee. Well, it's invested by an investment manager, and the 
trustee oversees the investment managers to make sure that they are investing according 
to the policies of the commission's decision as well as the various individual 
investment policies. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MS. CONNER: Did you want to know any information as to what the the total level of 
funding is in each of the funds? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Give us a ballpark for the four plants in California, the 
total. 
MR. O'NEILL: Excuse me. You mean the decommissioning cost estimates? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes. 
MR. O'NEILL: I have those totals. For Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, based on the 
latest estimate, including a 50 percent contingency, the PUC has estimated the cost to 
be $894 million. Now that's including the 50 percent contingency. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: I understand. 
MR. O'NEILL: For San Onofre ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You can leave it up. Don't worry about it. 
MR. O'NEILL: For San Onofre Units 2 and 3, we have estimated the decommissioning 
costs at $667 million. That's in 1990 dollars, so it's not quite comparable to the 
Diablo figures. And that also includes a contingency, a contingency of 25 percent. 
The San Onofre .•• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Which plants are those? 
MR. O'NEILL: San Onofre 2 and 3. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now how about number 1? 
MR. O'NEILL: San Onofre 1, the estimate is $230 million in 1990 dollars with a 25 
percent contingency. 
MS. CONNER: And the Palo Verde estimate is -- excuse me -- one more page. The 
Palo Verde estimate is $121.8 million. That's for Edison. 
MR. O'NEILL: Edison's share. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Now the utilities own the plants outside of California? 
MR. O'NEILL: Yes, they have interests ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Does that money go into the same fund? 
MS. CONNER: Yes. It's what the utilities are responsible for, the PUC, 
jurisdiction-wise. so Edison's interest in Palo Verde -- I don't know exactly what the 
-91-
interest is -- but their nuclear decommissioning costs are allocated to the ratepayers 
here in California. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You don't know what that figure is? 
MS. CONNER: No, I don't. I thought it was ••• 
MR. O'NEILL: You mean their percentage interest? 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: No, we're talking about dollars approximately. 
MS. CONNER: Oh, $121.8 million. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: How much? 
MS. CONNER: $121.8 million is the ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: $121.8 million. 
MS. CONNER: Estimated decommissioning costs, Edison's share. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Thank you very much. 
MR. O'NEILL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Now we'll hear from Jim Adams, Redwood Alliance. And would 
you please tell me what the Redwood Alliance is. 
MR. JAMES s. ADAMS: Yes, I will. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the 
committee, and staff. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: We will include this as part of your testimony, if you'll just 
tell us briefly what it says. 
MR. ADAMS: I certainly will. First of all, despite our name, we are not involved 
with any forestry-related issues. It's merely because we're based out of Arcata and 
Humboldt County. And when we formed our group in 1978 to work primarily on energy and 
other resource issues, we chose the name Redwood Alliance. So I'm here not to discuss 
legislation related to Redwoods, et cetera. 
What I would like to talk about, and I was interested in the testimony, I just 
heard from Mr. Womack. The Redwood Alliance, as he mentioned, was part of an agreement 
regarding the decommissioning plan for the Humboldt plant. And as part of the 
agreement, PG&E agreed to basically to do a couple of things, to try to find, basically 
get the fuel assemblies, the fuel rods, out of the plant as soon as possible when there 
is a respository for them to be placed in. And another thing was to re-evaluate the 
dry-cask storage method of storing the fuel rods once those technologies have been 
licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 
I was unaware that PG&E had in fact re-evaluated the dry-cask storage option that 
Mr. Womack just said. And so after this, perhaps he and I can get together and discuss 
more of the details. I think one of the problems is that we haven't probably been 
communicating as appropriately between PG&E and ourselves because we were unaware of 
that. Perhaps that's partly our fault as well. 
-92-
The second issue I'd like to talk about is the -- we still have a concern -- well, 
first of all, let me say that in general, we are pleased with PG&E's safe-storage 
process, the decommissioning plan that it put together, and, of course, the decision 
not to reopen the Humboldt Bay plant primarily because of the issue of seismicity. 
There were some active earthquake faults that the plant had not been designed for. And 
in order to retrofit that, PG&E would have had to spend a lot of money, and we think 
they made the right decision in not re-opening the facilities. So we support that and 
the process that's gone on since then. 
However, we have a couple of concerns, one of which is whether or not there has 
been an adequate analysis of dry-cask storage, and I will get into that with PG&E 
representatives directly. And the second one is the monitoring well situation. And, 
in fact, I believe, there's an attachment -- it's labeled Attachment C in the packet 
that I gave you. Our concern is that we would feel better if there were some 
water-monitoring wells placed between the radioactive waste storage areas and the bay. 
Essentially what we have here is a situation where the facility is very close to 
Humboldt Bay, and the tide moves the water in and out on a regular basis. And from our 
review of the documents, there are no monitoring wells between the radioactive waste 
storage areas and the bay. 
We contacted the EPA on this and wrote them, corresponded with them, to try to 
raise the issue. We did not receive any results from that. We still have a concern 
that there needs to be some additional monitoring wells put in, and I have a feeling 
it's one of the things that we'll try to negotiate with PG&E when we can set up some 
meetings. 
Another issue is the, and it has been mentioned today, and it's this whole thing 
about INPO reports. And I refer to that on page ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What report is that? 
MR. ADAMS: INPO. Let me find it in the -- on page 4 of the testimony, INPO refers 
to the -- actually, the name of it is laid out at the bottom of page 3 and then a 
discussion on page 4. It's called the "Institute of Nuclear Power Operations". It's a 
nuclear utility self-regulating group funded basically by ratepayers' electric bills. 
And as it notes there, it conducts periodic inspections of all nuclear power plants and 
assembles fairly candid reports about what is going on in these facilities. 
Unfortunately, the NRC has refused to grant public access to these reports, so we 
have a situation where the utility themselves have very candid reports about how the 
operations are working at every nuclear power plant in the country. They submit these 
reports to the NRC. They share them with themselves. They share them with some of the 
international nuclear agencies, but the NRC's refused to grant them to the public. 
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There's been court cases on the East Coast and Washington, D.C., where an appellate 
court has ruled against the NRC in a couple of cases saying there's no reason why these 
reports shouldn't be released to the public, and we take that position as well. 
We have written the INPO agency directly, and I believe that's one of the 
attachments. Attachment D, the very last attachment of my packet, was our response 
from INPO to our, one of our Redwood Alliance organizers, Michael Welch, basically 
denying us access to the reports on the basis that it would seriously impact the 
detailed, and this is a quote directly, " ••• would seriously impact the detailed and 
candid exchange of information that is so vital to the INPO evaluation program." We do 
not believe this is a sufficient reason for not releasing these reports. It goes to 
what you were mentioning about -- you would feel better if there was a possibility for 
the Safety Committee to visit the site unannounced to just check and see how operations 
are going. We would feel much better if we could see the candid reports for the 
nuclear power plants, such as San Onofre, Diablo, in particular, to know that in fact 
what it is that the industry is finding itself and not be told by the NRC that we do 
not have access them, and we would hope that this committee would join us in an attempt 
to get those reports. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Question. I'm not familiar with what NRC is capable of or not 
capable of doing. But can it refuse a court decision? 
MR. ADAMS: Apparently what has happened is at the first district level, the court 
has ruled in favor of the NRC, but it has been appealed. And the appellate court has 
now, from my understanding, for a third time, sent the case back to the district court, 
saying it could find no reason why the NRC cannot provide these reports; and it's my 
understanding that that's where it lays. It has not gone any further, and obviously no 
reports have been submitted to the groups back on the East Coast. And as you can see, 
by our denial and others, no reports have been released by the NRC at this time. 
Perhaps we'd work with staff, but we would like some help essentially to try to 
persuade either the California delegation or the NRC itself that this is a matter that 
should be taken up and access should be provided. And I do think you will see a move 
in Congress. Some hearings will be conducted on this next year, and we will be 
participating in that. 
Those are the end of the specific remarks. You have the written testimony in front 
of you. I would like to say that I'm hoping that out of this hearing gives us renewed 
impetus for negotiating and communicating better with the utility on this issue because 
we all know that the decommissioning of nuclear power plants is still a fairly unknown 
activity in terms of the cost. I would just point out that it costs approximately $98 
million to decommission the shipping port facility which is slightly larger than the 
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Humboldt plant. But we do not believe right now that we have an adequate handle on 
what it's going to cost to decommission the large nuclear power plants, and that's why 
every couple of years when they're reassessed, the price keeps going up. So we will 
continue to watch that as well. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
Thank you very much. 
The final one in this session, James Shetler, Deputy Area General Manager of 
Nuclear, Sacramento, for SMUD. Welcome. 
MR. JAMES SHETLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Russell. I do have a handout 
that I will be referring to in general terms as I walk through my presentation. 
My name is James Shetler. I'm the Deputy Assistant General Manager, Nuclear, for 
SMUD. It is a pleasure to be here this afternoon to discuss the status and the closure 
and decommissioning process for Rancho Seco. 
I'm going to briefly expand upon Mr. Freeman's comments from this morning. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You don't have to expand too greatly on the ••• 
MR. SHETLER: I won't do that, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. SHETLER: Basically, I would like to make a few points. Number one, in June of 
'89, when the plant was shut down, we were faced with a rather new territory. We had 
not been there before -- and the NRC also had not been there before -- prematurely shut 
down plants were not something that the industry had dealt with a lot at that time. We 
recognized our goal was to maintain the health and safety to the public and the 
environment but at the same time trying to minimize the costs to our ratepayers. 
We finally honed in on an approach that today has us in a permanently defueled 
state and down to about 175 technical people at Rancho Seco. We have submitted our 
decommissioning plan to the NRC in a proposed form in June of this year after several 
public hearings. And in October of this year, our board ratified that plan. Our 
decommissioning plan also envisions a phased approach, basically, due to the reason 
that there is no place to send the high-level waste and the nuclear fuel at this time. 
We will be entering into a SAFESTOR period when the decommissioning plan is 
approved, which is envisioned to occur starting this summer of '92. We will maintain 
the fuel on a wet-storage arrangement until 1998. In parallel with that, we are 
working on a demonstration project with the Department of Energy to look at procuring, 
and designing and procuring a combined storage and shipping cask which would allow us 
to place the fuel in dry storage one time; and when the Department of Energy is ready 
to receive it, to then ship it directly to the Department of Energy and not have to 
return to the spent-fuel pool. 
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It is our anticipation that this demonstration program had authorized funding from 
the federal government. It will be initiated in '93, and we'll have the results of 
that by 1995. At that time, it would be our intent to purchase additional casks and 
place all our fuel in dry storage by 1998. At that time, we will place the plant in 
what we call a hardened SAFESTOR mode, where the nuclear portion of the plant had been 
secured from inadvertent intrusion. Our intent then is to maintain the plant in that 
mode until 2008, which is the end of our original operating license; and then we will 
enter into a phase of decontamination for the final decontamination of the plant. our 
intent is to have the license terminated by 2011. We've talked quite a bit about the 
costs. 
A couple of points I'd like to make -- one of the major costs we have to deal with 
is waste disposal. For our plan, we have assumed that the low-level waste will be 
shipped to the Southwest compact side of Needles, California. And we are looking at 
the high-level waste; and the spent fuel, of course, can be received by the Department 
of Energy, either at a monitored retrievable storage site by 1998 or the final 
geological repository. We're for looking at 2010. 
We have talked about the dollar figures. our estimated $281 million in 1991 
dollars, estimated that about $80 million to cover the SAFESTOR period, about $20 
million to deal with disposal of the fuel and the dry casks, and about $177 million to 
deal with the actual decontamination of the site. Those dollars will be set aside in a 
trust fund, and we are contributing to that. Beyond that is site restoration. This is 
not an area that the NRC regulates, but it is open to the utility to determine what 
they will do with the final clean structures of the facility at the end of its life. 
We did believe that the cost estimate is a major issue. As Mr. Freeman mentioned, 
we had two prudency reviews done, one by Batelle Northwest Lab, which is the NRC's 
consultant for decommissioning costs, and one by a European contractor to get a 
European perspective. Both of those came back with some adjustments. 
To date, as Mr. Freeman mentioned, we have $100 million approximately in our fund 
that was transferred in July to an independent trustee. We are making contributions at 
the rate of about $8 million a year that will increase to $12 million a year starting 
with the approval of the decommissioning plan. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: we can read many of the things you're saying. Why don't you 
sum up. 
MR. SHELTER: Just in summary then, we also went through the environmental process, 
both the state and the federal process. And we believe, that after entering a rather 
uncertain environment with a premature closure, that we have identified a process where 
we can meet the regulations for the environment and health and safety, and can do so at 
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minimum cost to our ratepayers. 
With that, I'm open to any questions, sir. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Senator Russell. 
MR. SHELTER: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
We will now have an open microphone. If there is anybody here that would like to 
add one or two more minutes ••• 
SENATOR RUSSELL: The PG&E guy wanted to say something, and you suggested he wait 
ti.ll now. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's fine. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'd like to hear from him, if he cares to. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: If you care to. Or you can do it in writing if you're not 
prepared. If you'd rather give it us in writing, that's fine. 
MR. WOMACK: Very briefly, on the subject of unannounced site visits, as I think 
Mr. Martin this morning from Region 5 referred, that is a practice that the NRC 
randomly employs throughout the year, both with their resident inspectors and their 
non-resident inspectors. In fact, most of the inspections that occur, as Mr. Martin 
referred to this morning, these week-long inspections, those are unannounced. Simply 
an inspector shows up 8 a.m., Monday morning, and starts work for a week or two. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But then they won't give the information to anybody who wants 
to find out what they found out. 
MR. WOMACK: No, that is incorrect, Mr. Chairman. That information is a part of 
the public record. It's communicated to the public document room and to all identified 
interveners in the process. 
The other information, which Mr. Adams was referring to, relates to INPO, the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. And INPO was formed as a, we call it an 
industry organization to really aid in kicking the industry in the butt, if I can use 
that term, in improving its performance; and as such, he's really considered a 
consultant to the industry. 
So on that basis, those matters have largely remained confidential but in many 
cases have been released to the NRC. so in that circumstance, it's not the NRC's 
choice to release that information to the public, as I see it anyway. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Do you have any information on these huge profits you're making? 
MR. WOMACK: Well, the so-called huge profits, I think, would be better put as 
Diablo right now -- again, depending on whether we have a year with two refueling 
outages or one refueling outage ranges between, say, 25 and below 20 percent of Diablo 
-- excuse me -- of PG&E's profit -- up to just over 30 percent on an annual basis. So 
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I would not call that huge or outrageous profit. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Are you not limited by a certain percentage in statute, I 
believe, as to the profit ••• 
MR. WOMACK: That's really beyond ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: This is beyond that 
MR. WOMACK: For the utility portion of the business that is regulated by the CPUC, 
yes. And for this year, I believe it was 12.9 percent return on our equity in the 
business. And for '92, I believe it's 12.65 percent. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: But this plant ••• 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: But Diablo is ••• 
MR. WOMACK: Diablo falls outside. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Sky's the limit, or you're going to go bankrupt? 
MR. WOMACK: No. The sky is -- you know, you can only generate so much power. And 
really, the level of performance we've achieved, there is not much up side to it. So 
there's not much more room to increase our revenue or profit. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Is the speed with which you refuel, or have refueled, is that 
speedier significantly than other nuclear power plants around the world? 
MR. WOMACK: No, it is not. In fact, the French and the Germans and the Japanese 
are routinely refueling, performing shut-down maintenance on their plant equipment in 
periods as short as four weeks, 28 days, and typically in the 30- to 40-day range. 
Their safety performance has been equal to or better than the performance overall in 
the u.s. 
Diablo's experience in the last four outages has ranged from 56 days up to, oh, 70 
to 80 days. I forget the exact number. So by no means is it close to being a world 
record for refueling outage performance. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Thank you. 
MR. WOMACK: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anybody in the audience would like to make a one-minute 
comment? 
MR. O'NEILL: Mr. Chairman, I would like to also --
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. O'Neill. 
MR. O'NEILL: -- put the price paid for Diablo canyon power into perspective since 
the number of questions have come up, and we didn't really respond to that in our 
earlier remarks. 
The commission's staff has monitored this. We're not just walking away from the 
plant and ignoring what's going on down there. And I think there are a number of ways 
of looking at the situation in order to understand it, exactly what is occurring and 
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what's likely to occur in the future. 
First, I think it's important to compare the amount of money ratepayers are paying 
for the power from Diablo under the performance-based pricing scheme with what may have 
been paid under normal, traditional rate making. And without getting into a lengthy 
debate about what costs were reasonable or may have been allowed by the commission, if 
we just picked the $5.5 billion cost at commercial operation and used that as a figure, 
just to give us a sense of perspective here, the annual revenue requirement for the 
p~ant in 1989 would have been $2.3 billion. And that would have covered the return on 
investment, depreciation, taxes, operating and maintenance expenses, administrative, 
and general expenses, things of that nature. 
The actual cost for power produced by Diablo Canyon in that year was $1.3 billion. 
In 1991, the revenue requirement would have been $2.3 billion, just slightly over that; 
and the price paid for Diablo Canyon power under the performance-based pricing scheme 
will be approximately $1.6 billion by the end of the year. That's estimated based on 
the current forecast for the operation through the end of '91. 
Now the price paid on a cents-per-kilowatt-hour basis compared to the cost of other 
power is on the high side. However, it's far lower than it would have been if the 
p~ant was included in the rate base. The price currently, under this complex pricing 
scheme we have, is 9.6 cents per kilowatt hour. The price PG&E pays for non-gas QF 
energy is currently about 10.4 cents. Now the price paid for gas QFs, or cogenerators, 
is substantially less, although that fluctuates wildly depending upon natural gas 
prices; and gas prices are now low. So the price per kilowatt hour is on the high side 
relative to some other sources of power, but it's substantially below what it might 
have been if it had been included in rate base. 
One other thing that's important to keep in mind here, the actual performance of 
the plant to date has been exceptionally good. There's just no question about that. 
The average lifetime capacity today is about 76 percent. To tell you the truth, it 
can't get much better than that with normal refueling outages. And I agree with Mr. 
Womack. The upside potential from this point from PG&E's perspective is minimal. 
They're doing about as well as they can possibly do, and we should give them credit for 
doing that. I think they've done a good job, and the NRC reviews indicates that. 
The prices that we pay for power are likely to actually improve over time. Even if 
the plant continues operating at very high capacity factors up to 76 percent, we'll 
still end up approximately where we would have been had the plant been included in rate 
base. And the reason for that is because under the settlement, after 1995, the basis 
for determining the price changes, it switches from an automatic, pre-determined 
escalation rate to a formula based on the consumer price index. And it actually will 
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likely produce a real decline in the price paid for Diablo canyon power. If the 
Consumer Price Index increases at 2.5 percent annually or more, the actual real price 
per Diablo Canyon power will decline under this formula. 
So over time, the relative difference between the price paid for Diablo canyon 
power and the price paid for other sources of supply is likely to improve, not get 
worse. So I just wanted to offer those comments to try to put the price paid into 
perspective. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. 
MR. O'NEILL: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Did you want to comment? 
MS. HELEN HUBBARD: About a minute-and-a-half. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. 
MS. HUBBARD: Thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Take two. 
MS. HUBBARD: Oh, thank you. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Identify yourself, please. 
MS. HUBBARD: Yes, I shall. My name is Helen Hubbard. I am President of Citizens 
for Total Energy which is a 15-year-old California-based, non-profit energy and 
educational organization. 
We believe that losing even one unit of California's five nuclear power reactors 
would not be in the best interest of California's electric consumers. We believe that 
San Diego Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison have convincingly demonstrated 
that Unit l at San Onofre can continue to operate safely, reliably, and environmentally 
soundly and on a cost-effective basis. 
I think I better say this right now. I believe it's incumbent upon me to distance 
myself and my organization from the public Mr. Fay says he represents. He does not 
speak for my organization or for me personally. Environmentally speaking, there hasn't 
been a single allegation raised today against San onofre or Diablo Canyon that I 
haven't heard over the last 15 years, over and over, ad infinitum. 
It's time to realize that nuclear power is here to stay, and no amount of 
obstructionism or litigation will put it out of existence. As difficult as risk is to 
live with, it is impossible to live without. And that's what I wanted to say there. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. 
MS. HUBBARD: And there is another issue that I'd like to address, and that is, the 
possible creation of an oversight committee for San Onofre. This may or may not be in 
the offing. In our view, such a commmittee does not make a power plant safer or more 
reliable. What it does do is add to the cost of the operation, and these costs in the 
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final analysis must be borne by the already overburdened taxpayer. No other industry 
in the United States is as overseen, tightly controlled, monitored, and regulated as 
the nuclear industry. 
I wonder how many of you gentlemen have been faced with the hundreds of volumes of 
rules and regulations which operators of nuclear power plants must comply. If you had 
to comply with the same stringent rules and regulations, you would probably throw up 
your hands in dismay and resign. 
All national polls taken in the last several years have shown that a majority of 
Americans, including state and national legislators, believe that nuclear energy is an 
Lmportant part of this country's energy mix now and in the forseeable future. It makes 
no sense to continually badger an industry which is safely and reliably producing 21 
percent of the electricity in the United States and 28 percent of electricity in 
california. 
To put it in the simplest terms, we believe that San Onofre Unit 1 should continue 
to produce electricity; and we also believe that there is absolutely no logical reason 
to create an oversight committee for these utilities. 
And I thank you for your patience. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. 
Ms. HUBBARD: You're welcome. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anybody else? I think, Senator Russell, this has been a good 
hearing. I want to thank everyone for their participation. I believe the committee 
now has a better understanding of the way in which our utilities and regulatory 
agencies are taking action to ensure the nuclear power plants are safe, clean, and 
cost-effective. 
SENATOR RUSSELL: I'd also like to thank the staff for the work that they did. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes, staff did a fine job on this, as usual. As a result of 
this, I don't have any bills now; but it doesn't mean that I won't have one. 
(Laughter) 
SENATOR RUSSELL: Uh-oh. Oops. 
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Anyway, the hearing is adjourned. Thank you very much. 
---ooo---
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Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committe. My name is John 
Martin. I am the Regional Administrator of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission's Region V office, located in Walnut Creek, California. I welcome 
the opportunity to summarize the responsibilities of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission relating to power reactors and to highlight, from our perspective, 
the status of the four nuclear power facilities in California. 
Let me begin by providing the Committee with a brief overview of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's nuclear power reactor regulatory program, with 
emphasis on the inspection program. There are three principle functions that 
comprise the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulatory program. They are: 
promulgation of regulations, issuance of licenses, and compliance inspection 
and enforcement. Regulation promulgation, and license issuance activities are 
administered by the NRC offices in Rockville, Maryland, while the inspection 
function in the Western United States is a primary responsibility of my 
Regional office. 
The NRC inspection program serves to assess the performance of commercial 
utility reactor facilities by confirming that utilities are in compliance with 
the provisions of their NRC issued license to operate the facility, and by 
ascertaining whether other conditions exist which have safety implications 
serious enough to warrant corrective action. Except for a limited number of 
special inspections conducted by Headquarters-based staff, the majority of 
inspections are conducted by inspectors assigned to my office. 
The inspectors performing inspections at reactor facilities in the state of 
California fall into 2 basic categories. First there are inspectors who work 
out of our regional office in Walnut Creek, who travel to the plant sites 
normally for a week at a time and then return to the office to report their 
inspection findings and to prepare for their next trip. In general, these 
region-based inspectors are specialists in specific technical areas such as 
health physics, emergency planning, physical security, fire protection, and 
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other specialty engineering disciplines. The other category of inspector is 
the resident inspector. The resident inspector is assigned to work full time 
at a plant site. This allows the resident inspector to become very 
knowledgeable in the operation of his assigned site. It also allows our 
office to have rapid knowledge of any occurrences of significance at the 
facility and to quickly provide an independent assessment of an event without 
reliance on the utility. Resident inspectors provide the major on-site 
NRC presence for direct observation and verification of routine licensee 
activities. Among other things, their work includes in-depth inspections 
of control room activities; observation of maintenance and surveillance 
testing carried out by the utility; periodic 11Walkdowns 11 of systems 
important to safe operation to verify the correctness of system lineups; 
and frequent plant tours to generally assess radiation control, 
security equipment condition, housekeeping and the like. 
For the purposes of understanding NRC oversight of nuclear plants it is 
important to know that the utilities are required by law to notify the NRC 
within one hour of significant events. To ensure prompt notification, the NRC 
maintains an operations center at our headquarters office, which is manned 24 
hours a day, and has direct communications with each facility via a dedicated 
telephone line. Through our emergency response organization, the NRC is 
prepared to promptly respond to events, regardless of the time of day. 
We devote approximately 6 man-years of effort for inspection and enforcement 
activities at each operating reactor in California annually. Each inspection 
results in an inspection report which documents the findings, including any 
violations of requirements or recommendations for improvement. These reports 
are made available to the public and are widely circulated. 
Let me now turn to the four specific nuclear power plants in California and, 
from our perspective, briefly highlight the status of each. At the San ~nofre 
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facility operated by Southern California Edison, the NRC presently has four 
full time resident inspectors assigned. The San Onofre facility consists of 
three reactor units, located near San Clemente. Unit 1 is an older plant, 
having comrrenced operation in 1967. Unit 1 produces about 450 MW of 
electricity. Units 2 and 3 entered operation in 1982 and 1983, and each 
produces about 1100 MW of electricity. The NRC's evaluation is that the San 
Onofre site's safety performance has been generally good to excellent during 
the past five years. Additionally, Southern California Edison has demonstrated 
a number of significant initiatives that we view as strong commitments towards 
safe operation of the facility. Two examples are their efforts to enhance the 
engineering staff support of the site and their commitments to excellence in 
the training area. 
There are several major regulatory issues that have faced Southern California 
Edison during the past ten years. Beginning in 1979, based on a review of the 
seismic design of Unit 1, that Unit underwent significant modifications to 
enhance the unit's ability to withstand a major earthquake. During the 
1980's, additional upgrades were made to improve Unit 1 in the areas of fire 
protection, qualification of safety equipment to function in radiation and/or 
steam environments, and in response to lessons that were learned from the 1979 
accident at the Three Mile Island Plant. Because Units 2 and 3 were 
constructed in the early 1980's, most of the Unit 1 enhancements were already 
incorporated into the original design of Units 2 and 3. 
To enforce compliance with NRC regulations, the NRC has the legal authority to 
assess civil penalties against utilities for significant failures in 
performance, or if need be, to order the facility to shut down or otherwise 
modify their operations if public safety demands. The NRC has not had reason 
to order San Onofre to shut down an operating unit. As is the case with most 
utilities, when a potential safety issue has clearly arisen, Southern 
California Edison has been prompt to take conservative actions without 
prodding from the NRC. Although the performance at San Onofre has been good 
overall, we have issued two monetary civil penalties during the past four 
years. In 1988, SCE was fined $150,000 for inadequate engineering work 
related to the ability of Unit 1 electrical equipment to operate in a harsh 
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environment. In early 1991, they were fined $150,000 for failing to maintain 
two safety system components in Units 2 and 3 properly aligned, as required 
by their license issued by the NRC. In both cases, Southern California Edison 
took actions to prevent a recurrence of the problems. 
Let me now turn the discussion to Diablo Canyon, a two unit facility with each 
unit producing about 1100 MW of electricity. The performance of the Diablo 
Canyon facility, during the past five to six years has been very good to 
superior, with a fairly consistent improving trend. Diablo Canyon is operated 
by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company and is located near San Luis Obispo. 
In a manner similar to that at San Onofre, the NRC has two full time resident 
inspectors at Diablo Canyon. Both units have recently experienced relatively 
event free operation. Unit 2 completed a record 481 day continuous period of 
operation this year prior to shutting down for a scheduled refueling outage. 
Diablo Canyon has also been strong in both the training and engineering areas. 
The largest issue faced by Diablo Canyon recently has been a review of the 
ability of the plant to withstand a major earthquake on the Hosgri fault, 
which is located about 3 miles from the plant. The review has focused 
primarily on the magnitude and type of earthquake that the Hosgri fault may 
generate, and whether the plant design is appropriate for the postulated 
earthquake. The study of this issue was recently completed and demonstrated 
the safety of the plant in this area. 
As was the case with San Onofre, the NRC has had no reason to order Diablo 
Canyon to shut down an operating unit. Since 1988, the NRC has fined Diablo 
Canyon on two occasions. In 1989, they were fined $75,000 for several 
examples of poor engineering work, which were identified by our inspectors. 
In 1990, they were fined $50,000 for failure to properly maintain safety 
equipment. These violations were again identified by our inspectors. In both 
cases, PG&E took extensive corrective actions. 
Turning to Rancho Seco, the faciltiy is a single unit site operated by the 
Sacramento Municipal Utility District. Rancho Seco was designed to produce 
about 900 MW of electricity, however in 1989, the plant was shut down in 
response to a voter referendum. Since that time, SMUD has been working with 
the NRC to move toward the ultimate decommissioning of the facility. The 
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reactor fuel has been stored in a large fuel storage pool at the site since 
1989, and much of the heat generated by the fuel has decayed away. This 
condition has resulted in the potential for a significant safety problem 
occurring at Rancho Seco being far reduced from that at an operating plant. 
We currently have one resident inspector who spends one-half of his time at 
the site. 
The major issue facing SMUD is to formulate a site decommissioning plan, which 
the NRC must approve. This work is under way with a scheduled completion date 
of mid-1992. 
Although Ranch Seco is no longer operating, all of the pertinent NRC rules and 
regulations still apply. Since the unit was shut down in 1989, we have fined 
SMUD on one occasion for failure to maintain a fully trained emergency 
response organization. Here again, the utility promptly corrected the 
problem. SMUD has remained committed to plant safety and adherence with our 
regulations since their 1989 shutdown. We consider that their overall actions 
during the past two years have been responsible and directed towards safety. 
Lastly, Humboldt Bay Unit 3 is a 65 MW plant located near Eureka, and operated 
by Pacific Gas and Electric. The plant started operation in 1963 and has been 
shut down since 1976. The plant shut down because the Commission ordered that 
seismic upgrades be made in order to continue to operate, however the company 
decided to cease operation instead. The company has since elected to 
decommission the facility and has an approved decommissioning plan. The 
facility is presently in a SAFSTOR condition, which simply means that the 
facility will be maintained in a mothballed condition until the spent fuel is 
removed to a federal waste disposal site, at which time the facility is 
scheduled to be dismantled. We do not have a resident inspector assigned to 
Humboldt Bay, however .we do make periodic inspection visits to the site. 
This completes my prepared remarks. I thank you again for the opportunity to 
be here today. If you ha~e any questions, I will be pleased to answer them if 
I can. 
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A. FEDERAL AUTHORITY OVER NUCLEAR ENERGY 
1. Under the Atomic Energy Act (42 U.S.C. §2011, et seq.) 
the federal government reserved comprehensive authority, 
exercised through the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
o·Ter: 
a. Nuclear safety; and 
b. The technical aspects of nuclear energy. 
2. The Atomic Energy Act did not preempt traditional State 
authority over the production and distribution of 
electricity. (See e.g. 42 u.s.c. §2018.) 
a. States were permitted to exercise their traditional 
authority over economic issues. 
b. The exercise of the States' traditional authority 
over economic issues is, however, subject to the 
reservation of federal authority to regulate sales 
of electric power for resale in interstate commerce. 
B. CPUC AUTHORITY OVER RATEMAKING AND ECONOMIC ISSUES 
The CPUC has broad authority over ratemaking and other 
economic issues (see e.g. Pub. Util. Code §§ 701, 728, 729, 
761 and 762) including: 
1. A~thority to set intrastate rates for the sale of 
e:ectricity which includes provision for the recovery of 
costs associated with the ownership and operation of 
nuclear power plants. 
2. Authority to review the cost effectiveness of nuclear 
plant construction and capital additions to nuclear power 
plants. 
3. Authority to establish the method to be used by utilities 
to recover the cost of constructing, operating, and 
maintaining nuclear power plants. 
4. Authority to establish a method for the collection of 
funds necessary to decommission nuclear plants at the end 
of their useful lives. 
5. Comprehensive authority to determine what costs 
associated with nuclear power plant construction, 
·. 
operation and ownership should be paid by uti:ity 
ratepayers, and what costs should be absorbed by utility 
shareholders. 
a. Authority to review the reasonablenss or "'prudence" 
of the costs incurred by utilities in cor.structing 
nuclear plants and in modifying nuclear ~lant 
facilities, systems and components; 
b. Authority to review the reasonableness O:!:" "prudence" 
of utility expenditures for operating, maintenance, 
general and administrative costs associa~ad with 
nuclear plants; and 
c. Authority to review the reasonableness of utility 
procurement decisions and practices in ot~aining the 
electricity to meet customer demands. 
d. Both the CEC and CPUC have authority over utility 
resource planning issues. 
C. CEC AUTHORITY OVER SITING OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
1. &~y utility seeking to build an electric power generating 
plant in California, including a nuclear plan~, is 
required to obtain a certificate authorizing such 
construction from the CEC. 
2. In addition, before any such certificate can te issued 
for a nuclear plant, the CEC must find that t~ere exists 
a demonstrated technology and means approved ty the NRC 
for the permanent disposal of high-level nucla~r waste. 
3. Currently there is a moratorium on the siting cf any new 
nuclear plants in California because, at prese~t, there 
is no permanent means or site for the permaner.~ disposal 
of high-level nuclear waste. 
COMMENTS OF ROBERT KINOSIAN 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
DIVISION OF RATEPAYER ADVOCATES 
REGARDING THE SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR FACILITY 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
December 2, 1991 
PRIMARY RECOMMENDATION: DISALLOW ADDITIONAL COSTS 
The need for over $100 million of modifications prcmpted the CPUC 
review of the cost-effectiveness of SONGS 1. 
Due to the high costs of nuclear fuel, operations and 
maintenance, the ongoing need for repairs and modificat~ons, and poor 
performance, it is not cost-effective to continue operating SONGS 1. 
The losses are expected to be between $250 and $700 million. 
In its analysis of cost effectiveness, DRA allocated marine 
damage and mitigation costs to SONGS 1 based on the Coas~al 
Commission's study, while SCE ignored these impacts. 
On the other hand, SCE did include the benefit of =educed air 
emissions in its analysis. In fact, the main reason SCE found SONGS 1 
to be cost-effective was the high value of reducing air pollution. 
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL: PERFORMANCE-BASED PRICING 
If the CPUC authorizes continued operation of SONGS 1, ORA has 
proposed that SCE's cost recovery be based on SCE's forecasted costs 
and the actual performance of SONGS 1, i.e., performance-based 
pricing. This means that SCE shareholders, and not the =atepayers, 
will assume the risk of any operating inefficiencies. 
The performance-based pricing would be based on SCE's current 
forecast of NEW costs, excluding any previous construction costs. 
Because the prices would be low, relatively little profit could 
be made from increasing SONGS 1 output. 
SCE's share of SONGS 1 is only 325 megawatts, compa=ed with over 
2200 megawatts for Diablo Canyon. This means that the pricing 
methodology has much less of an impact on corporate profits. 

COMMENTS OF BRUCE DEBERRY 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
SUMMARY OF DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR PLANT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
December 2, 1991 
A. EXCLUSIVE RATEMAKING AGREEMENT- It is the sole method 
to recover Diablo Canyon costs. 
B. TERM- The Agreement covers the period from December, 1988 
through May, 2015 (Unit 1) and March, 2016 (Unit 2). 
C. PRICE PAID FOR ENERGY- The price paid consists of a fixed 
price and a variable price. The variable price escala~es at 
established rates through 1994 then increases by the a7erage of 
the current Consumer Price Index plus 2.5 percent. 
D. PRICES PAID VARY ACCORDING TO PEAK PERIODS- A higher 
price is paid for the first 700 hours generated durin~ the hours 
of 10 a.m. to 10 p.m. in the months of June through Se?tember. 
This is offset by lower prices in the next 700 hours. 
E. BALANCING ACCOUNT COLLECTIONS- PG&E may not cc~lect 
balancing account accruals {approximately $2 billion) or any 
litigation costs {approximately $150 million). 
F. DECOMMISSIONING COSTS- All decommissioning costs are 
excluded from this settlement. 
G. BASIC REVENUE REQUIREMENT- A basic revenue recuirement of 
$1,056 million is established as plant, to be deprecia~ed 
and collected in base rates. 
H. FT~OR- An annual revenue floor can be triggered under 
extreme ccnditions. Revenues which are received by PG&E as floor 
payments must later be returned to ratepayers, with in~erest. 
Operation at less than floor capacity for three consecutive 
years requires an application for potential abandonmen~. 
I. ABANDONMENT- In the event of a prolonged or pe~anent 
outage PG&E may file an application to abandon one or both Diablo 
units. T~e amount to be recovered is capped by either future 
floor payments or $2.7 billion (1991), which is reduced by $100 
million per year in future years. This application can be 
challenged by the CPUC or the California Attorney General. 
J. PURCHASE REQUIREMENT- All Diablo output must be purchased 
by PG&E, except during hydro-spill conditions, when excess water 
is used to generate energy. 
•. 
K. COST SEGREGATION- All Diablo costs must be segregated 
from other PG&E operations. 
L. TREATMENT AFTER 30 YEARS- An application must be filed in 
2015 (Unit 1) and 2016 (Unit 2) requesting future ratemaking 
treatment. 
M. EFFECT OF CHANGE IN AGREEMENT- Any change in the 
Agreement renders it null and void. 
N. SAFETY COMMITTEE- An independent safety committee is 
established consisting of three members appointed by the 
Governor, Attorney General, and the Chairman of the Energy 
Commission. The CPUC participates in the nomination of potential 
appointees. The Committee is funded through base rates 
($500,000) and may hire consultants. It also has the right to 
receive Diablo related reports, conduct site inspections, and 
issue reports and recommendations. 
COMMENTS OF ANNE MESTER, ESQ. 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
SUMMARY OF THE DIABLO CANYON SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AS IT PERTAINS TO 
THE DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
December 2, 1991 
A. Created through a settlement among the Attor~ey General of 
California (AG), the CPUC's Division of Ratepayer Advoca~es (DRA), and 
PG&E, adopted by CPUC in Decision 88-12-083 (1988). 
B. Created to "review Diablo Canyon operations fer the purpose 
of assessi~q the safety of operations and suggesting a~y 
recommendations for safe operation." It has no responsi~ility or 
authority f~r plant operations and cannot direct PG&E personnel. 
c. E~titled to receive certain reports from PG&E; can contract 
for services, including consultants and experts. 
D. Has the right to conduct an annual site exami~ation; can 
conduct additional site visits, as deemed necessary. 
E. ~~st issue an annual report on safety-related ~spects of 
plant opera~ions, which shall include recommendations t: ?G&E. PG&E 
has 45 days to comment. PG&E's comments become part c: ~ie report, 
which is t~e~ transmitted to four entities for review: ~he CPUC, the 
CEC, the AG, and the Governor. 
F. A:~er receiving Committee's annual report on safety of 
operations cf the Diablo facility, any of the four revie~ing entities, 
including C?UC, can request the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to 
institute a proceeding to require PG&E to adopt any safe~y 
recommendation made by the Committee. 
G. C?UC President serves, along with Dean of Enqi~eering at 
u.c. Berke:ey and PG&E, on a nominating committee, whic~ presents 
nominations to three appointing authorities: the Chai~.an of the CEC, 
the AG, and the Governor. Appointments are for 3 years ~nd are 
s~aggered. 
H. C:mmittee was intentionally created as an ince~endent safety 
committee, ~ot beholden to either PG&E or the CPUC;· CPUC's oversight 
role is specifically limited to inspecting and auditing ~he 
Committee's books, records and accounts, including revie~ of 
reasonable~ess of fees and expenses and review for conf:icts of 
interest. C?UC sets compensation for Committee members, commensurate 
with fees PG&E pays for similar services. 
I. To date, the Committee has issued one annual report 
(covering January 1, 1990 to June 30, 1990), which concludes the 
facility is being operated safely. None of the reviewing entities has 
requested any action by the NRC. The Committee approved the second 
annual report, covering July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1991, at its public 
meeting of October 10, 1991. After inclusion of PG&E's comments it 
will be ~ransmitted to the reviewing agencies. 
J. CPUC's Advisory and Compliance Division staff has attended 
all of the Committee's public meetings. CPUC staff will undertake the 
first audit of Committee books, records and accounts in first quarter 
of 1992. 
•. 
COMMENTS OF CHERRIE CONNER 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
NUCLEAR DECOMMISSIONING TRUST FUNDS 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
December 2, 1991 
A. In Order Instituting Investigation 86 and Decision 83-04-013 
the Commission determined that decommissioning fuhds should 
be accumulated using an external sinking fund appr~ach. An 
annual level payment amount is added to revenue requirements 
for each nuclear unit, calculated such that, over the life of 
the fund, the payments will accumulate to equal tte total 
costs of decommissioning the unit. Decommissionihg cost 
estimates and funding levels are reviewed in conj~~ction with 
each utility's general rate case. 
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 accorded special tax status to 
Nuclear Decommissioning Reserve Funds. Under section 468A of 
the Internal Revenue Code, a utility may elect, u~der certain 
conditions, to take a current year tax deduction =~r payments 
to a decommissioning trust fund. Earnings of the fund are 
taxable. Funds set up under section 468A are te~ed 
"qualified" funds. Qualified funds are limited tc post-1984 
service life decommissioning costs. The prior se~rice share 
of decommissioning cost funds are placed into a 
"non-qualified" (taxable) fund. Investments to qualified 
funds are limited to (1) municipal bonds, (2) u.s. treasury 
bills and (3) certificates of deposit in a bank o= insured 
federal credit union. 
c. In 1987, the Commission established future estimates of 
decommissioning cost for Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2, 
Humboldt Bay Unit 3, San Onofre Units 1, 2, and 3, and Palo 
Verde Units 1, 2 and 3; established annual decommissioning 
revenue requirements for Pacific Gas and Electric Co., 
Southern California Edison Co., and San Diego Gas & Electric 
Co.; directed PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E to establish qualified and 
non-~alified nuclear decommissioning trusts; adcfted the 
trust agreements; and limited the investments· for non-
qualified funds to those allowable under section 468A plus 
guaranteed investment contracts, high quality corporate bonds 
and equity securities, and other securities guaranteed or 
secured by the U.S. government. 
D. Each utility has a five-member 
for oversight of their trusts. 
more than two employees of the 
Committee members nominated by 
Trust Committee resoonsible 
The Committee includes no 
company. The outside 
the company are subject to 
•. 
confirmation by the Commission. The Trust Committees are 
responsible for selecting the trustee and investment managers 
for their funds (subject to Commission approval), setting 
investment policies, evaluating the performance of the 
tr:.1stee and investment managers annually, and submitting 
annual and tri-annual reports to the Commission. 
E. The Commission Advisory and Compliance Division of the CPUC 
monitors each utility's fund performance. It's role is to 
keep the Commission informed about the level of funds 
accumulating in the trusts, the comparative performance of 
each of the funds, and to alert the Commission to any 
possible performance problems. 
COMMENTS OF CHERRIE CONNER 
CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
SUMMARY OF HUMBOLDT DECOMMISSIONING 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
December 2, 1991 
PG&E has conducted three nuclear decommissioninc cost 
studies for Humboldt Bay which have been submitted to the 
Commission. The Commission utilizes these studies in developing 
the revenue requirements to be collected for the company's 
Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Funds. 
Pursuant to Decision 85-12-022 and Resolution E-3041, PG&E 
was authorized to collect $26.894 million annually for four 
years, beginning July 1, 1987, for decommissioning costs 
estimated at $58 million in 1986 dollars and $438.5 million in 
2015 dollars. PG&E submitted a 1987 decommissioning cost study 
in its 1990 General Rate Case proceeding indicating the estimated 
cost had dropped to $322.2 million. The Commission, however, did 
not adjust the funding level because the change in the future 
cost estimate is due purely to a drop in the expected inflation, 
which will fluctuate over a thirty year period. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company collected decommissioning 
funds for Humboldt and apportioned them between the Qualified and 
Non-qualified Trusts as follows: 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
Total 
Qualified Trust 
($1000) 
$ 5,025 
10,049 
10,049 
10,049 
5,025 
$40,197 
Non-Qualified Trust 
($1,000) 
$ 9,264 
16,765 
16,765 
16,765 
8,422 
$67.981 
Total 
($1000) 
$108,178 
Total Humboldt Nuclear Decommissioning Trust Fund assets as 
of September 30, 1991, and the returns earned since inception are 
as follows: (Note: assets are less than funding due to taxation 
of the revenues collected for the Non-Qualified Trust Fund) 
Qualified 
Non-Qualified 
Total 
Assets 
$ 46.7 
47.2 
$ 93.9 
Return 
Pre-Tax After Tax 
8.2% 
9.5 
7.1% 
10.1 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
505 VAN NESS AYeNUE 
SAN FRANCISCO, CA. 9410:Z-3296 
December 16, 1991 
The Honorable Herschel Rosenthal, Chairman 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilitles 
State Capitol, Room 2035 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Subject a DECEMBER 2, 1991 HEARING ON CALIFORNIA'S 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
Dear Senator Rosenthal: 
PETE WILSON, Oo,..mor 
Thank you- for allowing us to appear be1fore the Committee. 
We appreciate the opportunity to present the Division's views on 
the status of nuclear power in the State of California. In 
accordance with your wishes, we have enclosed our responses to four 
questions regardinq our proposals for the San Onofre Nuclear Power 
Generating Station Unit 1. We hope this will satisfy your concerns. 
Should any further queations arise we will be more than happy to 
respond to them. 
Sincerely, 
td .~ ;>~,;_'-.._ 7~£<-I;/L_ 
EDMUND J. TEXEIRA 
Director 
Division of Ratepayer Advocates 
cca Members, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
Assemblyman Richard Mountjoy 
AeserJblyman Trice Harvey 
Michael Shapiro 
Paul Fadelli 
BESPONSES OF DIVISION OP RATEPAYER APVQCATES 
TO QUESTIONS 01" SENATOR RQSI!iN'Ji'HAL 
QUESTION 11 What power options does ORA believe would be available 
to SCE that could be less expensive than the continued operation of 
SONGS Unit 1 after capital additions? 
RESPOftSEt The analyses performed by SCE and ORA compared the costs 
of SONGS Unit l with the costs of replacing its power using SCE's 
entire system. These analyses did not evaluate SONGS Unit l 
compared to one specific alternative, thus we are not recommending 
that SONGS Unit 1 be replaced by any one option. A number of 
different resources all serve to replace SONGS Unit 1, including 
increased production from exiating power ~lants, increased 
development of new geothermal and wind un1ts, increased Demand Side 
Management programs, and increased purchases of power from other 
utilities. The combination of these resources was found to be less 
expensive than continuecl operation of SONGS Unit 1. 
QUBSTION 2 1 Doea the ORA fall-back option to use •performance 
based" ratemaking for SONGS Unit 1 mean that DRA ia fully satisfied 
with the resul ta of the Diablo "performance based • settlement? 
BESPONSE: As discussed below in response to Question 3, there are 
many differences between the DRA proposal for SONGS Unit 1 and the 
Diablo settlement. Because of these differences, ORA's 
satisfaction with the Diablo settlement was not a factor in the 
decision to propose performance-based priein9 for SONGS Unit 1. 
However, ORA was satisfied with the settlement terms when it 
entered into the agreement, and believes the settlement has 
achieved the goals for which it was implemented• Operation risks 
have been, shifted from ratepayers to PG&EJ costs are lower than 
with traditional ratemaking; years of expensive litigation 
regarding the reasonableness of construction costs have bean 
avoided; and, PG&E has been given an incentive to operate the 
facility reliably and safely. 
OQESTION 3t Under ORA's proposal, what ratemakinq differences 
would there be between the San onofre and Diablo Canyon plants? 
RJSPONSRt There are a number of differences between the SONGS 
Unit l proposal and the Diablo settlement. First, the Diablo 
Canyon settlement addressed the costs of operation as well as the 
costs of building Diablo Canyon. ORA's proposal for SONGS Unit 1 
only includes the coats of future operation. This results in the 
prices for SONGS Unit 1 being considerably less than the prices 
specified in the Diablo Canyon settlement. 
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In addition, the pricea for SONGS Unit 1 under ORA's proposal 
are based on SCE's optimistic forecasts. SCE assumes high 
reliability and low costs for SONGS Unit 1. This further reduces 
the prices and limits any potential economic risks to ratepayer& 
from the proposal. In addition, the SONGS UJtit 1 proposal does not 
contain any floor provisions to limit the utilities' risks. 
The SONGS Unit 1 proposal replacee the existing ratemakinq 
treatment, which contains performance targets based on short-term (two-year) deadlines. By replacing the existing ratemaking 
process, the SONGS Unit 1 proposal reduces the need for litigation 
and removes any incentives to delay maintenance or other work to 
achieve higher short term performance. In contrast, no ratemaking 
treatment was in place for Diablo Canyon when the settlement was 
implemented. 
QUESTION 4: Assuming performance based pricing is adopted for 
SONGS Unit 1, should the PUC also create an independent safety 
committee for the SONGS plant? 
BESPQNSEa DRA does not believe that a safety committee is 
necessary. SCE's share of SONGS Unit 1 is on.ly 300 MW, less 
than 1/7 the size of Diablo Canyon. As discussed in response to Question 3, above, the prices for SONGS Unit 1 are also relatively 
low. SONGS Unit 1 will have much less im~act on SCE'a finances 
than Diablo Canyon has with PG&E. In add1tion, by replacing the 
current ratemaking treatment for SONGS Unit 1, which contains 
short-term performance criteria, the performance based pricin9 
proposal reduces potential incentives to operate unsafely. s~nce 
the proposal will not result in any increase of incentives for 
unsafe operation, ORA does not believe a safety committee is 
warranted. However, the Commission could consider requirinq such a 
committee if it favors ORA's ratemaking proposal. 
ENERGY COMMISSION PRESENTATION AT THE 
DECEMBER 2 1 1991 HEARING OF THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
ON "CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR 
SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND ECONOMIC COSTS" 
THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN. I AM WILLIAM CHAMBERLAIN APPEARING 
FOR THE ENERGY COMMISSION. SEATED NEXT TO ME IS MR. DANIEL NIX OF 
THE ENERGY COMMISSION WHO CO-CHAIRS THE WESTERN INTERSTATE ENERGY 
BOARD HIGH-LEVEL WASTE COMMITTEE. HE IS HERE TO ANSWER ANY 
QUESTIONS REGARDING THE FEDERAL PROGRAM FOR DISPOSING OF SPENT FUEL 
FROM NUCLEAR REACTORS. 
BASED ON THE REQUESTS IN YOUR INVITATION TO US, I WILL DO 
THREE THINGS THIS MORNING: FIRST, I WILL SUMMARIZE THE ENERGY 
COMMISSION'S RESPONSIBILITIES REGARDING CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR 
POWERPLANTS; SECOND, I WILL PROVIDE OUR VIEW CONCERNING THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS BEING SITED IN CALIFORNIA; 
AND THIRD, I WILL ADDRESS ISSUES RELATING TO CALIFORNIA'S CURRENTLY 
OPERATING NUCLEAR UNITS. 
ADDRESSING FIRST THE ENERGY COMMISSION 1 S RESPONSIBILITIES, THE 
COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION TO LICENSE ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT 
THAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED FOR SITING IN CALIFORNIA (UNLESS SOMEONE 
DEVELOPS ONE WITH CAPACITY UNDER 50 MW). WE HAVE NO JURISDICTION 
OVER ANY OF THE EXISTING NUCLEAR PLANTS THAT YOU ARE EXAMINING 
TODAY. THEY WERE ALL SPECIFICALLY EXEMPTED FROM OUR LICENSING 
AUTHORITY AND FROM THE CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR LAWS ENACTED IN 1976. WE 
DID EVALUATE THE FEASIBILITY OF ALTERNATIVES TO THE RANCHO SECO 
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NUCLEAR FACILITY WHEN ITS RETIREMENT WAS UNDER CONSIDERATION, AND 
WE CONCLUDED THAT SMUD COULD REASONABLY EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO 
PURCHASE POWER FROM PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY AND FROM 
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON. BUT WE HAVE NO REGULAR ROLE IN 
INSPECTING OR MONITORING THE OPERATION OF ANY OF THE DIABLO CANYON 
OR SAN ONOFRE UNITS. 
TURNING TO OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF SITING NEW 
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS IN CALIFORNIA, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE PROBABILITY 
OF SUCH AN EVENT IS VERY LOW FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT DECADE. FIRST, 
UTILITY OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED NO INTENT TO PURSUE FURTHER 
NUCLEAR POWERPLANT DEVELOPMENT, CITING HIGH COST OF CONSTRUCTION, 
LONG REGULATORY AND CONSTRUCTION LEAD TIMES, AND PUBLIC OPPOSITION 
TO NUCLEAR POWER. CALIFORNIA UTILITIES ARE NOT ALONE IN THIS 
ATTITUDE--NO NEW ORDERS OF NUCLEAR PLANTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THE 
UNITED STATES SINCE 1978. 
SECOND, THERE ARE TODAY MANY SOURCES OF ELECTRICITY WHICH ARE 
MUCH LESS EXPENSIVE THAN EXISTING NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, INCLUDING 
DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT, COGENERATION, REPOWERING OF UTILITY GAS-
FIRED BOILERS, AND ALTERNATIVE RESOURCES SUCH AS WIND, GEOTHERMAL, 
AND SOLAR-BASED TECHNOLOGIES. NATURAL GAS PRICES ARE ALSO VERY LOW 
TODAY, AND OUR RECENTLY COMPLETED PRICE FORECASTS CONCLUDE THAT 
THEY WILL CONTINUE TO BE ATTRACTIVE THROUGHOUT THE 1990s. LOW 
PRICE PROJECTIONS FOR NATURAL GAS MAKE HIGHLY CAPITAL INTENSIVE 
RESOURCES, LIKE NUCLEAR UNITS, APPEAR ECONOMICALLY UNATTRACTIVE. 
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A THIRD AND FOURTH REASON FOR OUR VIEW THAT NEW NUCLEAR UNITS 
ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE SITED IN CALIFORNIA RELATES TO EARTHQUAKE 
SAFETY AND SCARCITY OF WATER FOR COOLING. ALMOST ALL OF 
CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE WITH NUCLEAR UNITS HAS BEEN MARRED BY 
UNEXPECTED PROBLEMS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH UNDISCOVERED GEOLOGIC 
FAULTS. BECAUSE OF CALIFORNIA'S GENERALLY UNSTABLE GEOLOGY, 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS WILL BE HIGHER HERE THAN IN MOST OTHER AREAS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF GEOLOGIC SURPRISES IS 
INCREASED. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE NUCLEAR UNITS CONVERT HEAT TO 
ELECTRICITY LESS EFFICIENTLY THAN OTHER GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES, 
THEY REQUIRE MORE WATER FOR COOLING. THE PAST SIX YEAR'S DROUGHT 
EMPHASIZES THE PROBLEM THIS POSES WHEN OTHER SOURCES OF GENERATION 
REQUIRE LESS WATER CONSUMPTION. 
A FURTHER HURDLE FACED BY ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT PROPOSAL 
OF AN INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITY WOULD BE THE CALIFORNIA PUBLIC 
UTILITIES COMMISSION'S CURRENT REGULATORY PROCEDURES FOR RESOURCE 
ACQUISITION. THOSE PROCEDURES, WHICH ARE INTENDED TO GAIN FOR 
RATEPAYERS THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITION, REQUIRE UTILITIES TO 
IDENTIFY A DEFERABLE RESOURCE AND PERMIT OTHERS TO BID FOR THE 
OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE THAT POWER INSTEAD. THIS PROCEDURE WOULD 
MAKE A UTILITY COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR UNITS DIFFICULT IF NOT 
IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS TIME BECAUSE THE NUCLEAR UNIT WOULD FIRST HAVE 
TO BE IDENTIFIED AS DEFERABLE AND OTHERS WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TRY 
TO PROVIDE THAT POWER AT THE SAME OR LOWER COST. THE ENERGY 
COMMISSION'S ANALYSES OF LIKELY UTILITY RESOURCE ADDITIONS DO NOT 
3 
IDENTIFY NUCLEAR UNITS TO BE CANDIDATE RESOURCES FOR AT LEAST THE 
NEXT 8-12 YEARS. 
FINALLY, AS YOU ARE PROBABLY AWARE, CALIFORNIA LAW PROHIBITS 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANT IN CALIFORNIA UNTIL 
THE ENERGY COMMISSION FINDS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS 
DEMONSTRATED AND THERE EXISTS A TECHNOLOGY FOR THE PERMANENT 
DISPOSAL OF SPENT FUEL FROM THESE FACILITIES. BASED ON THE SLOW 
PACE OF THE FEDERAL PROGRAM'S PROGRESS, IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE 
ENERGY COMMISSION COULD MAKE THAT FINDING TODAY. THE COMMISSION IS 
NOT LIKELY TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE UNTIL AND UNLESS SOMEONE PROPOSES 
TO DEVELOP A NEW NUCLEAR UNIT. FOR ALL OF THESE REASONS, WE 
CONCLUDE THAT IT IS UNLIKELY THAT ANY NEW NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS WILL 
BE PROPOSED THIS CENTURY FOR CONSTRUCTION IN CALIFORNIA. 
THE ONE POTENTIAL BRIGHT SPOT FOR NUCLEAR POWER LIES IN ITS 
LACK OF AIR EMISSIONS INCLUDING EMISSION OF GREENHOUSE GASES. THE 
HOPE OF THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY IS THAT A NEW GENERATION OF LOWER COST 
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS CAN PROVE ATTRACTIVE IN A WORLD THAT PLACES A 
HIGH VALUE ON TECHNOLOGY THAT AVOIDS AIR POLLUTION EMISSIONS. 
WHILE IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT THIS VISION COULD BECOME REALITY, EVEN 
IN CALIFORNIA, IT IS MORE LIKELY THAT THERE WILL BE OTHER, LESS 
EXPENSIVE AND LESS ECONOMICALLY RISKY WAYS OF DEALING WITH AIR 
EMISSION PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES. IN 
OTHER WORDS, IT IS LIKELY THAT IF A GOAL IS ESTABLISHED TO REDUCE 
C02 EMISSIONS BY A PARTICULAR AMOUNT, WE WILL BE ABLE TO BUY FAR 
MORE REDUCTION IN C02 PER DOLLAR THROUGH EFFICIENCY IMPROVEMENTS 
AND POSSIBLY THROUGH RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES THAN WE WILL BE ABLE 
TO BUY BY CONSTRUCTING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS. 
TURNING NOW TO ISSUES REGARDING OUR EXISTING PLANTS, WE NOTE 
THAT IN CONTRAST TO THE POOR PERFORMANCE OF THE RANCHO SECO PLANT, 
BOTH DIABLO UNITS 1 AND 2 AND SAN ONOFRE UNITS 2 AND 3 HAVE ENJOYED 
EXCELLENT AVAILABILITY FACTORS IN THEIR EARLY YEARS OF OPERATION. 
SAN ONOFRE UNIT 1 IS AN OLDER UNIT THAT WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER 
UTILITY INVESTMENT TO REMAIN IN OPERATION. I AM SURE THAT OTHER 
SPEAKERS HERE TODAY WILL PROVIDE YOU DETAILS ON THE STATUS OF AND 
PLANS FOR THAT UNIT. AS EACH OF THESE UNITS AGE, UTILITIES, THE 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, AND THE LEGISLATURE WILL NEED TO 
ASSESS PERIODICALLY THE LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUED SUCCESSFUL 
OPERATION AND BALANCE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM THAT OPERATION 
AGAINST THE LIKELY INVESTMENT REQUIRED BY THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY 
COMMISSION IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE PLANT TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE 
SAFELY. IN 1989, THE SACRAMENTO VOTERS FINALLY DETERMINED THAT 
THIS BALANCE FAVORED CLOSING THE RANCHO SECO NUCLEAR PLANT AFTER 
MANY YEARS OF TROUBLED OPERATION. 
THE FINAL POINT I WILL MAKE RELATES TO THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 
ENERGY COMMISSION IN SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR 
LAWS AGAINST A FEDERAL PREEMPTION CHALLENGE. CALIFORNIA CITIZENS 
OBVIOUSLY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR FACILITIES, AND 
THIS GIVES RISE TO YOUR LEGITIMATE INTEREST IN THAT ISSUE. BUT THE 
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UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS NOW CLEARLY INDICATED THAT ACTIONS 
OF THE STATES THAT ARE DESIGNED TO REGULATE RADIATION HAZARDS FROM 
SUCH FACILITIES ARE PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. BY CONTRAST, THE 
COURT H~S UNANIMOUSLY UPHELD STATE ACTION THAT IS BASED ON 
LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE WISDOM AND COST-
EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS TECHNOLOGY WHEN COMPARED WITH OTHER 
ALTERNATIVES. THE STATE CAN ALSO LEGITIMATELY REGULATE OTHER 
ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, SUCH AS ADVERSE BIOLOGICAL IMPACTS OF ONCE-
THROUGH COOLING ON COASTAL WATERS. WE WOULD THEREFORE RECOMMEND 
THAT ANY ACTION THE COMMITTEE MIGHT CONSIDER, WITH RESPECT TO 
EXISTING NUCLEAR UNITS AVOID DIRECT REGULATION OF RADIATION HAZARDS 
AND FOCUS INSTEAD ON TWO AREAS: (1) ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS NOT 
ASSOCIATED WITH RADIATION HAZARDS, AND ( 2) THE ECONOMICS OF 
CONTINUED INVESTMENT IN AND OPERATION OF THOSE FACILITIES GIVEN 
POSSIBLE FEDERAL NUCLEAR SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. 
THAT COMPLETES MY PREPARED REMARKS. BOTH MR. NIX AND I ARE 
AVAILABLE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. 
6 
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Chairman Rosenthal and members of the Committee, my name is 
Robert G. Lacy. I manage the Nuclear Department at San Diego Gas 
& Electric. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss San Onofre 
and, in particular, San Diego's involvement in the operation of 
the plant. As you heard from Mr. Rosenblum, we own 20% of the 
plant. We also obtain about 20% of our customers' electric 
energy from it. We take our role related to the safe operation 
of the plant very seriously. 
San Diego's focus at San Onofre is twofold--to look after 
the interests of our shareholders and customers and to provide 
support and assistance to Edison whenever it is appropriate. We 
monitor and work with Edison in a number of areas: 
1. We have a full time engineer at the site who provides 
us with close to real time information on the status of the 
plant. This person has a nuclear background and is thoroughly 
familiar with the plant and the people who operate and maintain 
it. 
2. We participate with Edison in the estimating and 
budgeting process. We also monitor expenditures and commitments 
2 
with a full time cost engineer, the equivalent of two full time 
accountants and an auditor. 
3. We monitor nuclear licensing activities and issues 
through the efforts of a full time licensing engineer who works 
with his Edison counterparts. In addition, our Senior Vice 
President-Engineering and Operations and I attend selected 
meetings with the NRC. 
4. San Diego is an active participant on the San Onofre 
Board of Review. This group oversees the plant as a business 
endeavor. They approve budgets, overhaul schedules, nuclear fuel 
plans and, except for safety, other matters related to the 
operation of the facility. 
In addition to the monitoring efforts just discussed, San 
Diego takes a very proactive role in insuring the continued safe 
operation of San Onofre. 
1. We participate on the two Onsite Safety Review 
committees. These committees monitor Unit 1 and Units 2 & 3 to 
verify they are operated in a manner consistent with policy, 
rules, procedures and NRC license provisions as related to safety 
and environmental matters. 
2. We also participate on the two Nuclear Control Boards. 
These groups consist of senior management people from Edison, San 
Diego and, in the case of Units 2 and 3, the Cities of Anaheim 
and Riverside. In addition, a consultant who is a recently 
retired senior NRC manager serves on the Boards. Among other 
3 
things, the Boards review significant safety issues and verify 
that safety and environmental occurrences which deviate from 
operating instructions or acceptance standards are promptly 
investigated and corrected. The Boards are similar to the Diablo 
Canyon Independent Safety Committee except that they have the 
authority to direct changes for the purpose of enhancing or 
ensuring plant safety. I should point out that these Boards are 
not required by the NRC. However, it is my understanding they 
are looked upon very favorably. 
As Mr. Rosenblum has testified, the CPUC BRPU hearings have 
recently completed. Briefs were filed last week. This 
proceeding reviewed the resource plans for all the regulated 
electric utilities in the State. It specifically addressed the 
continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1. San Diego participated 
with Edison in developing the assumptions used to prepare a 
benefit/cost analysis. These assumptions were unique to the Unit 
and included such things as capacity factor, capital 
requirements, operating and maintenance costs, and steam 
generator performance. San Diego then prepared its own 
benefit/cost analysis taking into consideration additional 
assumptions which are unique to us such as capacity requirements, 
resource mix and resource opportunities, financial considerations 
and nuclear fuel costs. Our analysis demonstrated without a 
doubt that continued operation of San Onofre Unit 1 is in the 
best interests of our customers. This conclusion held even after 
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we did sensitivity runs which evaluated the impact of lower gas 
prices, higher capital and O&M costs. 
San Diego performed six sensitivity runs of the cost-
effectiveness of San Onofre Unit 1 at a capacity factor of 60% 
and six sensitivity runs at an extremely low capacity factor of 
44%. Those runs showed that at a 60% capacity factor the Unit 
remained cost-effective even under high capital and O&M cost 
assumptions. Even at a very low capacity factor, the Unit was 
cost-effective for all but one sensitivity run which used the 
most extreme adverse assumptions, and was cost-effective under 
all sensitivities when realistic lead times were reflected. 
While these runs were conducted using the CPUC mandated ER 90 
fuel price forecast, it is our judgment that San Onofre Unit 1 
would be cost effective at a 44% capacity factor and lower gas 
prices. 
While we do not believe it will be necessary, we even 
concluded that replacement of the steam generators followed by 
continued operation of the Unit with no life extension is still 
in the best interests of our customers. 
This concludes my remarks. I will be happy to answer any 
questions. 
MARINE REVIEW COMMITTEE 
TESTIMONY BY WILLIAM MURDOCH, CHAIRMAN, MRC, TO THE SENATE 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES, DEC 2, 1991 
Introduction 
1 
Between 1976 and 1989 the MRC carried out a study of the effects of the cooling system of 
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) on the marine environment. The study 
broke new ground, first, in being wholly independent of the power company, and second in 
using a powerful statistical design that can distinguish the effects of the power plant from 
natural variation in the environment. 
Before summarizing the effects found by the MRC I need to stress that the study has 
virtually nothing to say about the safety of nuclear power. It did not, and could not, 
determine whether the various short- and long-term potential hazards of nuclear energy 
(e.g. nuclear accidents, long-term storage of nuclear waste) can be avoided. It did show 
that the plant did not release environmentally-significant amounts of radioactive materials 
into the ocean when we investigated this question. 
The Effects 
The power plant affects marine organisms in two ways. First, it takes in enormous 
quantities of ocean water to cool the reactor: an amount equivalent to a square mile 14 feet 
deep every day. Second, it moves turbid water, i.e. water with a lot of particles, from near 
the shore and from close to the ocean floor, offshore, up towards the surface and, about 
60% of the time, over the nearby kelp bed. In doing so it reduces the amount of light 
reaching the ocean floor in the kelp bed and it increases the flow of particles across the 
cobbles and boulders in the bed. 
The two major corresponding effects on the marine biota are as follows. 
(1) First, the intakes kill about se billion fish eggs and larvae every year. Now, although 
fish populations have some ability to "compensate" for such losses, It is most likely that the 
adult stocks nevertheless decline as a consequence of these deaths. The main effects fall 
on a few species of fish that are concentrated near shore, and the MRC calculated that the 
standing stock of these species is reduced by 1% to 10% in the southern California Bight 
(the region from Point Conception to northern Baja), an amount equivalent to around 600 
tons. 
These are not large percentage losses, and they occur mainly in non-sport and non-
commercial species. But they occur on top of losses imposed by other human activities, 
and they probably appear ultimately as reductions in the sport and commercial species that 
feed on the affected group. 
(2) Second, the changes in the physical environment caused by the turbid plume from the 
power plant cause a roughly 50% reduction in the average size of the kelp bed near 
SONGS, an average reduction in abundance of about 70% in fish living near the bottom, 
and of about 45% in 9 species of invertebrates in the kelp bed. These effects are 
substantial because kelp beds are ecologically important and biologically diverse habitats in 
the ocean and are quite sparse in the San Onofre area. 
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The MRC concluded that these effects do not constitute an ecological disaster, but they are 
substantial adverse effects and require corrective or compensatory action. 
MRC Recommendations and CCC Action 
First, the :\1RC considered massive changes, namely the addition of cooling towers and 
alterin~ the discharge system, that could prevent most of these effects. The majority of the 
Committee concluded, however, that the costs would be disproportionate to the benefits 
and that there would be additional significant environmental effects. 
The MRC instead unanimously recommended a set of options from which the Commission 
was invited to select its final list of conditions. The options included changes to the 
operation of the plant, and various possibilities for mitigation. Mitigation options included 
a replacement kelp bed and, for the Bight-wide fish losses, a fish reef or restoration of 
coastal wetland. The MRC worked with Commission staff in exploring these options and 
decided that changes to the plant would reduce its efficiency and would transfer a portion 
of the environmental effects to other power plants. Thus the mitigation package fmally 
imposed on Edison by the Commission centered on a replacement kelp bed and restoration 
of coastal wetland, and this package is entirely consistent with the MRC recommendations. 
Regional Water Quality Board Hearings 
The MRC recently submitted testimony to the San Diego Regional Water Quality Board at 
hearings on SONGS' NPDES permit. That majority testimony is that two standards in the 
permit are not being met: (1) the plant reduces the light reaching the ocean floor in the 
kelp bed and (2) the plant causes degradation of the biota by reducing the abundance of 
kelp and other orgarusms in the kelp bed. The Board is presently weighing this and other 
testimony. 
You asked me to comment on what the Water Board should do. First, I am not competent 
to evaluate the legal or regulatory issues. But, from an environmental point of view, since 
the Coastal Commission has required full environmental compensation, I believe the 
Board need not impose additional requirements. However, I would like to see the Board 
reinforce the Coastal Commission's requirement for remedial action to be undertaken by 
Edison. 
Implications for Regulation 
Finally, you asked me to comment on the broader implications for regulation. I have 
concluded that current regulation under SONGS' NPDES permit is inadequate, for three 
reasons. 
(1) The present standards are ineffective. Edison is required by its NPDES permit to carry 
out environmental studies to determine whether or not the effects of SONGS on the 
marine environment violate regulatory standards. But the mandated studies do not have 
the power to detect any but the most disastrous of effects. 
(2) Self-assessment does not work. As is standard, Edison investigates itself. The 
company, or its consultants, carry out the studies required by the permit. The company 
analyzes and interprets the results. These analyses do not apply adequate techniques for 
findmg effects. 
(3) The Regional Water Quality Board has too small a scientific staff to investigate 
properly the issues raised by this inadequate process. 
3 
In my view the regulatory activities carried out for SONGS' NPDES permit have been 
almost entirely a waste of the millions of dollars that have been spent. The situation could 
be improved by (a) carefully rewriting the regulatory standards and (b) requiring third-
party monitoring by a wholly independent body reporting directly to the regulatory agency. 

State1nent of Riuunon C. Fay, Ph.D. to the California State Senate 
Couuuittee on Energy and Public Utilities, 2 December 1991 
San Onofre Nuclear G~nerating System (SONGS) entrains and kills 
billions of organisms amounting to thousands of tons of biomass 
per year. In addition, the flow of cooling water through the 
plant followed by discharge to the ocean results in the 
displacement of suspended sediments offshore. These sediments 
adversely impact the environment by reducing the penetration of 
light accumulating on the bottom, of causing other disruptive 
effects upon the organisms in the area impacted by this 
discharge. These results are documented in the final report of 
the l1arint! Review Committee (MRC) and some 16 technical 
appendices. One of those technical reports, 0., "Water Quality 
Compliance" details the fact that the discharge from the SONGS is 
not in compliance with the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) permit issued by the San Diego 
Regioual Water Quality Control Board in that the penetration of 
light through the water column is reduced, sediments accumulate 
on the bottom, and a Balanced Population of Indigenous Organisms 
is not being maintained. So long as the SONGS continues to 
Opt!rate as it now does, this damage to the mar~ne environment 
will continue. 
The MRC found unanimously that over 90% of this continuing damage 
to the murine environment cun be prevented by the retrofitting of 
cooling towers to the uuits at the SONGS. 
Instead of acting to eliminate the problem of water pollution 
caused by the SONGS, the California Coastal Committee (CCC) acted 
to compensate for the damage to llli . .: ll4arine environment by 
requiring Southern California Edison (SCE) to build an artificial 
reef, restore some wetlands area, and fund a fish hatchery. 
Review of the pollution problem by the Water Quality Control 
Board, San Diego Region, is not complete and this agency has not 
yet decided what is to be done in this matter. 
Els...,~a.._ cooling towers are required for nuclear generating 
stations where far lesser biomasses of aquatic resources are at 
risk compar~d to the situation at the SONGS. 
MRC studies of the effects of radiation released from the SONGS 
were incomplete. In fact, the MRC submitted a special report to 
the CCC criticizing the design of the radiation monitoring 
program conducted at the SONGS. 1'wo problems remained to be 
resolved with regard to the issue of release of radioactivity 
fr01a the SONGS. One is the total amount and characteristics of 
the release of radioactive substances leaving the station either 
in the flow of cooling water or from the stacks. These releases 
increase as the units age. Also, the radioactivity 1n the 
components of the plant increases as the rate of neutron induced 
corrosion increases. The other is the disposal of radioactive 
wastes as it is now prorosed to externalize this problem into the 
public sector,from the private sector. 
''t 
The MRC study produced the most reliable data of its type ever 
reported for an environmental study. The estimates of annual 
losses of marine organisms and damage to the marine community 
affected are conservative. No evaluation of the chronic effects 
resulting from the operation of the SONGS have been made. At the 
same time, Nuclear Regulatory Commission practice will extend the 
probable operating life of these units to a period of 40 to 50 
years. Each and every day of operation will result in the death 
and destruction of more fish and habitat than resulted from the 
single spill of an herbicide into the Sacramento River and the 
site will remain dangerously radioactive for more than 250,000 
years. 
The permit to construct the SONGS units 2 and 3 was issued under 
the terms of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 
which forbade an irreversible, irretrievable comn1itment of 
coastal resources without full mitigation to prevent any net loss 
of these resources at this in water quality exists in a State in 
which has expended billions of dollars to abate problems in water 
pollution. It is inconsistent with the objectives of every law 
adopted to protect, maintain, enhance, and restore coastal 
resources without preventing this damage from occurring. It is 
also alarming to expect that this pattern of damage will increase 
in the future as the plant ages. 
Attachment: Table of estimated annual losses caused by 
operations of the SONGS 
--
Summary of Estimated Losses of tHota 
Resulting from Operation of SONGS 
Kelp plants 
Entrainment Losses 
Phyt.op lank ton* 
Zooplankton ** 
Ichthyoplankton*** 
Juvenile and adult fish 
l"1ys ids (ho 1 op lank tonic) 
Relative Abundance Losses 
Kelp bed fish - bottom 
Kelp bed invertebrates 
Regional Fish Stocks 
Local Midwater Fish 
b9,000 plants 
200 acres of kelp bed 
10,000 tons per year 
1,350 tons per year 
4 billion larvae per year 
~1 to 56 tons per year 
14 tons per year 
70% reduction {2b tons) 
30- 90% reduction (no est.) 
0 - 10% reduction'(600 tons) 
30- 70% reduction (no est.) 
*Estimated as approximately lOx amount of zooplankton 
**Holoplankton and meroplankton excluaing fish, dry weight 
***No estimate of weight 
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San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station 
Background 
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) consists of 
three nuclear-fueled electrical generating facilities, Units 1, 2 
and 3. All three units are located in San Diego County, on a 
site between the cities of San Clemente and Oceanside, 
immediately adjacent to the Pacific Ocean, approximately two and 
one half miles south of San Mateo Point, within the boundaries of 
the United States Marine Corps Base, Camp Pendleton. SONGS is 
within the jurisdiction of the California Regional Water Quality 
Control Board, San Diego Region. 
Unit 1 began commercial operation in 1968 with a waste discharge 
volume of up to approximately 500 million gallons per day, most 
of which is condenser cooling water. Approximately 14 million 
gallons per day of wastes resulting from plant operations, and 
approximately 0.145 million gallons per day from two small sewage 
treatment plants are also discharged. The cooling water intake 
is located approximately 2980 feet offshore of the plant in 
approximately 27 feet of water. The discharge structure is 
located approximately 2460 feet offshore in approximately 25 feet 
of water. 
Units 2 and 3 were placed in operation in 1983, each with a 
separate discharge and a waste discharge volume of up to 
approximately 1400 million gallons per day, most of which is 
condenser cooling water. Approximately 65 million gallons per 
day of wastes resulting from plant operations are also introduced 
into the discharge from each unit. Units 2 and 3 r1ave separate 
cooling water intakes, each located approximately 3183 feet 
offshore in 32 feet of water. The Unit 2 discharge is through a 
diffuser extending from approximately 5888 to 8350 feet offshore 
ranging in depth from approximately 39 feet to 49 feet. The Unit 
3 discharge is through a diffuser extending from approximately 
3558 feet to 6020 feet offshore ranging in depth from 
approximately 32 feet to 38 feet. 
Fish return systems serve the intake from each unit. A common 
discharge structure is used for the discharges from both fish 
return systems. 
The SONGS discharges of cooling water and other miscellaneous in-
plant waste streams and the discharge from the fish return system 
have been regulated by NPDES permits adopted by the Regional 
Board since the facility began operation. Since NPDES permits 
typically have durations of 5 years the permits for the SONGS 
units have been renewed a number of times since the plant began 
operation. Unit 1 is currently regulated under Regional Board 
Order No. 88-01. Unit 2 is currently regulated under Regional 
Board O~der No. 85-11. Unit 3 is currently regulated by Regional 
Board Order No. 85-13. 
Information in Regional Board files indicates SONGS has been the 
subject of three water quality related enforcement actions since 
the facility began operation. I will concentrate on the current 
ongoing action, related to the report of the Marine Review 
Committee, in the belief that it is of most interest to this 
corr:mittee. 
Marine Review Committee Report 
In addition to the Regional Board's permits, Units 2 and 3 of 
SONGS are also regulated under a California Coastal Commission 
permit (Permit No. 183-73, adopted by the then California Coastal 
Zone Commission in 1974). As a condition of this permit, because 
of concerns about the effects of operation of Units 2 and 3 on 
the marine environment, Edison was required to fund a three 
member independent committee - the Marine Review Committee (MRC) 
to: " ... carry out a comprehensive and continuing study of the 
marine environment offshore from San Onofre ... to predict and 
later to measure, the effects of San Onofre Units 2 and 3 on the 
marine environment with emphasis on a) the effects of SONGS 
Units 2 & 3 on zooplankton and larval organisms and b} 
compliance with the regulatory requirements of State and Federal 
water quality agencies ..... in a manner that will result in the 
broadest possible consideration of the effects of SONGS Units 1, 
2 and 3 on the entire marine environment in the vicinity of San 
Onofre". 
After a reported 17 years of study, and a cost of approximately 
$48,000,000, the MRC issued its final report in August 1989. 
Included in the report were findings that the discharges from 
SONGS Units 2 and 3 were not in compliance with applicable NPDES 
permit limi~ations for: natural light in the ocean waters and 
degradation of marine communities. 
The Regional Board received copies of the final MRC report in 
August 1989. Staff members of the Regional Board and California 
Coastal Commission (CCC) met a number of times, beginning before 
the MRC report was finalized, to coordinate actions of the 
respective agencies on the findings of the report. 
During one of the early meetings it was agreed that ~he Regional 
Board should not begin any hearings or other actions until after 
the CCC concluded their hearing process. I believe this approach 
was appropriate for the following reasons: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
The CCC commissioned the MRC and the subsequent report as a 
part of their permitting process for the construction and 
operation of SONGS Units 2 and 3. The findings of the 
report had not yet been formally considered by the CCC in a 
public hearing. It was appropriate that the CCC hear and 
act on the findings of the MRC before another State agency 
acted. · 
Staff of the CCC and the Chairman of the MRC requested that 
any Regional Board hearings to consider the alleged 
violations cited in the MRC report not be held until after 
the CCC hearings began. 
Issues before the CCC included the necessity of altering the 
CCC permit for Units 2 and 3 to require: changes in the 
cooling water systems, operational changes, mitigation 
projects to compensate for any damages to marine life or 
modifications to the cooling water system for Units 2 and 3. 
The testimony before the CCC and any subsequent decisions on 
these issues would be a major consideration in any Regional 
Board deliberations. 
Other possible actions taken by the CCC in response to the 
MRC report (including acceptance, rejection or request for 
additional work) would appropriately be considered by the 
Regional Board in any deliberations they undertake. 
In response to a request by representatives of Friends of the 
Earth and the Surfrider Foundation for Regional Board enforcement 
action, the findings of the MRC report were discussed during the 
December 18, 1989 Regional Board meeting. A considerable amount 
of testimony was presented by Regional Board staff, CCC staff, 
representatives of Edison, representatives of the MRC and other 
interested parties. Following the discussion the Board 
tentatively decided to call an enforcement hearing. Subsequent 
to making that decision the Board concurred, for the reasons 
cited above, that their enforcement hearings not begin before the 
start of the CCC hearing process. 
I 
The CCC hearings were scheduled and postponed a number of times. 
The matter was eventually heard by the CCC on July 16, 1991 in 
Huntington Beach. 
During their August 12, 1991 meeting the Regional Board scheduled 
an enforcement hearing for October 31, 1991. The hearing was 
opened on that date for the purpose of receiving testimony only. 
The record for receipt of written testimony was held open until 
November 15, 1991. A copy of the Regional Board staff report 
presented at the hearing has previously been provided to the 
Committee's staff. 
The Regional Board will meet to consider a decision o~ the matter 
after staff have completed their review of the considerable 
amount of testimony that makes up the hearing record. We will be 
discussing possible dates for this meeting with the Regional 
Board, during their next regular meeting, on December 9, 1991. 
At this time, based on the volume of written and oral information 
that must be reviewed, I estimate the will not meet to consider a 
decision prior to January 1992. 
Discoloration of the Ocean Surface at Unit 1 
Prior to beginning of coremercial operation of Units 2 and 3 the 
Regional Board initiated an enforcement action because of Permit 
violations at Unit 1. Shortly after Unit 1 was placed in 
operation discoloration of the ocean surface in the vicinity of 
the discharge was noted. This resulted from the intake 
entraining turbid water from the inshore area, near the ocean 
floor, with subsequent discharge of turbidity through the 
discharge structure; entrainment of turbid water from near the 
ocean floor, in the vicinity of the discharge structure, with 
wa~er discharged through the discharge·structure; and, the 
effects of the ocean currents on the discharge structure. The 
discoloration was in violation of NPDES Permit conditions 
requiring no aesthetically undesirable discoloration of the ocean 
surface as a result of the discharge. 
In response to the violations the Regional Board issued a time 
schedule {Order No. 82-15) in 1982. Order No. 82-15 required 
Southern California Edison, as operators of SONGS, to conduct 
studies to determine the causes of the problem and potential 
solutions. In 1983 Edison presented the results of their studies 
to the Regional Board, concluding tha~ the discoloration of the 
ocean waters resulting from the Unit 1 discharge was not a 
significant aesthetic problem because it was visible to only a 
small number of people. Edison also reported that the cost to 
correct the problem would be in excess of $400,000,000 and 
requested that ~he Regional Board not require correction of the 
problem. 
On November 14, 1983 the Regional Board, concurring with the 
Edison request, adopted Addendum 1 to Order No. 82-14 which 
relieved the Company of the requirements that the discoloration 
of the oce&n waters caused by the Unit 1 discharge be eliminated. 
Effluen~ Violations at Unit 1 
As previously ~entioned discharges from Unit 1 consist of 
condenser cooling water and discharges from in-plant operations, 
including discharges from two small sewage treatment plants. The 
sewage treatment plants are used to treat domestic sewage from 
SONGS workers and vis~tors. 
During the period from January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1990 
the NPDES permit monitoring program indicated the effluent 
limitations that apply to the Unit 1 discharges were exceeded a 
total of 17 times. The effluent limits for the combined 
discharge were exceeded for chlorine residual. The effluent 
limits for one group of the small discharge streams, called "low 
volume wastes", were exceeded for grease and oil. The discharges 
from the sewage treatment plants exceeded effluent limits for, 
settleab:e solids and pH. 
These violations were noted on reports the Regional Board 
provides to the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
Exercising its oversight role pursuant to Federal regulations, 
the EPA informed the Regional Board that if a formal enforcement 
ac~ion was not initiated by the State, EPA would initiate such an 
action under Federal authority. Since Regional Board enforcement 
resources were limited, and the violations were not considered to 
have significant water quality impacts, I advised EPA that if 
enforcement action were considered necessary they should pursue 
it. The Administrator of EPA subsequently issued an 
administrative enforcement order on February 27, 1991. 
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TESTIMONY BY KARL ORY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CAMPAIGN CALIFORNIA 
Utilities can't make tough decisions. They're on a nuclear power treadmill, driven by the 
guarantee of a rate return and lack of competition. It is time to put on the brake. 
Campaign California is one of the state's largest environmental and consumer 
organizations with over 30,000 members. It led the two campaigns in Sacramento in 1988 
and 1989 that led to the closure of Rancho Seco nuclear plant. 
The chairman of Campaign California is Assemblyman Tom Hayden. Campaign California 
has led other initiative campaigns, including Prop. 65 -- the 1986 Get Tough on Toxics 
initiative, Prop. 99 -- the 1988 Tobacco Tax initiative, and Prop. 128, Big Green, in 1990. 
We call for the closure of San Onofre nuclear generating station# 1 (SONGS 1). Much of 
my testimony is reflected in the Division of Ratepayer Advocacy's (DRA) testimony and 
its report on the cost-effectiveness of SONGS 1. 
The DRA report documents a record of deception by Southern California Edison (SCE) in 
its filing for authorization to pass costs of SONGS 1 onto ratepayers, including examples of 
inflated capacity performance and reliability and numerous underestimations of costs--
including the cost of capital additions, of line losses, of environmental impact on marine 
life, of insurance, and of decommissioning. And they overestimate the cost of replacement 
power. 
SCE is cited by DRA for flawed and incomplete information -- as an example, SCE used 
for comparison a group of 7 similar nuclear plants, but omits five other similar plants that 
had poor performance. 
Campaign California applauds the DRA recommendation, now under consideration by the 
PUC-- that SONGS 1 be designated a deferrable resource and its capacity be put out to 
bid. Let the free market determine the need for SONGS 1. The state's leading ratepayer 
organization, TURN, joins us in this position. 
Simply put, SONGS 1 is like an old car with too many miles -- it's dangerous, it's inefficient; 
it operates to avoid embarrassment to the nuclear industry. 
SONGS 1 is the nation's 3rd oldest nuclear reactor-- and the oldest of commercial size. It 
began operating in 1967 and is 24 years old. Nuclear plants are not exempt from the laws 
of nature. As nuclear plants age they require increasingly larger expenditures for 
maintenance and repairs and produce ever less power. 
One national study showed that, for the period of 1981-85, repair costs at older nuclear 
plants (built in the '60's) was double than that for newer plants (built after 1970). An 
earlier DOE report predicted this trend, suggesting that, after 15 years, capacity of older 
plants will decline by 20Jo per year. 
SONGS 1 has proven the rule. Reliable in its first decade, it averaged only 27% of its 
capacity from 1980-1987. In '88, it rose to 36%, and fell to 31 OJo in 1989. 
Yet, SCE projects a capacity factor of 60% to 80% in future years in order to justify 
continued operation of the plant. 
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To continue to operate at all, expensive repairs and improvements will continue to be 
needed. SCE budgets for some long-delayed safety improvements triggered by the Three 
Mile Island accident, but leaves little contingency for other likely costs. 
A 1988 national study of costs found SONGS 1 to be the costliest in the nation. It 
measured annual net capital additions from 1982-86, ranked by cost per KW. 
While SCE would like to think that they've got everything fixed, they face probable large, 
unbudgeted expenses. SCE's rosy forecasts would be destroyed if SONGS l's troubled 
steam generator needed to be replaced, estimated by SCE at $200 million. Yet -- ALL 
other 3-loop Westinghouse Pressurized Water Reactor plants have replaced steam 
generators. 
The optimists at SCE also project that the NRC will lighten up on requirements as the 
plant ages, because modifications will not be cost effective. We agree that it appears that 
the NRC at times places cost above safety; but not even the NRC will, as a matter of policy, 
allow a plant to operate less safely because of age. 
Factors outside of the controls SONGS 1's managers may force unbudgeted expenses onto 
the plant. A problem at any of the 12 similarly designed plants may trigger improvements 
at all plants. The current Earth Island Institute lawsuit could increase costs. Seismic 
activity and continued research could lead to yet further earthquake safety requirements. 
SONGS 1 is simply not needed. A 1987 study showed that even without nuclear power, the 
nation had 280Jo surplus electrical generating power in 1986; in the western half of the 
nation, the surplus without nuclear was 40%. 
Even the perceived environmental benefit proves to be just so much smoke: 
First of all, SONGS 1 reduces the need for fossil fuel only the extent it operates and is 
reliable -- and for a decade it's only worked about a third of the time. Does anyone believe 
that SONGS 1 will be a reliable energy source into the next century? Second, any air 
benefit is offset by the damage to the marine environment. Significant marine 
environmental benefit would result when SONGS 1 is closed. Third, continued operation 
increases the large amount of on-site stored nuclear waste, and, finally, continued 
operation exposes the nation's largest urban population needlessly to the inherent safety 
risks of nuclear power. 
SONGS 1 should be considered a deferrable resource. The DRA report notes that 
SONGS 1 has not met ANY of the requirements for designation a resource as non-
deferrable. If the PUC arbitrarily designates SONGS 1 as non-deferrable, it will shield it 
from competition from other energy resources. This lost opportunity could cost ratepayers 
hundreds of millions of dollars. 
If the PUC ignored its own policies, legislation should be adopted defining what resources 
can be shielded •• and requiring a competitive market. 
I'm reminded of a fight that Campaign California joined in the late '70's to stop SDG&E's 
involvement with Sun Desert nuclear plant. We were told then of rosy costs projections 
and unbridled need. However, two years later a SDG&E's executive described the denial 
of their plans as the best thing that ever happened to them. 
Based on the DRA analysis and the experience of Rancho Seco, we expect a similar post-
SONGS 1 message by Southern California Edison. 
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STATEMENT AND PRESENTATION 
OF THE 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
TO THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
December 2, 1991 sacramento, california 
A. Introduction/Background 
Chairman Rosenthal and Members of the Committee: 
My name is Robert Wellington and I am the Legal Counsel for the 
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee. On behalf of the Safety 
Committee, I would like to express our appreciation at being asked to 
participate in today's oversight hearing. Senator Rosenthal's recent 
letter asked the Safety Committee to present a general status report 
of its activities to date, plus a summary of activities planned in the 
future. Since the Committee has been in operation for less than two 
years, and since this is our first opportunity to appear before you, I 
thought I would give you a brief history on the formation of the Diablo 
Canyon Independent Safety Committee ("DCISC") and then discuss its ac-
tivities to date. 
1. Formation of the DCISC. The establishment of the Diablo Canyon 
Independent Safety Committee was provided for as one of the terms of an 
extensive settlement agreement entered into by the Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates ("DRA") of the California Public Utilities Commission ("PUC"), 
the Attorney General ("AG") for the state of California and Pacific Gas 
and Electric Company ( "PG&E") . The settlement agreement, dated June 24, 
1988, covers the operation and revenue requirements associated with the 
two units of PG&E's Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant ("Diablo Canyon") 
for the thirty-year period following the commercial operation date of 
each unit. The agreement arose out of rate proceedings that had been 
pending before the PUC for four years, and which included numerous 
hearings and pre-trial depositions. Just prior to the commencement of 
trial, the ORA, the AG and PG&E prepared and entered into the settlement 
agreement and submitted it to the PUC for approval. In addition to ex-
tensive provisions relating to the Diablo Canyon rates and pricing 
structures, the agreement also provides in pertinent part that: 
"An Independent Safety Committee shall be estab-
lished consisting of three members, one each 
appointed by the Governor of the State of Cali-
fornia, the Attorney General and the Chairman 
of the California Energy Commission ("CEC"), 
respectively, serving staggered three-year terms. 
The Committee shall review Diablo Canyon opera-
tions for the purpose of assessing the safety of 
operations and suggesting any recommendations for 
safe operations. Neither the Committee nor its 
members shall have any responsibility or authority 
for plant operations, and they shall have no au-
thority to direct PG&E personnel." 
The agreement further provides that the Safety Committee shall have 
the right to receive certain operating reports and records of Diablo 
canyon and that the Committee shall have the right to conduct an annual 
examination of the Diablo Canyon site and such other supplementary vis-
its as it may deem appropriate. The Safety Committee is to prepare an 
annual report and such interim reports as may be appropriate, which 
shall include any recommendations of the Committee. 
The settlement agreement was referred to the PUC for review and 
approval, and following hearings before a PUC Administrative Law Judge 
and the Commission itself, in December 1988 the PUC approved the settle-
ment agreement, finding that it was reasonable and "in the public in-
terest" and that the "Safety Committee will be a useful monitor of safe 
operation at Diablo Canyon." 
2. Appointment of Committee Members. The settlement agreement 
_..,_ 
provides that the Safety Committee members are to be selected from a 
list of candidates jointly nominated by the President of the PUC, the 
Dean of Engineering of the University of California at Berkeley and 
PG&E, and that they "shall propose as candidates only persons with 
knowledge, background and experience in the field of nuclear power 
facilities." In July 1989 when then PUC President G. Mitchell Wilk 
announced the initial list of nine candidates nominated for appointment 
to the Committee, he noted that "an independent safety committee clearly 
requires members who could demonstrate objectivity and independence. 
For this reason, none of the nominees has testified for PG&E or any 
other party before the PUC or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in any 
proceeding regarding Diablo Canyon." 
William E. Kastenberg. In September 1989 Governor Deukmejian 
appointed UCLA nuclear engineering professor William Kastenberg to a 
one-year term on the Safety Committee. Professor Kastenberg received 
his BS and MS in Engineering from UCLA and his PhD in Nuclear Engineer-
ing from the University of California, Berkeley. Upon graduation, he 
joined the faculty at UCLA where he is currently Professor of Engineer-
ing and Applied Science. Dr. Kastenberg has taught courses in nuclear 
reactor theory, design and safety; thermodynamics and heat transfer; 
energy technology and environmental risk. His research interests in-
clude nuclear reactor safety and risk-benefit studies. A more detailed 
statement of Dr. Kastenberg's educational and research background is set 
forth in Exhibit "A," which is set forth in the packet of documents 
provided to each of you. 
In July 1990 Professor Kastenberg was re-appointed by the Gov-
ernor to a new three-year term on the Safety Committee. Professor Kas-
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tenberg was the first Chairman of the Diablo canyon Independent Safety 
Committee, serving from May 1990 through June 1991. 
warren H. owen. In December of 1989, Warren Owen was appointed 
to a three-year term as the second member of the Safety Committee by 
the Chairman of the California Energy Commission. Mr. owen was elected 
Chairman of the Safety Committee in June 1991 for the current fiscal 
year. Mr. owen is Executive Vice President of Duke Power Company in 
Charlotte, North Carolina, where he is responsible for power group op-
erations. In this capacity he directs all electric power production 
activities (plant design, construction and operation) as well as related 
technical and information services for the company. Mr. Owen graduated 
from Clemson University with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Mechanical 
Engineering. He joined Duke Power in 1948. The additional details of 
Mr. Owen's accomplishments are also found in Exhibit "A." 
Herbert H. Woodson. In March 1991 the California Attorney General 
appointed Herbert Woodson to the Safety Committee for both the then un-
expired term through the end of the fiscal year and for a three-year 
term commencing July 1, 1991. Dr. Woodson is the Dean of the College of 
Engineering and the Director of the Bureau of Engineering Research at 
the University of Texas at Austin. He attended Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology, where he received his Bachelor of Science and Master of 
Science degrees in 1952, and a Doctor of Science degree in 1956, all in 
Electrical Engineering. He served as a faculty member at M.I.T. from 
1956 to 1971, when he joined the staff and became Chairman of the 
Electrical Engineering Department at the University of Texas. Dr. 
Woodson's resume is further set forth at Exhibit "A" in your packet of 
documents. 
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B. Safety committee Activities 
The variety and extent of the Safety Committee's activities during 
the first nineteen (19) months of its operational existence can proba-
bly best be summarized for you here today by a brief review of six 
topics: 
oThe documents received and reviewed by the Committee. 
oThe four public meetings held in San Luis Obispo County 
by the Safety Committee. 
oThe Committee's technical presentations and fact-finding 
sessions. 
oThe consultants and experts retained by the Committee 
and their efforts to date. 
oThe site visits, facility inspections, open houses and 
related activities of the Committee members. 
oThe reports prepared by the Safety Committee. 
1. Documents Provided to the Safety committee. The settlement 
agreement provides that the Committee shall have the right to receive 
on a regular basis specified operating reports and records of Diablo 
Canyon, as well as "such other reports pertinent to safety as may be 
produced in the course of operations and may be requested by the Com-
mittee." Thousands of documents have been provided by PG&E to the 
Safety Committee, relating to both historical and current operations. 
An example of the list of documents provided to the Committee members 
on a quarterly basis, as well as upon specific request, are shown in 
Exhibit "B." I should note, however, that the list itself does not 
begin to indicate the extent and bulk of these documents, which arrive 
every three months at my office as a stack a to 10 inches high. 
2. committee Meetings. A major portion of the Safety Committee's 
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work has been conducted at the four public meetings which it has held in 
San Luis Obispo County, in communities adjacent to the Diablo Canyon 
plant. The very first meeting of the Committee was held at the Grange 
Hall in San Luis Obispo on May 22, 1990. As you can see from the Notice 
of Meeting and the meeting Agenda, which are set forth at Exhibit "C" of 
your materials, the meeting was conducted in three sessions, starting at 
9:30 in the morning and running throughout the afternoon and evening. 
This has continued to be the general format of each of the Committee's 
meetings: an initial or morning session at which Committee business and 
organizational matters are considered; a second or afternoon session 
devoted exclusively to technical presentations from PG&E representatives 
on topics of plant operations, as requested by the Committee Members; 
and a third session conducted in the evening for the primary purpose of 
receiving comments and communications from the public. Comments from 
the public are also welcome at the morning and afternoon meeting ses-
sions. 
You can see from Exhibit "C" that at this first meeting the Safety 
Committee adopted various Committee policies on such matters as internal 
organization, accounting procedures, travel and expense reimbursement, 
communications and procedures for conducting its meetings. Committee 
members reported on their inspections of the plant, and technical re-
ports were given on PG&E's organization and operations at Diablo canyon, 
on planned operational improvements and modifications, on training and 
maintenance programs and on the current status of NRC issues and assess-
ments. 
Each of the initial meeting sessions was attended by 60 to 95 per-
sons. The evening session did not adjourn until nearly 11: oo P.M., with 
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the two Committee members having spent over ten hours in that first pub-
lic meeting. 
Subsequent Safety Committee meetings have been held on November a-
9, 1990, on June 6, 1991, and on October 10, 1991. The meeting notice 
and agenda for each of those three meetings are included at Exhibits 
"D," "E" and "F," respectively. Again, day-long three-session meetings 
were held. All of the meetings except the third one were held in San 
Luis Obispo; the June 6, 1991, meeting was held in Arroyo Grande, about 
15 miles to the south. Attendance at each of the sessions of the last 
three meetings has averaged between 25 to 40 persons. 
When some members of the public indicated that the Committee's 
legal notices were not sufficient, the Committee commenced publishing 
multiple display ads in the two largest local newspapers (see Exhibit 
"G"). The meeting notices are also mailed out to some ninety persons 
and organizations on a service list provided by the PUC and to over 
thirty newspapers and radio and television stations. Minutes (Exhibits 
"H" and "I") and typed transcripts have been prepared for each of the 
Safety Committee's meetings, and these documents have been filed for 
review in the Public Document Room at the Cal Poly Library in San Luis 
Obispo. 
3. Technical Presentations. As you can see from a review of the 
agendas provided to you, a considerable number and variety of technical 
presentations have been given to the Committee at its meetings. I have 
already mentioned the PG&E reports given at the first meeting of the 
Safety Committee. At its second meeting in November 1990 the Committee 
received presentations on outage management, operator training, fitness-
for-duty programs and fuel handling operations (see Exhibit "D"). The 
technical reports given at the third meeting covered a number of topics, 
including organizational improvements, significant events and error 
reduction programs, performance of the steam dump valves, reliability 
centered maintenance ("RCM"), employee performance assessments, the 
installation of the sixth diesel generator at the plant and PG&E's 
radiological effluent program (Exhibit "E"). At the recent Safety 
Committee meeting this past October, the requested presentations on 
plant operations included the status of the refueling outage, a summary 
of the recent Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance ("SALP") 
Report from the NRC, pipe cracking experience and resolution, and PG&E's 
pipe erosion and corrosion control program (Exhibit "F"). 
I believe it is worthwhile to note that in its four meetings to 
date, the Safety Committee has received over sixteen (16) hours of 
technical presentations on safety-related issues concerning Diablo 
Canyon. These have been truly productive fact-finding sessions, held 
in the local communities and open to the public. These sessions have 
permitted the Safety Committee - an independent panel of technically 
qualified experts - to review and assess the safety of operations at 
Diablo canyon, and have permitted the affected public to sit in on and 
observe the process. 
All of these technical presentations have been summarized by the 
Safety Committee in its reports (see Exhibit "J" for example summary), 
and also may be read in detail in the meeting transcripts. My personal 
observation has been that anyone who has attended one of these technical 
presentations, or has read the transcript of such a session, could not 
help but be impressed by the interest and knowledge exhibited, the 
questions raised and the safety-related discussions generated by the 
Safety Committee Members and consultants. It is my opinion that these 
fact-finding sessions are the real substance of the Safety Committee. 
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4. Safety committee consultants. As authorized by the settlement 
agreement, the Safety Committee has retained consultants and experts to 
assist and advise it. A review of the meeting agendas and minutes 
(Exhibits "B"-"E" and "H" and "I") will show that the Committee has 
contracted for the services of a geotechnical engineer to advise on 
seismic issues, a board certified psychiatrist to review fitness-for-
duty and employee assistance programs, a metallurgical engineer, a 
professor of radiology and a consulting engineer to advise on 
probabilistic risk assessment ("PRA"). These experts have given oral 
presentations at the public meetings of the Safety Committee (see 
Exhibits "H" and "I") and their written reports have been appended to 
the Committee's report on its activities (see Exhibit "L," pp. iii-iv). 
s. Plant Inspections and Other Visits. Each of the Committee 
Members has had one or more inspections of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear 
Power Plant. A review of Exhibit "K" at pages 8-9 will give you some 
idea of the extent of the initial inspections by Members owen and 
Woodson. Chairman Owen also visited the plant site during the refueling 
outage this last October. Pages 6 and 7 of that exhibit further detail 
three plant visits and two trips to PG&E headquarters by Professor 
Kastenberg during fiscal year 1990-91. He also conducted an open house 
in San Luis Obispo to meet with the public and attended meetings with 
the Mothers for Peace and the local Citizens for Adequate Energy. As 
noted at page 7 of Exhibit "K," a number of issues have been raised at 
these meetings which have led to further investigation and follow-up by 
the Committee and its consultants (e.g., the spent fuel pool, site 
emergency plan, Long Term Seismic program, low-level radiation, 
psychological testing, etc.). 
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6. Safety committee Reports. As I previously mentioned, the 
settlement agreement provides that "The committee shall prepare an 
annual report, and such interim report as it deems appropriate, which 
reports shall include any recommendations of the committee." At its 
third meeting, in June 1991, the Safety Committee adopted an initial 
interim report, concerning the first six months of its operations, from 
January through June 1990. A copy of that first report, 56 pages in 
length, has been provided to this Senate Committee. The interim report, 
which identified several areas of particular review and made 
recommendations regarding specific improvements, concluded that the 
Safety Committee "is satisfied that Diablo Canyon Power Plant is being 
operated safely." 
The Committee's second report, an annual report covering fiscal 
year 1990-91, was approved at its meeting in October and forwarded to 
PG&E for its response. When the written response of PG&E is received 
(in mid-December), pursuant to the settlement agreement it will become 
part of the Committee's report which will then be filed with the 
Governor, the Attorney General, the PUC and the Energy Commission.· We 
will also provide a copy to your Committee at that time. 
A preview of this second annual report, which will be over 200 
pages in length, can be obtained by a look at the report's index, set 
forth in Exhibit "L." As you can see, the report contains reviews, 
assessments, conclusions and recommendations on numerous Diablo Canyon 
issues. A further listing of Safety Committee recommendations to PG&E 
can be seen in Exhibit "M," which is a draft of a chart prepared by a 
consultant to track the various recommendations which have been made to 
date. 
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c. Future Committee Activities 
In response to the request that we give a summary of Committee 
activities planned for the future, I can best direct you to the list 
of agenda items tentatively scheduled for the Safety Committee's next 
meeting in February 1992 (Exhibit "N"). The Long Term Seismic Program 
will be discussed, as well as internal oversight practices, pipe 
cracking and PRA. In addition, as noted above, in determining its 
future activities the Safety Committee will remain open to the 
suggestions and concerns of the public regarding Diablo Canyon issues. 
And finally, as noted in its two published reports, the Safety 
Committee will continue to monitor and investigate any significant 
items or trends adverse to the safe operation of the plant. 
Conclusion. This concludes my status report on the Diablo Canyon 
Independent Safety Committee. Thank you again for inviting us to 
appear today. I would be happy to answer any questions which you 
might have. 
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BACKGROUND RESUMES 
OF 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
William E. Kastenberq. In September 1989 Governor George Deukme-
J1an appointed UCLA nuclear engineering professor William E. Kasten-
berg to a one-year term on the DCISC. William Kastenberg received his 
BS and MS in Engineering from UCLA and his PhD in Nuclear Engineering 
from the University of California, Berkeley. Upon graduation, he 
joined the faculty at UCLA where he is currently Professor of Engi-
neering and Applied Science. Dr. Kastenberg has taught courses in 
nuclear reactor theory, design and safety; applied mathematics; ther-
modynamics and heat transfer; energy transfer; energy technology and 
environmental risk. His research interests include nuclear reactor 
safety and risk-benefit studies. Professor Kastenberg has studied the 
potential safety and environmental problems of other nuclear energy 
systems including laser and magnetically confined fusion, fusion-fis-
sion hybrids and electronuclear breeders. 
Professor Kastenberg spent a sabbatical year at the Nuclear Re-
search Center in Karlsruhe, West Germany (1972-1973) and a sabbatical 
year as a Senior Fellow with the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safe-
guards, USNRC (1979-1980). He has published papers on severe acci-
dent mitigation systems for LWRs, on value-impact assessment for decay 
heat removal systems in LWRs and on the allocation of safety goals for 
LMRs. More recently he has been applying risk analysis techniques of 
problems associated with toxic waste control with emphasis on metal 
emissions from incinerators and ground water contamination. The lat-
ter involves volatile organic compounds and pesticides. 
Professor Kastenberg has won distinguished teaching awards from 
the Engineering Graduate Students Association at UCLA and the Ameri-
can Society for Engineering Education. He was appointed Assistant 
Dean for Graduate studies in the School of Engineering and Applied 
Science (1981-1985) and Chairman of the Mechanical, Aerospace and Nu-
clear Engineering Department (1985-1988) at UCLA. Dr. Kastenberg has 
served as Chairman of the Nuclear Reactor Safety Division of the ANS, 
on two National Research Council Committees related to nuclear reactor 
safety, and was Chairman of the NRC Peer Review Committee for the 
first draft of NUREG-115 o, "The Reactor Risk Reference Document. " 
Professor Kastenberg was a member of the Advisory Committee on Nuclear 
Facility Safety to the DOE and a member of the Special Review Commit-
tee which reviewed the second draft of NUREG-1150. 
In July of 1990 Professor Kastenberg was reappointed by the Gov-
ernor to a new three-year term on the DCISC. Professor Kastenberg was 
the first DCISC Chairman, serving until June 30, 1991. 
Warren H. owen. In December of 1989, Warren H. Owen was ap-
pointed to a three-year term as the second member of the DCISC by the 
Chairman of the California Energy Commission. Mr. Owen was elected 
Chairman of the DCISC in June 1991 for one year. Mr. owen is Execu-
tive Vice-President of Duke Power Company in Charlotte, North Caro-
lina, where he is responsible for power group operations. In this 
capacity he directs all electric power production activities (plant 
design, construction and operation) as well as related technical and 
information services for the company. 
Mr. Owen graduated from Clemson University with a Bachelor of 
Science Degree in Mechanical Engineering. He joined Duke Power in 
1948 as an engineer in the steam Production Department. He was named 
Vice-President of the Design Engineering Department in 1971; and 
Senior Vice-President, Engineering and Construction in 1978. He was 
also elected to the Board of Directors and Executive Committee in 
1978. He was promoted to Executive Vice-President, Engineering and 
Construction, in 1982, and Executive Vice-President, Engineering, Con-
struction and Production, in 1984. He was named to his present posi-
tion in 1988. 
Under Mr. owen's leadership, Duke Power's fossil and nuclear gen-
erating plants have achieved one of the industry's highest levels of 
operating performance and efficiency. Duke Power has had the number 
one fossil generating system in the country for the past seventeen 
years and finishes high in total generating efficiency, both nuclear 
and fossil each year. Mr. owen's involvement in the design and con-
struction of power plants led to placing in operation 14,295 megawatts 
of productive capacity, half of which is comprised of seven nuclear 
units. Mr. Owen is now directing the company's efforts toward comple-
tion of four pumped-storage hydroelectric units with a combined capac-
ity of 1,000 megawatts. 
Mr. owen is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and 
a Fellow in the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. He is also 
a member of the American Nuclear Society, North Carolina Society of 
Engineers, Professional Engineers of North carolina and the National 
Society of Professional Engineers. 
In 1981, Mr. owen received the Clyde A. Lilly, Jr. Award from the 
Atomic Industrial Forum for managing recovery efforts following the 
accident at Three-Mile Island; in 1984, the Award for Outstanding 
Engineering Achievement presented by the North Carolina Society of 
Engineers; and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers' James 
N. Landis Medal in 1987 for outstanding contributions to the electric 
industry in the management of design, construction and operation of 
one of the nation's best and most efficient nuclear power generating 
systems. In December 1988, he received an Honorary Doctor of Law De-
gree from Clemson University. 
Herbert H. Woodson. In March 1991 the California Attorney Gen-
eral appointed Herbert H. Woodson to the DCISC for both the then un-
expired term through the end of the fiscal year and for a three-year 
term commencing July 1, 1991. Dr. Woodson holds the titles of Dean, 
College of Engineering, Ernest H. Cockrell Centennial Chair in Engi-
neering, Dean's Chair for Excellence in Engineering, and Director, 
Bureau of Engineering Research, The University of Texas at Austin. 
Dr. Woodson graduated from high school in Lubbock, Texas, served 
in the u.s. Navy during World War II, and then attended Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology where he received his Bachelor of Science and 
Master of Science degrees in 1952, and Doctor of Science degree in 
1956, all in Electrical Engineering. He served as a faculty member 
in Electrical Engineering at M.I.T. from 1956 to 1971, holding the 
position of Philip Sporn Professor of Energy Processing from 1967 to 
1971. He was the founder in 1968 and first Director of the Electric 
Power systems Engineering Laboratory at M.I.T. from 1968 to 1971. 
In 1971, he joined the faculty in Electrical Engineering at The 
University of Texas at Austin. From 1971 to 1081 he served as Chair-
man of the department, from 1974 to 1988 he was Director of the Center 
for Energy Studies, and from 1982 to 1988 he was Director ad interim 
of the Center for Fusion Engineering. From 1980 to 1982 he was Texas 
Atomic Energy Research Foundation Professor of Engineering, and since 
1982 he has occupied the Ernest H. Cockrell Centennial Chair in Engi-
neering. He served as Associate Dean for Development and Planning in 
1986-1987, served as Acting Dean of Engineering from September 1, 1987 
to July 5, 1988, and on that date he was appointed Dean of Engineer-
ing. 
Dr. Woodson is the co-author of two textbooks, the holder of six 
patents, and the author of numerous technical articles. He has been 
a consultant for a number of companies and has served on several ad-
visory panels for government and industry. He served as president of 
the IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978-1980, from 1983 to 1986, as 
Chairman of the Energy Engineering Board of the National Research 
council, and 1987-1989 as Chairman of the Advisory council of the 
Electric Power Research Institute. He is a member of the National 
Academy of Engineering, a Fellow of the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers, a Registered Professional Engineer in Texas and 
Massachusetts, and a member of a number of professional and honorary 
organizations. In 1978 he received the Power Engineering Educator 
Award from the Edison Electric Institute, in 1984 he received the 
Nikola Tesla Award and a Centennial Medal, both from IEEE, in 1988 he 
was named Engineer of the Year by the Texas Society of Professional 
Engineers, and in 1990 he was named Engineer of the Year by the Na-
tional Institute of Professional Engineers and Outstanding Power En-
gineering Educator by the IEEE Power Engineering Society. 
Dr. Woodson served during 1979 and 1980 as a consultant to the 
Texas Utilities Company as a member of the Comanche Peak Design Re-
view Team which participated in a detailed review of the engineering 
design of the Comanche Peak nuclear generating units following the 
accident at Three-Mile Island. The purpose of the review was to 
examine the possibilities of a similar accident at Comanche Peak to 
make recommendations for changes that would make such an accident much 
less likely and to mitigate the effects if such an accident should 
occur. Since 1980, he has served as a consultant to the Gulf States 
Utilities Company as a member of the Nuclear Safety Advisory Committee 
(NSAC) which has three to four regular meetings per year in which many 
different technical aspects of the River Bend nuclear generating unit 
are examined in detail and recommendations made to improve performance 
and safety. During the design and construction phase of the project, 
the NSAC met regularly with design engineers to review the details of 
a variety of plant systems to assure that designs were technically 
sound. When the River Bend unit began operating, the Committee was 
augmented with operational experience, and it continued to examine 
technical aspects of the plant operation. The Committee has examined 
root cause analyses of scrams and other reportable events, and it has 
examined maintenance problems, testing problems and engineering re-
designs for improved performance and safety. 
From 1984 to 1987, Dr. Woodson served as a consultant to the 
Houston Lighting and Power Company as a member of the South Texas 
Project Engineering Assurance Oversight Committee which participated 
in a detailed review of the engineering design of the South Texas 
Project nuclear generating units. 
List of Documents 
A. Diablo Canyon Monthly Operating Report (May 15, 1991: 
June 15, 1991; July 15, 1991) 
B. License Amendment Requests (LARs) 
1. LAR 91-01 and 91-02, Additional Information, 
May 3 , 1991 
2. LAR 91-04, May 23, 1991 
3. NRC Approval of LAR 90-05, May 23, 1991 
4 . LAR 91-05, June 5 , 1991 
5. LAR 91-06, June 5 , 1991 
6 • LAR 90-12, Additional Information, June 20, 1991 
7 . NRC Approval of LAR 90-10, June 26, 1991 
8 . NRC Approval of LAR 90-09, June 27, 1991 
c. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) 
1. LER 1-84-044-01, April 2 , 1991 
2. LER 2-90-009-01, April 3 1 1991 
3 . LER 1-91-004-00, April 8, 1991 
4. LER 1-91-005-00, April 19, 1991 
5. LER 2-88-027-00, April 24, 1991 
6. LER 1-91-006-00, April 25, 1991 
7. LER 1-91-002-01, May 17, 1991 
8. LER 1-91-007-00, May 21, 1991 
9 . LER 1-91-008-00, May 23, 1991 
10. LER l-91-009-00, June 17, 1991 
11. LER 1-91-010, June 17, 1991 
12. LER 2-90-002-02, June 18, 1991 
D. Inspection Reports/Notices of Violation (IRs/NOVs) 
l. PG&E Letter DCL-91-072, Reply to Notice of Deviation in 
IR 90-30, April 1, 1991 
2. IR 91-05, April 5, 1991 
3. IR 91-03, April 11, 1991 
4. IR 91-06, April 11, 1991 
5. IR 91-08, April 15, 1991 
6. IR 91-09 (Augmented Inspection), April 19, 1991; and 
PG&E Event Investigation Report 91-2 
7. PG&E Letter OCL-91-113, Reply to NOV in IR 91-03, 
May 3, 1991 
8. PG&E Letter DCL-91-127, Reply to NOV in IR 91-04, 
May 10, 1991 
9. IR 91-10, May 31, 1991 
10. IR 91-12, June 25, 1991 
11. IR 91-17, June 28, 1991 
1:" Information Notices (INs) ..... 
1. IN 91-25, April 1, 1991 
2. IN 91-26, April 2 , 1991 
3. IN 91-27, April 10, 1991 
4. IN 91-28, April 15, 1991 
5 • IN 91-29, April 15, 1991 
o. IN 91-31, May 9, 1991 
7. IN 91-32, May 15, 1991 
8. IN 91-33, May 31, 1991 
9. IN 91-34, June 3 , 1991 
10. IN 91-35, June 7, 1991 
11. IN 91-36, June 10, 1991 
12. IN 91-37, June 10, 1991 
13. IN 9l-38, June 13, 1991 
14. IN 91-40, June 19, 1991 
15. IN 91-41, June 27, 1991 
16. IN 91-42, June 271 1991 
F. Inspection And Enforca~ent Bulletins (IE Bulletins) and 
Generic Letters (GLs) 
1. GL 91-04, April 2, 1991 
2. GL 91-05, April 9, 1991 
3. NRC Letter on PG&E Response to GL 90-03, April 24, 1991 
4. GL 91-06, April 29, 1991 
5. GL 91-07, May 2, 1991 
6. GL 91-08, May 6, 1991 
G. Miscellaneous 
1. NRC Letter on Closeout of Steam Generator Tube Rupture 
Analysis Issue for DCPP, April 3, 1991 
2. NRC Letter on Performance Indicators for DCPP for 
Fourth Quarter 1990, April 12, 1991; and for First 
Quarter 1991, June 24, 1991 
3. Special Report 91-03, April 17, 1991 
4. PG&E Letters DCL-91-096 and OCL-91-164, Status of Court 
Order, April 24 and June 28, 1991 
s. PG&E Letter DCL-91-098, Annual Radiological 
Environmental Operating Report, April 25, 1991 
6. PG&E Letter DCL-91-106, Annual Non-Radiological 
Environmental Operating Report, April 29, 1991 
7. PG&E Letter DCL-91-112, IST Relief Request, May 3, 1991 
a. NRC Letter on Summary of Fitness-For-duty Experience, 
May 9, 1991 
9. PG&E Letter DCL-91-132, IST Program Relief Request -
Pump Bearing, May 17, 1991 
10. PG&E Letter DCL-91-138, Emergency Preparedness Field 
Exercise Scenario Manual (without enclosure -
confidential}, May 22, 1991 
G. Miscellaneous (Continued) 
11. NRC Letter on issuance of Supplemental DCPP Safety 
Evaluation Report (without enclosure - furnished 
separately), June 6, 1991 
12. PG&E Letter DCL-91-153, Containment Integrated Leak 
Rate Test, June 13, 1991 
13. NRC Letter on Fitness-For-Duty Inspection for DCPP, 
June 17, 1991 
14. Recent News Articles on Diablo Canyon 

NOTICE OF MEETING 
OF THE 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on May 22, 1990, at the Grange 
Hall, 2880 South Broad Street, San Luis Obispo, California, a 
public meeting will be held by the Diablo Canyon Independent 
Safety Committee. The Committee, with one member now appointed 
by the Governor and one by the Chairman of the California Energy 
Corrmission, was established by an agreement approved by the Cali-
fornia Public Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to review 
the safety of operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company's Di-
ablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its initial 
meeting in three separate sessions, at the times indicated, to 
consider the following matters: 
1. Morning Session - 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon: Selection 
of Chair and Vice-Chair; introductory comments; approve indemni-
fication agreement and contracts with accounting firm and legal 
counsel; adopt Committee policies and procedures for operation; 
Committee member reports on plant inspection tours and documents 
provided; and public comments. If time permits the afternoon 
technical presentations may be started in this morning session. 
2. Afternoon Session- 1:30 P.M. to 5:00P.M.: Consider 
various technical presentations requested by the Committee from 
PG&E on topics relating to plant operations. (These may commence 
in the morning session.) 
3. Evening Session- 7:30P.M. to 10:00 P.M.: Public com-
ments and communications to the committee. If time permits, the 
Committee will conclude its initial meeting with a wrap-up dis-
cussion by the members concerning actions the Committee may wish 
to take next, further information it may want to obtain or review, 
consultants or experts it may retain, and the scheduling of fu-
ture site visits, study sessions and meetings. If there is not 
adequate time for these matters, NOTICE IS HEREBY FURTHER GIVEN 
that the Committee may elect to continue these concluding discus-
sions and reschedule them for a fourth session to be held the 
following morning, on Wednesday, May 23, 1990, at the Grange 
Hall, at a time to be announced by the Committee prior to the ad-
journment of the public meeting on the evening of the 22nd and 
posted immediately thereafter. 
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and 
materials regarding these items will be available for public re-
view commencing Friday, May 18, 1990, at the Documents and Maps 
Department of the Cal Poly library in San Luis Obispo. For fur-
ther information prior to the public meeting, please contact 
Robert Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, 505 Abrego Street, 
Monterey, California; telephone: (408) 373-8733. Written state-
ments or communications to the Committee which are received at 
the foregoing address by no later than May 15, 1990, will be 
placed into the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting. 
Dated: May 9, 1990 
NOTE: This notice was mailed to you because your name was 
on a service list provided to the Committee by the P.U.C. relat-
ing to Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant rate proceedings. If 
you wish to receive future notices of Committee meetings, pursu-
ant to Government Code §11125, please so notify the Committee 
Legal counsel in writing at the above address. 
DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Committee Members: William Kastenberg 
Warren Owen 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
A G E N D A 
Tuesday, May 22, 1990 The Grange Hall 
San Luis Obispo, California 2880 South Broad Stree 
Morning Session - 9:30 A.M. to 12:00 Noon 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL 
II. NOMINATION & SELECTION OF CHAIR AND VICE-CHAIR 
III. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
A. History of Committee Formation - Legal Counsel 
B. Introduction, Background & Comments - Committee Members 
IV. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can approve 
with a single motion and vote. A member may 
request that any item be placed on the regular 
agenda for separate consideration.) 
A. Contract with Accounting Firm - Ratify 
B. Contract with Legal Counsel - Ratify 
c. Member Indemnification Agreement - Ratify 
D. Committee Policies and Procedures re: 
1) Committee Organization; 
2) Accounting Procedures; and 
3) Reimbursement for Travel and Other Expenses. 
V. ACTION ITEMS 
A. Committee Policies and Procedures re: 
1) Rules and Procedures for Conduct of meetings; 
and 
2) Communications to the Committee. 
VI. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS 
A. Member Plant Inspection Tours 
B. Documents Provided to the Committee 
VII. STA~F-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
VIII. CORRESPONDENCE 
IX. PUBLIC COMMENTS (Oral communications on Committee matters, 
limited to 5 minutes per speaker. No ac-
tion will be taken on matters raised, but 
they may be referred to further study, re-
sponse or action.) 
X. ADJOURN MORNING SESSION (If time permits the afternoon tech-
nical presentations may be started 
in the morning session.) 
Afternoon Session - 1:30 to 5:00 P.M. 
XI. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION - ROLL CALL 
XII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (May commence in the 
morning.) 
A. Technical Presentations requested by the Committee 
of PG&E Representatives: 
1) Introductory Remarks. 
2) Overview of DCPP/NPGBU Organization and Operations. 
3) Planned-Operational Improvements and 1-iodifications. 
4) Training Programs. 
5) Maintenance Programs. 
6) NRC Issues and Assessments. 
XIII. ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION 
Evening Session - 7:30 to 10:00 P.M. 
XIV. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION - ROLL CALL 
XV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on 
Committee matters, lim-
ited to 5 minutes per 
speaker. No action will 
be taken on matters 
raised, but they may be 
referred for further 
study, response or action.) 
XVI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
A. Future Actions by the Committee. 
B. Further Information to Obtain/Review. 
c. Retaining of Experts or Consultants. 
D. Scheduling of 
and Meetings. 
XVII. ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING 
Future Site Visits, Study Sessions 
(NOTE: If the Committee so elects, 
---- it may continue these con-
cluding discussions to a 
Fourth Session to be held 
on the morning of May 23, 
1990, at the Grange Hall, 
at a time to be announced 
prior to adjournment of the 
Evening Session.) 
NOTICE OF MEETING 
OF THE 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on November 8 and 9, 1990, at the 
San Luis Obispo City-County Library Community Room, 995 Palm 
Street, San Luis Obispo, California, a public meeting will be held 
by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee. The Committee 
was established by an agreement approved by the California Public 
Utilities commission Decision 88-12-083 to review the safety of 
operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company • s Diablo Canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its second meeting in three 
separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the 
following matters: 
1. Afternoon Session (11/8) - 3:00 P.M.: Introductory 
comments; approve minutes of May 22, 1990, meeting; ratify 
consulting agreements; approve revised rules and procedure for 
conduct of meetings; Committee members and staff-consultant 
reports; P. G. & E. plant status report; and a study session to 
permit the committee members to work on a draft of a Committee 
report. 
2. Evening Session (11/8) -7:30P.M.: Public comments and 
communications to the Committee. 
3. Mornina Session (11/9) - 9:00 A.M.: Consider various 
technical presentations requested by the committee from P. G. & E. 
on topics relating to plant operations (including outage 
management, training programs, fuel handling operations, and 
fitness for duty); public comments; and scheduling of future site 
visits and meetings. 
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and 
materials regarding these items will be available for public review 
commencing Monday, November 5, 1990, at the NRC Public Document 
Room of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo. For further 
information prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert 
Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, 
Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688. Written 
statements or communications to the Committee which are received 
at the foregoing address by no later than November 1, 1990, will 
be placed into the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting. 
Dated: October 26, 1990 

DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Committee Members: William Kastenberg 
Warren Owen 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
A G E N D A 
Thursday, November 8th and 
Friday, November 9th, 1990 
San Luis Obispo, California 
City-county Library 
Community Room 
995 Palm 
Afternoon session (11/8) - 3:00 P.M. 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL 
II. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can 
approve with a single motion and vote. A member may 
request that any item be placed on the regular agenda 
for separate consideration.) 
A. Minutes of May 22, 1990 Meeting -Approve 
B. Consulting Agreement with Engineer F. Wardell - Ratify 
c. Consulting Agreement with H. Cass, M.D. - Ratify 
D. Revision to Committee Policy No. 5, 
Communications to the Committee -Approve 
III. ACTION ITEMS 
A. Revisions to Committee Policy No. 4, 
Rules and Procedures for Conduct of Meetings -Approve 
IV. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Site Visits and Other Related Activities 
B. Issues Raised at Last Meeting 
c. Documents Provided to the Committee 
V. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
VI. CORRESPONDENCE 
VII. PLANT STATUS REPORT (from P. G. & E.) 
VIII. STUDY SESSION (At which time the Committee Members and 
their consultants will discuss and work upon a draft of 
a Committee report.) 
(Continued . . • ) 
IX. ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION 
Evening session (11/8) - 7:30 P.M. 
X. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION 
XI. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (by Committee Members) 
XII. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications 
on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. 
No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may 
be referred for further study, response or action.) 
XIII. ADJOURN EVENING SESSION 
Morning session (11/9) - 9:00 A.M. 
XIV. RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION 
XV. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
A. Technical Presentations requested by the 
Committee of P. G. & E. Representatives: 
1) outage Management; 2R3 outage Experience 
2) Training Programs (Emphasis on Operator Training) 
3) Fitness-for-Duty 
4) Fuel Handling Operations 
XVI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
A. Future Actions by the Committee 
B. Further Information to Obtain/Review 
c. Scheduling of Future Site Visits, 
Study Sessions and Meetings. 
XVII. ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING. 
NOTICE OF MEETING 
OF THE 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on June 6, 1991, at the South 
Coast Regional Center, 800 W. Branch, Arroyo Grande, California, a 
public meeting will be held by the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety 
committee. The Committee was established by an agreement approved 
by the California Public Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to 
review the safety of operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company's 
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its third 
meeting in three separate sessions, at the times indicated, to 
consider the following matters: 
1. Morning Session 9:00 A.M.: Opening comments; 
introduction of new Committee member; approve minutes of November 
8-9, 1990, meeting; ratify indemnification agreement and consulting 
agreements; consider and adopt Committee Interim Report on Safety 
of Operations; Committee member and staff-consultant reports; and 
public comments. If time permits, the afternoon technical 
presentations may be started in this morning session. 
2. Afternoon Session- 1:30 P.M.: Consider various technical 
presentations requested by the Committee from PG&E on topics 
relating to plant operations, including NPG organizational 
improvements, plant status and refueling schedule, reliability 
centered maintenance, employee assistance program/psychological 
screening/behavioral observation program, sixth diesel generator 
installation, personnel errors and radiation releases. 
3. Evening Session 7:30 P.M.: Public comments and 
communications to the Committee; wrap-up discussion by Committee 
members and scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and 
meetings. 
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and 
materials regarding these items will be available for public review 
commencing Monday, June 3, 1991, at the NRC Public Document Room of 
the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo. For further information 
prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert Wellington, 
Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, Monterey, 
California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688. Written statements 
or communications to the Committee which are received at the 
foregoing address by no later than May 28, 1991, will be placed in 
the Committee's agenda packets prior to its meeting. 
Dated: May 7, 1991 

DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Committee Members: William Kastenberg 
Warren owen 
Herbert Woodson 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
AGENDA 
Thursday, June 6, 1991 
Arroyo Grande, California 
South Coast Regional Center 
800 w. Branch 
Morning session - 8:30 A.M. 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL - INTRODUCTIONS 
II. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can 
approve with a single motion and vote. A 
member may request that any item be placed 
on the regular agenda for separate 
consideration.) 
A. Minutes of November 8-9 Meeting 
B. Consulting Agreement with Geotechnical 
Engineer Alfred Hendron 
c. Consulting Agreement with Dr. Jacob 
Fabrikant (Prof. of Radiology) 
D. Consulting Agreement with Metallurgical 
Engineer Michael Boldrick, PH.D. 
III. ACTION ITEMS 
A. DCISC Interim Report on Safety of Diablo 
-Approve 
-Ratify 
-Ratify 
-Ratify 
Canyon Operations; January 1-June 30, 1990 -Approve 
IV. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION 
A. Site Visits and Other Committee Activities 
B. Documents Provided to the Committee 
V. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
A. or. Hyla cass 
B. Engineer Robert Lancet 
(Continued • . • ) 
VI. CORRESPONDENCE 
VII. PUBLIC COMMENTS 
VIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
A. Technical Presentations requested by the 
Committee of P. G. & E. Representatives: 
1) summary of Plant Performance 
2) NPG Organization Improvements 
3) Significant Events/Error Reduction Program 
4) steam Dump Valve Performance 
IX. ADJOURN MORNING SESSION 
Afternoon session - 1:30 P.M. 
X. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION 
XI. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.) 
5) Reliability Centered Maintenance 
6) Employee Performance Assessment 
7) Sixth Diesel Generator Installation 
8) Radiological Effluent Program 
XII. ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION 
Jveninq session - 7:30 P.M. 
XIII. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION 
XIV. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (by Committee Members) 
XV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications 
on Committee matters, limited to 5 minutes per speaker. 
No action will be taken on matters raised, but they may 
be referred for further study, response or action.) 
XVI. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
A. Future Actions by the Committee 
B. Further Information to Obtain/Review 
c. Scheduling of Future Site Visits, 
Study Sessions and Meetings. 
XVII. ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING. 
NOTICE OF MEETING 
OF THE 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on October 10, 1991, at the San 
Luis Obispo City-County Library Community Room, 995 Palm Street, 
San Luis Obispo, California, a public meeting will be held by the 
Diablo Canyon Independent Safety Committee. The Committee was 
established by an agreement approved by the California Public 
Utilities Commission Decision 88-12-083 to review the safety of 
operations at Pacific Gas & Electric Company • s Diablo canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant, and will conduct its fourth meeting in three 
separate sessions, at the times indicated, to consider the 
following matters: 
1. Morning session-9:00A.M.: Opening comments; approve 
minutes of June 6, 1991, meeting; ratify consulting agreement; 
consider and adopt Committee 1990-91 Annual Report on Safety of 
Operations; discuss consultant guidelines and other administrative 
matters; Committee member and staff-consultant reports; public 
comments; and consider various technical presentations requested 
by the Committee from PG&E on topics relating to plant operations, 
including summary of plant performance and the plant refueling 
outage status and schedule. 
2. Afternoon session- 1:30 P.M.: Consider further technical 
presentations from PG&E on topics relating to plant operations, 
including summary of recent NRC Systematic Assessment of Licensee 
Performance (SALP) Report, pipe erosion/corrosion control program, 
and pipe cracking experience and resolution. 
3. Evening session 7:30 P.M.: Public comments and 
communications to the committee; wrap-up discussion by Committee 
members and scheduling of future site visits, study sessions and 
meetings. 
The specific meeting agenda and the staff reports and 
materials regarding these items will be available for public review 
commencing Monday, october 7, 1991, at the NRC Public Document Room 
of the Cal Poly Library in San Luis Obispo. For further 
information prior to the public meeting, please contact Robert 
Wellington, Committee Legal Counsel, 857 Cass Street, Suite D, 
Monterey, California, 93940; telephone: 1-800-439-4688. 
Dated: September 23, 1991 

DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Committee Members: William Kastenberg 
Warren Owen 
Herbert Woodson 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
AGENDA 
Thursday, October 10, 1991 
San Luis Obispo, California 
City-county Library 
Community Room 
995 Palm 
Morning Session - 9:00 A.M. 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL 
II. CONSENT AGENDA (Routine items which the Committee can ap-
prove with a sinqle motion and vote. A 
member may request that any item be placed 
on the reqular aqenda for separate consid-
ation.) 
A. Minutes of June 6, 1991 Meeting 
B. Consulting Agreement with 
Leonard J. Azzarello (re: 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment) 
III. ACTION ITEMS 
A. DCISC Annual Report on Safety of 
Diablo canyon Operations; July 1, 
1990 - June 30, 1991 
IV. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS AND DISCUSSION 
Approve 
Ratify 
Approve 
A. Site Visits and Other Committee Activities 
B. Documents Provided to the Committee 
V. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
A. Dr. J. Fabrikant (Radiology) 
B. Robert R. Lancet 
c. Ferman Wardell 
D. Robert R. Wellington 
VI. CORRESPONDENCE 
VII. PUBLIC COMMENTS 
VIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
A. Technical Presentations requested by the 
committee of P.G.& E. Representatives: 
l) Summary of Plant Performance 
2) Refueling outage Status and Schedule 
(Continued ••• ) 
IX. ADJOURN MORNING SESSION 
Afternoon session - 1:30 P.M. 
X. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION 
XI. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.) 
XII. 
XIII. 
3) NRC Systematic Assessment of 
Licensee Performance (SALP) Report 
4) Pipe Erosion/Corrosion Control Program 
5) Pipe Cracking Experience and Resolution 
CLOSED SESSION (Pursuant to Govt. Code §11126) 
ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION 
Evening Session - 7:30 P.M. 
XIV. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION 
XV. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS (By Committee Members) 
XVI. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS (Oral communications on 
Committee matters, limited to 5 minutaa per speaker. No ac-
XVII. 
XVIII. 
tion will ba taken on matters raised, but they may be refer-
red for further study, response or action). 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
A. Future Actions by the Committee 
B. Further Information to Obtain/Review 
c. Scheduling of Future Site Visits, 
Study Sessions and Meetings 
ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING 
When: Thursday, June 6, 1991 
8:30 a.m. 
Committee business sessiorr. 
and technicat presentations 
by PG&e otflcia~s orr 
p'ant operations. 
1:30 p.m. 
Funher technical 
presentations by PG&E. 
7~30 p.m. 
PubUc comments and 
communications ta 
the committee memtlers.. 
Where: Scuth County Regional Canter. 
800 W. Branctr Stleet 
Arroyo Grande 
POBLIC MEE'tlNG 
of the 
DIULO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFE1 
COMMI'n'EE 
WheD: Tlaarsdcry, /rme 6, l99l 
8:30 cr..m. 
C4nunittee basiaess sessi.o1. 
cmd technical preseJZtatioa: 
by PCHrE oilidals 011 plcmt 
operaao.as. 
1:30 p.m. 
1'vtJJer tec&niccz.l pnseala· 
fioas by PO&£. 
1:30 p.m. 
Pvbli.e c:o••eats cmcl c:om-
JIIIUiic:rio.as to f.&e Coannitt 
members. 
Where: Soat& Cocm Begjo11czl Ce.ate 
BDO W'. B.rcmc:b 
pt._. p1aa to atteDcl! !'or fm:ot1laJt ildoniiCI'I 
Call l..aao-438-4888. A Cop! of tke ..., 
.cllpDda packet may be 1"ftiwwecl Cit tke Cal 1= 
~ PUlic Docam.ezat Boom. 

M I N U T E S 
of the 
SECOND MEETING 
of the 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Thursday, November 8, 1990 
San Luis Obispo, California 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL 
The second meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety 
Committee was called to order by Chairman William Kastenberg at 
3:00 P.M. on November 8, 1990, at the Community Room of the City-
County Library in San Luis Obispo, California. Roll call was 
taken. 
Present: Committee Member Warren Owen 
Committee Member William Kastenberg 
Absent: None. [One Committee Member has 
not yet been appointed.] 
Audience: Approximately 30 to 35. 
II. CONSENT AGENDA 
Legal Counsel outlined and discussed briefly each of the 
four items on the Consent Agenda, indicating that they were routine 
matters which the Committee could approve with a single motion (or 
remove to the regular agenda for separate consideration). The 
matters were: a) approving the minutes of the May 22, 1990 first 
meeting of the Committee; b) ratifying the consulting agreement 
for Engineer Ferman Wardell; c) ratifying the consulting agreement 
with Hyla Cass, M.D.; and d) adopting a revision to Committee 
Policy No. 5, relating to Communications to the Committee. 
Members of the audience, Rochelle Becker and Laurie 
McDermott made some comments on and asked several questions about 
the consent agenda items. 
On motion by Mr. Owen, seconded by Dr. Kastenberg, the 
Committee unanimously approved the Consent Agenda, Items A through 
D. 
III. ACTION ITEMS 
Revisions to Committee Policy No. 4. Mr. Wellington next 
presented a revised version of Committee Policy No. 4, "Rules and 
Procedures for conduct of Meetings," briefly discussing each of the 
changes as suggested by Committee members or the public at the last 
meeting and in subsequent correspondence. The changes made related 
to rules of decorum, the availability of reports and 
correspondence, closed sessions and the location of meetings. 
Mr. owen and Mr. Kastenberg asked several questions about 
the revised policy. From the audience, Rochell.e Becker inquired 
about the deleted reference to the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting Act 
and the availability of DCISC records. Mr. Wellington responded 
that there is no determination that the DCISC is governed by the 
Bagley-Keene Act. Laurie McDermott stated that when policy changes 
are made it would be easier to review them if the changes were more 
clearly indicated. Motion was then made and seconded 
(OwenfKastenberg) and unanimously approved to adopt the revisions 
to Committee Policy No. 4. 
IV. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS 
A. Site Visits and Related Activities. 
Mr. Kastenberg reported on his July visit to PG&E's 
headquarters in San Francisco and his review with Robert Lancet of 
the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for Diablo Canyon. He 
discussed the purpose of the PRA and noted that it was state-of-
the-art. Mr. Kastenberg also reviewed the Diablo Canyon quality 
assurance program on that visit. He then reported on the open 
house he held at the San Luis Obispo library on August lOth, to 
discuss matters of concern to the public. He also indicated that 
he spent two days at the plant with Dr. Cass reviewing the matters 
of training and substance abuse. Mr. Kastenberg reported that he 
had written to CPUC President Wilk to request the appointment of a 
third Committee member, and that the process for selection was 
underway. 
Mr. Kastenberg next noted that he and Mr. Lancet had 
spent a day earlier in the week discussing spent fuel handling and 
storage with PG&E staff. On September 9th he and Dr. Cass met with 
a group from the Mothers for Peace and spent the following two days 
at the plant. Mr. Kastenberg indicated that he worked for five 
hours on the plant simulator and spent one day observing an 
operator requalification training class. He then reported at 
length on his observance on October 3rd of the community's 
extensive emergency planning drill. 
B. Issues Raised at the Last Meeting. Mr. Kastenberg 
next discussed the several issues which were raised at the 
Committee's last meeting which warranted further action or 
discussion. Relative to the fitness-for-duty issue, the Committee 
has acted to retain Dr. Cass to advise it on that matter. On 
emergency planning, the Committee will continue to observe the on-
going efforts of others specifically charged with that work. On 
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the seismic issues raised, the Committee will wait until the USGS 
releases its report, and will then consider retaining an expert.to 
assist it and schedule the matter for agenda discussion. On the 
question raised concerning a Committee presence in San Luis Obispo 
County, Mr. Wellington reported that arrangements had been made to 
file copies of all Committee documents at the NRC Public Document 
Room at the Cal Poly library, and that the Committee had obtained 
an 800 number so that toll-free calls could be made to the DCISC 
from anywhere in California. Mr. Wellington also indicated that 
contact had been made with the Citizens Advisory Committee on 
Emergency Services, and the two committees will exchange 
information and documents. 
Comments were received from two members of the 
audience that they had not been able to locate any Committee 
documents at the Public Document Room. Jim Woessner, PG&E Director 
of Nuclear Safety Assessment, indicated that he had also made 
arrangements with the library and that PG&E had been sending to the 
Public Document Room copies of all documents provided to the 
Committee for the last four months. Mr. Wellington and Mr. 
Woessner stated that they would look into the matter to get it 
straightened out. 
V. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
Robert Lancet outlined his activities in visiting PG&E 
facilities, obtaining further documents and fact-finding on the 
spent fuel pool issue. Dr. Hyla Cass then discussed her two days 
at the plant interviewing personnel on the issues of fitness-for-
duty and the employment assistance program. She observed certain 
psychological aspects of the accident management and drug screening 
programs, and would be preparing a report for the Committee. 
Consultant Ferman Wardell was then introduced by DCISC member Owen. 
VI. PLANT STATUS REPORT 
PG&E President George Maneatis made some opening 
comments on the report to update the Committee on Diablo Canyon 
operations, noting that the NRC had given PG&E a high rating in its 
SALP report. Jim Shiffer then continued with a broad overview of 
the plant operations during 1990. (The text of all PG&E technical 
presentations, as well as that of the balance of the DCISC meeting, 
is contained on a transcript of the proceedings.) Considerable 
information was presented and numerous questions were asked by the 
Committee members and consultants. 
VII. STUDY SESSION 
The Committee next conducted a study session to 
consider and discuss the preparation of its first report, to cover 
the period from January 1 through June 30, 1990. The Committee 
members and consultants each mentioned the section of the report 
they were working on and the status of preparation. When the 
various sections are put together it will be submitted as a draft 
for final review and adoption at the next DCISC meeting. 
VIII. ADJOURN AFTERNOON SESSION 
The afternoon session of the Committee meeting was 
adjourned at 5:45 P.M. 
IX. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION 
Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the DCISC meeting for 
its evening session at 7:40 P.M. Approximately 45 people were in 
attendance. 
X. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Audience member Roger Freeburg spoke to the Committee, 
indicating his concern for public safety and his support of drug 
testing programs. Jacqueline Wheeler stated she had problems with 
obtaining documents at Cal Poly, expressed some problems with the 
DCISC's 800 number as presently set up, asked about a Committee 
office in San Luis Obispo and had some questions of Dr. Cass' 
resume. committee discussion on these matters followed. Rochelle 
Becker indicated some problems with reviewing the meeting 
transcript, inquired about emergency planning and urged the 
Committee to contact the USGS on the long-term seismic issue. 
Laurie McDermott questioned the access to documents at 
the Public Document Room, requested that the 800 number be widely 
advertised and asked the Committee to become involved with the 
Hosgri Fault studies. Al Bohnan stated he had recently toured the 
plant and was impressed with the professionalism of the staff. 
Next speaking was Cordner Gibson, Dean of Agriculture, emeritus at 
Cal Poly. As Chairman of the local Citizens for Adequate Energy, 
he discussed a study about nuclear radiation. Walter Schroeder, a 
member of the same group, stated that PG&E was a good neighbor. 
The final speaker was Nancy Culver who noted that Committee 
membership required the qualification of having spent a great deal 
of time working in or for the nuclear power industry, and she 
doubted if that made anyone independent. She also outlined an 
incident when she had called the DCISC 800 number to find out about 
a containment water leal~, only to be told that the Committee would 
not be in a position to provide information about daily problems at 
the plant. 
XI. ADJOURN EVENING SESSION 
The DCISC evening session was adjourned at 8:50 P.M. 
XII. RECONVENE FOR MORNING SESSION 
-4-
The morning session of the DCISC meeting was 
reconvened on November 9 1 1990 1 at 9:00 A.M. 1 with approximately 30 
people in attendance. 
XIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
A. Technical Presentations requested by the Committee 
of PG&E representations: Before the technical presentations began, 
Jim Shiffer reported that PG&E has an active open-door policy for 
employee concerns and advertises the 800 numbers of its own staff, 
of the NRC and of the Committee. 
Mr. Shiffer then introduced Bill McClain, who 
presented an overview of the Diablo Canyon outage management 
program, concentrating primarily on re-fueling outages. Questions 
by the Committee members and consultants followed. 
The next technical presentation was by Jim Welch, 
and related to operator training issues. Following considerable 
discussion and questions, the next topic was PG&E's fitness-for-
duty program, presented by John Townsend. The final technical 
presentation concerned the subject of fuel handling operations and 
was presented by Dr. Pete Seraffian and John Gisglon. 
XIV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
Chairman Kastenberg discussed the planned schedule for 
DCISC meetings over the next year. He noted that the Committee 
would be working on its first report over the next few months, and 
would be requesting further technical briefings from PG&E on plant 
operations. Mr. Kastenberg indicated he would be discussing with 
the NRC its telephone complaint lines and stated that the Committee 
did not want to reproduce what the NRC is already charged with 
doing. Mr. owen stated he would be working on the Committee report 
and giving some preliminary consideration about review of the USGS 
report when it is available. 
Mr. Wellington indicated that concerns with the 800 
number and the Public Document Room would be dealt with. He 
reiterated that the DCISC 800 number would not be able to provide 
daily updates on plant operations, and that there were already 
toll-free numbers for that information from the NRC and PG&E. He 
also noted that there are certain federal requirements about what 
information must be reported to the NRC, and indicated that the 
Committee could not supplant the NRC in those matters. Mr. Lancet 
indicated that PG&E had agreed to provide further information on 
the procedures for the control of overtime by workers. 
XV. ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING 
There being no further business, the second meeting of 
the DCISC was adjourned at 11:45 P.M. 
,.. 

M I N U T E S 
of the 
THIRD MEETING 
of the 
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Thursday, June 6, 1991 
Arroyo Grande, California 
I. CALL TO ORDER - ROLL CALL - INTRODUCTIONS 
The third meeting of the Diablo Canyon Independent Safety 
Committee was called to order by Chairman William Kastenberg at 
8:30 A.M. on June 6,1991, at the South Coast Regional Center in 
Arroyo Grande, California. Roll call was taken. 
Present: Committee Member Warren Owen 
Committee Member William Kastenberg 
Committee Member Herbert Woodson 
Absent: None. 
Audience: Approximately 30 to 35. 
Mr. Kastenberg next introduced and welcomed Dr. Herbert H. 
Woodson, the newest and third member of the DCISC, recently 
appointed by the California Attorney General. He is the Dean of 
the College of Engineering at the University of Texas at Austin. 
Dr. Woodson responded and gave a brief outline of his educational 
and professional background. 
II. CONSENT AGENDA 
Legal Counsel outlined and discussed briefly each of the 
four items on the consent Agenda, indicating that they were routine 
matters which the Committee could approve with a single motion (or 
remove to the regular agenda for separate consideration). The 
matters were: a) approving the minutes of the November 8-9, 1990, 
second meeting of the Committee; b) ratifying the consulting 
agreement for Geotechnical Engineer Alfred Hendron; c) ratifying 
the consulting agreement with Dr. Jacob Fabrikant (Professor of 
Radiology; and d) ratifying the consulting agreement with 
Metallurgical Engineer Michael Boldrick, Ph.D. 
Following a brief discussion, on motion by Mr. owen, 
seconded by Dr. Woodson, the Committee unanimously approved the 
Consent Agenda, Items A through D. 
III. ACTION ITEMS 
Interim Report on Safety. The draft of the Committee's 
"Interim Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon Operations; January 1-
June 30, 1990 11 was discussed. Mr. Wellington noted that an annual 
report is one of the charges of the Committee, but since the first 
two DCISC Members were not appointed until late 1989 and could not 
hold their initial meeting until May 1990, it was decided that the 
first report would cover this interim period of January through 
June. Upon adoption, the settlement agreement provides that the 
report shall be submitted to PG&E, which then has forty-five days 
to respond in writing to the report, which will then be filed with 
the Governor, the Attorney General, the CPUC and the Energy Commis-
sion. It was noted that a copy of the report had been previously 
sent to the Public Document Room at the Cal Poly Library, where it 
was available for public review. 
There being no comments from the audience, motion was made 
and seconded (Owen/Kastenberg) and unanimously adopted to approve 
the draft report and forward same to PG&E for response. 
IV. COMMITTEE MEMBER REPORTS 
A. Site Visits and Related Committee Activities. 
Dr. Kastenberg reported that since the last meeting in 
November, he had on several occasions, with DCISC consultants, met 
with PG&E representatives to discuss the reliability centered 
maintenance program, the spent fuel pool, the sixth diesel proposal 
and with Dr. cass, the employee assistance program. He indicated 
that each of these topics would be discussed later in the meeting 
by the DCISC consultant involved or a PG&E staff person. Chairman 
Kastenberg also noted that he, Bob Lancet and Dr. Hyla Cass had 
visited the Duke Power Nuclear Power Plant in April. 
Mr. Owen then commented that although he was not 
available for the previously scheduled meeting in February, he had 
been following up on all consultant reports and information 
available on plant operations. 
Dr. Woodson next discussed his full-day tour of Diablo 
canyon on May 14, 1991, including the training facilities for 
maintenance and operations personnel. 
B. Documents Provided to the Committee. 
Mr. Wellington discussed the foot-high stack of 
documents received by the Committee during the last quarter, most 
of which were technical reports from PG&E, which were supplied 
pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. He also 
mentioned the correspondence received, including 1) a citizen 
complaint and the NRC follow-up and 2) a letter and attached 
report on plant radiation issues. Dr. Kastenberg noted that one of 
the documents received from PG&E was in response to an inquiry from 
the public at the November meeting and related to a proprietary 
computer program which for that reason had not been disclosed to 
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the public. 
V. STAFF-CONSULTANT REPORTS 
Dr. Hyla Cass gave reports on a February site visit to 
Diablo Canyon and the tour of the Duke Power facilities in April, 
with particular emphasis on employee assistance, fitness-for-duty 
and management development programs. Robert Lancet next discussed 
several fact-finding meetings conducted at PG&E facilities, looking 
into such issues as reliability centered maintenance, spent fuel 
pool safety issues, control of overtime and safety review 
procedures. Dr. Kastenberg and consultant Ferman Wardell 
participated in several of these meetings, and written reports are 
being prepared on each of these topics and will be submitted for 
inclusion in the 1990-91 annual report. 
VI. CORRESPONDENCE 
Mr. Wellington again mentioned the correspondence received 
by the DCISC, copies of which were in the agenda packet. Dr. 
Kastenberg noted that it would be best if correspondence was sent 
to him care of the Legal Counsel's address, as letters sent to him 
at UCLA could easily get mixed up with the great amounts of faculty 
mail. 
VII. PUBLIC COMMENTS 
There were no public comments from the public at this 
time. 
VIII. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE 
A. Technical Presentation requested by the Committee of 
PG&E representatives: PG&E President George Maneatis made some 
introductory remarks and noted that 1990 was a very successful year 
for Diablo Canyon. Jim Shiffer then continued with a broad 
overview of plant operations during 1990 and discussed six plant 
performance indicators. (Note: The text of all PG&E technical 
presentations, as well as that of the balance of the DCISC meeting, 
is contained in a transcript of the proceedings.) 
Warren Fujimoto, the newly appointed Vice President 
for Nuclear Technical Services, discussed the NPG organization 
improvements. Plant Manager John Townsend next reported on two 
recent significant events at the facility, a loss of off-site power 
on March 7, 1991, and a reactor trip on May 17, 1991. He also dis-
cussed PG&E's error reduction program. Mr. Fujimoto then reported 
on four failures of the steam dump valve system and actions taken 
to resolve the problems. Considerable information was presented by 
the several speakers and numerous questions were added by the DCISC 
members and consultants. 
IX. ADJOURN MORNING SESSION 
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The morning session of the Committee was adjourned at 
11:45 A.M. 
X. RECONVENE FOR AFTERNOON SESSION 
Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the DCISC meeting for 
its afternoon session at 1:30 P.M. Approximately 30 people were in 
attendance. 
XI. INFORMATION ITEMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE (Contd.) 
A. Technical Presentations (Contd.) 
Bryant Giffin. the Manager for Maintenance Services, 
gave the first technical presentation of the afternoon session, 
describing the history and details of the reliability centered 
maintenance program. The Diablo canyon employee assistance 
counselor, Cindy Johnson, next discussed employee performance 
issues with the Committee. Usama Farradj, the project manager for 
the sixth diesel generator installation at Diablo Canyon, then 
reported on the need for and the status of that project, and 
William Goelzer outlined the project schedule. The Plant Manager 
of Support Services, David Oatley, next made an extensive 
presentation on Diablo Canyon's radiological effluent program. 
Again, numerous questions were asked of each of the PG&E 
representatives making a presentation, and considerable discussion 
followed. 
XII. ADJOURN EVENING SESSION 
The afternoon session of the DCISC was adjourned at 4:10 
P.M. 
XIII. RECONVENE FOR EVENING SESSION 
Chairman Kastenberg reconvened the evening session of the 
DCISC at 7:30 P.M., with about 35 people in the attendance. 
Introductions and opening comments were made by the Committee 
Members. 
XIV. PUBLIC COMMENTS AND COMMUNICATIONS 
Audience member Cordner Gibson spoke as Chairman of the 
310-member Citizens for Adequate Energy organization in the county. 
He discussed the plant tours conducted by PG&E and indicated the 
group members were impressed with the operating training and the 
radiation protection programs. The next speaker, Ralph Forhees, 
noted that PG&E was a good neighbor and a valuable asset to the 
community. A third speaker, Ted Waddell discussed a Time magazine 
article on nuclear power and noted that the Diablo Canyon plant 
provided power without polluting the environment. Chris Pillsbury 
was the last speaker, and she stated that PG&E had assisted with 
many local education efforts, that nuclear power was one of the 
cleanest sources of power, and that in her opinion PG&E was 
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committed to the well-being of the community. 
XV. CONCLUDING REMARKS AND DISCUSSION BY COMMITTEE MEMBERS 
Chairman Kastenberg discussed the schedule for DCISC 
meetings during the next year, with meetings presently planned for 
october 10, 1991, and February 6, June 4 and October 8, 1992. He 
next noted that when he was elected Chairman in May 1990 it was 
with the understanding that the chairmanship would rotate every 
year among the members, and that the next item of business was to 
elect a Chairman for the next fiscal year commencing July 1, 1991. 
Dr. Woodson nominated Warren Owen, Dr. Kastenberg seconded the 
nomination and a motion was then passed to close further 
nominations, thus electing Mr. Owen. Noting that where he's from 
that is called a "South Carolina election", Chairman-elect owen 
then commented on the DCISC goals for the next year of a) 
completing the 1990-91 annual report by October, b) defining and 
focusing the DCISC's use of consultants, and c) setting up a 
process for establishing future actions and setting DCISC 
priorities. 
XVI. ADJOURNMENT OF MEETING 
There being no further business, Chairman Kastenberg 
adjourned the third meeting of the DCISC at 9:40 P.M. 

1.5.2 PG&E Presentations 
Introduction 
PG&E President George Maneatis made a brief introduction 
which focused on their commitment to and success in meeting 
the PG&E corporate goal to "Operate the Diablo Canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant at the highest level of safety, 
reliability and performance." 
Plant Performance 
Jim Shiffer provided a brief overview of the plant 
performance pointing out that "both units have run extremely 
well in 1990." The two Unit 1 reactor trips, one manual and 
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one automatic were discussed in some detail. Unit 2 had not 
experienced a trip in the current cycle. Repair of a minor 
weld leak in the Unit 2 letdown line was mentioned as was 
the short refueling times of 70 and 57 days for Units 1 and 
2, respectively. The capacity factors since the beginning 
of their last cycles were 92.6% and 91.9% for Units 1 and 2 
respectively. Finally, Diablo Canyon (DC) retained its top 
category rating following a 20-man, two-week INPO 
evaluation. 
These introductory presentations were followed by four 
technical presentations requested by the Committee. 
Outage Management Program 
Bill McClane presented the DC Outage Management Program. 
The first three refueling outages averaged around 120 days 
which was about the industry average. However, this was 
well in excess of their 84 day goal. PG&E decided a 
substantial change was needed in their approach to 
controlling refueling outages. A major study effort was 
initiated. They talked to other u.s. utilities, especially 
those that were doing well, the Institute of Nuclear Power 
Operations (INPO), Westinghouse, other contractors and 
vendors, European utilities, and "anyone that had a good 
idea on how to improve outage." As a result, changes were 
made to improve scheduling, coordination, teamwork, 
radiation exposure, and plant safety including: 
1. A dedicated full-time outage organization was 
established. 
2. An Outage Control Center was established to manage 
the entire outage. It was staffed 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. 
3. Critical path work was scheduled 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. Criticial path schedules were 
reviewed twice a day. 
4. Better coordination through the use of 1) outage 
coordinators for different parts of the plant, 2) 
outage managers, and 3) team building exercises, 
including sending some teams to the ROPES course. 
5. The formation of multidisciplined High Impact Teams 
(HIT) which are formed six to nine months prior to 
the outage. These teams have been so successful 
that their number has been increased from three to 
nineteen. 
6. Increased detailed scheduling down to the 
availability of major cranes 
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7. More advanced planning to allow additional time for 
reviews and re-reviewing 
8. Expanded management attention 
The net result of this effort was a continued improvement in 
the outage performance. The outage times went from about 
120 days to 82 days, 70 and then 57 days. (Following this 
meeting, Unit 1 was refueled in 62.3 days.) 
In the future PG&E plans to focus on continued reductions in 
radiation exposure, increases in plant reliability and 
increases in personnel and plant safety. 
Rather than try to speed up the individual operations, PG&E 
appears to have appropriately taken a systems approach to 
maximize the use of the available time. This approach 
emphasized improved advanced planning, teamwork, focused 
control, greater management involvement and continuous 
effort on critical items. Whenever tight schedules are 
involved, constant management attention is required to avoid 
compromises in safety and reliability. The radiation 
exposures may be evidence of this. Except for one point 
prior to the last outage, there was a consistent increase in 
radiation exposure with decreasing outage time. This trend 
was dramatically changed in the last outage. The changes 
made to correct this problem are described in Section 2.3.3. 
The Committee will continue to closely monitor the outage 
management program and its safety implications. 
Operator Training Program 
Jim Welsch presented the DC Operator Training Program. 
The program, which employs 30 instructors, is approved by 
the NRC and fully accredited by INPO. The trainees for 
Reactor Operator (RO) and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) 
licenses have about a 95% record for passing their exams the 
first time. This compares favorably with the industry 
average of 89%. Shift Supervisor and Shift Technical 
Advisor (STA) are four-year college degree positions. 
Initial non-licensed operator training consists of 19 weeks 
of classroom work plus five months training for each of five 
watch stations. Initial SRO/RO training consists of 34 
weeks of classroom work, six weeks of simulator training, 13 
weeks on-the-job training and seven weeks of pre-license 
preparation. All SROs are trained at the Shift Supervisor 
level. Initial training for STAs is 34 weeks of classroom 
work, two weeks of simulator training, and four weeks of 
on-the-job training. All licensed personnel are given one 
week of training every five weeks. Operators are taught to 
think through the procedures as they proceed to recognize 
when the plant behavior may require a deviation from the 
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procedures. A formal mechanism is in place to make changes 
"on the spot" which includes stopping and obtaining 
appropriate approvals for procedure changes. 
Annual simulator and in-plant oral exams are given as well 
as biennial written exams to verify the effectiveness of the 
training program. In addition, the training program is kept 
current through a series of internal and external 
evaluations. All design changes are routed through 
training, and the program is updated accordingly. 
Based on this presentation and a visit to observe training 
at the plant simulator, the Committee feels that the PG&E 
training program is very good. Periodic reviews will be 
held to verify that the current high standards are being 
maintained and that continued improvements are made. 
Fitness for Duty 
The PG&E Fitness for Duty Program was presented by John 
Townsend. PG&E established an Employee Assistance Program 
(EAP) about 20 years ago. Ten years ago, a full-time 
employee assistance counselor was placed at DC. There is a 
Twelve-Step Program for recovering individuals at DC which 
is similar to an Alcoholics Anonymous support program. In 
1982 the NRC mandated a behavioral observation program at 
nuclear power plants. This was followed by a 
Fitness-for-Duty (FFD) Policy in July 1986 and a rule in 
January 1989 which was to be implemented by January 3, 1990. 
The DCPP FFD Program complies with the NRC rule (10 CFR 26). 
The key elements of this Program are: 
1. Pre-access testing for drugs and alcohol within 60 
days of initial access to the protected or vital 
areas of the plant or assignment to activities 
associated with the emergency plan. 
2. Random unannounced testing for drugs and alcohol to 
deter and detect substance abuse. The test rate is 
equal to at least 100% of the work force per year. 
Eligibility is continuous so that some employees will 
be tested more than once per year, and some will not 
be tested at all. (Note for example that at one 
utility where about 2500 were subject to random 
selection, 20% were tested twice, and one person was 
tested seven times, while 29% were not tested at all 
in that year.) 
3. For-cause testing can be invoked when individuals are 
involved in accidents or when any credible information 
is received that suggests that an individual is 
abusing drugs or alcohol. Supervisors are trained to 
recognize substance abuse problems. 
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4. A three-year Post-Rehabilitation Testing Program is 
imposed on anyone who tests positive. This is a 
requirement for continued employment. 
~. Sanctions include enrolling in the Post-Rehabilitation 
Testing Program for the first confirmed positive test 
and denial of access for a minimum of three years 
following a second confirmed positive test. 
5. Positive tests are confirmed by a medical evaluation 
performed by a physician. 
7. The EAP offers assessments, short-term counseling, 
referral services, and monitoring of treatment. 
8. Specimen collection and analysis follow the guidelines 
provided by the Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
Appropriate training and audits are provided in support of 
the program. From January 3, 1990 to October 31, 1990 
random and for cause tests resulted in nine (out of 1543 
tested) and 11 (out of 1281 tested) positives for PG&E and 
contractors respectively. 
Committee comments on the FFD program are included in 
Section 4.5, and the complete consultant's report is 
provided in Exhibit B.S. 
Fuel Handling Design Basis Accidents and Operations 
The fuel handling operations were described by Dr. Pete 
Seraffian, and the design basis accidents were covered by 
John Gisclon. In preparation for fuel removal the reactor 
head is removed and set down within the sealed containment. 
The entire reactor cavity is filled with water up to the 
operating deck. Then the upper internals are removed. Fuel 
removal from the reactor vessel is only initiated after 100 
hours following shutdown. This reduces the fuel assembly 
decay heat load and fission product inventory in the event 
of an accident. The entire core of 193 fuel assemblies is 
removed one fuel assembly at a time and transferred to a 
specific location in the fuel handling building. About two 
thirds of these are inspected, the control rods are 
shuffled, and the fuel assemblies are returned to the core 
for the next cycle of operation. The remaining one third of 
the fuel is inspected and placed in the spent fuel pool 
(SFP). After about one year in the SFP, the decay heat has 
been reduced to the point where the fuel could be cooled by 
natural circulation of air alone. The remaining one third 
of the core is replaced with fresh fuel. During fuel 
loading, additional crew members monitor the neutron 
detectors on each side of the reactor vessel to ensure a 
large sub-critical margin is maintained. 
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The DC fuel has operated very reliably with the number of 
failures during operation varying from zero to three. ! Their 
performance puts them in the upper 25% of the industry. 
This performance is attributed to a good fuel supplier who 
is monitored by PG&E, an emphasis on loose parts control and 
housekeeping during refueling, and water chemistry control. 
Inspections for debris in the vessel are limited to the 
lower core plate before fuel is loaded, and the top of the 
fuel prior to installation of the upper internals. 
The first postulated accident discussed was the loss of 
cooling to the spent fuel pool. Based on a series of very 
conservative assumptions, boiling could be reached in about 
two and one half hours if all cooling were lost. This 
should be adequate time to provide the 90 gpm of water 
required to make up for the boil off. If not, there would 
be 48 hours to take action before the top of the fuel would 
be exposed. Because of the several redundant sources of 
makeup water, PG&E believes fuel uncovery is precluded. No 
probabilistic analysis was made using best estimates of 
system performance. 
There are no penetrations of the pool at a significant level 
below the water. Lines that bring cool water into the 
bottom of the pool have vacuum breakers so that the water 
cannot be siphoned out. Therefore, PG&E believes that there 
is no credible loss of coolant accident. 
Dropping a heavy load on the fuel in the SFP is precluded by 
administrative controls which limit the weight of loads over 
the SFP, restricting the cask operations and movement, and 
seismically qualifying the bridge cranes and parking them 
away from the SFP. Nevertheless, it was postulated that an 
accident occurred such that all of the rods in one fuel 
assembly were breached. In this case, it was found for both 
the containment building and the fuel handling building that 
the calculated doses were well within NRC 10 CFR 100 
guidelines. 
A brief discussion was presented of industry experience with 
events which lead to water loss in the reactor cavity or the 
SFP. PG&E feels that they preclude similar accidents at DC 
due to design differences and strict control of leakage 
paths. 
The Committee concurs that the risk from fuel handling 
design basis accidents appears to be acceptably small. 
However, following up a concern raised by members of the 
public at a previous meeting, the Committee investigated the 
risk from seismic events including beyond design basis 
seismic events. The results are s1mmarized in Section 4.1 
with the complete consultant's report provided in Exhibit 
H.l. 
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1.4 Committee Member Site Insoection Tours 
1.4.1 Inspections by W. E. Kastenberg 
Committee Chair W. E. Kastenberg made several visits to the 
site and to PG&E Headquarters in San Francisco during the 
period July 1, 1990 - June 30, 1991 as follow: 
July 27, 1990- To PG&E Headquarters with Mr. R. T. Lancet 
(Consultant) to discuss the 6th diesel generator addition. 
September 10-11, 1990 - To the plant with Dr. Hyla Cass 
(Consultant) to discuss operator training, the Employee 
Assistance Program and the Fitness for Duty Program. Dr. 
Kastenberg spent a full day at the simulator and a second 
day attending an operator regualification class. 
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October 3, 1990 - To San Luis Obispo and the plant to 
observe the Emergency Plan Exercise. 
December 5, 1990 - To PG&E Headquarters with R. T. Lancet 
to discuss the spent fuel pool. 
February 12, 1991 - To the plant with R. T. Lancet and H. 
Cass to discuss reliability-centered maintenance and 
management training. 
These meetings and visits were conducted for the purpose of 
fact-finding and led to presentations by PG&E at the full 
Committee public meetings. These presentations by PG&E are 
summarized in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 of this report, as 
appropriate. 
In addition, Chairman Kastenberg met with the public as 
follows: 
August 10, 1990 - Open house held at the San Luis Obispo 
Public Library 
September 9, 1990 - Met with the Mothers for Peace in San 
Luis Obispo at a member's home 
November 13, 1990 - Luncheon speaker at a meeting of the 
Citizens for Adequate Energy 
During these meetings a number of issues were raised which 
led to further investigations by the Committee and its 
consultants. These issues included the following: 
. The spent fuel pool with emphasis on seismic effects 
. The Long-term Seismic Program 
. The site emergency plan with emphasis on evacuation 
. Drug and substance abuse by plant personnel 
. Low-level radiation and releases 
. Psychological testing of operators 
. Maintenance and reliability 
. Operator training 
The Committee investigations regarding these issues are 
discussed elsewhere in this report. 
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1.4.2 Inspection by w. H. Owen 
(Note: Although this inspection occurred in the previous 
DCISC reporting period, it did not appear in the Interim 
Report and is included here for completeness.) 
DCISC Member Warren H. Owen visited the Diablo Canyon Power 
Plant on May 4, 1990 to become familiar with the plant type 
and layout, procedures and policies and personnel. A plant 
tour consisted of the following: 
. Training Building and Maintenance Training Facilities 
. Inside Protected Area, including Turbine Deck, Control 
Room, Cable Spreading Room, Electrical Rooms, Main 
Feedwater Pumps, and Unit 2 Diesel Generators 
. Administration Building, including Computer Center and a 
PIMS Demonstration 
. Outside Protected Area consisting of Warehouse, Cold 
Machine Shop, Technical Support Center, and I&C 
Maintenance Building 
. Auxiliary Building, including Access Control, RHR Pumps, 
Containment Spray Pumps, Charging Pumps, Component 
Cooling Water Pumps, Safety Injection Pumps, Auxiliary 
Feedwater Pumps, & Spent Fuel Pool 
Discussions and presentation during the visit consisted of 
the following: 
. ?G&E and DCPP Organization 
. DCPP History 
. Plant Operating Experience, including Achievements & 
Significant Events 
. Goals 
. Strengths 
. Performance Improvement Initiatives 
The major areas PG&E was targeting for improved performance 
were reactor trips, industrial safety, outage duration, 
engineering/plant interface, communications, and radiation 
exposure. Performance improvement initiatives had begun in 
the areas of personnel errors, valve/equipment alignment, 
configuration management, professionalism and maintenance. 
Facility improvements planned were increased space for 
training, warehouse, machine shop, telecommunications and 
medical functions. Major plant equipment enhancements 
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consisted of improvements/additions of a digital feedwater 
system, plant process computer, sixth diesel generator, 
radiation monitor system, and digital engineered safety 
systems ~nstrumentation. 
1.4.3 :nspection by Herbert Woodson 
DCISC member Herbert H. Woodson visited the Diablo Canyon 
Power Plant on May 14, 1991 to become more familiar with the 
plant, the organization and people responsible for its 
operation and maintenance, its operating history, and the 
PG&E goals and expectations for the plant. Presentations 
dur~ng ~hat visit included: 
. ?G&E and DCPP organization 
. DCPP history and plant description 
. Regulatory and generation performance and performance 
indicators for important parameters 
. Public and industrial safety 
. Cost competitiveness 
. Human resources 
. Management enhancements 
. Significant operational events such as loss of offsite 
power, stuck-open pressurizer spray valve, piping weld 
cracks, steam dump valve failures and auxiliary 
saltwater system degradation 
During the formal presentations there was extended 
discussion of how the plant staff was organized, who gets 
formal ~raining and how much, and how responsibility was 
determined and exercised. There was also extended 
discussion of where emphasis will be placed to achieve 
improved performance as described in PG&E's goals for the 
future. 
The plant tour included visits to: 
. The protected area (but not Radiologically 
Controlled Areas) 
. The warehouse 
. The operator training facilities 
. The maintenance training facilities, especially the 
facilities for hands-on training 
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. • City-County Ubrory, 995 Palm Street 
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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
I tea Reco-ndation Reference PCU: Action Reference nate 
1 Substantially increase emphasis on timely resolution 
of problems. 
1990 AR (2.4.1.2, 4.0) 
2 Provide needed attention to quality of health 1990 AR (2.4.2.1.3), 
physics and work practices during outages. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
3 Provide tiaely and effective actions needed to 1990 AR (2.4.2.1.3), ~" correct root causes of problems. NRC/DCISC Rec. 4 Improve understanding of design bases by aaintenance 
and operating staffs. 
1990 AR (2.4.3.2, 4.0) ~
5 Provide management emphasis and oversight to reduce 1990 AR (2.4.3.2, 4.0) ,9:' overtime during outages 
6 Improve escalation of problems to appropriate levels 1990 AR (2.4.4.1.3), 
......., 
of management or priority level to assure timely NRC/DCJ:SC Rec. 
corrective action. 
7 Improve level of engineering support in the 'l'SC and 1990 AR (2.4.4.1.3), 
' EOP. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
8 Increase aanagement attention to finalize hardware 1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3), 
corrective actions ori a timely bases. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
9 Correct weaknesses in integrated security system 1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3), 
lbarriers, perimeter alarm, and CCTV cameras) NRC/DCISC Rec. 
I 
10 Remove inadequacies of portions of vital area 1990 AR (2.4.5.1.3), 
barriers at Units 1 and 2 pipe galleries. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
11 strengthen interface between SF-based NECS and site. 1990 AR (2.4.6.1~3, 
4.0) 1 NRC/DCJ:SC Rec. 
12 Apply System Engineering approach to problea 1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3), 
solving. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
13 NECS should perform self critical assessments. 1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3), 
NRC/DCISC Rec. 
• 
14 Improve understanding of all the implications of 1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3), 
changes on actual plant operations. NRC/DCISC Rec. 
15 Improve tiaely assessment of plant material 1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3), 
condition NRC/DCISC Rec. 
16 Improve formal training for design system engineers 1990 AR (2.4.6.1.3), 
NRC/DCISC Rec. 
17 Assure proper control and aonitoring of QA audits of 1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3), 
equipment suppliers of safety grade equipment NRC/DCISC Rec. 
18 strengthen QA implementation of corrective action 1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3), 
_, pr~gram requirements. 
--~-
NRC/DCISC Rec. , __ -~---·····----------------' ------------····- --·-··- ----
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DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAl- .clTY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
:rtea aee-ndation bference PGU: Action bferenee Date 
19 Xmprove plant housekeeping. 1990 AR (2.4.7.1.3), 
NRC/DCXSC Rec. 
20 Closely monitor personnel error trends and determine 
their specific causes. 
1990 AR (2.5.1.2) 
--
21 Present, at a Public Meeting, an analysis of 
personnel error trends and plans for resolution 
1990 AR (2.5.1.2) 
22 Analyze inadvertent actuations or mode shifts of 1990 AR (2.5.1.2) 
A safetv-related ventilation systems. 
23 Apply good refueling practice& to other operations. 1991 AR (Eeec. swa., v,pA 6.0) 
24 Apply aignificant attention to the problems of, too 1991 AR (Exec. swa., ,....,~; ~ 111anv trips unplanned safety syste111 actuations. 6.0) 
• 25 Develop procedures to facilitate the hookup of a 1991 AR (Exec. sua., 
diesel from one unit to the other. 4.7) 
26 Accelerate RCM progra. 1991 AR (Exec. swa., 
4.3) 
27 Continue development and expand use of risk analysis 1991 AR (Exec. sua., 
111odels. Consider other ob1ective functions. 4.8) 
28 :Increase emphasis on completing actions 1991 AR (Exec. sua., 
4.4) 
29 Look at broader issues associated with human error. 1991 AR (1.6.2) 
30 Consider requiring acknowledgement of safety 1991 AR (1.6.2) 
considerations qiven durinq tailboard briefinqs. 
31 Consider using steam dwap valve presentation as a 1991 AR (1.6.2) 
111odel for future presentations. 
32 Develop documentation for verifyinq that supervisors 1991 AR (4.2) 
and fore~~~en have tracked overtillle hours. 
33 Revise overtime procedures to eliminate invalid 1991 AR (4.2) 
assurances and provide ability to verify department 
head compliance. 
34 Provide additional quidance for overtillle 1991 AR (4.2) 
authorization 
35 Xlllplement a positive »ethod for trackinq GONPRAC 1991 AR (4.4) 
outstandinq action ite111s . 
36 Add an outside (of PG'E) 111elllber to PG'E 1991 AR (4.4) 
37 Docu111ent reasons for not recoqnizinq all 
implications of Voqtle event and the correspondinq 
corrective actions taken. 
1991 AR (4.4) 
2 
~ ' ~ ~ =---, = = =====> ==-=' ==== = 
. 
== -- • =-
DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAP·f:TY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
I Itelll R.eco-ndation Reference PGSOE Action Reference Date 
38 Increase the Health Education and Stress Reduction 1991 AR (4.5) 
Programs in number and utilization. 
39 Continue development, expansion and implementation 1991 AR (4.6) 
of management training programs. 
40 Continue to seek cost--effective desiqn and 1991 AR (4.8) 
operational chanqes usinq risk aanaqement tools for 
principle plant vulnerabilities 
41 Complete Level 2 and Level 3 PR.Il on a timely bases. 1991 AR (4.81 A 
42 Improve effectiveness of corrective action proqram 1991 AR (4.8) {}~A for all aspects of operation. 
·~~~ ., 
. 
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Tentative Agenda Items 
for 
DCISC Public Meeting. February 5-6. 1992 
1. Annual plant tour by Committee Members. 
2. Results of PG&E review of internal oversight practices. 
3. Report on the Long Term Seismic Program by PG&E. 
4. Report of Long Term Seismic Program by DCISC consultant 
Hendron. 
5. PG&E tracking/handling of generic safety issues. 
6. PG&E Probabilistic Risk Assessment to date. 
7. Report on pipe cracking issue by DCISC consultant 
Boldrick. 
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Attorneys for DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMITTEE 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Application of Pacific Gas and ) 
Electric Company, for Authoriza- ) 
tion to Establish a Rate Adjust- ) 
ment Procedure for Its Diablo ) 
canyon Nuclear Power Plant; to ) 
Increase Its Electric Rates to ) 
Reflect the Costs of owning, ) 
Operating, Maintaining and ) 
Eventually Decommissioning Unit ) 
1 of the Plant; and to Reduce ) 
Electric Rates Under Its Enerqy ) 
cost Adjustment Clause and Annual ) 
Enerqy Rate to Reflect Decreased ) 
Fuel Expenses. ) 
) 
CU 39 El ) 
) 
And Related Matter. ) 
_______________________________) 
Application 
No. 84-06-014 
Application 
No. 85-08-025 
RESPONSE AND PROTEST OF DIABLO CANYON 
INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMI'rl'EE 
TO PETITION BY 
SAN LUIS OBISPO MOTHERS FOR PEACE ET AL. 
TO MQDIFY DECISION NQS. 88-12-083 AND 89-03-062 
25 The DIABLO CANYON INDEPENDENT SAFETY COMMI'rl'EE ( "DCISC") 
26 hereby makes a special appearance in this matter for the 
27 purpose of submitting its Response to the above-mentioned 
28 Petition to Modify herein, and to provide information to the 
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-11 California Public Utilities Commission ("CPUC") which is 
2!1 pertinent to a determination of said Petition, as follows: 
The Petition. The Petitioners allege that the 
4 performance-based pricing, which was provided for in the 1988 
5j settlement agreement between the Division of Ratepayers 
61 
71 
81 
9 
Advocates of the CPUC, the Attorney General and Pacific Gas & 
Electric Company ("PG&E"), has created a hazardous situation, 
and that the DCISC is non-functional, so that the cited 
decisions approving same should be modified to suspend the 
10 performance-based rates and disband the DCISC. The first 
11 seven numbered allegations or paragraphs of the Petition 
12 relate to the DCISC, as well as portions of allegations 10 and 
13 11, and will be responded to in turn herein: 
14 
15 
16 
17 
1. The DCISC, which has been in existence 
for just one and one-half years, bas 
adopted its first report on the safety 
of Diablo Canyon operations and will 
consider adoption of its second report 
in October. 
18 The Petitioners' first allegation is that "Although the 
19 Settlement Agreement was adopted in December 1988 the 
20 Committee's report is yet to be seen, even in draft form." 
21 This statement is misleading and incorrect. It is misleading 
22 in that there was in fact no committee in existence until the 
23 Governor appointed Dr. William Kastenberg of u.c.L.A. to the 
24 DCISC in September 1989 and the Energy Commission Chairman 
25 appointed Warren owen of Duke Power Company in mid-December 
26 1989. Thus, as 1990 began, there was finally a "committee," 
27 but a committee that had never existed before and which had no 
28 rules, procedures, staff, operational history or anything else 
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1· - except two members. Professor Kastenberg met with the CPUC 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
g 
10 
! 
I 
11 
staff in early February 1990 and at their suggestion an 
accounting firm and legal counsel were retained, following a 
two-month search and interview process. 
The DCISC then held its first meeting in May 1990 and its 
second meeting the following November (copies of the meeting 
notice and the agenda from each of those sessions are attached 
hereto as Exhibits A, B, C and D, respectively). 
In addition to the foregoing, the Petition's first 
allegation is also incorrect in that the DCISC has in fact 
adopted its first "Interim Report on Safety of Diablo Canyon 
12 Operations." This first report was adopted at the June 6, 
I 
I 
131 1991, meeting of the DCISC in Arroyo Grande, prior to the date 
14 that the certificate of service for the within Petition was 
15 signed by Petitioner Becker. Petitioners Becker and the 
16 Mothers for Peace were well aware that this report was to be 
17 adopted on June 6th because they were recipients of the 
18 meeting notice mailed out in May which described the proposed 
19 action (see Exhibit E), and they were also present when the 
20 DCISC members and consultants discussed and worked on draft 
21 portions of the first report at the November 1990 meeting. 
22 The draft of the report was completed in early 1991, pursuant 
23 to the intent clearly stated at the November meeting that it 
24 would be adopted at the meeting scheduled in February 1991. 
25 That meeting had to be canceled due to the illness of one of 
26 the then two DCISC members (so that a quorum could not have 
27 been obtained), and only for that reason was approval delayed 
28 until June. As indicated by the June meeting notice, a draft 
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1 copy of the report was filed in the Public Document Room at 
2 the Cal Poly Library on June 3, 1991. At no time since the 
3 draft was first discussed at the November DCISC meeting did 
i 41 anyone ever inquire about the status of the draft report prior 
5 to its final approval at the meeting in June. 
6 In light of the foregoing, the misleading and incorrect 
7 allegation quoted above is surprising. This less than 
8 forthright statement is also particularly distressing to the 
9 DCISC members, who have worked energetically and in good faith 
10 to commence the work of this new committee, to fully 
11' investigate the safety of operations at Diablo Canyon, and to 
12 meet with and respond to the concerns of the local community, 
13 including the Mothers for Peace (as will be discussed 
14 hereinbelow). 
15 Because of the delay in the appointment of members to the 
16 DCISC, its first interim report covers only the period of 
17 plant operations from January 1 through June 30, 1990. A 
18 second report, which will deal with fiscal year 1990-1991, 
19 ending June 30, 1991, is presently being drafted by the 
20 members and its consultants and will be presented for 
21 consideration and final approval of the DCISC at its next 
22 scheduled meeting on October 3, 1991. 
2:3 
24 
25 
26 
2. In less than one and one-half years 
since its formation the DCISC has 
conducted three public meetings and 
has participated in several other 
meetings with the san Luis Obispo 
county community. 
27 The second allegation of the Petition on file herein is 
28 also misleading and based upon limited facts in that it a) 
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1 refers to the time frame from the settlement agreement and not 
2 from the appointment of committee members and b) alleges 
3 only two meetings on the very eve of a third meeting. What 
4 also is left unstated is the length and substance of each of 
5 the DCISC public meetings and the additional meetings with the 
6 Mothers for Peace and others in the community that have been 
7 attended. 
8 Each of the DCISC's formal meetings has consisted of 
9 three sessions - committee business matters, technical 
10 presentations by representatives of PG&E on topics requested 
11 by DCISC members, and public comments and communications. The 
12 May 22, 1990 meeting went from 9:30A.M. to 10:40 P.M., and 
13 took up a full ten (10) hours of one day. The two subsequent 
14 meetings have each lasted approximately six and one-half 
15 hours. The greater portion of each of these meetings has 
16 dealt with the principal charge of the DCISC - to review and 
17 assess the safety of operations at the plant. over fourteen 
18 ( 14) hours of technical presentations on safety-related issues 
19 have been elicited at the first three DCISC public meetings, 
201 on such important topics as outage management, operator 
21 training, fuel handling operations, fitness-for-duty, steam 
22 dump valve performance, reliability centered maintenance, 
23 radiological effluent program, etc. (see Exhibits B and D and 
24 the agenda from the June meeting, Exhibit F). 
25 Notices of each of these meetings have been published in 
26 the local newspapers and also mailed to some ninety {90) 
27 persons and organizations on a service list provided by the 
28 CPUC and to over thirty (30) newspapers and radio and 
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1i television stations. When the Mothers for Peace complained 
I 
2! that legal notices in the newspaper were insufficient, the 
3i DCISC placed multiple display ads in the two largest local 
I 
I 
4j papers for its next two meetings (see example ad in Exhibit 
I 
5 i G) • 
6 In addition to the above formal meetings, the first 
7 Chairman of the DCISC, William Kastenberg, has been present in 
8 the local community on several occasions on behalf of the 
9 DCISC. on August 10, 1990, Professor Kastenberg conducted an 
10 advertised open house at the City-county Library in downtown 
11 San Luis Obispo, from 9:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. He met and 
121 discussed concerns about Diablo Canyon with numerous members 
I 
13 of the public, specifically including several representatives 
14 from the Mothers for Peace. On the evening of September 9, 
15 1990, Dr. Kastenberg and Hyla cass, M.D., who was retained by 
16j the DCISC to consult with it on drug and substance abuse, 
17 employee psychological screening, stress reduction and 
18 related issues, met for approximately three hours with a group 
I 
19! from the Mothers for Peace. on October Jrd, Professor 
20 Kastenberg attended the all-day emergency planning exercise 
21 related to the Diablo canyon plant, and on November 13th he 
22 addressed a luncheon meeting of the local Citizens for 
23 Adequate Energy, attended by over two hundred and fifty (250) 
24 people. Last week, on July 16th, Dr. Kastenberg held yet 
25 another open house in San Luis Obispo to hear the concerns of 
26 and receive input from the community regarding operations at 
27 the plant (see notice attached as Exhibit H). Over a dozen 
28 persons came in to talk to Dr. Kastenberg, and he was also 
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1/ interviewed by local radio and newspaper reporters. 
' 2i Contrary to the inaccurate and misleading statement of 
3! the Petitioners, the DCISC has had an active presence in the 
! 
41 community and has been quite open and available to the public. 
51 
i 
61 
I 
I 
71 
l 
I 
3. Apart from some delay in obtain-
ing the tapes of its first meet-
ing, DCISC meeting transcripts 
have been openly and routinely 
prepared in a timely fashion. 
8 Before responding substantively to the third allegation 
9 of the Petition (relating to the meeting transcripts), it 
10 should be first noted that this whole point is simply a 
11 "straw man argument" -setting up a standard that does not 
12 exist and then attacking it. There is no requirement in the 
13 law, in the settlement agreement or elsewhere that the DCISC 
14 must prepare a transcript of its meetings. The DCISC, in its 
15 sole discretion, has determined that such transcripts will be 
16 prepared (along with official meeting minutes) . That decision 
171 having been made, there are no resultant requirements as to 
18 when the transcript will be prepared and if and where it will 
19 
20 I 
21 
22 
23 
241 
25 
26 
27 
be filed. The principal purpose of the transcript is as a 
working document for the use of the DCISC members and 
consultants, and to that end the primary concern has been the 
accurate transcription of the technical presentations to the 
DCISC, to create a record for future reference in connection 
with safety-related issues. In response to requests to the 
DCISC that its public documents be made available locally, 
the DCISC has made arrangements to file same with the Public 
Documents Room ("PDR") at the Cal Poly Library in San Luis 
28 Obispo. The DCISC has also decided to file the transcript of 
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1 1 each meeting at the PDR a) when prepared and b) prior to 
2 the next following meeting. 
31 For almost five months after its first meeting in May 
' 
4 1990 the DCISC was unable to obtain the tapes of the meeting 
5 · from the party who prepared them. Petitioner Becker inquired 
6 about the transcript and specifically was made aware of the 
7 difficulty in obtaining the tapes. The 95-page transcript was 
8 finally prepared and placed in the PDR prior to the November 
9 1990 meeting. A new firm was hired to tape the subsequent 
10 meetings and the transcript of the November meeting was filed 
11 in the PDR on June 3, 1991, along with all agenda materials 
12 for the June 6th meeting. From November to June there were no 
13 inquiries to the DCISC about or requests to view or receive a 
14 copy of the transcript. 
1 51 Relative to the "issue" of PG&E being asked to correct 
1 6 their portion of the transcript, there are no covert actions 
17 involved, only standard operating procedures. In accordance 
18 with hearing transcript review practices followed by the CPUC 
19
1 
and other regulatory agencies, the DCISC has requested that 
20 PG&E proofread those portions of the transcript that contain 
21 the presentations made by its representatives (comprising well 
22 over 90% of the transcript), and to advise us of any 
23 typographical errors, misspellings or other non-substantive 
24 errors in transcription. The procedure involved is not unlike 
25 that provided in the Code of Civil Procedure for the reading, 
26 correcting and signing of the transcribed deposition of a 
27 witness. An accurate transcript is important to the OCISC, 
28 especially with regard to the technical safety-related 
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1 presentations, questions and answers, which will become a 
2 valuable reference tool and part of the permanent (and public) 
3 records of the DCISC. 
4 
5 
0 
4. correspondence and other communica-
tions to the DCISC from the public 
do not go unanswered. 
The allegation in paragraph 4 of the Petition that 
71 letters to the DCISC go unanswered is made without benefit of 
;I Bl evidence or examples; the undersigned presumes there are 
9 none. In checking with each of the DCISC members, none can 
10 recall anything that would give any basis to this claim. Many 
11 communications to DCISC members are by telephone. Some 
12 letters received do not require any response or have been 
13 responded to by telephone. At the recent meeting on June 6th 
14 Dr. Kastenberg discussed the issue of correspondence received 
15 at his office and his comments, which are pertinent to this 
16 allegation, are attached (Exhibit I). To further refute 
17 allegation 4, a few examples of responses which have been made 
18 by the DCISC are attached as Exhibit J (along with a follow-up 
19 response to one letter by the NRC) . 
20 s. There is correspondence from the 
the DCISC in the PDR, althouqh 
compliance with procedures for 
providinq same possibly could be 
improved. 
23 As shown in Exhibit J, some correspondence from the DCISC 
24 has been attached to meeting agenda packets, which in turn 
25 have been filed in the PDR. However, it is possible that 
26j there is some correspondence from DCISC members that has not 
27 been filed with Legal Counsel, as provided for in Committee 
28 Policy No. 5 (see Exhibit K). With DCISC members spread from 
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11' California to Texas to North carolina, compliance with this 
I, 
2 il policy is not easy to monitor but certainly has been 
·I 
3
1 
encouraged. It should be emphasized, however, as has been 
4! pointed out at the DCISC meetings, that many if not all of the 
5; requests and inquiries by the DCISC members have been made by 
61 telephone calls, not correspondence. 
I 
I 
si 
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6. The DCISC has determined that an 
office in san Luis Obispo is not 
necessary at this time for the 
accomplishment ot its objectives. 
10 The Petition's sixth allegation is correct, the DCISC has 
11 not been persuaded that an office in San Luis Obispo would be 
12i valuable. There has not been anything like a community-wide 
131 demand or request for a local DCISC office. Several members 
141 of the Mothers for Peace addressed the issue at the first 
151 meeting and three raised it last November, but the issue was 
16 not mentioned at all at the June meeting. The DCISC certainly 
17 has given consideration to the idea, but has determined that 
18 such an office is not reasonably necessary at this time to the 
191 fulfillment of its objectives and obligations to review and 
20 assess the safety of operations at the nuclear power plant. 
21 As noted above, the DCISC has had substantial physical 
22 presence in the community, its members and consultants have 
23 conducted numerous inspections at the plant and related 
24 facilities, it has provided for the filing of all public 
25 documents and papers in San Luis Obispo (over 95% of which are 
26 received from PG&E and are presently lodged at the POR), and 
2? has established a 24-hour "800" toll-free telephone number to 
28 receive questions and concerns. Calls and correspondence to 
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1 the DCISC have been very limited, and have not indicated any 
2 need for the expense of an office and the personnel necessary 
3 to staff it. The DCISC has indicated its preference at this 
time to spend available funds on the experts and consultants 
..., 
v 
6 
necessary to assist and advise the DCISC on safety and 
operations issues, rather than on an office which would be of 
7 limited use. However, the DCISC members have indicated that 
8 this issue is certainly not closed, and they will continue to 
1 
9 consider the matter. 
10 I 
11 
12 
13 
2.4 
7. All safety-related problems con-
cerning Diablo canyon that have 
been brought to the attention of 
the DCISC have been reviewed by 
it and have bean or will be com-
mented upon. 
Again, allegation 7 is made without example or 
15 elaboration so it cannot be specifically refuted. From the 
16 information available to the DCISC, the allegation is 
17 misleading, unsubstantiated and untrue. Numerous safety-
2.8 related issues and problems at Diablo Canyon have been 
19: reviewed and examined at length by the DCISC members and its 
' 
I 
20' consultants. Some of these matters have been commented upon 
I 
I 21 in the first Interim Report, and yet others will be discussed 
22 and recommendations made concerning same in the upcoming 
23 annual report. It must be recalled that the DCISC is not a 
24 regulatory agency; it does not supplant the NRC. Its charge, 
25 
26 
It should also be noted that, as with the transcript issue 
2? discussed above, there is no requirement for a local office 
and it is a matter to be determined in the discretion of the 
28 DCISC. 
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1 as set forth in the settlement agreement, is to review, 
2 assess, comment and recommend. The DCISC has taken action -
3 to review and consider all important safety-related issues 
4 and problems that have come to its attention. 
5 For example, the DCISC members and consultants reviewed 
6 the NRC Augmented Inspection Report concerning a loss of off-
7 site power event which occurred on March 7, 1991. At its 
8 June 1991 meeting the DCISC requested and received a further 
9 report on this incident from PG&E. Also at its June meeting 
10 the DCISC heard a report which it specifically had requested 
11 regarding recent problems with the steam dump valves (see 
12 Exhibit F, item VIII-A (4)). At this same meeting the DCISC 
13 acted to retain a metallurgical engineer, Michael Boldrick, 
14 for the purpose of reviewing and advising the DCISC concerning 
15 cracks which have developed in the Unit 2 Chemical and Volume 
16 Control System (CVCS) let-down lines (~., item II-D). Drs. 
17 Boldrick and Kastenberg spent a full day last week at Diablo 
18 canyon inspecting the eves lines and reviewing the pipe 
19 thinning monitoring program. In further response to public 
20 requests and concerns of its own, the DCISC also acted at its 
21 June meeting to retain the services of a geotechnical engineer 
22 to advise it on plant-related seismic issues, and Dr. 
23 Kastenberg and the DCISC's consultant will be present at the 
24 August 7, 1991 meeting in Washington D.C. at which time the 
25 U.S.G.S. report concerning the Diablo canyon Long-Term Seismic 
26 Program will be presented to the NRC Advisory Committee on 
27 Reactor Safeguards. 
28 II 
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8. Contrary to the unsubstantiated 
alleqations ot the Petition here-
in, the DCISC has proved to be a 
viable and functional committee, 
accomplishinq the purposes con-
templated by the parties to the 
settlement agreement. 
The principal purpose of the DCISC is to provide an 
61 independent panel of technically qualified experts to review 
71 and assess the safety of operations at Diablo canyon. The 
81 settlement agreement provides that only persons "with 
I 91 knowledge, background and experience in the field of nuclear 
10 power facilities" may be nominated. Any unbiased person who 
11 attended or read the transcripts of the technical 
12 presentations could not help but be impressed by the interest 
13 and knowledge exhibited, the questions raised and the 
, 4 1 discussions generated by the DCISC members and consultants. 
- I I 
1~ i
1 
These are truly productive fact-finding sessions on safety-
v ,, 
I ::.. 6 1 related issues. These sessions are the substance of what the 
17 DCISC is about, not offices and phantom correspondence. It is 
18 the possibility, and the probability, of the many benefits 
19 ~~ that must necessarily result from these expositions and open 
20 II discussions of operations and safety issues at Diablo Canyon, 
I 
I 
21 held in the affected communities and available to public view, 
22 that will provide the "additional assurance of safety" 
23 contemplated by the parties to the settlement agreement. 
24 Unfortunately only two or three of the Petitioners have 
25 attended less than one-third of these fact-finding sessions by 
26 the DCISC. It is not surprising, therefore, that they cannot 
27 understand or appreciate what the DCISC has accomplished. 
28 // 
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11 In a relatively short period of time, starting at ground 
2! zero, the DCISC has accomplished much. As of April 1991 the 
3! DCISC is now at full strength, and as its meetings, 
I 41 investigations, reviews and reports proceed, and as its 
I 
I 51 operations and procedures are fully developed, the DCISC will 
6 continue to accomplish the objectives of the settlement 
7 agreement. Contrary to the vague and unsubstantiated 
8 allegations of the Petition herein, the DCISC has certainly 
9 proved itself to be a viable and functional committee. 
10 Conclusion. Based upon the foregoing, and upon the lack 
11 of any substantial or credible evidence in the Petition, it is 
12 submitted and respectfully urged that those portions of the 
13 Petition relating to the DCISC be denied. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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19 
20 I 
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Dated: July ___ , 1991 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert R. Wellington 
Legal Counsel for the 
Diablo Canyon Independent 
Safety Committee 
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Decision 91-10-020 October 11, 1991 
BEFORE THE PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 
Application of Pacific Gas and ) 
Electric :ompany, for Authorization ) 
to Establish a Rate Adjustment ) 
Procedure for its Diablo Canyon ) 
Nuclear Power Plant; to Increase its ) 
Electric Rates to Reflect the Costs ) 
of Owning, Operating, Maintaining ) 
and Eventually Decommissioning ) 
Units 1 and 2 of the Plant; and to ) 
Reduce Blectric Rates Under its ) 
Energy Cost Adjustment Clause and ) 
Annual Energy Rate to Reflect ) 
Decreased Fuel Expenses. ) 
(Electric) ( U 3 9 E) ) 
-------------------------------------) ) 
And Related Matter. ) 
) 
------------------------------------) 
Mailed 
OCT 1 5 1991 
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
• or~ f? ~rrrnrr:=rnJ 
;------· .. -·; i 
Application 85-08-025 
0 P I H I 0 N 
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace, Life on Planet 
Earth, and Rochelle Becker (petitioners) seek to modify Decision 
(D.) 89-03-062 & D.88-12-083 to rectify what they allege to be an 
intolerable situation created by the CPUC's adoption of an 
innovative performance-based settlement for Diablo Canyon. 
Petitioners request that we suspend performance-based pricing for 
Diablo Canyon power and disband the Independent Safety Commit~ee. 
Petitioners allege: 
1. The Independent Safety Committee's single 
mandate is an annual report. Although the 
Settlement Agreement was adopted in 
December 1988, the Committee's report is 
yet to be seen, even in draft form. 
2. In the 2-1/2 years since the adoption of 
Diablo Canyon Settlement Agreement, the 
Safety Committee, an inseparable part of 
the agreement, has met publicly only twice. 
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3. The transcript from the first meeting of 
the Committee took over six months to 
appear in the public document room. This 
transcript was first sent to PG&E for 
correction to their portion of the meeting. 
The transcript from the second meeting, the 
first week of November 1990, is still not 
in the public document room. 
4. Letters to the Committee from the public go 
unanswered. 
5. There is nQ correspondence from the 
committee to anyone, including the utility, 
in the public document room. Only 
responses from PG&E are in the public 
document room. These responses do not 
allow the public to know what the committee 
has asked and if the answers are responsive 
to their questions. 
6. The community most closely impacted by the 
safety implications of the unique 
settlement agreement has requested, but has 
been unable to persuade the committee, that 
an office in San Luis Obispo would be 
valuable. 
7. Several safety-related problems during 
routine operation and refueling have arisen 
since the adoption of the Settlement 
Agreement and yet no action or comment by 
the Committee has resulted. 
8. The performance-based Settlement Agreement 
adopted by the CPUC in 1988 has resulted in 
millions of dollars in profit for PG&E from 
the operation of their Diablo Canyon 
Nuclear Power Plant. 
9. Ratepayers are currently forced to pay 
9.5 cents a kwh for power produced at 
Diablo Canyon, while the price per kwh of 
renewables (sic) is 7 cents, fossil fuel is 
3.5 cents and hydro is 1-3 cents a kWh. 
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10. Above and beyond the exorbitant price of 
electrical power ratepayers must pay, the 
CPUC added an excess of $500,000 per year 
for an "Independent Safety" committee which 
is nothing less than a cruel hoax. 
11. The settlement adopted by the California 
Public Utilities commission clearly has 
safety and financial implications for 
California ratepayers. The CPUC decided 
that NRC was not sufficient to deal with 
these safety implications and promised an 
"additional assurance of safety" by 
requiring that a Safety Committee be an 
inseparable part of the Settlement 
Agreement. The current committee members 
have done nothing to provide ratepayers 
·with any "additional assurance of safety." 
Petitioners argue that safety problems and violations 
have been due in part to the absence of a viable safety committee. 
The Settlement Agreement created an imminent danger to the 
residents of San Luis Obispo. They believe that safety violations 
may be related to performance-based ratemaking. They assert that 
over $500,000 of ratepayer dollars are being wasted each year on a 
committee that serves no purpose and provides no "additional 
assurance of safety." Petitioners pray that the Commission 
immediately suspend performance-based payments for Diablo Canyon 
and disband the Safety Committee. 
The Diablo canyon Independent Safety Committee (the 
Committee) and PG&E responded, denying the allegations and 
requesting that the petition be dismissed. 
The Committee's Response 
The Committee's response states that the Committee was 
not :armed until late December 1989. Its first committee member, 
or. William Kastenberg, was appointed by the governor in September 
1989 and the second member, Warren Owen, was appointed by the 
chairman of the Energy Commission in late December, 1989. The 
Committee had to organize itself, prepare rules and procedures, 
- 3 -
A.84-06-014, A.SS-08-025 ALJ/RAB/f.s 
retain a staff, and do those other housekeeping functions needed 
before it could be effective. The Committee held its first meeting 
in May 1990 and its second meeting the following November. It 
adopted its first report on the safety of Diablo Canyon operations 
in June, 1991. The report would have been adopted much earlier but 
for the illness of one of its two members which prevented a quorum 
for a meeting. A draft of the report was filed in the public 
document room at the California Polytechnic State University at San 
Luis Obispo library on June 3, 1991. The first report covered the 
period of plant operations from January 1 through June 30, 1990. A 
second report, which will deal with fiscal year 1990-1991, through 
June 30, 1991, is presently being drafted by the Committee and will 
be presented for consideration and final approval at its next 
scheduled meeting on october 3, 1991. 
The public meetings of the Committee are lengthy and 
include reports on committee business matters, technical 
presentations by representatives of PG&E on topics requested by the 
Committee, and public comments and communications. Meetings last 
from six to 10 hours a day. Notice of the meetings is given 
through a mailing to interested parties, publication of ads in 
local newspapers, and notices over radio and television stations. 
In addition to official meetings, the chairman of the Committee has 
met with numerous members of the public, including representatives 
of petitioners, on a number of occasions. 
The Committee prepares a transcript of its meetings, 
although a transcript is not required to be made, and permits those 
who have made presentations, especially technical presentations, to 
review the transcript for errors and omissions. The Committee 
maintains that this review is comparable to the review of 
depositions and is not an unusual practice. The Committee responds 
to written and telephone communications. The Committee points out 
that petitioners have not alleged any specific communications which 
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failed to elicit a response; the Committee in its filing has 
provided examples of responses it has made. 
The Committee has considered opening an office in San 
Luis Obispo but has determined that such an office is not necessary 
at this time to the fulfillment of its objectives and obligations 
to review and assess the safety of operations at the nuclear power 
plant. The committee notes that it has established a 24-hour 800 
toll free telephone number to receive questions and concerns. The 
Committee believes that at this time it is preferable to spend 
available funds on the experts and consultants necessary to assist 
and advise the Committee on safety and operations issues rather 
than on an office which will be of limited use. 
In regard to Allegation 7 of the petition that several 
safety related problems have arisen at Diablo Canyon without any 
action on the part of the Committee, the Committee asserts that 
this allegation is misleading, unsubstantiated, and untrue. No 
specific instances are cited by petitioners. The Committee states 
that numerous safety-related issues and problems at Diablo Canyon 
have been reviewed and examined at length by the Committee's 
members and its consultants. Some of these matters have been 
commented upon in the Committee's first interim report and others 
will be discussed in the forthcoming second annual report. The 
Committee has taken action. 
The Committee explains, for example, that its members and 
consultants reviewed the NRC Augmented Inspection Report concerning 
a loss of off-site power·event which occurred on March 7, 1991. At 
its June 1991 meeting, the Committee requested and received a 
further report on this incident from PG&E. Also at its June 
meeting, the Committee heard a report from PG&E which it 
specifically had requested regarding recent problems with steam 
dump valves. At this same meeting, the Committee acted to retain a 
metallurgical engineer for the purpose of reviewing and advising 
the committee concerning cracks which have developed in the Unit 2 
- 5 -
A.84-06-014, A.85-08-025 ALJ/RAB/f.s 
Chemical and Volume Control Systems (CVCS) let-down lines. 
Committee members spent a full day in August at Diablo Canyon 
inspecting the eves lines and reviewing the pipe thinning 
monitor:.ng program. In further response to public requests and 
concerns of its own, the Committee also acted at its June meeting 
to retain the services of a geotechnical engineer to advise it on 
plant-related seismic issues, and a Committee member and a 
consultant were present at a recent meeting in Washington, D.C. at 
which time the U.S.G.S. report concerning the Diablo Canyon Long-
Term Seismic Program was presented to the NRC Advisory Committee on 
Reactor Safeguards. 
PG&E 
PG&E supports the statements made by the Committee. It 
states that the Committee has adopted an annual report on Diablo 
operations, has met publicly since beginning operations in 
January 1990, has prepared transcripts of its meetings and made 
them available to the public in an open manner, and has been 
responsive to the public in San Luis Obispo County. PG&E asserts 
that it is operating Diablo canyon safely and that it is committed 
to operating Diablo canyon safely for the entire term of the 
settlement and the life of the plant. 
Discussion 
This is the second petition by petitioners regarding the 
settlement of the Diablo Canyon prudence review. In April 1989, 
petitioners filed a petition seeking to modify D.89-03-062 and 
D.88-12-083 (the decisions that approved the settlement of the 
Diablo Canyon prudence review) by suspending the performance-based 
payments for Diablo canyon. At that time, the petitioners alleged 
that the Independent Safety Committee was not appointed or 
functioning. In 0.90-04-008, we denied the petition. 
Petitioners are again before us, this time asserting that 
the Committee is ineffective. We have set out in detail 
petitioners' allegations and the response of the committee, and in 
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summarJ form, the response of PG&E. Petitioners have presented no 
facts which would cause us to suspend performance-based pricing for 
Diablo Canyon power and disband the Independent Safety Committee. 
We conclude that the petition should be denied. 
0 R 0 E R 
IT IS ORDERED that the petition of the San Luis Obispo 
~others for Peace, Life on Planet Earth, and Rochelle Becker is 
denied. 
This order is effective today. 
Dated October 11, 1991, at San Francisco, California. 
JOHN B. OHANIAN 
DANIEL Wm. FESSLER 
NORMAN D. SHUMWAY 
Commissioners 
Commissioner Patricia M. Eckert, 
being necessarily absent, did not 
participate. 
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United States Department of the Interior 
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
Senator Herschel Rosenthal 
345 Middlefield Road MS 977 
Menlo Park, California 94025 
4 December, 1991 
415/329-5620 FAX 415/329-5163 
Chairman, Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
Room 2035, State Capitol 
Sacramento, California 95814 
Dear Senator Rosenthal: 
TAKE 
PRIDE IN 
AMERICA 
-
-
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the oversight hearing at the State Capitol on 2 
December. I enclose a copy of the comments I prepared for the hearing. As you suggested, in my 
verbal testimony I summarized the prepared copy and incorporated some responses to the list of 
questions that were addressed to the U.S. Geological Survey. Your staff may fmd the original 
version helpful in transcribing the testimony. 
I also enclose written responses to the list of questions given to me. 
You also asked whether I agreed with the statement made by Mr. Martin that "NRC and USGS 
agreed to disagree". As I responded at the time, I believe that is an inaccurate description of the 
NRC response to our review. It also confuses the roles, for USGS acted as an advisor, not a 
partner in the decision process. In fact, the headquarters staff of NRC did respond, in varying 
degree, to USGS concerns about the dip of the Hosgri fault, the adverse effect of a vertical 
component of slip, and other important issues. For example, the final NRC position on ground 
motion required an increase in the assumed vertical component of slip, raising parts of the spectral 
ground-motion estimates by as much as 20% over the design values. 
Thank you again for your interest in the USGS review of the Diablo Canyon LTSP. 
enc.2 
cc. J. Devine, USGS 
R.Wesson, USGS 
R. Rothman, NRC 
!1212 
Sincerely yours: 
Robert D. Brown 
• 
-
-• 

Testimony by Robert D. Brown, U.S. Geological Survey 
at 
Hearing by California Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
regarding 
CALIFORNIA'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS: THEIR SAFETY, ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPACTS AND ECONOMIC COSTS 
Sacramento, California 
2 December, 1991 

December 2, 1991 R. Brown, U.S. Geological Survey 
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: 
Thank you for the inviting me to contribute to this hearing. In summarizing the U.S. 
Geological Survey's (USGS) role and findings regarding the Diablo Canyon power plant I would 
like to begin by explaining the USGS role and the scope of its acitivies. I would also like to 
remind you that the complete USGS report is available to the public as Appendix C in the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) Safety Evaluation Report, NUREG 0675, Supplement No. 34, 
dated June, 1991. 
Our report examined only the geological, geophysical and seismological issues. It did not 
examine such other topics as plant engineering, soil-structure interaction, or probabilistic risk 
assessment, although all of these were considered by Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) 
in their Long Term Seismic Program (L TSP) and by NRC and some of its other reviewers. 
Under a long-standing interagency agreement, the USGS advises NRC on earth-science 
issues and research related to reactor siting. For the Diablo Canyon Long Term Seismic Program, 
I was the principal USGS consultant from January, 1985, until completion of the NRC review 
process in September, 1991. That time period began with the original design and scoping of the 
LTSP in 1985 and continued through the acquisition, analysis, and interpretation of the data. 
The review process included a series of informational meetings between NRC and its 
consultants, and the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and its consultants. I and other 
USGS scientists attended chiefly those meetings devoted to geology, seismology, and tectonics, 
although on one or two occasions I also attended those on ground motion. 
PG&E's fmal report on the Diablo Canyon Long Term Seismic Program was issued in 
July, 1988. Chapters 2 and 3 of that report triggered many questions about PG&E's conclusions 
regarding the geometry and the direction and amount of slip on faults near the plant Those 
conclusions are important because they constrain ground-motion estimates, which in turn define 
the severity of shaking for structures and components at the site. PG&E responded to these 
questions in a series of supplemental reports issued between January, 1989, and July,l990. 
Together, all of these reports constituted PG&E's assessment of the geology, seismology, and 
tectonics as these topics relate to earthquake hazard near the plant site . 
The USGS review was based on the PG&E reports and supporting proprietary data 
furnished by PG&E, information from other published or pre-publication sources, and on our own 
investigations and file data. As noted in our report to the NRC, our review confirmed many of the 
findings of the LTSP. But we also questioned several conclusions by PG&E, most significantly 
those regarding the Hosgri fault geometry at depth and the direction and amount of slip on the 
Hosgri fault. 
The north-northwest-trending surface trace of this fault is offshore, 2.8 miles from the 
Diablo Canyon power plant The fault is judged to be capable of generating a 7.2 magnitude 
earthquake. PG&E interprets the Hosgri fault as a vertical or near-vertical plane, along which the 
displacements that cause earthquakes are essentially horizontal. In geologist's jargon, this is a 
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right-lateral strike-slip fault, geometrically similar to most parts of the San Andreas fault The 
USGS review considers the Hosgri fault to be a more complex structure, with parallel seaward 
branches, and with a main fault plane that--although nearly vertical within 2 miles of the sea floor--
flattens to dips of 50° to 70° NE, at depths of 2.5 to 7 miles. USGS also finds that the sense of 
motion on the Hosgri fault is most likely oblique. That is, earthquakes on this fault will result 
from approximately equal amounts of horizontal and vertical slip and will resemble the Lorna Prieta 
earthquake of October, 1989. 
These differences become important in estimating ground motion, which as a rule 
diminishes with distance from the slipped surface of the fault The seismic waves that produce 
strong ground motion will come chiefly from those regions of the Hosgri fault that are 3 to 8 miles 
deep. The USGS interpretation differs from PG&E's by placing this deep, seismogenic area of the 
Hosgri fault closer to the plant site and, in part, vertically beneath it Moreover, the ground-motion 
estimates for the LTSP indicate that oblique-slip earthquakes produce more severe shaking than do 
comparable strike-slip earthquakes. Thus, both the geometry of the fault and the oblique-slip 
orientation may contribute to increased levels of ground motion. 
Slip rates on faults, together with other information, help us predict the magnitude and 
frequency of earthquakes; higher slip rates translate into larger earthquakes, more frequent 
earthquakes, or both. From trench exposures and displaced stream channels, PG&E estimated a 
long-term, strike-slip rate of about 0.1 in./yr for the San Simeon fault, 36 miles northwest of 
Diablo Canyon. This estimate characterizes the surface deformation on the trenched fault strand, 
but it does not incorporate nearby geologic and seismologic evidence for an additional vertical 
component of slip which may equal the horizontal component. Net oblique slip (the vector sum of 
horizontal and vertical components) on the San Simeon fault may therefore exceed the estimated 
long-term rate of strike slip, contributing again to higher ground-motion estimates. 
Ground-motion levels that exceed the design parameters for the plant and its components 
can lead to failure and loss of function. The upper limits of ground motion are difficult to establish 
for several reasons. Let me mention just 3 that apply here: 
1.--The horizontal component of displacement for the Hosgri fault is imported from the 
San Simeon fault, 36 miles distant; these 2 faults are probably related, but the nature of 
that relationship is ambiguous. Direct observations of horizontal slip on the offshore 
Hosgri fault have not been obtained. 
2.--A vertical component of slip on the Hosgri fault is evident, but its magnitude is 
unknown and is likely to remain so without offshore drilling to provide reliable age 
control. 
3.--Even with all other questions resolved, ground motion estimates currently depend on 
a data base that is nearly devoid of ~7 earthquakes within 3 miles of strong-motion 
recording instruments. 
Such gaps in our knowledge makes the assessment of earthquake hazard uncertain. The 
use of probabilistic methods gives a basis for decisions, but cannot substitute for real data. At this 
time the analysis for Diablo Canyon depends heavily on geologic judgement, extrapolated data, and 
2 
December 2, 1991 R. Brown, U.S. Geological Survey 
tenuous assumptions regarding the Hosgri fault. New evidence from offshore geology and 
geophysics and from earthquake seismology will probably resolve some of this uncertainty in the 
next decade or two. That evidence could confmn present views of plant safety, but it could also 
drastically alter those views. 
The Diablo Canyon LTSP and the controversy regarding some of the earth-science issues 
underscores 5 important conclusions or lessons: 
• The problem of the Hosgri fault and its earthquake hazard potential is not satisfactorily 
resolved. 
• For such critical facilities as dams and reactors, geologic hazards should be fully and 
carefully evaluated ~ resources are committed to construct and operate the facility. 
• In regions as geologically complex and incompletely known as coastal California, 
exploration costs required to define earthquake hazards adequately may approach or 
exceed the construction costs for some facilities. 
• New discoveries and unexpected events occur frequently in earthquake research. 
Timely reassessment of earthquake vulnerability at existing facilities is a critical 
element in long-term risk management. 
• Where seismic hazard is recognized, adequately defined, and quantified, engineering 
strategies can usually reduce the risk to acceptable levels. An engineering solution to 
an undefmed or poorly constrained problem offers substantially less protection. 
3 
Response to questions for U.S. Geological Survey from California Senate Committee on Energy 
and Public Utilities, hearing of 2 December, 1991 
Q 1: Please comment on reports that Ken Campbell, a former USGS employee who was also 
involved in reviewing the Diablo Canyon seismic study, estimated the increase in ground 
motion at 47%. 
A 1: The 47% increase is probably from an estimate made early in the course of the Long Term 
Seismic Program (L TSP). Ground-motion estimates were based on several methods of 
analysis and were re-examined several times; estimates by different investigators clustered 
more closely toward the end of the investigation. Dr. Campbell's most recent comments on 
the empirical ground-motion estimates are contained in his Review of the Long-Term 
Seismic Program: Empirical Ground-Motion Studies, dated March 18, 1991, and Revised 
Ground-Motion Estimates, May 22, 1991. 
Q 2: Why wasn't ground-motion information included in the final USGS report? What is the 
USGS position on ground motion caused by the Hosgri fault? 
A 2: Dr. Campbell, as a member of the USGS staff, reviewed ground-motion estimates for NRC 
from 1985 unti11990. Campbell's resignation from the USGS in January, 1990, 
terminated USGS participation in the ground-motion review, but NRC continued to retain 
Campbell as a consultant until the review process ended USGS has taken no position on 
ground motion because it did not participate in the review after January, 1990. 
Q 3: Has any serious doubt been expressed within USGS about the ability of the Diablo plant to 
safely withstand a maximum Hosgri fault earthquake? 
A 3: The ability of the plant to "safely withstand a(n) ..... earthquake" depends on the detailed 
engineering analysis of the plant and its components when these are subjected to the strong 
shaking from a large earthquake. The USGS review of geology, geophysics and 
seismology did not extend into matters of plant safety and engineering. To my knowledge, 
the survivability of the Diablo plant under earthquake loads has not been seriously examined 
within USGS. See also the answer to question 4 below. 
Q 4: The recent NRC decision which endorses PG&E's position on the seismic safety of the 
plant requires PG&E to submit further calculations to NRC to back up its position. Will 
USGS be called on to review this new information? 
A 4: These calculations are probably those noted in section 3.8.1.1 of the NRC Safety Evaluation 
Report, Supplement 34 (SSER 34), p. 3-19, concerning the adequacy of seismic margins to 
accommodate the higher ground motions required in the NRC staff report. The calculations 
are for specific structures or systems within the plant and they would be reviewed by 
engineers and risk analysts, not by the USGS. See also the answer to question 3 above. 
Q 5: Has there been any consideration of a further independent USGS investigation--not just a 
review of PG&E studies? 
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A 5: USGS has not seriously considered a site-oriented investigation, similar to the LTSP. It 
continues to support a broad research program on active California faults. That program 
includes earthquake monitoring of the Hosgri and other coastal faults, seismic-reflection and 
field geologic investigations of the structure and stratigraphy near coastal faults, collection 
of strong-motion data on large earthquakes, and development of improved methods of 
estimating strong ground motion. 
Q 6: What lessons about the Hosgri fault were learned from the 1989 Lorna Prieta earthquake? 
A 6: Strictly speaking, the Lorna Prieta earthquake was located on a different structure than the 
Hosgri fault and so provided little direct evidence about the nature of the Hosgri fault. 
However, the Lorna Prieta earthquake emphasized several lessons of importance in the 
LTSP review. Some examples are: 1) oblique-slip and reverse-slip earthquakes of 
magnitudes greater than 7 are common in the San Andreas fault system; 2) surface evidence 
of faulting may not always foretell the mechanism for the next large earthquake; 3) where 
fault ruptures that produce earthquakes do not consistently reach the ground surface, the 
hazard from damaging earthquakes can be seriously underestimated; and 4) the character of 
faulting at depth can change within 10-20 miles along a single fault, making suspect those 
estimates that are based on extrapolated data. 
Q 7: Will USGS ongoing onshore and offshore studies provide relevant information that may 
have a bearing on the seismic safety of the Diablo Canyon plant? Will that information be 
shared with the NRC? 
A 7: The answer, as suggested in the response to question 5 above, is yes to both questions. 
Moreover, USGS research results are made available to the public, as well as to other 
federal and state agencies. The ongoing research ties between USGS and NRC make it 
likely that any significant new information on the Hosgri fault would be exchanged 
promptly. 
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San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
1 037 RHchi e Rd. 
Grover City~ CA 93433 
(605) 469-7 420 
SAFETY COMMITTEE 
The San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace actively participated in the 
California Public Utilities Commission's hearings on the Settlement 
Agreement for PG&E ·s Diablo Canyon. \.Yhile we were disappointed that the 
Pub 1i c Staff Di vision, 1 ater renamed the Di vision of Ratepayer Advocates, 
,jid not pursue their original recommendation of a $4.4 billion dollar• 
,jJsallowance in the anginal Diablo rate case, we were devastated when the 
CPUC announced the pay-for-performance rate scheme that PG&E .. the 
Attorney General, and the CPUC staff had come up with behind closed doors. 
Almost four years and hundreds of thousands of dollars in taxpayer money 
had been spent developing the reasonableness portton of the rate case and it 
is now buried in the archives somewhere. 
The prime objections of the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to the 
Settlement Agreement have always been based on safety. 'we felt that if 
PG&E Yvas only to be paid for power produced then the incentive for not 
shutting down when repairs needed to be made and /or rushing through 
refueling outages was great. We \'Vere told by the Commission that it was in 
PG$,_E's best interest to keep Diablo Canyon operating safely because if their 
nuclear plant did not operate PG&E would not be paid. \4/e argued that if 
safety problems arose that did not effect operation, PG&E would be likely to 
put off fixing those problems until refueling. 
To eliminate .., . ,.hat the Commission felt was a chance~ that safety might be 
compromised for profit the "Independent Safety" Committee was created. 
From the very beginning the requirements for this committe were set up in 
such o woy thot virtually no person wlth any history of safety concerns 
regarding the nuclear industry would be eligible to sit on the committee. 
Only those wlth "experience, background, and knowledge of the nuclear 
industry would be eligible. This is not even a requirement at the NRC who 
have the power to enforce, cite, fine, and supposedly shut down nuclear 
p 1 ants for safety vi o 1 au ons. 
For over a year the public ·waited for the "Independent Safety" Committee to 
r·1old its first rneeting. A third rnember was not even appointed until spring 
of this ~ear. If the Commission believed that safety could be compromised 
for profit, why did the commission a11ow PG&E to co11ect rates under this 
unique rate scheme for over a year before the committee was in place? V·lhy 
did they disallow any applicant who had testified on behalf of the public 
regarding safety issues at Diablo Can1don? 'w'hy did the commission fall to 
senously consider, much less adopt, even one of the recommendations 
:3ubmitted by public intevenors regarding safety implications of the 
settlernent aqreernent? If the commission did not believe that safety could 
be compromised for profit under this unique rate scheme, vvhy is the pub1ic 
paying over $500,000 a year for this "Independent Safety" committee? 
In the three yeors thot hove possed since the odoption of the 
Settlement Agreement do the Son Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
feel that the ·Independent Sofety· Committee has provided the 
·odditional assurance of safety promised by the commission? 
Absolutely noH The public attended the first committee meeting to let 
the committee ~~now v·ihat they needed to do in order for the community of 
San Luis Obispo to have any confidence in them. Basically three issues were 
repeated through out the afternoon and evening. First, that there be an an 
office and staff (a presence) in San Luis Obispo. The office should provide4 
a place where the public could go to ask questions and review documents 
requested by and subm1tted to the committee; a place where Diablo Canyon 
emplo1dees could go in confidentiality to report safety concerns. 
Second, members of the public repeatedly requested that the committee 
retain a consultant to do an independent analysis of PG&E's l TSP and the 
NRC review of that program. After repeating that request at several 
meetings and though several letters, that were never answered, this 
summer it is our understanding that the committee finally hired such a 
consultant. Unfortunately, the consultant was from the east coast and 
unable to attend the Atomic Committee on Reactor Safeguard's subcommitte 
t1earing in San Luis Obispo last September. In addition to the extreme delay 
in hiring this consultant the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace wonder why 
the committee felt that a California geologist or se1smollg1st would not be 
as qualified, if not more qualified to review a seismic program specific to 
the California coastline? 
Finally, we asked that all correspondence submitted to the committee be 
placed in the record and avallable for the publlc to review. This has not 
happened. In fact, the public document room which houses the documents 
from the committee is sorely lacking in its completeness. In the collection 
of ijocuments the public ·vvill find little if any publlc correspondence. We 
t·,ave no idea of ·what the committee has been asked to look into. Answers to 
questions submitted b!-1 the committee to PG&E flll the shelves, but not the 
questions themselves. Therefore, the public who read the committee's files 
have no idea if the ans-.,.vers are responsive to the committee's questions or 
lf tJtere was any fallow up. 
This macessabllity of the committee and the committee's documents even 
extends to the press. On November 20 .. 1991 .. the Five Cities Times Press 
Recorder ran a column entitled, "How Safe is Diablo? Vou·n have to Pay to 
Kno··i·i. It seems our 1 oca 1 paper had requested a copy of the safety 
committee's onnuol report and was told the newspaper would be charged 
$.30 a page for the 160 page report. This paper understands that the issues 
surrounding all aspects of Diablo Canyon have been and remain 
controversial. draws alot of public interest, and affect the public's health 
and welfare. By providing a copy to the press the community would hove 
been mode aware of what the committee has been doing with the money we 
are forced to pay and just where that money has been spent. Doesn't the 
committee want the public to know what they are doing with our money? 
They seem to me to have enough of our money to provide the press and I 
bell eve the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace with a copy of their reports. 
How man'd members of the the publlc still attend the "Independent Safety" 
comm1ttee's meetings? The answer is very few. V.Je believe the safety 
committee is a tooth 1 ess 1 ap dog, not a watch dog. 
From the beginning we had little confldence the committee would be able or 
even willing to provide the promised "addltional assurance of safety." 
Despite that fact, vve took time out of out busy schedules to attend the first 
two meetings and offer suggestions on how this committee might work 
successfully with the San Luis Obispo community to built that assurance of 
safety. It soon became apparent that our suggestions were not welcomed. 
Vie vv'ere virtually ignored. 
During the years since the settlement agreement w·as signed our fears that 
PG&E might compromise sofety for profit hove not disappeared. PG&E 
repeatedly touts their ability to refuel more quickly than any other utility. 
However during refuelings PG&E has been cited f£~2~c~ss1ve ~r 
overtime, they have had a serious crane accident, and~at their last refueling 
two contract workers were exposed to radidation. Also just before their 
last refuellng the Diablo nuclear plant had been leaking for three weeks, but 
PG&E 'Nas determined to set a world record for continuous operation. 
Somehow that record did little to increase the public's perception of PG&E 
as a utlllty that places safety before profit. 
Son Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace 
1 037 Ritchie Rd. 
Grover City .. Co 93433 
(805) 489-7420 
SEISMIC 
In 1973, after Diablo Canyon w·as about 50% constructed, the public first 
bec~me aw~re of the existence of the Hosgri Fault. The Hosgri Fault is an 
active fault \Nhich lies offshore & vvithin 2.8 miles of the Diablo Canyon 
nuc 1 ear p lent. ! t was in the fall of 197 4 that the San Luis Obispo Mothers 
for Peace tiled a motion wlth the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board to stop 
wort< on the plant untll se1sm1c studies could be completed. Our motion was 
denied. construction continued, and the economic investment by PG&E 
b 1 i r11jed the regula tors to safety concerns. 
We are here today, over 17 years later, to detan the history of PG&E's and 
the NRC's unwillingness to seriously look into the possibility that this fault 
could produce an earthquake that could trigger a radioactive release. 
The San Luis Ob1spo Mothers for Peace believe a historical perspective is 
vital to understanding how the seismic issue evolved to where it is today. 
To that end, we recently retained Dr. James Crouch, formerly with the 
United States Geological Survey {USGS), and a consultant to the CPUC on 
:::eismic issues during their reasonableness review to review PG&Es Long 
Term Seismic Program and the NRC's staffs review. Dr Crouch prepared 
testimony for a recent NRC subcommittee hearing. The Mothers for Peace 
have been actively involved in bringing to the NRC's and the publics· 
attention safety issues at Diablo canyon, as their representative I will also 
be quoting sections of~ testimony. 
(Dr.er"uch',.) 
After reading the USGS fln~l review of PG&E's LTSP, the Mothers for Peace 
understood that the USGS~concluded that PG&E's Hosgri related conclusions 
were unreasonable & biased toward a vertical slip strike fault. The USGS 
also concluded that as a result of this bias the related ground motion 
determined at Diablo Canyon may be underestimated. In fact, a member of 
the USGS review team pointed out that they could rightly be accused of 
being "too gentlemanly" regarding their report on PG&E's LTSP. 
To quote the last sentence in the first paragraph of the USGS executive 
:;ummary ..... some issues remain unresolved or controversial .. chiefly because 
of the lack of definitive evidence." They go on to state that "Revievv·ers, ... 
,jisagree with PG.5c.E's interpretation of the Hosgri fault as a strike-s1ip 
fault with little or no vert1cal component of sllp ... Strike-slip rate of 1-3 
mm/yr, derived by PG&E from surface geologic evidence, probably represent 
only part of the potentlai seismogenic slip on the Hosgri fault ... PG&E 
considers the Hosgri fault to be nearly vertical, but data for both the 
seafloor fault zone and the broader fault system suggests northeast dips of 
50-70 degrees at earthquake depths of 4-10 km ... A logic tree for the Hosgri 
fault designed by PG&E to characterize seismic sources probab11istica1ly, 
contains several branches in which parameters derived from a strike-slip 
model are substituted for data. Model-based values, biased to favor strike-
slip faulting, yield logic tree probability distribution functions for the 
Hosgri fault that are similarly biased .. .Some questionable procedural steps 
m the logic tree also bias t1'"1e number of outcomes in the same sense, 
producing more strike-slip outcomes ... And the final paragraph of the USGS 
summary, "These review comments may be especially important to 
estimates of ground motion. The most significant differences vvith PG&E 
interpretations concern the dip and seismogenic-sllp mechanism for the 
Hosgri fault at depths of 4-10 km, where earthquakes nucleate and where 
most seismic energy originates. If ground motions depend on fault 
characteristics other than earthquake magnitude, the ground motion values 
for a vertical strike-slip fault may underestimate those for oblique slip, 
reverse. or thrust faults." 
Senators, none of these concerns were raised in the NRC staff's report SSER 
34. According to the testimony of Dr. Crouch at the September meeting in 
San Luis Obispo, "the NRC staff virtually adopted and reiterated almost 
verbatim all of PG&E's unconservative conclusions regarding the Hosgri 
fault and the related ground motion: Furthermore, the USGS criticisms lead 
the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace to be1ieve that PG&E's multi-million 
dollar investment in their LTSP has not resulted in assuring the public that 
Diablo Canyon is any more seismically safe than it was when their study 
began. 
The independent conclusions of the USGS differ regarding the character and 
dip of the Hosgri fault. We feel it is vital to discover how this difference in 
interpretation might impact ground motion at the Diablo Canyon site. Given 
the weight of scientific evidence, the San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace do 
not believe that PG&E's conclusions regarding the character and dip of the 
Hosgri fault and the associated ground motion at the sHe are appropriate in 
terms of applying reasonable conservatism. 
ln Dr Crouch's testimony of September 16, 1991, he restates the opinions of 
other scientists \'·tho had revie·wed PG&E's LTSP. Dr. Ralph Archuleta, stated 
that "After a revie 1N of all of the elements of the numerical simulations, I 
conclude that the PG~"-E numerical analyses has systematically 
underestimate,j the ground motion for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power 
Plant for the expectant r·1 7.2 earthquake. 
Dr. Ken Camp be 11 vvho vvorked on ground motion used the f o 11 owt ng 
descriptive v·tords in his review: biased_. unconservative, unreliable, 
inappropriate, too subjective. 
f1r. David McCulloch, \Nho was involved in the review of the offshre data 
related to the Hosgri fault but has since retired, was so disturbed by the 
r··iRC staff's conclusions in ~SER 34 that he is formulatting a letter of 
protest that v·ti 11 soon be forwarded to the NRC. 
It appears that in arriving at their conclusions in Safety evaluation Report 
34 regarding the character and dip of the Hosgri fault and related ground 
motion the NRC staff essentially agreed wtth PG&E's interpretation of the 
Hosgri fault and in doing so ignored the noted concerns of the USGS 
reviewers. Reasonable conservatism has not been applied in the review 
process. Furthermore, there is something fundamentally wrong wtth a 
review process which allows NRC staff to ignore the advise of their 
consultants. Vo/e flrmly believe that an Independent Study of the Hosgri fault 
could produce a conservative and more scientifically sound outcome. 
Dr. Crouch, a Santa Barbara scientist immenently Qualified to speak on 
siesmic issues especially in Callfornia told the NRC's subcommHee that he 
is "not opposed to nuclear power in general, nor Diablo Canyon specifically. 
I am, however, opposed to the misuse of science and to what I perceive to be 
a flawed regulatory review process, a process which relies on investigative 
material assembled and presented by an applicant who has a mu1ti-b1111on 
,jollars investment and income base to protect, a process in which the 
overvvhelming review and approbval decisions are in the hands of a few 
individuals, the NRC staff, who hove little or no local expertise in the 
complex gee-seismic issues surrounding Diablo Canyon, but have power to 
set aside the advice of their own independent consultants who possess this 
expertise." 
Another independent scientist, Dr Jay Namson, testH1ed at the recent NRC 
~:;ubcornmittee meeting held in San Luis Obispo that there are a series of 
large folds within the coast ranges and going out into the offshore where 
the Diablo nuclear plant is located. He used a series of overheads .. which 
'vvere not included in the transcript, to explain that these folds could have a 
significant impact on PG&E's nuclear plant. Dr. Namson and his partner Dr. 
Davis had studied the offshore geology and submitted their wor~c According 
to Dr. Namson·~: testimony of September 16, 1991, PG&E \.Yas asked to 
address the Namson and Davis model. Dr. Namson said PG&E's summary and 
critique of the Davis & Namson model "is filled with half-truths, 
1rrelevancies, absolutely wrong 1nformat1on or conclusions, and, ~ think 
most importantly .. it shows that they (PG&E) have great misconcetions about 
t·,ow you use this tectmique and approach. They clearly don't understand how 
to do this ... one of the things that they (PG&E) go through and do in their 
critique is that they point out that none of the folds, the Point San Luis 
anticline, the San Luis range anticlinorium, or the La Panza anticlinorium, 
basically they go on to conclude that these folds don't even exist; that they 
are a figment of our approach and we developed them because of our 
approact1 ... for them (PG&E) to 1gnore this long regional trend of t1iocene 
rocks and be telling you that the folds don't exist is absolutely 
1udicrous .. .THe other thing was that right along one of those important folds 
concerning Diablo Canyon, this fold that I call the Point San Luis anticline, 
which runs right underneath or right along the northern edge of the Santa 
Maria Valley and then underneath Diablo Canyon. That fold was first mapped 
by Reed & Hollister in the 1930's. I didn't invent that fold ... the (PG&E's) 
cone 1 us10ns are the f o 1 ds don't exist; therefore, the thrusts underneath don't 
exist." 
Dr. Narnson goes on to explain that PG&E was "asked to come up with their 
o·.,vn ideas as to ·whether there might be ·what we call blind thrust 
faults ... undemeath the nuclear power plant...Well, in these two studies, 
there's a couple of interesting things about them. One is that the Point San 
Luis anticline, which they argued didn't exist, is now shown ... and they 
(PG&E) now show a series of thrust faults underneath the power plant... they 
(PG&E) never actually say there is a fold there but they've certainly drawn 
it." 
Dr. Namson goes on to state that he was criticized by PG&E for not 
understanding "crustal rheology· (please don't ask me what that is). As he 
was about to explain why his studies reflect the correct method of 
understanding the way rocks behave and why that is important to the 
subject at hand for the NRC subcommittee, he was interrupted by the 
chairman and told he was out of time. This is one of many examples of the 
NRC's unwillingness to look at independent scientific data that exists, when 
it might impact the operation of one of their nuclear plants. Fortunately, 
ttme was given to Dr. Namson from another member of the public and Dr. 
Namson v·fas allo··Ned to continue. He explained he was an expert in the field 
of rnodeling folds. He teaches course on the subject. PG&E does not have 
.~nyone ..... ·rho has a background on this technique. He finished his testimony by 
:;tating that "I h(:lve to conclude that not only are they (PG&E) incompetent, 
but the'd are clearly advocates of the nuclear pov·ler industry, clearly 
advocates of Diablo Canyon, and clearly advocates to minimize the seismic 
risk." 
The public vvho had attended the NRC subcommitte meeting were amazed at 
Dr. Narnson·s testimony and at the courage 1t took this scientist to come to 
San Luis Obispo on his own to fight for what he believed was right. As a 
non-scientist, I osked Dr. Steve Lewis of the USGS if Dr. Namson·s 
allegations had amd basis in fact; his answer was a resounding VES! 
The reports and test.1mon'd from the above independent scientists cry out for 
an maepenaent study mto the seismicity and geology of the Diablo Canyon 
onshore and offshore area. The publlc deserves to know that 1f they live by 
a nuclear plant that sits less than 3 mtles from a major active earthquake 
fault they everything in our governments po·wer to assure that the public 
·...vill be safe should be done. This means an indepth seismic study done by 
independent scientists \f'tith continual updates when new seismic 
information becomes available. 
T U R N Toward Utility Rate Normalization 
625 Polk Street, Suite 403, San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 929-8876 FAX: (415) 929-1132 
Senator Herschel Rosenthal 
Chairman 
December 2, 1991 
Senate Committee on Energy and Public Utilities 
State Capitol, Room 2035 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Rosenthal, 
Thank you for inviting TURN to participate in your 
committee's hearing on "California's Nuclear Power Plants: Their 
Safety, Environmental Impacts and Economic Costs." I regret that 
another commitment prevents me from attending the hearing and 
ask that this letter be included in the formal record. 
TURN shares many of the concerns that will be raised by the 
Division of Ratepayer Advocates, Mothers for Peace, Campaign 
California and others who will testify at the hearing regarding 
the safety and environmental problems of nuclear power plants. 
My comments will focus specifically on the economic impact of 
what is undoubtedly the most controversial of California's 
nuclear power plants-- Pacific Gas & Electric Co.'s Diablo 
Canyon plant near San Luis Obispo. 
As you may know, PG&E profits handsomely from the power it 
generates at Diablo canyon as a result of a controversial 
settlement that the utility entered into in 1988 with the 
California Public Utilities Commission's Division of Ratepayer 
Advocates and the California Attorney General. The settlement 
does away with traditional ratemaking and lets PG&E base its 
revenues for Diablo Canyon primarily on the amount of electricity 
generated at the plant. 
In addition to providing PG&E with a strong incentive to put 
production concerns before safety, the settlement enabled the 
utility to avoid the embarrassment of having to explain why it 
took 17 years, three attempts and $5.6 billion to construct the 
plant. such an explanation would have been necessary under 
traditional ratemaking because the rules require that utilities 
demonstrate that the costs incurred in building a new power plant 
are reasonable and prudent. 
Instead, PG&E's rates are among the highest in the nation. 
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners 
survey of winter 1990-91 power rates ranked PG&E among the 25 
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most expensive utility companies. Furthermore, the price that 
PG&E gets for Diablo power is more expensive than any other power 
on PG&E's system, including power from the qualifying facilities 
that are criticized by utilities as too expensive. 
PG&E notes in its annual report that as a result of the 
settlement, the price of power generated at Diablo Canyon was set 
at 9.6 cents per kilowatt-hour in 1991. In 1992, the price of 
Diablo Canyon electricity will rise to 10.34 cents per kilowatt-
hour, and by 1994 it will be at 11.89 cents per kilowatt-hour as 
a result of the settlement. 
In comparison, the price for power that PG&E generates at 
fossil fuel plants like Moss Landing is approximately 5-6 cents 
per kilowatt-hour, and power from hydroelectric sources is priced 
at 1-3 cents per kilowatt-hour. It is significant to note that 
the Diablo power is even more expensive than independently 
produced power from qualifying facilities, which averages 7.3 
cents per kilowatt-hour and is frequently criticized by utilities 
as too expensive. 
Given the recordbreaking rate at which Diablo is generating 
power, it isn't surprising that PG&E's earnings are up. Indeed, 
the company's most recent annual report cites increased earnings 
from Diablo as a major reason that earnings per common share were 
higher in 1990 than in the previous year. And net income for the 
year came close to reaching the $1 billion mark. 
Meanwhile, PG&E's electric customers have been faced with 
huge rate hikes. Between 1988 and 1991, PG&E's residential 
electric rates went up 49 percent, and customers who stayed 
within the baseline allowance saw even steeper increases. When 
PG&E raised its electric rates more than 10 percent last January, 
nearly one-third of the increase was a result of the Diablo 
settlement. 
TURN opposed the Diablo canyon settlement at the time it was 
announced, and we continue to believe that the terms of the 
settlement unfairly benefit PG&E's stockholders at the expense of 
captive ratepayers. The facts revealed in PG&E's latest annual 
report substantiate our concerns. 
Although TURN appealed to the California Supreme court to 
review the CPUC's decision authorizing the Diablo settlement, we 
were not surprised when the Court declined to hear the matter. 
Unfortunately, TURN believes the CPUC also lacks the will to 
correct the inequities that have resulted from the settlement. 
Consequently, it may be time for the Legislature to consider 
legislation that would require the CPUC to revisit the Diablo 
settlement in order to provide for more equitable rates and to 
eliminate the incentive to favor production over safety. 
Again, I want to thank you for inviting TURN to participate 
in the Dec. 2 hearing. Please feel free to contact me if you 
have questions about my comments or would like additional 
information about the impact of the Diablo canyon settlement on 
PG&E's electric rates. 
Sincerely, 
~-~ 
Audrie Krause ~ 
Executive Director 
co: Committee members 
December 2, 1991 
PREPARED TESTIMONY OF THE REDWOOD ALLIANCE 
REGARDING THE HOMBQLDT BAY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT 
AND THE INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR POWER OPERATIONS 
BEFORE THE 
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES 
OF THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 
PRESENTED BY JAMES S. ADAMS 
The Redwood Alliance (Alliance) appreciates the opportunity to 
address this committee on the Humboldt Bay Nuclear Power Plant and 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. Since its formation in 
1978, the Alliance has worked on a variety of issues concerning 
nuclear power plants in California. The Alliance would like to 
comment on three of those issues this morning. 
The first concerns the Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit #3, 
a small (63 megawatt) nuclear generation facility that 
operated from 1963 to 1976 until the reactor was shut down for 
periodic fuel replacement and never reopened. The owner, 
Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), made a decision in the 
early 1980's to retire Unit 3 in part because of concerns 
about seismic safety and the cost of structural repairs. The 
Alliance supported this decision and reviewed the 
Environme~tal Impact Report for SAFSTOR and decommissioning 
, activ:i.tif1s, 9.'i-1d .the relevant license modifications in 1986 and 
. ,1 ·~ ... ·. ; ... ' ··•. •. -: .. ·.~·. .~. 
1~ia1: · .. ~ 
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~· -. 
. · 
p.o. box 293 arcata, california 95521 (707) 822-7884 
The Alliance entered into an agreement (see Attachment A) with 
PG&E, political representatives for the Humboldt area and local 
citizens, regarding the storage and disposal of radioactive waste 
at the Humboldt plant. The agreement had three main components: 
1. PG&E agreed to ship the spent fuel assemblies to a u.s. 
2. 
Department of Energy approved repository as soon as one 
is available; 
PG&E agreed to 
dismantling of 
carry 
Humboldt 
out 
Bay 
the process of 
Unit 3 following 
final 
the 
removal of the spent fuel assemblies and any other high 
or intermediate level waste from the Unit 3 site; 
3. PG&E agreed to reexamine the possibility of utilizing 
"dry cask storage" as a method of storing the fuel 
assemblies until they could be moved to a repository. 
At the time of the agreement (June 1987), the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) had not approved the dry cask 
technology as viable means of storing fuel assemblies. However, 
the NRC recently sanctioned the use of dry cask storage and the 
Alliance believes that PG&E should now reexamine the preferred 
option of utilizing the new method at Humboldt Unit #3. 
The spent fuel pool at Humboldt Bay Unit 3 is housed in a 
building which is not designed to withstand a maximum credible 
earthquake from the underlying Little Salmon fault and other 
adjacent faults. A 262 foot tall discharge stack and a 200 ton 
emergency condenser are located directly over the storage pool. 
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Even though chances are slight that an accident could cause the 
spent fuel to reach criticality, the Alliance believes there are 
identifiable risks of environmental contamination. Removing the 
fuel from the building and placing it in dry cask storage outside 
of the building would preclude any chance of a collapsing building 
or discharge stack from harmfully impacting the irradiated fuel. 
In addition, it is our understanding that the Sacramento 
Municipal Utility District (SMUD) has undertaken a project to 
develop a dual purpose dry cask that can be used onsite at a 
nuclear plant, transported by truck or train, and stored 
indefinitely at a repository. Funds for the project are being 
provided by SMUD, the Department of Energy, and the Electric Power 
Research Institute. The Alliance encourages PG&E to participate 
fully in this endeavor in parallel with its own study of 
implementation of Dry Cask Storage, in hopes that the technology 
will soon be available to nuclear power plants like Humboldt Bay 
Unit 3. 
Second, we hereby request that PG&E drill groundwater test 
wells between the plant's radioactive waste handling areas and 
Humboldt Bay. It is our opinion that the test wells that are 
currently on site are inadequate in that they are not "downstream" 
from the plant in the direction that the water table flows (see 
Attachments B & C). Therefore, it is possible that leaks at the 
facility remain undetected. 
The third issue the Alliance would like to comment on involves 
public access to reports issued by the Institute of Nuclear, Power 
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Operations (INPO), a nuclear utility self-regulating group funded 
by ratepayers' electric bills. INPO conducts periodic inspections 
of all nuclear power plants and assembles candid reports about each 
facility's operation, safety procedures, and related matters. The 
NRC has refused to release these reports to the public despite 
several rulings by the U.S. Court of Appeals that the documents 
should be made available. 
The Alliance has requested copies of the reports for Diablo 
Canyon and Humboldt Bay nuclear power plants. The request was 
denied by INPO on the grounds that public exposure would damage the 
"detailed and candid exchange of information that is so vital to 
the INPO evaluation program" (see Attachment D). The NRC has not 
yet responded to our request; however, a denial is expected based 
on the experience of others attempting to obtain INPO reports. A 
denial would be in direct contradiction to previous rulings of the 
Appellate Court, and undermines the regulatory role of the NRC 
regarding the public dissemination of reports and analyses about 
the safety and operation of nuclear power plants. 
The Alliance urges this Committee to contact the NRC and 
require that all INPO reports for nuclear power plants in 
California be provided to this Committee. If this request is 
denied, the Alliance encourages the Committee to notify Congress of 
that fact. 
We are prepared to assist the Committee and staff in whatever 
manner is appropriate. Thank you for the opportunity to address 
the Committee. 
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A'l''IACHMENT A 
3 In consideration ~or the Joint Intervenors, GAYE M. BARR, 
4 LEAG:.:E OF \·i0~1EN VOTERS 0? n~:-sc.:..:DT COU!1TY, DANIEL E. HAUSER, 
5 BARRY KEENE, DOUGLAS H. BCSCO, \\'ESLEY CHESBRO, THE REDv100D 
6 ALLIANCE, PJ\LPH KRACS and UONA KRAU~ (hereinafter the Intervenor.!) 
7 agreeing to withdraw t~eir o9position to Pacific Gas and Electric 
8 Company's (hereinafter Licensee) request for modification of 
9 their possession-only license in NRC Docket case. No. 50-133 OLA, 
10 Licensee agrees to co~ply in good faith with the following terms 
11 and conditions c: settler:.e;.t: 
12 1. Licensee agrees ~o shi? the spent fuel assemblies 
13 p~esently stored at t~e Humboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3 to the 
14 Department of Energy (hereinaf~er DOE) as soon as the DOE has a 
15 repository or some other facilicy in o~eration capable of 
16 receiving the spent fuel asse~blies under the terrns of the 
17 existing contract enterec into between the Licensee and DOE on 
18 June 30, 1983, or such ocher successor agree~ent as reay be 
19 entered into between Licensee and DOE or its successors or 
20 assigns, and the DOE indicates i~s readiness to accept the spent 
21 fuel asserr~lies. 
22 Licensee further agrees to reasonably pursue the highest 
23 DOE priority for the renoval of the Hunboldt Bay Power Plant Unit 
24 3 spent fuel asse~blies. 
2. Pacific Gas and Electric Company agrees to carry out 
the process of final decorr:.rnissioning of f.umboldt Bay Unit 3 
following the re~c~al of the spent fael assemblies and any other 
1 ment ~f actual de~ornr:-,issio:Ling activities will be subject to 
2 receipt of a9propriate approvals from the Nuclear Regulatory 
3 Corrur.ission ("NRC"), and the availability of decommissioning 
4 funds based U?On California Public Gtilit~· Com.rnission ("CPUC") 
5 action. If the cost of decommissioning at this earlier time 
6 exceeds funds then authorized by the CPUC for decommissioning of 
7 Humboldt Bay Unit 3, then the Intervenors agree not to oppose 
8 the Licensee's request before the CPUC for additional funds to 
9 pay fer the cost of deco~~issioning. 
10 3. Finally, Licensee and the Intervenors acknowledge that 
11 at the presen~ time, no DOE repository exists that can accept 
12 the spent fuel assemblies presently stored at the Humboldt Bay 
13 Power Plant Unit 3, and that no such DOE facility may exist for 
14 a number of years. It is further understood by the parties to 
15 this agreement that the NRC has authorized Dry cask Storage as 
16 a means o: interim sto~age in the absence of a DOE repository, 
17 but such an option is not yet authorized by the NRC for sites 
18 such as Hu~boldt Bay Power Plant Unit 3. 
19 The Licensee agrees to reexamine the possibility of 
20 utilizing Dry Cask Storage, if and when such a storage option 
21 becomes available for sites such as Hunboldt Bay Power Plant 
22 Unit 3. 
23 4. Licensee further agrees to publicly commit to the 
24 foregoing terms of settlement. 
25 
26 
This agreement was entered into on the day of 
\ 
____ \ _·_:_7'0___,-.... ·' ___ , 1987, at 
.., 
I.. \ . ,. ' ' . "' 
____ ,_·~-~·~\--~_!_.~·---------' California. 
1 
2 
3 
Signed on behalf of Licensee 
PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY 
4 BY: 
5 
~ BY:~~~~~-+-__._......::C,__:_c_/!_~ 
8 Gas and Electric Company 
9 
10 
Signed on behalf of the 
11 JOINT INTERVENORS 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
~-------
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
NONA KRAUS 
,, 
9 # .. ----. -----:· 
----·/:-.. """"'-.•·•" / • _,.,...::: • r• / 
. ·---;.::'/'"' ·-- ..: .· ·--;..-· - / / 10 3Y'·, ..-""'' ·//,/ · -' ·. £~- / .• • 
===-·/-=--/-==:-=' ·-=-· -::!!=··~( _____ ,.,_ ...<. ~. -~ ..... ····--. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
SCOTT L. FIELDER ·-
Attorney for the Joint 
Intervenors 
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IN PO 
Mr. Michael Welch 
Office Coordinator 
Redwood Alliance 
P. 0. Box293 
Arcata, CA 95521 
Dear Mr. Welch: 
ATTACHMENT D 
Institute of 
Nuclear Power 
Operations 
Suite 1500 
1100 Circle 75 Parkway 
Atlanta, Georgia 30339-3064 
Telephone 404 953-3600 
Telelax 404 953-7549 
November 12, 1991 
This is in reply to your recent letter to Dr. Zack Pate, president of the Institute of Nuclear 
Power Operations (INPO), requesting evaluation reports for Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. 
The U.S. nuclear utility industry established the Institute as an independent, nonprofit 
organization whose mission is to promote the highest levels of safety and reliability - to promote 
excellence - in the operation of nuclear electric generating plants. Periodic evaluations of operating 
nuclear stations arc one of the basic means of accomplishing the Institute's mission. 
INPO evaluation results arc provided to the operating organization of the respective nuclear 
plant for the purpose of assisting that utility in achieving high levels of safety and reliability in its 
nuclear power plant operations. The evaluations identify exceptions to performance objectives and 
criteria based on standards of excellence rather than regulatory requirements. 
INPO has a long-standing policy of not externally releasing evaluation reports, and not 
commenting on the conduct of specific evaluations. This policy on external release is based on our 
concern that such release would seriously impact the detailed and candid exchange of information 
that is so vital to the INPO evaluation program. Further, we believe that ample information 
regarding compliance of licensees with Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements is available to 
the public and should satisfy your interest in the safety of nuclear power plants. 
ASH:cna 
cc: Mr. Zack T. Pate (INPO) 
Angelina S. Howard 
Vice President 
Industry Relations and 
Information Services 
~SMUD 
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT P. 0. Box 15830, Sacramento CA 95852-1830, (916) 452-3211 
AN ELFCTRIC SYSTEM SERVING THE HEART OF CALIFORNIA 
The Honorable Herschel Rosenthal 
California State Legislature 
State Capitol, Room 2035 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
Dear Senator Rosenthal: 
December 2, 1991 
GM 92-933 
SUBJECT: RANCHO SECO DECOMMISSIONING AND FINANCIAL ASSURANCE PLAN 
The purpose of this letter is to certify that the Sacramento Municipal Utility District 
(the District) is conducting activities associated with decommissioning Rancho Seco 
Nuclear Generating Station in accordance with the requirements of the California 
Nuclear Facilities Decommissioning Act (the Act). The District has developed a sound 
strategy for decommissioning Rancho Seco, and has made a significant effort to develop 
a realistic, credible, and accurate decommissioning cost estimate. 
The District staff submitted its proposed Decommissioning Plan and Financial Assurance 
Plan to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in May 1991. The Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission has recently approved the Financial Assurance Plan, and is continuing to 
review the Decommissioning Plan. We anticipate approval of the Decommissioning Plan 
in late 1992. 
As discussed in the Decommissioning Plan and the Financial Assurance Plan and in 
accordance with the requirements of the Act, the District will make annual adjustments 
to the cost estimate to account for inflation. In addition, the District will review 
and modify its annual funding level at least every five years to reflect inflation, 
technology changes, and other factors that may impact decommissioning costs. 
District staff held public workshops and then presented the proposed Decommissioning 
Plan to the District's Board of Directors. The Board conducted public hearings and 
ratified the Decommissioning Plan by resolution at a public Board meeting held on 
October3, 1991. 
Members of your staff with questions requiring additional information or clarification 
may call Ken Miller at (916) 452-3211, extension 4513. 
Sincerely, 
~-" ~ 
I I 
·--:--- ;"r.l-t~~)~;;"'/-; 
S. DAVID FREEMAN 
GENERAL MANAGER 
-·---·-- ··- ... - ....... , .... _ _.. .... _"' r--, ~""'" r"' ,..... .. ___ • C"' ..... ______ ..__ r"A nc:o1.., 1000 
RANCHO SECO . 
Nuclear Generati.ng Station 
DECEMBER 2, 1991 CALIFORNIA SENATE COMMITIEE 
) 11 ON ENERGY AND. PUBLIC: UTILITIES 
- De~ommissioning 
• Spent Fuel Disposition 
SMUD 
SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 
CURRENT LICENSE/ 
I•IANT HEFUELEI> 
-
* Maintain current license 
requirements for defuelcd 
condition in accordance 
with Tech. Spec. evaluation 
* Centralized Training 
• Current E-Pian 
* Current Security Plan 
• lm(,lemented/Received 
RANCHO SECO CLOSURE 
0 
INTERIM RELIEF/ 
UEFUELEil AMENUMENT 
c 
* Streamlined E-Pian 
at 10 mile EPZ 
• Centralized Training with 
OJT only, except for 
Operations 
* Reduced Security Posts 
- Submitted 1 2(29/89 
-Implemented 7/1/90 
CURRENT STAFFING 
217 Total 
( l 1/04/91) 
~ 
c 
LLO:SUKt<.; ~ 
PLAN 
t•ERMANENTLY DEFUELEU 
-Permanently Dcfueled Tech 
Specs 
*Permanently Dcfueled 
Emergency Plan ( Aprvd 2(22/91) 
• Permanently Dcfueled 
Training Program (Aprvd 8/5/91) 
* Permanently Defucled 
Security Plan 
- POL License 
-Submitted 4/30/90 
- Expected Implementation 1/1/92 
I•ROJECTEU STAFFING 
-175 Total 
...- lJI<.:L:OMMISSIONINtl 
PLAN 
DECOMMISSIONING 
- Implement Custodial and 
Hardened SAFSTOR 
* Environmental Report 
- Submitled 5(20/91 
- Expected Implementation l/l/93 
t•RO.JECTED STAFFING 
-150 Total 
10776 
R-16 

rr- -------------- ----- ----------- ~ 
91-0041A 
RANCHO SECO LONG RANGE PLAN (Proposed) 
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DECOMMISSIONING STRATEGY 
• EVALUATED THREE NRC ALTERNATIVES 
- DECON 
-
-
ENTOMB 
SAFSTOR 
• SELECTED SAFSTOR WffH DEFERRED-DECON 
·---·--- - --- -
• 
• 
WASTE DISPOSAL ASSUMPTIONS 
LOW LEVEL WASTE DISPOSAL 
- SOUTHWEST COMPACT, NEEDLES, CA 
SCHEDULED OPERATION IN 1993 
HIGH LEVEL WASTE I SPENT FUEL DISPOSAL 
-
-
MONITORED RETRIEVABLE STORAGE (1998) OR 
FEDERAL GEOLOGICAL REPOSITORY (2010) 
DECOMMISSIONING COST ESTIMATE 
• SAFSTOR ESTIMATE - $281M 
(INCLUDES SPENT FUEL STORAGE 
EXCLUDES SITE RESTORATION) 
-
CUSTODIAL-SAFSTOR - $10.6 M I YR 
-
HARDENED-SAFSTOR - $ 2.6 M I YR 
DEFERRED-DECON - $177M 
• SITE RESTORATION $38- $47 M 
PRUDENCY REVIEW OF COST STUDY 
• BA'ITELLE NORTHWEST LABS 
-
PROVIDED INPUT FOR NRC COST ESTIMATES 
• ASEA-BROWN BOVERI 
-
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 
• 
• 
• 
DECOMMISSIONING FUNDING 
ACCUMULATED FUNDS - $90 M (JULY 1991) 
ANNUAL D-FUND CONTRIBUTION: 
- CURRENTLY $8 M 
- - $12 M AFTER D-PLAN APPROVAL, UNTIL 2008 
ANNUAL D-FUND WITHDRAWALS: 
-
- $10.6 M I YR UNTIL 1997 
- $ 2.6 M I YR UNTIL 2006 
WITHDRAWAL FOR SPENT FUEL STORAGE 
(- $16-20 M 1993 - 1996) 
ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW 
• CEQA ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT I STUDY 
• 
-
-
-
NEGATIVE DECLARATION 
DISTRICT IS LEAD AGENCY 
ADDRESSES BOTH DECOMMISSIONING 
AND SPENT FUEL 
NEPA ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT 
-
-
-
"NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT," UNLESS SITE-SPECIFIC 
FOCUS ON COST AND RADIOLOGICAL AREAS 
NRC IS LEAD AGENCY 
SEPARATE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENTS FOR 
DECOMMISSIONING & SPENT FUEL 
·-·----
SUMMARY 
DECOMMISSIONING STRATEGY: 
-
-
.. 
-
ENSURES PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFE'IY 
CONFORMS TO AVAILABLE REGULATORY GUIDANCE 
PROVIDES PRUDENT COST ESTIMATE & FINANCIAL PLAN 
PROPOSES D-FUNDING TO END OF LICENSE, 2008 

I'J'JO 
I 'J'JO 
- ·- --~ 
--------
SPENT FUEL DISPOSITION STRATEGY 
Wll'll DOE COMMITMENT 
I >I eM( INSTI{ ATION 
J>I.ANNIN<illJ<:ENSING 
WET STOkAliE 
491 ASSEMIJUES 
L ~TOkAGE/IRANSJ>OI{~:~~ - --
I 48 ASSEMULIES 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
---1'1'1\ 
WLTSTOkAGt: 
421 ASSEMUUES 
-I'J'JS 
'JHANSI'I:I{ 
TO 
DOl'. 
STOki'/M(INIT(Ht 
AI·TEI{ 
l'J'JII 
HNAL 
SIIII'MENTS 
·-It I 
========================----=--=-----=------=:=:..~~---=- __ _::_::_::- ------ .J 
EXPECTED SAVINGS 
Wet versus Dry Spent Fuel Storage 
CUSTODIAL SAFSTOR (Wet) $10.6 Million/Year 
HARDENED SAFSTOR (Dry) $ 2.6 Million/Year 
Annual Cost Difference $ 8.0 Million/Year 
TOTAL SAVINGS* 
CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
Net Potential Savings 
$ 80 - 176 MILLION 
$ 20 MILLION (Estimated) 
$ 60 - 156 MILLION 
* Assumes no MRS until 1998 with final acceptance of fuel by 2008 or 
no Repository until 2010 with final acceptance of SMUD fuel 2020 
PROJECTED DOE DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM COSTS 
DOE 
DUAL PURPOSE CASK (1) 
CASK-TO-CASK TRANSFER SYSTEM 
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT 
SMUD 
DUAL PURPOSE CASK (1) 
IN-KIND (Ucenslng, ISFSI, 
Fuel Handlers) 
EPRI 
(Electric Power Research lnstHute) 
CASK-TO-CASK TRANSFER SYSTEM DESIGN 
$ 8 MILLION 
$ 3-5 MILLION 
$ 0.5 - 1 MILLION 
SUMMARY 
• TECHNOLOGY PROTECTS PUBUC HEALTH & SAFETY, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 
• SCHEDULE SUPPORTS HARDENED SAFSTOR 
• 
• 
DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM HAS NATIONAL BENEFITS, & 
MAY ALLOW SMUD TO ABANDON THE SPENT FUEL POOL 
LONG-TERM SAVINGS JUSTIFY CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
